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# ACRONYMS

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADCAP</td>
<td>Age and Disability Capacity Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAC-N</td>
<td>Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Country Learning Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Communicating with Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP</td>
<td>Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWEA</td>
<td>Improved Early Warning - Early Actions to Strengthen Disaster Preparedness Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Financial Enablers Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Emergency Response Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHI</td>
<td>Harvard Humanitarian Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDI</td>
<td>In-depth Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRB</td>
<td>Institutional Review Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAP</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/NNGO</td>
<td>Local/National non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPRR</td>
<td>Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEL</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHAB</td>
<td>National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHN</td>
<td>National Humanitarian Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPAC</td>
<td>Non Project Attributable Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHEP Gambella</td>
<td>Public Health Emergency Preparedness in Gambella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Protection in Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROI</td>
<td>Return on Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPS</td>
<td>Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>START Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STP</td>
<td>Shifting the Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Time Point 1 (formative phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Time point 2 (interim phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>Talent Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Transforming Surge Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEWEA</td>
<td>Urban Early Warning Early Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAWG</td>
<td>Violence Against Women and Girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VFM</td>
<td>Value for Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
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</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) evaluation team extends thanks to Action Against Hunger, who commissioned this report, and Dr. Robina Shaheen and Hannah Wichterich who managed the external evaluation. We also send our deep gratitude to Niamh Gibbons (management support), Root Change (Network Analysis), Valsa Shah (Value for Money), and Piotr Bialowolski, Ph.D. (Statistical analyses) for their contributions. We thank the many participants in this evaluation, including country-based Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) project teams, headquarters-based DEPP stakeholders and those involved in DEPP’s leadership and governance. We are also grateful to community members in Myanmar and Ethiopia who took the time to respond to household and community surveys.

Particular thanks are due to our research partners who implemented data collection and contributed their expertise and knowledge in specific countries and elements of the evaluation: the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics (Kenya), The Ethiopian Public Health Association (Ethiopia), Innovations for Poverty Action (Myanmar, the Philippines). We thank T-Cons in South Sudan for their willingness to partner with us.

We are appreciative of the time and effort put in by the leadership and research administration teams at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, whose on-going support has been crucial to this evaluation. Lastly, we would like to acknowledge our interns, Sarah Thang, Julian Neylan, Amina Goheer, Noor Zanial, Michael De St Aubin and Gina Ciancone for their valuable support on this report.
INTRODUCTION

This report provides the summative results from the three-year external impact evaluation of the Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) conducted by a team at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI). The DEPP was a £40 million programme funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) that aimed to strengthen skills and capacity and improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries that are at risk of natural disasters or emergencies.

The DEPP was delivered by two Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) consortia, the START Network, which received £27 million, and the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC-N) Network from 2015-2018, which received £3 million. In addition, £10 million was reserved for an innovation window which was separately implemented and evaluated. The DEPP comprised 14 individual projects implemented in one or more of 10 priority countries: South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines, with each project operating in some but not all of the countries. Only one project (the Learning Project) was implemented in all 10 countries while five projects (Public Health Emergencies Preparedness (PHEP) in Gambella, Improved Early Warning Early Actions (EWEA) in Ethiopia, Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar, Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA in Kenya), Financial Enablers in the Philippines) were implemented in only one country each. The 14 DEPP projects, their consortia members, locations and budgets are presented in Table 1.

### The Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP)

- **Investment:** £40 million
- **Location:** 10 countries
- **Duration:** 3 years
- **Number of preparedness projects:** 14 humanitarian capacity building projects
- **Overall objective:** To improve quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries that are at risk of natural disasters or humanitarian emergencies

**Key approaches:** Capacity building of local and national humanitarian staff and communities, early warning system development, supporting collaborative action and strengthening networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPP PROJECT</th>
<th>PROJECT CONSORTIA MEMBERS</th>
<th>COUNTRIES**</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>BUDGET (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TALENT DEVELOPMENT (TD)</td>
<td>Save the Children UK (Lead), Oxfam GB, Relief International, CHS Alliance</td>
<td>Bangladesh, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan and Kenya, Lebanon</td>
<td>To produce high-quality professionals at all levels who are better equipped to tackle the issues surrounding complex emergencies, helping to ensure that the right people are in the right place doing the right things to assist disaster-affected communities.</td>
<td>5,985,087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Indonesia was initially selected as an 11th DEPP focal country, but no selected projects planned to implement activities there.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Name</th>
<th>Lead Organisations</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shifting the Power (STP)</td>
<td>ActionAid International (Lead), CAFOD (Lead), Christian Aid, Tearfund, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>To support local actors to take their place alongside international actors in order to create a balanced humanitarian system that is more responsive and accountable to disaster-affected communities.</td>
<td>4,876,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Learning Project</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger</td>
<td>All DEPP Countries</td>
<td>To evidence the extent to which preparing people is an effective and efficient approach to disaster management and broker internal and external relationships for learning about what is and is not working in capacity exchange.</td>
<td>3,343,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Dialogue, Better Information, Better Action (CDAC-N Project)</td>
<td>World Vision (Lead), CDAC-Network, Thomson Reuters Foundation, BBC Media Action, Internews</td>
<td>Bangladesh, South Sudan, The Philippines</td>
<td>To ensure that two-way communication is a predictable, coordinated and resourced component of humanitarian response in order to contribute to improvement in effective delivery of assistance to disaster affected communities.</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transforming Surge Capacity (TSC)</td>
<td>ActionAid International (Lead), ACF, Christian Aid, CAFOD, CARE, IMC, Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Plan, Save the Children, Tearfund</td>
<td>Pakistan, the Philippines, Regional Hub in Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>To strengthen civil society surge capacity at international, regional and local levels, contributing to a diverse and decentralised third sector pillar better able to complement existing United Nations, Red Cross and government structures in order to help communities increase resilience, reduce risk and improve crisis response.</td>
<td>2,482,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>HelpAge International (Lead), Care international, Handicap International, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, Coventry University</td>
<td>The Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, Haiti</td>
<td>To develop a system of approaches and tools for disaster preparedness that increases the ability of organisations to respond immediately, effectively and appropriately when a disaster strikes.</td>
<td>1,987,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Enablers (FE)</td>
<td>Oxfam GB (Lead), Tearfund, Christian Aid</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>To transfer humanitarian capacity, autonomy and decision-making to organisations closer to people affected by crisis, as a way of facilitating more effective and appropriate aid.</td>
<td>1,637,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age and Disability Capacity Building (ADCAP)</td>
<td>HelpAge International (Lead), CBM, DisasterReady.org, Handicap International, IFRC, Oxford Brookes University, RedR UK</td>
<td>Kenya, Pakistan</td>
<td>To ensure older people and persons with disability benefit from improved access to services, as a result of recognition by humanitarian actors of their specific needs and increased capacity amongst humanitarian actors to deliver inclusive, accessible and appropriate response.</td>
<td>1,045,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking Preparedness and Resilience (LPRR)</td>
<td>Christian Aid (Lead), Action Aid, Concern, HelpAge International, King's College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld, World Vision</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Kenya, DRC, Pakistan, the Philippines, Colombia, Indonesia***, Myanmar</td>
<td>To design and roll out programming approaches which strengthen the resilience of people living in fragile states and beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>1,002,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar (SEPS)</td>
<td>Christian Aid (Lead), DCA, Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Africa and Asia (RIMES)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>To strengthen the links among national, subnational and local-level preparedness in Myanmar, with a primary focus on capacitating local communities and structures to access information and link with the on-going establishment of preparedness and early warning systems in the country.</td>
<td>925,698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The DEPP’s logical framework outlined the following outputs, outcomes and impact indicators for the three-year programme presented in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>STATEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Improved knowledge and understanding of individuals by sharing best practice of humanitarian preparedness and response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Improved preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk of disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Increased number of coalitions, partnerships and networks which working together, are able to address humanitarian needs in a wide range of emergency situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Improved institutional arrangements and policy environments so that national systems for humanitarian response and preparedness are better supported and more suitable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5. Strengthened evidence base for what works to help build humanitarian capacity at scale

6. Human-centered design approaches tested and implemented across four innovations labs, leveraging non-traditional local actors to deliver preparedness approaches which are community-appropriate, leading to more prepared and engaged communities

1. Increased and strengthened emergency preparedness capacity in DEPP countries, focusing on strengthening local humanitarian capacity and championing localisation in a manner consistent with the Grand Bargain and the World Humanitarian Summit

1. DEPP reduces suffering and delivers better humanitarian services, through improved preparedness, for people around the globe affected by disasters and emergencies

Table 2: Summary of DEPP programme-level logical framework

The final version of the programme-level logical framework was approved by DFID in 2017 and fully implemented by August 2017, several years after the start of the programme and the commencement of the external evaluation. While there were several draft versions of the programme-level logical framework in place before then, they required significant strengthening. Therefore with the agreement from DFID, the evaluation was not designed in conjunction with the logical framework and does not report against it (See below for further details). In addition, output area 6 in the programme logical framework relates to the innovation window, referred to as the DEPP Innovation Labs. Though originally conceived to be implemented simultaneously with the 14 DEPP projects, due to delays, its implementation began recently and will continue for two years, ending in 2019. As it was not implemented during the timeframe of the external evaluation, DEPP Innovation Labs was not part of this external evaluation. A separate evaluation has been commissioned.

DEPP THEORY OF CHANGE AND SIMPLIFIED CAUSAL CHAIN

During the evaluation inception phase, the evaluation team assessed the DEPP programme theory of change (Annex 3) presented in the business case (Annex 1). The programme theory of change was found to be complex and no longer represented well the suite of projects as they had evolved over time. A process was undertaken to create a more simplified but conceptually appropriate representation of the DEPP that could serve as the backbone of the evaluation approach and to report against during each evaluation phase. Figure 1 illustrates the DEPP programme causal chain that was developed and that was used to develop a programme-level logical framework and set of indicators for the evaluation. The causal chain illustrates

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3 For example, DFID’s Annual Review of the DEPP, March 2018 states: “There is still more work to do on the logframe – including finalising the outcome indicators and including an output which tracks value for money.”

4 Page 17 of the DEPP business case stated, "Through a commissioned evaluation, we will develop the Theory of Change in more detail as part of the evaluation inception stage, and we will test our core assumptions through the DEPP evaluation." The evaluation team revised the Theory of Change to enable a feasible evaluation design as mandated in the inception phase and the Terms of Reference. The revised causal chain was approved by the Evaluation Steering Committee and thus became the basis for the evaluation design, including the evaluation framework and indicators. Note that while there were several draft programme logical frameworks in place in 2016, the final version was not approved until 2017.
the causal links between the 14 DEPP projects and their activities, four expected evaluation output areas (1. Capacity building, 2. Collaboration, 3. Learning and 4. Early Warning System Development), expected outcomes in both the short term (improved humanitarian capacity, improved preparedness) and long term (increased effective delivery of humanitarian response). Hypothesised downstream impacts (mortality, morbidity, economic impact and recovery) are also depicted below, but are not expected to be achieved within the programme’s three-year cycle and thus were considered outside of the scope of the overall evaluation. The causal chain also specifies that the activities, outputs and outcomes are expected to occur at the individual, organisational, community and government levels. This also captures the variety of DEPP beneficiaries that were targeted at each of these levels (including individual humanitarian staff, humanitarian organisations, communities, governments etc). This impact evaluation focused only on assessing outputs, as well as short to long-term outcomes at these different levels. Note that the output, outcome and impact areas in the programme logical framework (Table 1) are quite similar to the evaluation team’s output and outcome areas as depicted in Figure 1. However, the indicators are unique (See Chapter 2 for further detail).

Programme output 1 corresponds to evaluation output 1, programme output 2 to evaluation output 4, programme output 3 to evaluation output 2, programme output 4 does not directly correspond with any evaluation output area, programme output 5 corresponds to evaluation output 3, programme output 6 does not correspond to any evaluation output area, programme outcome 1 corresponds with evaluation outcome 1, and programme impact 1 corresponds with evaluation impact 1. Programme output area 6 corresponds to the innovation window which is not within the scope of this evaluation, impact 1.
PURPOSE

The three-year external impact evaluation of the DEPP aimed to:

1. improve programme effectiveness and enhance learning; and
2. assess the extent to which the DEPP overall has provided an efficient and effective approach to strengthening response capacity.

The evaluation also served to provide accountability and learning for programme, project and external stakeholders. These stakeholders include DEPP project consortia members, DEPP beneficiaries, programme and project-level staff, as well as external stakeholders from humanitarian NGOs, international organisations, the UN, and governments.

The evaluation was implemented in four phases: an inception phase during which the evaluation framework and methodology were designed; a formative phase to evaluate the implementation of the DEPP by assessing the relevance of outputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery; an interim phase to assess short-term outcomes; and a summative phase to assess intermediate outcomes and preliminary indicators of likelihood of impact.

The research design for the external evaluation was guided by a set of questions and methodological approach outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex 4) and refined in the inception report. It used a mixed methods quasi-experimental design to assess impact at the programme level. It was not designed to assess individual project impacts (which were assessed by each project’s own independent evaluation), or the £10 million innovation window. The external evaluation methodology included a minimum set of evaluation activities comprising a document review and remote data collection across all countries, as well as an intensive set of evaluation activities in four countries (Myanmar, the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia). The intensive set of evaluation activities included quantitative and qualitative data collection comprising organisational-level assessments and community-level assessments; an economic Value for Money (VFM) assessment; analysis of humanitarian preparedness and response networks; humanitarian response assessment/case studies; observation and site visits. In the four intensive set countries, the evaluation team partnered with local research organisations who implemented the data collection. These included the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics (Kenya), The Ethiopian Public Health Association (Ethiopia), and Innovations for Poverty Action (Myanmar, The Philippines). Data were collected at two time points that were roughly 12 months apart – time point 1 (T1) during the formative phase of the evaluation, and time point 2 (T2) in the interim phase, in order to assess changes over time. In total, 634 documents were reviewed, and 2542 quantitative surveys, and 133 qualitative interviews were conducted at T1 and 3291 quantitative surveys and 149 qualitative interviews were conducted at T2. Evaluation findings related to T1 were presented in the formative phase report and this summative report presents T2 findings addressing the five evaluation questions and sub-questions. The summative report includes findings from all phases of the external evaluation (November 2015 – May 2018).

The summative findings correspond to the key evaluation questions in the following five areas:

1) Relevance and Validity of Design;
2) Relevance and Effectiveness of the Interventions;
3) Effectiveness of Management Arrangements
4) Efficiency and Value for Money (VFM);
5) Sustainability of the Intervention and Likelihood of Impact of the Programme.

The key findings are presented below.
MAIN FINDINGS

1. RELEVANCE AND VALIDITY OF DESIGN

The established five results areas (objectives) of the DEPP were appropriate, and the right people in the right places were targeted. The focus on building national capacity, improving preparedness and targeting vulnerable groups to ensure their inclusion during humanitarian response activities is consistent with needs identified during literature and evidence reviews, as well as with newer global commitments related to humanitarian system reform and localisation of aid. At a high level, the programme’s objectives were clear, relevant, aligned with DFID’s humanitarian priorities and aim to fill a clear gap in humanitarian capacity. However, the programme’s three-year time frame was unrealistic to meet these objectives.

The country selection process was iterative, based on appropriate criteria but was not optimal due to lack of strategic direction and objectives at the portfolio level and ultimately some key countries at risk of humanitarian crises may not have been included. The portfolio of interventions in each country varied which could have led to lost opportunities to maximise impact and efficiencies within each setting.

The design process, at least in the initial phase, was not logical and coherent. These issues led to the design and selection of many projects that were retrofitted to the business case or selection criteria. Local involvement is a critical step within the design process that was not adequately considered, leading to challenges with respect to local ownership and stakeholder buy-in and potentially reducing wider impact of the DEPP. The design process was participatory but local beneficiaries and stakeholders were not adequately involved.

Insufficient time and resources were allocated during the design phase to ensure project consortia had the necessary time and space to grow, and that key stakeholders, especially at the local level, could be involved in a participatory way. Individuals and agencies did not always have the capacity to collaborate and facilitate and capacity building around collaboration could have contributed to healthier more effective collaborations. The design phase during the second round of START Network projects addressed many of these weaknesses and was led by in-country teams ensuring local buy-in, and eventually smoother and timelier project implementation.

Resourcing for the DEPP at the portfolio level was considered sufficient, but project budgets were tight, with insufficient non-project attributable costs (NPACs), inadequate allocation of funds for collaborative activities and variable allocation for monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Resources were also needed during the design phase to ensure that smaller agencies and in-country staff could participate in a meaningful way.

Design at the programme level was not adequately considered and projects were designed in isolation with limited local consultation and buy-in. Despite the flaws in the design process,

---

6 Full evaluation findings are presented in Chapter 3.
7 There is no globally accepted definition of localisation. One suggested definition is: “Aid localisation is a collective process involving different stakeholders that aims to return local actors, whether civil society organisations or local public institutions, to the centre of the humanitarian system with a greater role in humanitarian response. It can take a number of forms: more equitable partnerships between international and local actors, increased and “as direct as possible” funding for local organisations, and a more central role in aid coordination. Underpinning this is the question of power. Localisation requires a shift in power relations between actors, both in terms of strategic decision-making and control of resources.” More than the money- Localisation in Practice, Groupe URD, Trocaire, 2017.
the selected projects did address country needs once they were contextualised during their implementation periods. The objectives, systems and processes, the programme theory of change, definition of key terms, and expectations about how projects are intended to interlink and interact were not developed and articulated at the outset. Gender inclusion was required but specific guidelines were not clearly articulated during the project design stage.

Response to emergencies was not adequately considered during the design phase – the programme was designed to improve emergency preparedness but mechanisms to enable or facilitate contribution to humanitarian response efforts were not explicitly integrated into the programme (leading to reduced potential impact). Despite this, DEPP contributed to at least 42 humanitarian responses in 11 countries.

2. RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVENTIONS

Implementation delays were universal across the DEPP projects. Delays were due to limited contextualisation and involvement of in-country teams in the design phase, underestimation of time required for collaboration, and administrative and contractual bottle necks. These delays led to shorter periods for project activities and reduced potential programme impact.

The number of individuals exposed to DEPP capacity building activities (N=33,388) exceeded the ultimate target of the programme of training 4,200 individuals by 795%. The gender target was missed by about 5% (i.e., 45% of these trainees were women). Examples of these activities includes in-person trainings, development of training packages and guidelines, development of early warning systems, collaboration activities such as learning events and conferences, development of case studies and evidence sharing and dissemination.

DEPP contributed to increased capacity building efforts, collaboration, early warning system development, and learning in beneficiary organisations. However, outcome-level changes with respect to knowledge change, and in preparedness levels were variable. Overall, there were no significant improvements in knowledge on core humanitarian competencies of humanitarian staff, on self-reported knowledge on disaster preparedness, response to disasters and emergencies or age or disability-related issues in disasters despite the increased exposure to capacity building.

The most effective individual-level capacity building approach reported by beneficiaries involved in- person training combined with a strategy to reinforce knowledge (simulations, mentoring, coaching). Flexible funding approaches, though initially considered high risk, were found to have high potential of effectiveness. Distance or remote learning was not reported to be as effective as in-person approaches.

There have been some significant improvements in individual, organisational and community preparedness among DEPP beneficiaries, especially among local organisations. However, both DEPP and non-DEPP participants were exposed to capacity building activities related to emergency preparedness and response, and in some cases similar improvements have also occurred in the comparison groups. The changes in the comparison group may or may not have been related to exposure to other capacity building activities. Overall, for most indicators, the Difference-in-Difference analysis showed no overall net effect of the DEPP. However, qualitative data suggests some improvements in emergency preparedness that may be difficult to detect with quantitative indicators.

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8 Full evaluation findings are presented in Chapter 4.
Document review and in-depth interviews demonstrate contribution of the DEPP to at least 42 different emergency responses in 11 countries. There were no documented contributions to responses in Mozambique, one of the countries with the fewest DEPP projects (N=1). The largest number of response contributions (N=16) occurred in the Philippines which also had the highest number of DEPP projects implemented (N=6). Note that Kenya and Pakistan also had six DEPP projects but in these specific contexts, DEPP contributed to substantially fewer responses than in the Philippines. The high performance in the Philippines in terms of absolute number of humanitarian response efforts was largely driven by the Financial Enablers project which cumulatively involved contribution towards 14 different responses (out of 16 DEPP-supported responses in the Philippines). Qualitative data collected in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia suggest more timely, locally driven responses in these contexts; qualitative data were not available to systematically assess responses in many other countries. However, it was evident that in many cases DEPP beneficiaries were unable to respond due to lack of funds allocated for emergency response activities. In contrast to the qualitative indicators, quantitative data on perceptions of improved speed and effectiveness of response activities did not show a significant measurable effect of the DEPP.

3. EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Collaborative approaches were consistently reported through in-depth interviews and quantitative data to be the most appropriate, preferred approach to deliver humanitarian capacity building, but respondents identified challenges in engagement, communication and coordination. Qualitative data triangulated with data extracted from project and programme documents demonstrate that as a delivery mechanism, collaborative and consortia-based approaches were particularly effective when the following conditions were met: existence of joint objectives, values and common ways of working; collaborations were organic not forced; sufficient time, space, resources, capacity and will to foster healthy collaborative relationships; and streamlined decision-making and contractual processes, and fewer consortia partners. Quantitative network data demonstrated that the top three areas where organisations within the humanitarian networks in the four intensive set countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar and the Philippines) collaborated were advocacy, community capacity building and project implementation.

The network structures in each of the four intensive set countries were found to be significantly different from the outset. There was some evidence of strengthened humanitarian response networks among the three of the four intensive set data collection countries (the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, while the network in Myanmar remained unchanged). The Philippines network was found to be highly locally driven with 70% of links with local/national NGOs (L/NGOs); network size increased between T1 and T2, but the network became less dense with a smaller number of connections. There was evidence of network growth in both in Ethiopia and Kenya. The network in Ethiopia was internationally driven with little input from local organisations, while in Kenya, the network was balanced between local and international actors. The network in Myanmar was very small, isolated and dominated by international actors.

Findings on collaboration were mixed. Collaboration frequency (a proxy indicator of trust) and quality of relationships increased in Kenya and the Philippines, but decreased in Myanmar and Ethiopia over time. Collaboration within the DEPP cohort increased in Myanmar and the Philippines, but both did not increase engagement with non-DEPP actors. In Ethiopia and Kenya the number of relationships between DEPP and non-DEPP organisations increased indicating that DEPP institutions are reaching beyond their DEPP partnerships into the broader system.

9 Full evaluation findings are presented in Chapter 5.
Based on the network analysis, there was no quantitative evidence of increased localisation over the course of the programme within the four intensive set countries. In this particular analysis, localisation was assessed by measuring the proportion of relationships with local/national organisations within the humanitarian networks. While there was no change in this metric in Ethiopia, the Philippines or Kenya over time, in Myanmar, the humanitarian network actually became more dominated by international NGOs (INGOs) over time. However, qualitative data (see Chapter 7) and data from document review suggest that changes in attitudes around localisation have occurred. Taken together these data demonstrate that attitudinal changes have occurred but have not yet translated into quantitative behavioural change related to localisation.

In addition, insufficient time passed between the data collection points to sufficiently assess and test the hypothesis that strengthened networks and greater collaboration lead to better emergency preparedness. Data at T1 picked up network effects caused by ever-shifting strategies common to first-year implementation. T2 likely captured some distinctive programme impacts of DEPP, but sufficient time to follow network change requires at least an additional 12 months.

According to qualitative data, inter-project collaboration contributed to improved sharing of learning and evidence but this did not necessarily translate to behavioural change.

4. EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY

Focusing on economy and efficiency, Value for Money (VfM) shows good potential for the programme with areas for improvement. Good indicators of cost economy were evident, though some budgets were lean with insufficient resources for portfolio management and collaboration activities.

The collaborative model necessarily lends itself to a degree of inefficiency, high transactions costs and slow information flows. On the flip side, this model had substantial benefits and for some projects the benefits have likely outweighed the costs. For other projects the same benefits of the model could have been achieved at lower cost and greater efficiency if the contracting, M&E system and costing of activities had been more consciously considered from inception. The collaborative model tied to hierarchical long delivery chains has likely compromised economy and efficiency to a degree.

There were shortfalls in terms of systems and resources set up for efficiency in governance and strategy, portfolio management, decision-making and consortium arrangements. The spending on management functions at the programme level were too economical and would have benefitted from some funds and time being redeployed from the Learning Project to the DEPP management team in the form of M&E expertise, both at the programme and project levels. If, however, independence was desired, then more direct linkage and communication between the management team and the Learning Project whereby data from M&E transmitted regularly and directly to the management team through both automatic reporting or direct data access through a dashboard followed by regular meetings could have been considered.

Positive findings in terms of VfM reporting, adaptive management and collaborative ways of working were identified. After the formative phase recommendation to increase use of VfM indicators, the DEPP management team made a strong effort to increase the project staff capacity around VfM concepts and reporting through the implementation of two half-day training events. Subsequently, some projects carried out ad hoc reports on VfM and most projects incorporated VfM as a component of their final evaluations.

There are no strong quantitative VfM findings to suggest that preparedness improved the
efficiency of humanitarian response. Analysis of the empirical data showed no significant difference between DEPP and comparison organisations with regards to perceived impact of DEPP on institutional speed and cost of response, and the extent to which institutional and policy environment affected the speed and cost of response.

Cost per result indicator analyses were undertaken to estimate the expenditure incurred to achieve outcomes related to capacity and preparedness. While return on investment analyses assesses potential or projected return on investment, the cost per indicator analyses compares actual expenditure incurred per result achieved. This analysis demonstrated good VfM per result actually achieved. The highest VfM was for Myanmar, which demonstrated a cost per percentage point increase in perceived organisational preparedness of only £1,138. It is not advisable to make direct comparisons between countries because of the differences in cost bases within countries, and the many other factors that come into play. Notably, Kenya also had a very low unit cost per result area. For the individual response performance indicator in the Philippines, the annual unit cost figure for each trained individual is roughly £30. It is difficult to make a value judgment on this figure because there is limited basis for comparison, but given the fact that a significant improvement in the satisfaction rating was observed, and from experience with other projects that £30 is not outside the reasonable range, this appears to be a good VfM finding.

5. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTION AND LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME

DEPP has contributed to strengthening national emergency preparedness systems in some of the programme countries, but not all. For example, the Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA) project to detect urban emergencies and enable rapid response has been adopted by the Nairobi County government in Kenya, who have also committed to addressing urban food security issues. The Public Health Preparedness project in Gambella, Ethiopia, worked with the government to improve disease and outbreak surveillance, leading to improved surveillance and reporting at various levels of the health system in several districts and in the strengthened capacity to test for pathogens at the regional laboratory. In Pakistan, management of the surge platform developed under the Transforming Surge Capacity project has been taken over by the National Humanitarian Network (NHN), with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place with the local government body to ensure implementation after the project ends. The Marsabit County Government in Kenya adopted the Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response (LPRR’s) project’s conflict-sensitive approach during humanitarian response (including during the 2016-2017 droughts) thus providing additional evidence of DEPP’s contributions to national preparedness systems. In other settings, however, the degree to which the DEPP has influenced national preparedness systems and government disaster plans has been less clear. The positive influences that have been identified are important and represent significant investment and efforts. However, it should be noted that generally these effects have been on a smaller geographic scale – often at the district or county level and in most cases, each positive example of change was directly attributable to an individual project.

While the DEPP business case underscored the disproportionate impact of disasters and humanitarian emergencies on women in particular and emphasised that the programme would strategically address inclusion, at least in regard to gender and violence against women and girls (VAWG), such a focus was largely absent from the programme. Across the programme, two projects specifically focused on inclusion, Protection in Practice (PIP) which focused on protection, and Age and Disability Capacity Programme (ADCAP) which focused on

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11 Full evaluation findings are presented in Chapter 7.
strengthening inclusion of the elderly and people with disabilities in emergency response. Both of these projects made strides to build protection and inclusion capacity and in some cases influenced the work of other DEPP projects. ADCAP in particular strongly championed inclusion efforts including at programme-level events and helped shape programme-level dialogue on this issue. However, the extent to which priority groups (women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities and other vulnerable or marginalised groups) were holistically included across the programme and inclusion efforts adequately monitored was minimal. The lack of mainstreaming of inclusion of gender and prioritised groups across the programme resulted in a fragmented programme-wide approach and uneven results. While there was no evidence of individual knowledge change on inclusion of vulnerable groups or on VAWG, there was some evidence of organisational change with respect to inclusion, in particular in Ethiopia and among local organisations in intensive set countries. In Ethiopia, there was a statistically significant increase in inclusion of the elderly and people with disabilities in design and implementation of preparedness programming in DEPP organisations, as well as a statistically significant increase in organisations with policies on inclusion. There was also a statistically significant increase in the proportion of local organisations across all intensive set countries that have inclusion policies in place.

Previous external evaluation reports from the interim and summative phase documented a consistent lack of disaggregated data and minimally documented gender considerations across projects. Recommendations to strengthen gender reporting within project data were taken up after the formative phase evaluation report. There was an increase in data disaggregation by gender over the course of the programme. However, reporting on other prioritised groups remained low, making it difficult to assess the true extent to which these groups have been reached by capacity building or other activities.

There have been several concrete examples wherein DEPP has impacted government policies or systems or increased political commitment. For example, UEWEA project’s advocacy and sensitisation efforts led to an amendment of the Disaster and Emergency Management Act 2015 (DEM Act) to include food security and an MOU with the Nairobi City County Government to ensure the government’s role in addressing urban food security issues. The Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response project demonstrated changes at the institutional level. For example, Christian Aid adopted the updated resilience framework, and a Violence to Peace strategy. Despite these examples, there was no statistically significant change across the DEPP in policy-related quantitative indicators in the four intensive set countries. Changes may take significant time to occur and quantitative data may not fully capture other types of policy change or shifts in the landscape that are more difficult to measure quantitatively.

Changes in quantitative indicators related to localisation have not yet occurred within three out of four intensive countries. In Ethiopia, however, the percentage of DEPP organisations with policies inclusive to L/NNGOs increased by 16% between T1 and T2. In addition, attitudinal changes towards localisation have also occurred, including in how INGOs consider, address, and involve local actors and communities. This adoption of the localisation approach is considered to be DEPP’s most significant change by key informants. Examples of this type of change were described in Bangladesh where local actors became involved in decision-making processes within a large national preparedness platform, and in the Philippines where local organisations were the first to mobilise and respond to the crisis in Marawi.

There is some evidence of benefits being embedded within organisations and systems and

potential for longer-term effects but this is dependent on the extent to which program components are able to continue beyond the end of DEPP. The likelihood of sustainability was enhanced for projects or project components that demonstrated the following characteristics: built on existing work and existing partnerships and/or consortia; partnered with the national and local government; had and/or developed a policy or advocacy element; worked towards systems-level change; paid greater attention to exit plans earlier in the project cycle; developed tools, guidelines, or systems that fill an important gap; involved beneficiaries and/or local stakeholders, and exhibited good VfM; built linkages with other entities and other DEPP projects; and implemented in contexts that were more fertile for change.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The DEPP programme was designed in 2014, and was ahead of its time in many ways, especially with its strong focus on localisation and multi-stakeholder consortia. It included a mix of both flagship projects using more traditional approaches (i.e., in-person individual capacity building) with some more innovative elements (i.e., a £10 million Innovation Window; flexible funding mechanisms to finance both local capacity building but also emergency response; pooled surge platforms; urban early warning systems and inclusion of food security as an emergency).

The DEPP suffered from a number of design challenges including a three-year time frame that was unrealistic to meet the objectives and universal implementation delays. The decision by DFID to no longer fund the programme limits the potential long-term impact of the DEPP. Despite this decision, the DEPP’s focus on emergency preparedness and localisation is still a relevant one. It aligns well with the growing dialogue among the global humanitarian community and with more recent policy commitments such as the Grand Bargain and the Charter for Change which advocate for increased voice for local actors, and for rebalancing of power and relationships within the existing humanitarian architecture.

Despite its initial design flaws, positive findings related to the collective action of the DEPP and to individual DEPP projects have been documented. These include the following key achievements:

- 33,388 individuals were exposed at varying degrees to capacity building based on project reports
- Stakeholders across the programme noted that the most significant change due to the DEPP was a change in attitudes toward and increased support of localisation (i.e., contributing to the Grand Bargain)
- Changes in capacity of local organisations (in terms of systems and processes, fundraising, conducting needs assessments) and their emergency preparedness levels, that led to outcomes such as becoming eligible for UN pooled funding, success in securing external emergency response funds, and being given leadership roles
- Significant changes in organisational policy with respect to inclusion of vulnerable groups (Ethiopia, local organisations across all intensive set evaluation countries), and localisation (Ethiopia)
- Some evidence of strengthened networks and increased collaboration (Ethiopia, Kenya, the Philippines)
• Contribution to at least 42 humanitarian responses in 11 countries and some qualitative evidence in several settings (The Philippines, Kenya) of improved speed, efficiency and inclusiveness of emergency response
• Cross-country learning in terms of the amount of learning documents produced and sharing of ideas across countries and projects
• Strong cross-project collaboration in the Philippines demonstrating benefits of collective action

Nevertheless, a greater impact, as originally envisioned, could likely have been achieved had there been a more cohesive design, a longer time frame, a more robust programme M&E system and a more strategic approach with regards to type of capacity building implemented at each level of action (individual, organisational, community, systems) and the balance between these levels. Overall, the external evaluation found the following findings that need to be examined further in future evaluations and programming related to emergency preparedness:

• No quantitative evidence to date that the three-year programme has led to measurable impact with regards to more efficient, and timely humanitarian response
• No quantitative evidence to support the hypothesis that strengthened networks can lead to improved emergency preparedness and response (mainly due to the short observation period available to assess this)
• No quantitative evidence that DEPP improved individual knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, preparedness, inclusion of vulnerable groups, or protection issues in the four intensive set countries
• Few changes in quantitative policy-related indicators, though there were some examples of improved policies documented by projects
• Too wide of a variety of individual capacity building initiatives and lack of strategy on type of capacity building approaches at each level (individual, organisational, system, community) and effect desired at each level

The three years allotted for an emergency preparedness programme to achieve five macro results in 10 countries was an ambitious timeline and agenda. The level of exposure to the DEPP programme activities was unevenly distributed across the 10 DEPP focus countries; each country received only a subset of the 14 projects. For example, three DEPP countries benefitted from six projects each, while two countries had only one project each (Not including the Learning Project; see Table 4.7 for the full list of project numbers per country). This uneven level of exposure to DEPP compounded with varying country-specific contextual factors has led to varying results in specific countries. Had the DEPP been able to continue for another three years or more and been able to integrate its learnings into a revised programme strategy (i.e., permitting time to restructure its management structure, scale up projects that show promise and revise projects that are less promising), there would be a more feasible time period to obtain more conclusive findings about DEPP’s achievements towards its five result areas.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR PROGRAMME COMPONENTS

Given the key evaluation findings, there is scope to replicate and further test, or scale up some components of the programme (Table 3). This will ensure that the previous investment in DEPP is sustained, and that any additional resources will be used effectively, efficiently and strategically. Based on evaluation findings that have been triangulated using multiple data sources, none of the DEPP programme components have been recommended to be ceased and not be pursued in the future. This in itself is a strong indication that the DEPP core theory of change and initial assumptions are worthy of being re-examined for future investment. Specially, nine components were recommended to be modified and re-tested, while eight were recommended to be replicated in different contexts and potentially on a larger scale, enabling more rigorous evaluations (Table 3) Note that in a programme each of these components would not be expected to function in isolation, and the interaction between components should also be considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPP PROGRAMME COMPONENT</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED ACTION</th>
<th>KEY FINDING / LESSONS LEARNED</th>
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</table>
| Individual Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Prioritise multi-pronged approaches (in-person + coaching, mentoring, simulations)  
• Quality of trainings should be prioritised over quantity of individuals trained (webinars can reach a lot of people but may be less effective)  
• Consider structural barriers within organisations that may impede application of learning |
| Organisational Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Prioritise approaches that permit organisational self-assessments and capacity building approaches tailored to organisations’ needs  
• Focus on strengthening of administrative policies, procedures and systems (i.e., human resources, procurement, finance systems) has been effective for L/NGOs  
• Approaches should be better adapted to different contexts  
• Access to funding is key for organisations to put learning into practice  
• Conduct comparative assessments of the effectiveness of different approaches |
| Community Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Few projects addressed this, but those that did indicated some potential; further evidence is needed on how best to build community capacity |
| Systems Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Few projects directly addressed this, but there has been some evidence of qualitative attitudinal change that could be a precursor to eventual systems- level change; more time and further evidence are needed on how best to build capacity at the systems level |
| Early Warning Systems | Replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts | • UEWEA’s urban surveillance system should be tested in other urban settings  
• Other early warning system projects could be adapted for and implemented in other contexts with sufficient project timelines |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pooled Surge Platforms</strong></td>
<td>Replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts</td>
<td>- Pooled surge platforms, especially national-level platforms have shown some evidence of effectiveness. Pooled surge platforms should ensure a locally driven design process and implementation to ensure contextualisation and local ownership</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Replicate and test these in different contexts to generate more rigorous evidence on their effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Flexible Funding Mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>Replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts</td>
<td>- Flexible funding mechanisms were found to be a promising approach to support L/NNGOs self-directed capacity building efforts. In addition, flexible funds were essential to translating emergency preparedness into timely and efficient response activities, especially for L/NNGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Flexible funding mechanisms (both for capacity building and response efforts) should be replicated in other settings, and more rigorously evaluated</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Multi-stakeholder Platforms</strong></td>
<td>Modify and re-test</td>
<td>- These platforms were more effective in contexts where existing humanitarian structures were more mature and with supporting governments.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Further modification and testing of the approach is needed to understand how best to utilise this strategy and in which specific settings</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consortia</strong></td>
<td>Modify and re-test</td>
<td>- Consortia that build on existing relationships, common values and ways of working, and that are smaller with inclusion of L/NNGOs should be favoured</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strengthening Networks</strong></td>
<td>Modify approach and re-test</td>
<td>- Use knowledge and data on country networks to create more targeted approaches to strengthen networks; allow enough time to test whether stronger networks can lead to increased emergency preparedness</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Advocacy and Policy</strong></td>
<td>Mainstream across programme</td>
<td>- Some advocacy efforts were implemented but there was no systematic advocacy component at the programme level. It was recognized that advocacy and policy change are needed to overcome barriers to change and to increase programme sustainability</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy related to advocacy and policy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learning Project</strong></td>
<td>Modify and re-test</td>
<td>- The approach of having an individual project dedicated to learning and generating evidence is unique but findings were mixed due to the lack of programme monitoring and the lack of a direct link to the management team. Alternative models for an independent learning project could be envisioned and potentially assessed in a future programme</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence Generation</strong></td>
<td>Modify approach</td>
<td>- Prioritise quality over quantity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Include empirical evidence generation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Adapt evidence use and knowledge translation strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protection</strong></td>
<td>Mainstream across programme</td>
<td>- Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy related to protection</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusion of Prioritised Groups</strong></td>
<td>Mainstream across programme</td>
<td>- Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy on inclusion of prioritised groups (such as women, the elderly and people with disabilities)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Localisation</strong></td>
<td>Contextualise and replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts</td>
<td>- Define localisation (what it is, which entities are considered) and test approaches to enable INGOs to take a more supportive role towards L/NNGOs, and better operationalise localisation in different contexts</td>
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</table>
In addition, a number of best practices related to the DEPP programme components have been compiled to guide future programme design and implementation. These best practices can be found in Annex 11.

Specific conclusions and recommendations related to each evaluation question can be found below.

1. RELEVANCE AND VALIDITY OF DESIGN

CONCLUSION 1: While the objectives and targets of the DEPP were appropriate, relevant and aligned with DFID priorities, the DEPP design process suffered from numerous weaknesses that hindered its potential for impact. Any future programme would require a significant redesign based on the lessons learned and the evidence generated from the DEPP. For future design, programme results that are realistic within a three-year time frame must be set, or the project time frame should be extended to allow for more time to meet longer-term outcomes. A more logical, coherent design process, which is locally led, draws on needs assessments, and uses participatory approaches should be prioritised to ensure that projects are contextualised and based on existing needs at the country level. The design process should adequately consider project alignment and complementarity as well as risks at the programme level. It should also ensure the development and implementation of programme-level systems and processes, such as a robust M&E system, to ensure course correction and that projects function as a portfolio rather than as standalone projects. This includes elaborating a programme-level theory of change, definition of key terms, cross-project linkages, and streamlined inclusion of gender and prioritised groups along with appropriate consideration of cross-cutting themes. Emergency preparedness and response projects should also consider urban contexts and issues such as poverty and food insecurity which lie at the humanitarian-development nexus. Budgets should include higher allocation for NPACs, programme management functions and M&E across all projects.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1: [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] The design process should be re-envisioned to consider alternative programme models and governance structures. To increase the local relevance and effectiveness of the programme, the design process should be locally driven from the outset (i.e., led by local stakeholders), and include sufficient time and funds for project design, localisation, consortia development and collaboration.

Potential Model 1: The process could involve several stages: After the overall programmatic business case and theory of change are developed, global goals could be established and local and national ownership prioritised. A programme-level focal point could be appointed in each country to conduct contextualised needs assessments which would feed into the development of the portfolio-level strategy. The project design process would occur at the country level, under the oversight of the focal points and the Programme Board. This approach would drive the localisation agenda and allow for country-based organisations to determine the most needed initiatives within the goals of the overall theory of change as well as risk assessment. It would help align projects toward common programme goals,
identify complementary elements of different projects, main actors and those that need to be bolstered as well as more risky projects worthy of support. It would also ensure sufficient investment in each country in order to accomplish the theory of change, and would enable more comprehensive assessments of risks. Also, a return on investment assessment could be conducted to inform the final investment. Focal points could work with a regional or country M&E and Learning Advisor to develop and implement programme- and project-level M&E systems. As a programme-level actor, the focal point would help build cohesiveness and enhance the visibility of DEPP as a unified programme in each country.

Potential Model 2: Alternatively, consider a multi-phase programme in which a series of pilot interventions are developed and implemented on a small scale with strong but targeted M&E systems integrated to evidence changes and provide accountability mechanisms. Successful pilot interventions could be scaled up during the subsequent phase, building on the lessons captured during the pilot. A strong programme- and project-level M&E system during the scale up phase would be integral to measuring change and ensure regular tracking of outputs to modify the programme when needed. In addition, this type of multi-phase programme could include a pre-pilot phase where seed funding is provided to develop promising ideas, to conceptualise projects and to build consortia around the projects.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.2:** [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] The programme portfolio should be balanced in terms of risk, types of activities, size of projects, geographic scope and cost. To maximise impact, the link between emergency preparedness and response should be better articulated; preparedness programmes should strongly consider embedding flexible funding mechanisms in order to facilitate contribution to humanitarian response by local actors. The portfolio should include a mix of more established ideas and projects, those that are considered riskier and with a higher likelihood of failure, as well as innovative elements. Prioritising humanitarian need, examining country disaster and emergency profiles, as well as aligning with overall programme strategy during country selection process would ensure a more optimal, balanced set of focus countries. For a fund of this size, concentrating on a smaller group of projects (at least in any scale up phase of a multi-phase programme), and potentially fewer overall countries may help to ensure that investments are not spread too thin and that there is both sufficient investment and a large enough number of projects in each country to reach a critical mass and achieve systems-level changes. A complementary and strategic mix of activities at the programme level and especially at the country level is warranted to maximise impacts; but this too needs to be focused. For example, the DEPP’s open approach led to too many different types of capacity building, too great an emphasis on individual capacity building, and lack of consensus on desired effects at each level. Instead, a more deliberate and evidence-based global capacity building strategy is needed, with more balance between levels of action (individual, organisational, systems), as well as consideration of structural barriers to change that might hinder behaviour change or operationalising organisation-level changes. In many cases advocacy, policy change or other system-based approaches may be critical to easing some of these obstacles; integrating a programme-wide advocacy or policy component should be further explored. Emergency preparedness must not be thought of in isolation and mechanisms to embed linkages to humanitarian response (including response funding) are needed.
**RECOMMENDATION 1.3:** [PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] Portfolio-level harmonisation should be prioritised, including mainstreaming of gender and inclusion of prioritised groups. To ensure alignment of the projects and a cohesive programme-wide approach, portfolio objectives, as well as key terms (e.g., collaboration, preparedness and localisation), and approaches (e.g., types of capacity building efforts) should be fully defined, and the definitions standardised across the programme. Cross-cutting themes that are prioritised by the donor and/or programme and project stakeholders, such as gender and addressing VAWG, must be given adequate attention and embedded across the programme. Inclusion of prioritised groups and gender considerations are equally important and should be mainstreamed.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.4:** [PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] Ensure objectives are realistic and feasible within the programme's time frame. Develop programmes with realistic objectives that are feasible within a three-year time frame. These most likely would focus on outputs and shorter-term outcomes. Alternatively, consider creating longer (i.e., five-year or longer) programme timelines if longer-term outcomes must be included. While longer programme timelines may not correspond to current DFID funding cycles, a multi-phase programme could be an effective solution that is compatible with funding terms as well as activities aimed at longer-term impact.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.5:** [PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] Ensure M&E processes are integrated within the programme design from the outset and that there is an appropriate balance between M&E and learning activities. It is imperative that a programme-level logical framework be in place prior to implementation of any programme or project activities. Development of this framework should occur in parallel with the programme and with input from local stakeholders. Ideally, indicators should be streamlined across the programme, and should contain a core set of programme indicators against which all projects report, with potentially a series of additional site-specific or project-specific indicators where relevant. Incorporate quantitative VFM indicators within the core set of indicators to ensure VFM and efficiency can be tracked across the programme. The M&E system should enable the collection and reporting of data disaggregated by sex and other prioritised groups. In at least one programme focus country, consider prioritising a randomised controlled trial (RCT) or other rigorous evaluation design to evaluate programme effectiveness. This would require involving the evaluation team in the initial stages of the programme design process to ensure alignment of the evaluation questions, randomisation of the intervention sites, and adequate baseline data collection. This would allow for testing of the effectiveness of targeted components of the programme as well as the programme overall, isolating the role of different contextual factors. Technological solutions such as dashboards with real-time data visualisations of key indicators could help enhance routine monitoring, and allow for more rapid course correction. Sufficient training for programme and project focal points with respect to the M&E system must be provided and appropriate mechanisms to ensure higher quality data must be in place. Learning is important but requires a well-designed M&E system in order to be of most value.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.6:** [DFID] Re-examine the development of the business case, as well as its timing and its content, and broaden definitions of disasters, emergency preparedness and response. For any future programme at the scale of the DEPP, to facilitate project design, the business case should provide timely and sufficient details such as focus countries, the criteria for country selection, a set of definitions of key concepts (such as collaboration, institutional arrangements, emergency preparedness and localisation), and a concise summary of the DFID policy on inclusion of prioritised target groups in programme and project design. Further considerations for how to think about emergency preparedness in urban contexts and conflict-affected settings are needed. Considerations
for issues such as poverty and food insecurity which lie at the intersection of development and humanitarian sectors should be considered when designing emergency preparedness and response projects depending on the context.

2. RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVENTIONS

CONCLUSION 2: DEPP interventions were overwhelmingly found to be relevant and appropriate and were demonstrated to fill important gaps that have not been previously well addressed (surveillance of emergencies in urban settings, conflict-sensitive emergency preparedness, inclusion of aging and disability, etc). However, start-up delays limited project implementation periods and reduced potential impact. Optimising the design process as described above and streamlining administrative and contractual process would ensure smooth and timely project start-up and minimise implementation delays. At the programme level, there was no evidence of improved knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, inclusion, or emergency preparedness due to the DEPP but significant changes in organisational capacity and preparedness among DEPP beneficiaries occurred, in particular among local organisations. Furthermore, DEPP organisations contributed to improved response in several contexts (The Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia). A greater impact could likely have been achieved with a longer implementation period, and with easier access to emergency response funding. There is scope for certain programme components to be replicated or scaled up or modified and further tested.

Conclusion 2a: Collaboration and Consortia

Functioning of consortia was suboptimal and contributed to implementation delays and slow decision-making. A smaller, more strategic set of consortium members, with more consistency between UK and in-country members for each project would streamline project delivery and should be considered in future programmes. Inclusion of more L/NNGOs within consortia might help shift power balances and contribute to localisation. Collaborations with external stakeholders including government and UN, though essential, were difficult and lessons learned should inform future programming. In two sequential diarrhoeal outbreaks in Kenya, the consortia model and collaboration with the government enabled coordinated effective response activities that improved with each subsequent emergency.

Conclusion 2b: Capacity Building

Overall individual training targets at the programme level were exceeded suggesting successful implementation of DEPP capacity building activities. However, these data included individuals who participated in capacity building efforts with minimal exposure such as webinars and forums. Accessibility to training remained uneven. The target of including 50% women trainees across the programme was not met, and some trainings were only available in English. Structural barriers, such as organisational and management arrangements, were a key barrier to applying and integrating knowledge gained from DEPP capacity building efforts at the organisational level and should be addressed in future programmes. Multi-pronged capacity building efforts that include practical approaches to sustain and apply knowledge were perceived to be most effective, but quantitative data show no evidence of knowledge change. Organisational-level capacity building efforts where several strategies were combined and tailored to the specific gaps of each organisation were perceived to be effective, and evidence of increased organisational capacity of local organisations was demonstrated in a number of settings.
Conclusion 2c: Evidence Generation and Learning

Generation of learning and evidence was high in terms of quantity, but evidence was mainly anecdotal and lacking in scientific rigor. Arguably too much emphasis was placed on generation of learning products compared to routine monitoring. Differential reporting by projects against the programme-level logical framework (once it was finalised and fully implemented in August 2017) occurred, and there was evidence of weak quality assurance. In addition, there was a lack of disaggregated data collected with respect to important subgroups. Sharing of learning did occur but there is no evidence that this translated to behaviour change. Learning events were a useful approach to share learning, however an increased focus on the dissemination of evidence at these events would have been valuable. The Learning Platform was an important resource (that now serves as part of the DEPP’s institutional memory) but it was not used consistently across projects and featured varying amounts of evidence and learning shared by each project. Such platforms should be more heavily promoted to increase use by in-country partners, represent resources from all projects and ensure availability of resources in relevant languages. The DEPP Learning Project had been originally conceptualised to take on the M&E functions of the DEPP in addition to learning. While a unique idea, this model did not work well – M&E functions and responsibility would have been better placed at the programme management level. Placing these functions as one project alongside the others with limited authority led to diffusion of accountability and responsibility. As a standalone learning project, it has had mixed results, but could be re-envisioned for future programmes.

Conclusion 2d: Early Warning Systems

Early warning systems are important as they provide (in theory) accurate, predictive and timely data to support emergency preparedness. However, findings with respect to implementation of early warning systems are mixed. Six diverse early warning systems were developed and five were fully operational at the time of this report. However, because of implementation delays, the length of time these systems were functional was very limited. Several of the systems have been well integrated into appropriate structures contributing to increased likelihood of sustainability and impact. Only two systems (UEWEA, PHEP Gambella) have been used in an emergency response. UEWEA in particular was shown to be an effective system that was able to detect several emergencies that would have otherwise gone unnoticed in informal settlements around Nairobi and this contributed to improved timely and effective response. This system had been operational the longest, and also established a concrete exit strategy, with the local county government taking over management of the system. This project benefitted from a longer “effective” timeline compared to the other projects as it took forward work from a previous project\(^\text{15}\) that conceptualised the system, developed and tested the indicators and established government collaborations. Without that existing work to build on, UEWEA would likely have faced similar challenges as the rest of the cohort in terms of establishing a functional system with the programme period.

Conclusion 2e: Emergency Preparedness and Response

There are some emerging examples in several countries of perceived improvements in emergency preparedness at the organisational and community level. Document review has demonstrated that the DEPP has contributed to at least 42 responses in 11 countries and there are several self-reported examples of strengthened, more localised response.

RECOMMENDATION 2.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] The Learning Project and its placement should be re-examined, with its role, responsibilities, objectives and accountability mechanisms clearly defined at the outset of any future programme. Programme-level M&E should sit within programme-level management, but the case could be made to test a differently structured standalone learning project in a future programme. Further considerations to ensure a balance between quantity and quality of learning and evidence generated, including the burden and time requirements placed on projects, and the timing of M&E activities to begin before projects start implementing are needed.

RECOMMENDATION 2.2 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] Project-level M&E systems should directly feed into programme-level systems (via a common, core set of indicators), and should be in place prior to implementation with timely reporting to permit agile course correction. Stronger M&E systems including collection of empirical data would support projects in accessing additional funding and yield better quality projects with a greater likelihood of impact. Accountability mechanisms, including accountability to beneficiaries, should be strengthened.

RECOMMENDATION 2.3 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] To increase the effectiveness of capacity building interventions, emphasis should be placed on quality not on quantity. At the individual level, approaches that build skills and reinforce learning, and combine several strategies, should be prioritised. At the organisational level, approaches that are tailored to identified gaps and aim to strengthen systems and processes should be emphasised. Flexible funding mechanisms providing small or in some cases micro grants for capacity building were one successful approach to empower local organisations to build their capacity and should be considered in future programmes. Systems-level capacity strengthening should also be further pursued. Further attention to the balance of activities across these different levels and the desired effect at each level will be needed to maximise impacts. Structural barriers need to be addressed, and capacity building interventions should be better tailored to specific contexts.

RECOMMENDATION 2.4 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] Development of early warning systems should be taken forward within future programmes but only when sufficient implementation periods are available. A three-year time frame was insufficient to design and operationalise an early warning system; more realistic timelines are needed to ensure completion of the system and allowing time to test the system within emergency responses (or simulations). Community members and government officials should be actively involved in designing the surveillance systems, beneficiary criteria, and response package details. Consensus on indicators and early warning systems should be reached in collaboration with community and government stakeholders. Early and sustained engagement should be emphasised to foster trust and strengthen partnerships.

RECOMMENDATION 2.5 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] Future programmes must consider emergency preparedness and response on a continuum with more attention paid to the response component. The programme should strategise on how best to enable improved response through emergency preparedness activities and ensure such
mechanisms are embedded within the programme, rather than expecting response contribution to occur organically as a natural by-product of preparedness activities. This could take various forms. Flexible response funds could be built in to the programme (and potentially the individual projects) to provide a rapid mechanism for local programme beneficiaries to implement response activities. As this approach at the project level has worked well in several contexts it should be viewed as a promising strategy worthy of replication in more settings and tested as a programme-level component. Alternatively, or in addition, more formal links with existing emergency response funds (such as the START Fund) could be pursued. In addition, further thinking around emergency preparedness in conflict-affected settings and in urban contexts is needed.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.6 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** To leverage the global momentum around localisation of humanitarian response and build on the contribution of DEPP in advancing this agenda, more nuanced considerations on localisation are needed. This includes articulating a clear definition of what localisation means, which entities are considered local and what the implications of these definitions are from a practical standpoint. Strategically, laying out and potentially testing approaches which could enable INGOs to take a more supportive role, and better operationalise localisation (move from theoretical to actual). Organisational policies around localisation could be one target, but understanding how to operationalise the policies into actual processes would be an important element. Additionally, the humanitarian landscape in different settings and its relationship to localisation need to be considered to ensure that appropriate, contextually relevant strategies to support localisation are implemented. Finally, localisation from the donor perspective should be further explored to understand strategies which might enable donors to more easily support local counterparts within the context of risk aversion and due diligence processes.

### 3. EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

**CONCLUSION 3:** Collaboration is highly valued and DEPP’s consortia approach was universally deemed to be the most appropriate, preferred delivery mechanism for humanitarian capacity building and emergency preparedness and response activities. There was some evidence that the consortia model enabled coordinated, timelier response in some settings. Globally, effectiveness of consortia could be increased in future programmes through a smaller, more strategic set of consortia members, improved communication, opportunities for better coordination of activities, and provision of sufficient resources for strategic and organised collaborations. Inclusion of more L/NGOs within the consortia could contribute to the localisation agenda. Network analyses demonstrated evidence of strengthened humanitarian response networks in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, while the network in Myanmar remained unchanged. A range of different types of emergency preparedness and response networks exist in these countries, from highly isolated (Myanmar) to highly distributed, locally led (The Philippines). In any future programme aiming to strengthen networks, these differences in the size, scope and priorities of networks across countries should be appropriately considered during the both design and implementation. Humanitarian landscapes and existing networks across focal countries should be considered, particularly in the design of the projects and at the programme level to leverage existing collaborations and local partnerships. Targeting of network members for capacity building and evidence sharing should be more strategic and include relevant key influencers.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** In future programmes, refine and optimise the consortium model building on lessons from the DEPP, ensuring context-specific considerations. Working effectively with collaborative structures in the
future will require better understanding of what types of consortia are appropriate and effective within different contexts. Overarching factors which should be incorporated in programmes of this nature include supporting collaborative structures that build on existing successful relationships and that work with a smaller number of members, and that work towards strategic collaborations. To increase the speed of decision-making and effectiveness of consortia, streamlined contracting and reporting processes should be established. Ensuring L/NGOs are included in consortia, and assessment of strategies to address risk aversion among donors to supporting such consortia are needed.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.2 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** Network assessments could better inform targeted strategies to enhance collaboration and to effectively strengthen emergency preparedness and response networks. Country-specific network mapping and assessments should be undertaken, when appropriate, to facilitate the use of more targeted approaches to building networks and partnerships, such as through the identification and targeting of key influencers. Deeper exploration on the level of influence and role of different organisations (i.e., as resource hubs, knowledge brokers etc.) within the network in focal countries would be extremely valuable to inform strategies around which organisations to target and how. These assessments could also enable optimisation of collaboration with local and national actors. For example, localisation efforts could be refined in the Philippines where national NGOs are already very strongly involved within emergency preparedness and response networks.

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**4. EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM)**

**CONCLUSION 4:** Good indicators of cost economy were evident, but in some cases project budgets were too lean with insufficient resources for consortia management and collaborative activities. At the portfolio level, resources dedicated to portfolio management and collaboration, M&E and to NPACs were insufficient with respect to desired programme objectives. In future programmes, more strategic allocation of funds should be undertaken. In addition, systems and resources for governance, strategy, portfolio management, decision-making and consortium arrangements should be restructured to improve efficiency. Adaptive management processes permitted course correction and revisions of project plans to reflect changing contexts, and VFM reporting improved over the course of the programme. Future programmes should better adopt and standardise VFM indicators in order to collect data for internal project purposes, cross-project comparisons and general learning. There were no strong VFM findings to suggest that emergency preparedness improved the efficiency of humanitarian response within the programme duration.

**RECOMMENDATION 4.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** Streamline contractual processes, management decisions and flow of funds. While recognising the importance of subcontracting processes and organisations’ internal procedures, future programming should take steps to minimise and streamline contractual processes. For example, pre-agreement letters of commitment could help clarify some contractual issues prior to the start of projects. The programme management could also provide a template for subcontracts and consider setting a standard timeline for contract turnaround. If projects are structured with a global grant holder and in-country host or partner, streamlining management decisions and flow of funds so that the same organisation serves in both roles whenever possible could be considered.
**RECOMMENDATION 4.2 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND PROJECTS]** Adopt and standardise VFM indicators at programme and project levels and implement routine reporting. DFID guidance on VFM in humanitarian programmes or other relevant VFM guidance should be used to enhance VFM monitoring and reporting in future programmes. Adopting VFM indicators at the programme level, as well as the project level will ensure that VFM can be closely tracked and analysed at both levels.

**RECOMMENDATION 4.3 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** In a future programme, strategically allocate funds to achieve programme objectives, with greater funds designated for programme management costs, M&E and NPACs. For a large portfolio, programme management costs should be in the range of around 10%, to enable sufficient resources to undertake its key functions of management, M&E and strategic tasks. NPACs can be up to 20% and as high as 25%, but should be considered realistically to ensure that in-country and back office costs are covered. With respect to M&E, ensure sufficient resources are available at the both the programme and project levels to efficiently implement both routine monitoring and more rigorous evaluations.

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**5. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTION AND LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME**

**CONCLUSION 5:** In some settings, DEPP has contributed to strengthening national emergency preparedness systems but typically on a small geographic scale, and by individual project consortia. There have been several concrete examples where DEPP has impacted government policies or systems or increased political commitment. Stakeholders noted a shift in the way organisations consider, address and involve local actors and communities, and attributed it as one of DEPP’s most significant contributions. However, there was a lack of a detailed strategy for the inclusion of gender and prioritised target groups at the programme level resulting in a fragmented programme wide approach and uneven results. In addition, cross-cutting themes such as addressing VAWG were not adequately integrated into the programme. Rather than only including one or two projects with an inclusion and protection focus within a portfolio, a more integrated approach involving mainstreaming across the programme should be prioritised. This should entail dissemination of detailed expectations and guidelines on inclusion of gender and other prioritised groups and reporting requirements during the design phase to ensure that projects are developed accordingly. As well, consistency in implementation of gender and inclusion considerations with regular monitoring should be established. In addition to inclusion, sustainability planning was weak and was not clearly planned or documented at both the programme and project levels. This failure seems to have been linked to expectations around the possibility of receiving additional funds from DFID for a second phase of the DEPP, as articulated in the business case, combined with lack of guidance from the programme on sustainability. In any future programme, more deliberate, strategic sustainability planning is needed at all levels, beginning during the design phase, and with transparency around the possibility of further funding. At the programme level, there is some evidence that benefits have become embedded – with examples of system and policy change as well as strengthened national preparedness systems, albeit on a small geographic scale. However, the potential for longer-term effects is dependent on the extent to which different components are able to continue beyond the close of the programme. Future programmes should prioritise longer implementation periods to increase likelihood of impact, and incorporate government collaboration, systems-level change, policy or advocacy components, involvement of beneficiaries and good VFM in order to promote sustainability.
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND PROJECTS] Develop a strategy for inclusion of gender and prioritised target groups at programme level, ensure projects adopt an approach which aligns with this strategy and monitor implementation at all levels. In the governance criteria, consider broadening the gender statement to a statement on inclusion of prioritised target groups. Develop guidelines for projects on requirements for this statement. This could include links to key documents on best practices and the law and policies governing inclusion of prioritised target groups in development programming and project design. Ensure gender considerations are consistently implemented and reported.

RECOMMENDATION 5.2: [DEPP PROGRAMME AND PROJECTS] Within any future programme, integrate deliberate, strategic sustainability planning that takes a more holistic view on sustainability going beyond simply securing funding streams. Programme and project sustainability plans should be developed as early as possible, preferably in the design phase and updated regularly. However, for riskier projects with a high possibility of failure, sustainability planning does not make sense and is not a good use of resources until results can be demonstrated. Future programmes should increase the likelihood of sustainability and longer-term impacts by building on previous efforts and existing partnerships/consortia, working with governments (when appropriate), incorporating a policy or advocacy element, developing sustainable outputs such as tools, guidelines or systems, increasing cross-project linkages, fostering sustainable relationships that can continue beyond the DEPP, improving beneficiary engagement, and strengthening feedback mechanisms for the community. Good VFM should also be prioritised to maximise sustainability. Programme visibility at the country level should be maximised through increased advocacy initiatives and the development of streamlined communication with external stakeholders.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION & CONTEXT
Each year the severity and complexity of natural and man-made disasters continues to increase, making recovery and reconstruction efforts more challenging and costly. Foreseeing this trend, the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR)\(^{16}\) urged the UK government’s Department for International Development (DfID) to invest in innovative approaches to disaster preparedness in order to build local resilience, stating “If we are to meet the challenges ahead, we have to be ‘ahead of the curve’ rather than always behind; preparing for disasters, as well as reacting to them.” At that time, less than 5% of all humanitarian funding was invested in disaster preparedness. This constituted less than 1% of Official Development Assistance (ODA), despite the fact that “early response is far more cost effective than late humanitarian response” and better preparedness is critical to more timely response\(^ {17}\). The HERR also highlighted that “the level of professionalism in the humanitarian sector needs to be raised through better investment in skills and training.” In response to the HERR, DfID created the business case\(^ {18}\) for the Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) (See Annex 1) and allocated £40 million of funding to strengthen skills and capacity to improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries that are at risk of natural disasters or emergencies. The DEPP aimed to increase preparedness at the local, regional and national levels to enable countries to be better equipped to respond to disaster.\(^ {19}\) It focused on building capacity of “national actors who are usually the first on the scene of a disaster”, an approach now referred to as localisation (see the boxes below).

The DEPP was delivered by two Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) consortia, the START Network, (receiving £27 million), and the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC-N) Network, (receiving £3 million), to implement 14 capacity building projects. The remaining £10 million was reserved for an innovation window which was developed, implemented, and managed separately with a later timeline. The 14 DEPP projects were implemented in one or more of 10\(^ {20}\) priority countries: South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines, with each project operating in some but not all countries. Only one project (the Learning Project) was implemented in all 10 countries while five projects (Public Health Emergencies Preparedness (PHEP) in Gambella, Improved Early Warning Early Actions (EWEA) in Ethiopia, Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar, Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA in Kenya), Financial Enablers in the Philippines) were implemented in only one country each. The 14 DEPP projects, their consortia members, locations and budgets are presented in Table 1.1.

THE DISASTERS AND EMERGENCIES PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMME (DEPP)

- **Investment:** £40 million
- **Location:** 10 countries
- **Duration:** 3 years
- **Number of preparedness projects:** 14 humanitarian capacity building projects
- **Overall objective:** To improve quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries that are at risk of natural disasters or humanitarian emergencies

**Key approaches:** Capacity building of local and national humanitarian staff and communities, early warning system development, supporting collaborative action and strengthening networks

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17 Business Case Intervention Summary: Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme, DFID.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Indonesia was initially selected as an 11th DEPP focal country, but no selected projects planned to implement activities there.
The **Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme** uses collective networks to improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries at risk of natural disaster or conflict related humanitarian emergencies.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Emergency preparedness refers to “the ability of governments, professional response organisations, communities and individuals to anticipate and respond effectively to the impact of likely, imminent or current hazards, events or conditions. It means putting in place mechanisms which will allow national authorities and relief organisations to be aware of risks and deploy staff and resources quickly once a crisis strikes.”

Emergency preparedness focuses narrowly on improving response to disasters, but it belongs to a wider set of activities to reduce the likelihood and impact of disasters on people’s lives called ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’ (DRR). These include activities focused on prevention, mitigation and response to humanitarian emergencies.

The IASC Common Framework for Preparedness describes the following components of emergency preparedness:

- Hazard and risk analysis and early warning systems
- Institutional and legislative frameworks
- Resource allocation and funding
- Coordination
- Information management and communication
- Preparedness and contingency / response planning
- Training and exercises
- Emergency services, standby arrangements and prepositioning

The DEPP aimed to focus on those areas related to ‘people and systems’, in particular hazard, risk and early warning; information management and communication; contingency/preparedness and response planning; and training and exercises.

LOCALISATION

There is no globally accepted definition of ‘localisation’ of humanitarian aid. The definition suggested by Trocaire and Group URD is holistic and appears to align very closely to the DEPP approach to localisation: “Aid localisation is a collective process involving different stakeholders that aims to return local actors, whether civil society organisations or local public institutions, to the centre of the humanitarian system with a greater role in humanitarian response. It can take a number of forms: more equitable partnerships between international and local actors, increased and “as direct as possible” funding for local organisations, and a more central role in aid coordination. Underpinning this is the question of power. Localisation requires a shift in power relations between actors, both in terms of strategic decision-making and control of resources.”

The OECD states that supporting local humanitarian responders contributes to the following:

- Early response and access (including to small scale crises below the threshold for international aid)
- Improved acceptance of humanitarian aid (such as in conflict-affected areas)
- Cost effectiveness
- Links with development
- Increasing accountability

The growing calls to increase support for local humanitarian responders is also reflected in a number of policy commitments including:

- Good Humanitarian Donorship, Principle 8
- The Grand Bargain, Workstream 2
- The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
- The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

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22 ibid.
24 Business Case Intervention Summary: Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme, DFID.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPP PROJECT</th>
<th>PROJECT CONSORTIA MEMBERS</th>
<th>COUNTRIES**</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>BUDGET (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TALENT DEVELOPMENT (TD)</td>
<td>Save the Children UK (Lead), Oxfam GB, Relief International, CHS Alliance</td>
<td>Bangladesh, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan and Kenya, Lebanon</td>
<td>To produce high-quality professionals at all levels who are better equipped to tackle the issues surrounding complex emergencies, helping to ensure that the right people are in the right place doing the right things to assist disaster-affected communities.</td>
<td>5,985,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIFTING THE POWER (STP)</td>
<td>ActionAid International (Lead), CAFOD (Lead), Christian Aid, Tearfund, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>To support local actors to take their place alongside international actors in order to create a balanced humanitarian system that is more responsive and accountable to disaster-affected communities.</td>
<td>4,876,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE LEARNING PROJECT*</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger</td>
<td>All DEPP Countries</td>
<td>To evidence the extent to which preparing people is an effective and efficient approach to disaster management and broker internal and external relationships for learning about what is and is not working in capacity exchange.</td>
<td>3,343,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETTER DIALOGUE, BETTER INFORMATION, BETTER ACTION (CDAC-N PROJECT)</td>
<td>World Vision (Lead), CDAC Network, Thomson Reuters Foundation, BBC Media Action, Internews</td>
<td>Bangladesh, South Sudan, The Philippines</td>
<td>To ensure that two-way communication is a predictable, coordinated and resourced component of humanitarian response in order to contribute to improvement in effective delivery of assistance to disaster affected communities.</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSFORMING SURGE CAPACITY (TSC)</td>
<td>ActionAid International (Lead), ACF, Christian Aid, CAFOD, CARE, IMC, Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Plan, Save the Children, Tearfund</td>
<td>Pakistan, the Philippines, Regional Hub in Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>To strengthen civil society surge capacity at international, regional and local levels, contributing to a diverse and decentralised third sector pillar better able to complement existing United Nations, Red Cross and government structures in order to help communities increase resilience, reduce risk and improve crisis response.</td>
<td>2,482,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>HelpAge International (Lead), Care international, Handicap International, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, Coventry University</td>
<td>The Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, Haiti</td>
<td>To develop a system of approaches and tools for disaster preparedness that increases the ability of organisations to respond immediately, effectively and appropriately when a disaster strikes.</td>
<td>1,987,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINANCIAL ENABLERS (FE)</td>
<td>Oxfam GB (Lead), Tearfund, Christian Aid</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>To transfer humanitarian capacity, autonomy and decision-making to organisations closer to people affected by crisis, as a way of facilitating more effective and appropriate aid.</td>
<td>1,637,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE AND DISABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING (ADCAP)</td>
<td>HelpAge International (Lead), CBM, Disaster Ready.org, Handicap International, IFRC, Oxford Brooks University, RedR UK</td>
<td>Kenya, Pakistan</td>
<td>To ensure older people and persons with disability benefit from improved access to services, as a result of recognition by humanitarian actors of their specific needs and increased capacity amongst humanitarian actors to deliver inclusive, accessible and appropriate response.</td>
<td>1,045,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKING PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE (LPRR)</td>
<td>Christian Aid (Lead), Action Aid, Concern, HelpAge International, King’s College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Save the World, World Vision</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Kenya, DRC, Pakistan, the Philippines, Colombia, Indonesia, Myanmar</td>
<td>To design and roll out programming approaches which strengthen the resilience of people living in fragile states and beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>1,002,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With 14 individual projects, the DEPP was broad in scope and complex in design. Each project implemented a different set of activities, and worked within different structures. The projects also targeted various levels of action (or beneficiaries) including individuals, communities, organisations and governments. The programme utilised a number of strategies including collaboration, innovation, scale, decentralisation, complementarity, learning and addressing cross-cutting issues. The five overall objectives or targeted result areas of the DEPP as outlined in the business case are presented in the box below. While each project worked towards one or more of these results areas, as a whole the collective action of the programme aimed to address all five.

Table 1.1: Projects in the Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Lead organisations</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impact Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRENGTHENING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SYSTEMS IN MYANMAR (SEPS)</td>
<td>Christian Aid (Lead), DCA, Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Africa and Asia (RIMES)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>To strengthen the links among national, subnational and local-level preparedness in Myanmar, with a primary focus on capacitating local communities and structures to access information and link with the on-going establishment of preparedness and early warning systems in the country.</td>
<td>925,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTECTION IN PRACTICE</td>
<td>Oxfam (Lead), IRC, World Vision International</td>
<td>DRC, Lebanon, Turkey, South Sudan, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Philippines</td>
<td>To enable national NGOs to implement protection actions in disaster and conflict responses, develop new types of partnerships and collaborations between protection actors and influence the international protection architecture so it is more inclusive of national NGOs.</td>
<td>870,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPROVED EARLY WARNING – EARLY ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN ETHIOPIA (EWEA)</td>
<td>Oxfam GB on behalf of Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance (Lead), Christian Aid, National Disaster Risk Management Commission, National Meteorological Agency</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>To contribute to improved emergency preparedness, timeliness and quality of risk information and response actions by community, government (local to federal) and NGOs in a coordinated manner.</td>
<td>784,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN EARLY WARNING, EARLY ACTION (UEWEA)</td>
<td>Concern Worldwide (Lead), Oxfam, Kenya Red Cross Society</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>To improve urban early action by improving the alignment of local and municipal governance institutions and response agencies towards identifying relevant triggers and implementing early response based on these, supported by an increase in the allocation of financial support from key donors towards urban Early Warning Early Action.</td>
<td>675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES PREPAREDNESS IN GAMBELLA (PHEP)</td>
<td>Christian Aid (Lead), Amref Health Africa, Ethiopia Ministry of Health, National Meteorological Agency</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>To strengthen early warning, preparedness and prompt response of the health sector to public health emergencies.</td>
<td>548,694</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Formerly known as the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Project (MEL).

**Includes non-DEPP focal countries where projects were implemented (i.e., Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Colombia, Turkey).

***Indonesia was initially selected as an 11th DEPP focal country but none of the selected projects planned implementation in Indonesia. However, over the course of the programme, LPRR ultimately did implement some activities in this country.

With 14 individual projects, the DEPP was broad in scope and complex in design. Each project implemented a different set of activities, and worked within different structures. The projects also targeted various levels of action (or beneficiaries) including individuals, communities, organisations and governments. The programme utilised a number of strategies including collaboration, innovation, scale, decentralisation, complementarity, learning and addressing cross-cutting issues. The five overall objectives or targeted result areas of the DEPP as outlined in the business case are presented in the box below. While each project worked towards one or more of these results areas, as a whole the collective action of the programme aimed to address all five.

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32 In all countries except Jordan, the combined projects covered all four DEPP objectives. Talent Development was the only project implemented in Jordan and did not cover the 3rd and 4th objectives.
A 3-year external impact evaluation of the DEPP programme was commissioned by Action Contre La Faim (ACF) (see ToR in Annex 4), and conducted by an evaluation team (Annex 2) at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI). This report presents the summative results of the impact evaluation including findings from all phases of the evaluation.

**DEPP THEORY OF CHANGE AND SIMPLIFIED CAUSAL CHAIN**

During the evaluation inception phase, the evaluation team assessed the DEPP programme theory of change (Annex 3) presented in the business case (Annex 1). The programme theory of change was found to be complex and no longer represented well the suite of projects as they had evolved over time. A process was undertaken to create a more simplified but conceptually appropriate representation of the DEPP that could serve as the backbone of the evaluation approach and to report against during each evaluation phase. Figure 1.1 illustrates the DEPP programme causal chain that was developed and that was used to create a programme-level logical framework and set of indicators for the evaluation. The causal chain illustrates the causal links between the 14 DEPP projects and their activities, four expected output areas (1. Capacity building, 2. Collaboration, 3. Learning and 4. Early Warning System Development), expected outcomes in both the short term (improved humanitarian capacity, improved preparedness) and long term (increased effective delivery of humanitarian response). Hypothesised downstream impacts (mortality, morbidity, economic impact and recovery) are also depicted within the causal chain, and based on stakeholder interviews were not expected to be achieved within the programme’s 3-year cycle and thus were considered outside of the scope of the evaluation. The causal chain also specifies that the activities, outputs and outcomes are expected to occur at the individual, organisational, community and government levels. This also captures the variety of DEPP beneficiaries that were targeted at each of these levels (including individual humanitarian staff, humanitarian organisations, communities, governments etc). This impact evaluation focused only on assessing outputs, as well as short to long-term outcomes at these different levels.
DEPP PROGRAMME-LEVEL LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

A final version of the DEPP programme-level logical framework was approved by DFID in 2017 and fully implemented by August 2017, several years after the start of the programme. The final version of the logical framework is presented in Table 1.2 below. While there were several draft versions of the programme-level logical framework in place before then, they required significant strengthening\(^{34}\). Therefore, with agreement from DFID, because the external evaluation had already begun before the finalisation of the logical framework, it does not report against it. However, it is important to note that the output, outcome and impact areas in this logical framework are quite similar to the evaluation team’s output and outcome areas as depicted in Figure 1.1.\(^{35}\) The indicators, however, are unique (See Table 2.1 in the Methodology section for further detail).

\(^{34}\) For example, DFID’s Annual Review of the DEPP, March 2018 states: “There is still more work to do on the logframe – including finalising the outcome indicators and including an output which tracks value for money.”

\(^{35}\) Programme output 1 corresponds to evaluation output 1, programme output 2 to evaluation output 4, programme output 3 to evaluation output 2, programme output 4 does not directly correspond with any evaluation output area, programme output 5 corresponds to evaluation output 3, programme output 6 does not correspond to any evaluation output area, programme outcome 1 corresponds with evaluation outcome 1, and programme impact 1 corresponds with evaluation impact 1. Programme output area 6 corresponds to the innovation window which is not within the scope of this evaluation.
## STATEMENT

1. Improved knowledge and understanding of individuals by sharing best practice of humanitarian preparedness and response

1.1 # of DEPP humanitarian capacity building programmes, countries and strategies that utilise a range of implementation methods to improve the capacity of individuals at the international, national and sub-national levels

2. Improved preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk of disasters

2.1 # of countries with preparedness systems for communities, agencies and government institutions developed or strengthened, including early warning systems, preparedness plans, collaborative surge rosters

2.2. Improved preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk of disasters

### INDICATOR

1.1. # of DEPP humanitarian capacity building programmes, countries and strategies that utilise a range of implementation methods to improve the capacity of individuals at the international, national and sub-national levels

1.2. # of staff across multiple humanitarian disciplines who access quality DEPP humanitarian capacity building activities of varying duration and qualification on a range of subjects

2.1. # of countries with preparedness systems for communities, agencies and government institutions developed or strengthened, including early warning systems, preparedness plans, collaborative surge rosters

2.2. Improved preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk of disasters

### TARGET (MARCH 2018)

1.2 humanitaran capacity building programmes are revised, scaled up or developed in 12 countries, using a mix of 6 strategies including: short courses, long courses, training of trainers, mentoring/coaching, e-learning and webinars

At least 4200 individuals (50% male, 50% female) have accessed quality DEPP humanitarian capacity building activities across 10 subjects to various levels of accreditation (including short courses, long, courses, e-learning and ToT)

Prepared systems in use in at least 7 countries and at least three government institutions, and capacity built in responsible institutions at community and national level and tested via simulation in at least one country or where a response is required

6 systematic communication approaches (including early warning bulletins and surveillance reports) operational in at least 3 countries at multiple levels and tested via simulation in at least one country or where a response is required

### ASSUMPTIONS

Capacity building activities will include a diversity and inclusion approach.

Individual humanitarian workers can transmit learning into action within their organisations and wider operating environments.

Chosen approaches, methodologies, and innovations are the correct ones to build capacity in an increasingly complex humanitarian ecosystem.

A systems approach to preparedness is suited to identified countries and populations, as well multiple forms of hazards.

Results expected from the deployment of these systems will have a positive impact on incentivising preparedness and early action.

Note: The language used for this indicator has been chosen on purpose to clarify that the preparedness systems developed by the DEPP are not national preparedness systems. The organisations that will use these preparedness systems will include local, regional and national government bodies, INGOs, national NGOs, and other international actors.
### Outputs

#### 3. Increased number of coalitions, partnerships and networks which working together, are able to address humanitarian needs in a wide range of emergency situations

- **3.1** Formal partnerships are established and maintained with a wide range of national and international actors (both within and outside the DEPP consortium) that increase action and commitment to address humanitarian needs in emergencies.
- **3.2** Collaborative mechanisms contribute to improved learning, efficiency and coordination of DEPP stakeholders for emergency preparedness, programming and response.

#### 4. Improved institutional arrangements and policy environments so that national systems for humanitarian response and preparedness are better supported and more suitable

- **4.1** Number of strategies (including action plans, guidelines and tools) covering various thematic areas adopted by national and international actors in a range of countries to achieve more appropriate humanitarian response for crisis affected populations.
- **4.2** DEPP advocacy and institutional change activities target core humanitarian themes such as age and disability, protection and communicating with communities.

#### Partnerships between at least 200 national and international humanitarian actors (including national NGOs, international NGOs, academic institutions, government agencies, private sector companies, and Red Cross/Crescent Societies) demonstrate increased action and commitment to address humanitarian needs in emergencies collaboratively.

- At least 70% of these actors commit to maintaining at least one of their partnerships beyond the end of the programme, in order to continue addressing humanitarian needs collaboratively.

- Analysis of 140 collaboration stories and project feedback indicate that collaboration has led to improved learning, efficiency and coordination.

- Strategy development and implementation stories and feedback indicate that strategies adopted have contributed to improved preparedness.

#### Models of collaboration being tested contribute to improving effectiveness in preparedness work.

- Collaborative mechanisms created do not reinforce systematic disempowerment and exclusion of crisis affected populations, first responders, local and national humanitarian leadership.

- Platforms, forums and communities of practice actively reflect on strengths and weaknesses of different approaches so that they remain relevant mechanisms for the humanitarian system. Aspects of existing and new mechanisms that don’t work can be addressed, and there is willingness to change.

- Strategies for advocacy activities are the correct ones suited to the wider humanitarian sector.

- Vulnerable groups and crisis affected populations voices are consistently integrated into influencing humanitarian preparedness.

- Initiatives and innovation are able to influence policy and practice of organisations or the wider humanitarian sector.
5. Strengthened evidence base for what works to help build humanitarian capacity at scale

5.1 Evidence across the DEPP is generated and captured systematically and contributes to future uptake of lessons learned to help build humanitarian capacity at scale

At least 200 learning resources that promote the uptake of best practice and lessons learned from the DEPP are produced and shared, covering a broad range of preparedness subject areas including humanitarian capacity building, resilience building, preparedness systems, humanitarian surge, localisation, collaboration, age and disability capacity building and protection mainstreaming.

Every DEPP project demonstrates at least one example of significant adaptive project management based on recommendations from DEPP learning resources on how to improve humanitarian programming.

DEPP MEL project provides project support to all other 13 DEPP projects, co-creates 13 research pieces with DEPP partners, manages the DEPP external evaluation in its summative phase and delivers 20 learning events across 9 countries.

5.2 DEPP MEL project promotes generation, sharing and use of evidence and learning

6. Human centered design approaches tested and implemented across four innovations labs, leveraging non-traditional local actors to deliver preparedness approaches which are community-appropriate, leading to more prepared and engaged communities

6.1 Communities are actively identified, engaged and involved in all stages of the innovations process and outputs are assessed using community-based evaluation methods.

Relevant / user communities have evaluated lab activities for relevance and usefulness. Independent community perception survey data gathered across four labs to complement contextualised participatory methods for coherent comparisons and reporting.

Community engagement in the design process leads to generation of new ideas and development of more appropriate preparedness mechanisms.

Community are motivated to remain engaged with the innovation process because of the value they attribute to being involved in developing more useful tools.
6.2 DEPP Labs in the four countries test, pilot and support innovations through an innovation process, learning from which is curated and shared with the broader network.

At least 48 projects supported and tested across the four labs. Scaled innovations evaluated and shared across four countries. Lessons learned about non-traditional sector engagement and contextualised approaches to community centered design in emergency preparedness shared across the broader network. Final evaluation includes external assessment of sustainability, quality and effectiveness of community led innovation processes by relevant local innovations actors.

Some innovations have already been pioneered, which can be identified and scaled up more quickly with lab support.

Lab support mechanisms including training, funding and multi-sectoral partnerships are adequate to progress innovations to a point of greater viability.

Sharing lessons learned with network members contributes to behaviour change within the sector.

One assumption is that training staff will result in increased organisational preparedness - we have tried to address this by including one indicator around staff knowledge (Indicator 1) and one around NGO reports of capacity strengthen (Indicator 4).

Coordination mechanisms and preparedness systems are well integrated into organisations and staff receive adequate training.

Strategies to accomplish institutional change are both diverse, flexible and easy to integrate into existing programming, with appropriate support and training provided.

1. Increased and strengthened emergency preparedness capacity in DEPP focus countries, focusing on strengthening local humanitarian capacity and championing localisation in a manner consistent with the Grand Bargain and the World Humanitarian Summit.

Out of sample taken from 13 humanitarian capacity building programmes, 70% will demonstrate increased knowledge, attitudes and behaviours.

1. Proportion of recipients of quality humanitarian capacity building activities that demonstrate improved knowledge, attitudes or behaviours in core humanitarian areas.

6. cont.
OUTCOMES

1. cont.

2. DEPP coordination mechanisms and preparedness systems promote efficient response to emergencies, with clear policies and procedures and institutional support.

Feedback on 100% of pilot mechanisms and systems indicates that 70% of a sample of stakeholders report increased preparedness, and that the surrounding policies and procedures are adequate.

Analysis from a DEPP return on investment study demonstrates that DEPP systems promote efficient response to emergencies.

3. DEPP agencies, with a particular emphasis on local and national NGOs, implement strategies which result in improved programming for humanitarian preparedness.

All DEPP agencies demonstrate improved humanitarian programming (including policies, plans and learning).

L/NNGOs supported by DEPP report more increased capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters than sample of L/NNGOs not supported by DEPP.

IMPACT

1. DEPP reduces suffering and delivers better humanitarian services, through improved preparedness, for people around the globe affected by disasters and emergencies.

1. Reduction in the number of lives lost, affected communities and economic losses due to improved preparedness in 10 DEPP focus countries.

In 2017 the number of reported deaths, total people affected, and economic losses due to natural disasters in 10 DEPP countries is reduced from the previous year.

More direct funding to local NGOs, as well as more funding into disaster preparedness, will result in faster and more efficient response on the ground.

It is assumed that for indicator 1 that in line with WHS guidelines, all agencies will self-report annually against commitments.

Reductions in overall numbers of lives lost and economic damages in the 10 DEPP focus countries are primarily due to humanitarian and government initiatives, although annual and seasonal fluctuations in the severity and number of disasters also play a role.
2. Humanitarian actors, including NGOs and governments, invest more in emergency preparedness programming to ensure that response to crises are better anticipated and planned.

The total amount of global official humanitarian assistance reported as committed to disaster prevention and preparedness in 2017 is USD 2500m.

Note: For impact indicator 2 the data is on a global level - it was not possible to disaggregate by DEPP country. Also, the DAC codes for reporting funds committed to disaster prevention and preparedness will change in the upcoming year, so that may affect data consistency across milestones.

Note: The data for Indicator 1 is available disaggregated by country.

Table 1.2: DEPP programme-level logical framework (fully implemented by August 2017)

**THE DEPP EXTERNAL EVALUATION**

**Purpose**

The three-year external, independent evaluation included process and performance as well as impact evaluations. The overall aims of the independent evaluation are:

1) to improve programme effectiveness and enhance learning

2) to assess the extent to which the DEPP overall has provided an efficient and effective approach to strengthening response capacity.

The research design for the evaluation was guided by a set of questions and methodological approach as outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex 4). The evaluation used a mixed methods design in order to capture a comprehensive picture of the DEPP’s effectiveness. The evaluation was conducted in four phases (inception, formative, interim, and summative phases). The detailed methodology can be found in Chapter 2.

The evaluation focuses at the programme level, and it is important to note that individual evaluations of the 14 individual projects are not within the remit of this evaluation. The evaluation serves to provide accountability and learning for programme, project and external stakeholders. These stakeholders include DEPP project consortia members, DEPP beneficiaries, programme and project-level staff, as well as external stakeholders from humanitarian NGOs, international organisations, the UN, and governments.

The evaluation’s inception phase was completed in January 2016. The inception phase report reviewed the DEPP theory of change, and presented the refined evaluation methodology and its limitations as well as the process for selecting countries for targeted intensive data collection during the formative, interim, and summative phases of the evaluation. The evaluation’s formative phase focused on relevance of programme outputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery. The formative phase report, completed in May 2017, assessed the programme design stage (2011 to early 2015), the programme implementation stage (October

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2014 to March 2017), and presented baseline quantitative indicators related to knowledge, attitudes, exposure to the DEPP, and emergency preparedness. The interim phase report was completed in October 2017 and presented perceptions on programme implementation and outputs (October 2014-October 2017), short-term outcome changes, as well as progress since the formative phase evaluation report and adoption of formative phase recommendations. The interim report also identified current gaps and emerging successes in programme implementation and provided guidance to DEPP stakeholders about how to improve the potential effectiveness of the DEPP and evidence to inform future similar programmes.

This summative phase report presents the cumulative findings from all phases of the external evaluation from November 2015 to May 2018. The aim of the summative phase was to assess intermediate outcomes and preliminary indicators of likelihood of impact. Findings are organised in five main sections that correspond to the key evaluation questions: 1) Relevance and Validity of Design; 2) Relevance and Effectiveness of the Interventions; 3) Effectiveness of Management Arrangements (in relation to collaboration); 4) Efficiency and Value for Money (VfM); 5) Sustainability of the Intervention and Likelihood of Impact of the Programme.

Evaluation Criteria and Questions

As per the evaluation ToR, the evaluation was designed based on five criteria which were adapted from the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) principles for Evaluating Development Assistance: relevance and fulfilment of objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The evaluation gathered and analysed data in order to answer the five key evaluation questions and associated sub-questions presented below. More detailed DEPP-specific evaluation criteria and questions are included in Annex 5.

**EVALUATION QUESTION 1: RELEVANCE AND VALIDITY OF DESIGN**

1. **To what extent are the objectives of the programme intervention consistent with stakeholders’ requirements and the programme design logical and coherent?**

   a. Has the programme targeted the right people in the right places?

   b. To what extent does the programme design (theory of change) support the projects’ design (logical framework)?

   c. In what ways was the programme design process participatory? Were project beneficiaries adequately engaged before, during and after?

   d. To what extent was the programme design logical and coherent?

      i. Were the objectives of the programme clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?

   e. Have prioritised target groups (people with disabilities, older people) and gender aspects been taken into consideration in the programme design?
EVALUATION QUESTION 2: RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS

2. In what ways have DEPP capacity building programmes strengthened emergency preparedness and response capacity amongst participants?
   a. What delivery mechanisms are working effectively and why?
   b. To what extent is DEPP contributing to greater preparedness and response among local organisations and communities?
      i. Has local capacity to respond to disasters changed since the start of DEPP? If yes, how has it changed? If not, why not?
      ii. Has DEPP led to improved knowledge and understanding of best practices relating to disaster and emergency preparedness and response? If yes, in what ways?

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

3. To what extent was the programme’s theory proven that capacity development is more effective when undertaken as a multi-agency collaborative approach?
   a. Is the collaborative approach of multi-stakeholder platforms an effective delivery mechanism?
   b. Focusing on coalitions, partnerships, and connectedness – what can be said about the effects of strengthened networks?
   c. What have been the main patterns of collaboration, and the benefits and disadvantages of informal vs. formal collaboration?
   d. What unique contribution did collaborative relationships and “multi-stakeholder platforms” make towards deepening cross-programme learning?

EVALUATION QUESTION 4: EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM)

4. How economically have resources and inputs (funds, expertise and time) been converted to results? To what extent does preparedness improve the efficiency of humanitarian response?
   a. Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the programme objectives?
   b. Have resources been used efficiently? In general, do the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results be attained with fewer resources?
   c. Have the programme funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
EVALUATION QUESTION 5: SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTION AND LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME

5. To what extent and in what ways have the benefits of the programme become embedded?

a. What contribution has the programme made in strengthening national preparedness systems?

b. Has the programme taken into consideration prioritised target groups (people with disabilities, older people, women, children and youth)? What contribution has the programme made in strengthening inclusion of target groups and gender aspects at the level of national and local institutions?

c. In what ways has DEPP influenced institutional and policy environments?

d. What is perceived to be the be the most significant change attributed to the DEPP and why?

Evaluation Timeline

The external evaluation had four phases (See Table 1.3): an inception phase during which the evaluation framework and methodology were designed; a formative phase to evaluate the implementation of the DEPP by assessing the relevance of outputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery; an interim phase to assess short-term outcomes; and a summative phase to assess intermediate outcomes and preliminary indicators of likelihood of impact. A modified timeline was approved by the evaluation steering committee due to delays in contracting local research partners, securing local approvals and challenges with data collection due to areas of insecurity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
<th>ACTUAL END DATE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception</td>
<td>Finalise evaluation methodology</td>
<td>8 Months</td>
<td>May 2016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formative</td>
<td>Assess relevance of programme outputs and efficiency of delivery</td>
<td>12 Months</td>
<td>May 2017*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim</td>
<td>Assess short-term outcomes delivered by the programme and reflect on programme management process</td>
<td>6 Months</td>
<td>October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summative</td>
<td>Assess intermediate outcomes and preliminary indicators of likelihood of impact</td>
<td>7 Months</td>
<td>May 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3: External evaluation phases, objectives and timeline

* Revised end date
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
EVALUATION DESIGN

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team’s approach used a mixed methods design with quantitative and qualitative data collection, including organisational-level assessments and community-level assessments, an economic VfM assessment, analysis of humanitarian preparedness and response networks, humanitarian response assessments and case studies, observation and site visits, and document review. Findings from these data sources were triangulated to address the five main evaluation questions and their sub-questions. As per the evaluation ToR, the evaluation framework was developed based on the DAC Principles for Evaluating Development Assistance, with the aim to improve future aid policies and programmes and to provide a basis for accountability.39 The framework which outlines the evaluation questions and their corresponding indicators is presented in Table 2.1 below. Data were collected throughout the four phases of the evaluation against the evaluation framework, and included all indicators included below. These indicators are presented throughout this report to answer the corresponding evaluation questions40.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN EVALUATION DESIGN</th>
<th>SECONDARY EVALUATION QUESTIONS</th>
<th>DEPP PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE / ELEMENT OF THEORY OF CHANGE</th>
<th>MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Evaluation Question</strong></td>
<td><strong>Secondary Evaluation Questions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Problem Statement (Theory of Change):</strong> In the context of rising need, insufficient preparedness systems and [few] people with the right knowledge, attitudes and skills are available to ensure effective delivery of assistance, particularly at the national level.</td>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are the objectives of the programme intervention consistent with stakeholders’ requirements and the programme design logical and coherent?</td>
<td>• Has the programme targeted the right people in the right places?</td>
<td>• Number of capacity development programmes developed and implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent does the programme design (theory of change) support the projects’ design (logical framework)?</td>
<td>• Number of national staff and counterparts trained</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In what ways was the programme design process participatory? Were project beneficiaries adequately engaged before, during and after?</td>
<td>• Number of platforms established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent was the programme design logical and coherent?</td>
<td>• Number of learning events held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Were the objectives of the programme clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?</td>
<td>• Number of reports / case studies developed and shared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have prioritised target groups (people with disabilities, older people) and gender aspects been taken into consideration in the programme design?</td>
<td>• Increased advocacy to strengthen policy and practice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


40 For example, evaluation question two in the framework below is associated with indicators on knowledge (improved knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, disaster preparedness, humanitarian response, on ageing, disability and VAWG). These are presented in Chapter 4, the chapter corresponding to this evaluation question (see Figure 4.6).
### 2. RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVENTIONS

**Objective 1:** To improve knowledge and understanding of people in the system regarding best practice for humanitarian preparedness and response.

- Stakeholder perspectives on effective delivery mechanisms
- Improved knowledge and skills of national staff and counterparts in best practices for humanitarian preparedness and response
  - Improved knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, disaster preparedness, humanitarian response
  - Improved knowledge on ageing, disability and VAWG
- Improved emergency preparedness among organisations and communities
  - Improved perceived level of preparedness of humanitarian staff to respond to a disaster
  - Improved perceived level of preparedness of organisations to respond to a disaster
  - Improved community access to early warning alerts
  - Improved actual level of organisational preparedness to respond to disasters (Organisational preparedness score)
  - Improved actual level of community preparedness to respond to disasters (Vulnerability index / Community preparedness score)
- # and types of disasters organisations responded to in the previous 12 months, and types of response activities
- Improved delivery of humanitarian assistance during a humanitarian response
  - Improved perceptions of humanitarian staff on their own performance during a previous response
  - Improved perceptions of humanitarian staff on their own ability to respond to a disaster in the future
  - Improved perceptions on organisations’ performance during a previous response
  - Improved perceptions on organisations’ ability to respond to a disaster in the future
  - Improved satisfaction of community members with previous response to a disaster
  - Increased speed of response
  - Increased collaboration during response

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In what ways have DEPP capacity building programmes strengthened response capacity amongst participants?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• What delivery mechanisms are working effectively and why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent is DEPP contributing to greater preparedness and response among local organisations and communities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Has local capacity to respond to disasters changed since the start of DEPP? If yes, how has it changed? If not, why not?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Has DEPP led to improved knowledge and understanding of best practices relating to disaster and emergency preparedness and response? If yes, in what ways?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

**To what extent was the programme’s theory that capacity development is more effective when undertaken as a multi-agency collaborative approach proven?**

- Is the ‘collaborative’ approach of multi-stakeholder platforms an effective delivery mechanism?
- Focusing on coalitions, partnerships and connectedness – what can be said about the effects of strengthened networks?
- What have been the main patterns of collaboration, and the benefits and disadvantages of informal versus formal collaboration?
- What unique contribution did collaborative relationships and ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ make toward deepening cross-programme learning?

**Objective 2:** To increase the number of coalitions and partnerships developed.

- Increased number of networks and coalitions formed
  - Increased network size
  - Increased links per node
  - Increased network density
  - Number of second degree, third degree connections

- Increased collaboration and strength of connections
  - Increased number of collaboration areas
  - Increased frequency of collaboration
  - Increased strength of connections
  - Stakeholder perceptions on collaboration
  - Types of benefits / disadvantages of informal and formal collaboration

- Emerging evidence base for what works in building humanitarian capacity
  - Number and types of learning documents generated and shared
  - Sharing and use of evidence and lessons across DEPP projects and externally

### 4. EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM)

**How, economically, have resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) been converted to results? To what extent does preparedness improve the efficiency of humanitarian response?**

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the programme objectives?
- Have resources been used efficiently?
  - In general, do the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results be attained with fewer resources?
- Have programme funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?

**All DEPP Objectives.**

- **4 ‘E’ Framework**
  - Economy
  - Effectiveness
  - Efficiency
  - Equity
  - Percent of budget allocation to programme management costs, M&E, NPACs
  - Timeliness of delivery of funds and activities
  - Cost per activity and results areas
  - Stakeholder perspectives on VFM, delivery of funds
5. SUSTAINABILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT

To what extent and in what ways have the benefits of the programme become embedded?

- What contribution has the programme made in strengthening national preparedness systems?
- Has the programme taken into consideration prioritised target groups (people with disabilities, older people, women, children and youth)? What contribution has the programme made in strengthening inclusion of target groups and gender aspects at the level of national and local institutions?
- In what ways has DEPP influenced institutional and policy environments?
- What is perceived to be the most significant change attributed to DEPP, and why?

Objective 3: To improve institutional and policy environments for building humanitarian capacity.

Objective 4: To improve preparedness systems for communities at risk of disaster.

Objective 5: Strengthened evidence base for what works to help build humanitarian capacity at scale.

Improved national preparedness systems
- Stakeholder perceptions on strengthened national preparedness systems

Inclusion of vulnerable groups
- Percentage of organisations with inclusion policies
- Perceived inclusion during organisational preparedness activities
- Perceived inclusion during organisational response activities
- Perceived inclusion in community preparedness plans

Improved institutional environment/arrangements
- Perceived individual influence with organisation
- Perceived influence of organisations on institutional and policy environment
- Perceived influence of organisation on national preparedness systems
- Inclusiveness of organisational policy towards L/NGOs
- Change in organisational policy on working with L/NGOs

Most significant change
- Stakeholder perspectives on most significant change attributed to the DEPP

---

Due to limited resources, the evaluation was designed to conduct in-person data collection in a subset of DEPP countries, and remote data collection among the remaining DEPP countries. The evaluation methodology therefore included:

1) An intensive set of evaluation activities with on-site quantitative and qualitative data collection in a subset of DEPP focus countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Myanmar and the Philippines)

2) A minimum set of evaluation activities including a desk review and remote quantitative and qualitative data collection. Qualitative data were collected across all ten DEPP countries, and quantitative data were collected in five non-intensive set countries (South Sudan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, and DRC). There were no DEPP activities in Mozambique at the time of data collection, therefore data were not collected as part of the minimum set.

The intensive and minimum set of evaluation activities, as well as the other data collection sources and their respective study locations, are described in more detail below.

Data were collected at two time points that were roughly 12 months apart—time point 1 (T1) during the formative phase of the evaluation, and time point 2 (T2) in the interim phase, in order to assess changes over time. A true baseline was not possible given that the evaluation team was selected and contracted after the start of the DEPP projects. As such, data collection in T1, which serves as the first data point in the evaluation and a comparison for T2 data collection, took place after DEPP activities had already begun for most projects. The potential
effects of this lack of a true baseline assessment are described in greater detail in the limitations section. Data from relevant comparison groups were collected where possible.

**COUNTRY SELECTION FOR INTENSIVE SET EVALUATION ACTIVITIES**

Of the ten DEPP countries, the external evaluation team initially aimed to select three countries for targeted data collection as part of the intensive set evaluation activities. During the country selection process, a number of key criteria were identified and applied. These included the selection criteria as defined in Table 2.2. To ensure diversity of geographic regions, types of humanitarian crises, inclusion of both CDAC and START Network projects and a range of types of targeted beneficiaries including community-level direct beneficiaries, the evaluation team opted to expand the number of countries selected from three to five. Additional criteria that factored into the decision-making process included ensuring the inclusion of several countries with a high likelihood of an upcoming disaster or emergency to permit potential assessment of outcomes related to real emergency situations. In addition, the team sought to include countries with varying numbers of DEPP projects and different project combinations to permit study of whether these factors influenced network formation and outcome changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY SELECTION CRITERIA</th>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Region</td>
<td>Ensured adequate regional representation of DEPP projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>Considered types of humanitarian crises including armed conflict, natural disasters, famine, and epidemics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of CDAC and START Network Projects</td>
<td>Included CDAC and START Network projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP Funds Allocated to Country</td>
<td>DEPP funds allocated to each country were estimated based on available project budgets. Countries with less than and greater than the average (10%) allocation were included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Direct Beneficiaries (Household, Community, Organisation, etc.)</td>
<td>Assessed the types of direct beneficiaries at the project and country levels. Given that few DEPP projects directly target communities, it was important to include countries with community-level direct beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of Upcoming Disaster or Emergency</td>
<td>While this was difficult to predict, the evaluation team considered countries that had a high likelihood of a disaster or emergency occurring during the DEPP timeline as this would allow for assessment of outcomes during a disaster or emergency situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual Factors</td>
<td>Accounted for unique contextual factors such as social, economic, political factors to ensure that selected countries represented a diverse range of contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of DEPP Projects and Project Combination in Country</td>
<td>Assessed number of DEPP projects and the specific combination of projects in each country. The final cohort of selected countries included countries with different numbers of DEPP projects and different project combinations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the selection criteria, five DEPP countries were selected for intensive set evaluation activities. These included Kenya (Africa region, high number of DEPP projects), Ethiopia (Africa region, medium number of DEPP projects), the Philippines (Asia region, medium number of DEPP projects), and Myanmar (Asia region, low number of DEPP projects) (see Table 2.3). The fifth country selected was South Sudan. However, increased violence in July 2016 significantly affected the DEPP projects operating in that country and required evacuation of their staff members; thus, data for the intensive set of evaluation activities were not collected in South Sudan. After discussions with the CDAC-N and Protection in Practice projects operating in South Sudan, and close monitoring of the security situation, in October 2016, the evaluation team revised the methodology for data collection. Instead of on-site data collection as initially planned and outlined in the inception report, data on South Sudan was collected as part of the
minimum set evaluation activities and through an in-depth case study. As the CDAC-N project eventually shifted its programming to the Philippines, the final four intensive set countries were still able to ensure representation of all 14 DEPP projects within the evaluation (see Table 2.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPP Project*</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>MYANMAR</th>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Emergency Preparedness in Gambella</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved Early Warning – Early Actions to Strengthen Disaster Preparedness in Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar</td>
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<td>Urban Early Warning Early Action Learning Project</td>
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<td>Financial Enablers CDAC-N</td>
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<td>Shifting the Power Talent Development</td>
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<td>Transforming Surge Capacity Protection in Practice</td>
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<td>ALERT</td>
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<td>Age and Disability Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience</td>
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<th>Key Selection Criteria</th>
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<td>Geographic Region</td>
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<td>Asia</td>
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<td>Inclusion of CDAC and START Network Projects</td>
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<td>CDAC and START</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct Community-level Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPP Funds Allocated to Country (Estimated based on available project budgets)</td>
<td>&gt;10%</td>
<td>&gt;10%</td>
<td>&lt;10%</td>
<td>&gt;10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of DEPP Projects at time of country selection*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Number of Projects (at end of DEPP) | 5 | 7 | 4 | 7 |

Table 2.3: Country selection matrix for the intensive set of evaluation activities

*There were some changes in the implementation countries over the course of the DEPP

**CON Texts OF INTENSIVE SET EVALUATION COUNTRIES**

As intended, the final four intensive set countries are diverse and have very different disaster profiles and contexts as detailed in the boxes below (pages 51 and 52). These contexts influenced the implementation of the projects and, to some degree, what could be achieved in each setting. Therefore, analysis of the country-level findings takes into account the country-specific contexts.
THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines is at great risk for natural disasters due to its wide-ranging terrain, vast coastline, and position on the “Ring of Fire,” an arc of active volcanoes in the Pacific Ocean basin that make this one of the most active and unpredictable geographical areas in Southeast Asia. Typhoons, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and fires, are examples of common natural disasters, with roughly 6-7 tropical cyclones causing significant damage annually, out of an average of 22 occurrences. Man-made threats include climate change, an overuse of coastal, marine, and forest resource, and forced displacement due to occasional conflicts in Mindanao.

There is a strong presence of local NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) involved in humanitarian work in the Philippines. OCHA also maintains a sub-office in Cotabato City, in order to monitor different aspects of an emergency, such as the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their evacuation and transition sites, as well as connect with various stakeholders, including local government, UN agencies, and NGOs. With regards to government disaster risk reduction (DRR), the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) functions as the lead agency for DRR preparation and actions. Other arms of the government that are directly involved in disaster relief include the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) (which leads immediate disaster relief efforts), and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

MYANMAR

The humanitarian situation in Myanmar is both complex and large, with an estimated 863,000 people requiring humanitarian assistance in 2018. There is a large range of threats and challenges within the country, including natural disasters, food insecurity, armed conflict, inter-communal tensions, statelessness, displacement, and trafficking. Natural disasters that affect Myanmar include floods, cyclones, earthquakes, droughts, fires, and landslides in the mountainous regions. Other humanitarian challenges include internal displacement, with roughly 241,000 displaced (77% women and children) and living in camp or camp-like situations in Kachin, Kayin, Shan, and Rakhine states. In 2012, 120,000 were displaced following inter-communal violence, and in 2016, tens of thousands were displaced due to border post attacks in northern part of the Rakhine State. Occasional conflicts also occur in the Kachin and Shan states, which displaced nearly 100,000 people. More recently, from August to November 2017, more than 600,000 refugees of the Rohingya ethnic minority left Myanmar to resettle in Bangladesh.

Currently, various INGOs have a presence in Myanmar, though the amount of activity and work conducted by these organisations is lower compared to that of several other DEPP countries, as Myanmar only recently opened to humanitarian actors. The presence and level of engagement of local NGOs are lower than that of INGOs due to the current humanitarian landscape.
Kenya faces a range of humanitarian challenges, including drought, food insecurity and malnutrition, and outbreaks of diseases such as cholera. The country hosts nearly 500,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. As of January 2018, six different counties within Kenya were battling an active Cholera outbreak. Drought conditions persist over large portions of the country leading to inter-communal conflict in certain areas. These challenges have impacted communities dependent on agriculture and pastoralism, as the frequent recurrence of natural disasters such as drought result in a loss of crops and/or livestock. This has contributed to food insecurity, with 3.4 million people requiring food assistance, and a rise in food prices. Finally, the continued influx of refugees has also placed a strain on Kenya’s already scarce resources such as water.

The government of Kenya has had active roles in responding to some of these humanitarian challenges. For instance, they led the drought response at the county and national levels in 2017. However, the country’s infrastructure is not generally able to respond to large-scale crises. In late 2017, these challenges were further exacerbated by delays, uncertainty, and civil unrest during the political election.

INGOs and multi-lateral organisations have a strong presence in Kenya, with several closely collaborating with the government in certain humanitarian responses.

Ethiopia’s key humanitarian challenges fall under the following categories: displacement of individuals, disease outbreaks, climate-related issues, socio-economic difficulties, malnutrition, and a lack of safe drinking water. Ethiopia hosts a large population of refugees, and IDPs due to a combination of internal conflict and climate-related difficulties such as drought and flooding. Throughout Ethiopia, resources such as food and safe drinking water are scarce and are worsened by drought, leading to rising levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. UN agencies have indicated that these challenges are contributing to higher rates of violence against women, and limited access to health facilities, particularly for those affected by these crises.

Ethiopia receives support in the form of funding and in-country presence from various multi-lateral organisations and INGOs, in part to increase prevention activities, raise the level of emergency preparedness, and strengthen the system for recovery efforts. Many of these organisations have identified priority areas and donor funding, such as improving emergency systems and increasing the capacity of local government. Several organisations have also sought to collaborate with the local and national governments, such as to develop the Ethiopia Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan (HDRP) and a comprehensive drought response plan.

59 United Nations OCHA. Kenya [Internet]. [place unknown]: OCHA; [updated 2018 February 20; cited 2018 April 24].
61 Save the Children. Humanitarian Response: The Situation for Children in Kenya [Internet]. [England]: Save the Children; [updated 2018; cited 2018 April 24].
63 Ibid.
64 USAID. Ethiopia [Internet]. [place unknown]: USAID; [updated 2018 April 9; cited 2018 April 24].
65 Ibid.
66 USAID. Active USG Programs for the Ethiopia Response [Internet]. [place unknown]: USAID; [cited 2018 April 24].
68 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Ethiopia: 2018 Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan seeks US$1.6B to assist 7.9M people [Internet]. [place unknown]: OCHA; 2018 March [cited 2018 April 24].
69 USAID. Ethiopia.
70 Relief web. Ethiopia: Government and partners launch the humanitarian and disaster resilience plan (HDRP) for 2018. [place unknown]: Relief Web; 2018 March [cited 2018 April 24].
DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES AND TOOLS

Given the complexity of the DEPP and its range of activities targeting different levels of action (including individual, organisational, community, and systems) and its objectives to strengthen networks and improve efficiency of the humanitarian response, a number of data collection approaches were conceptualised, and corresponding data collection instruments were developed. Overall seven types of assessments were planned with many of these including several different, complementary data collection elements. The seven assessment types along with the corresponding tools are presented in Table 2.4. All of the data collection instruments are available in Annex 6.

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<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL ASSESSMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTRY DIRECTOR</strong></td>
<td><strong>METHOD</strong></td>
<td><strong>SURVEY/ TOOL</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOPIC</strong></td>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td><strong>NIGERIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETHIOPIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>MYANMAR</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
<td><strong>KENYA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country director (Senior management if country director not available) *</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Organisational Survey</td>
<td>Questions on preparedness, response, &amp; capacity building activities implemented, coordination structures, perceptions of institutional environment, network &amp; collaborating partners, &amp; the outputs &amp; outcomes of the DEPP</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational humanitarian staff</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Survey</td>
<td>Questions on knowledge, skills, &amp; behaviour in humanitarian preparedness and response, core humanitarian concepts, prioritised groups, exposure to capacity-building activities, network and collaborating partners, and the outputs &amp; outcomes of the DEPP</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior management (Country director or another senior manager if the country director was not available)*</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>In-depth Interviews</td>
<td>Questions on experiences with capacity building, collaboration, institutional environment and policies, organisational preparedness, improving preparedness systems for communities, contextual factors</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-level or Senior-level staff</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Organisational Checklist</td>
<td>Questions on organisational preparedness plans, and organisational response capacity and coordination</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme staff/ management &amp; project leads</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>In-depth Interviews</td>
<td>Questions on experiences with DEPP activities, perceptions of project and programme effectiveness, contextual factors, number and type of specific project activities</td>
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<td>✔</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTRY DIRECTOR</strong></td>
<td><strong>METHOD</strong></td>
<td><strong>SURVEY/ TOOL</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOPIC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>NIGERIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETHIOPIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>MYANMAR</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
<td><strong>KENYA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Community focus group discussion</td>
<td>Questions on community vulnerability, risk, and resilience to disasters and emergencies</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Community survey</td>
<td>Questions on community preparedness plans and actions, structural mitigation activities, new or improved early warning systems, political commitment of local government and community structures</td>
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<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Household survey</td>
<td>Questions on household preparedness, disaster risk knowledge, exposure to hazards, access to early warning alerts, households behaviour related to preparedness, perceptions of community preparedness for emergencies and disasters</td>
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<td><strong>THE PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
<td><strong>KENYA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme staff/ management &amp; project leads</td>
<td>Value for money in-depth interviews</td>
<td>Value for money &amp; financial review</td>
<td>Questions on resource allocation, value chains &amp; transaction costs, &amp; time &amp; resources</td>
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<td><strong>MYANMAR</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
<td><strong>KENYA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collaborating partners identified in network section of organisational surveys &amp; KAP surveys during organisational Assessment</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Network survey</td>
<td>Questions on collaborating organisations, trust among partners, &amp; frequency of collaboration within networks</td>
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<td>✔</td>
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</table>
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE ASSESSMENT AND CASE STUDIES

- DEPP & external stakeholders
  - Qualitative:
  - In-depth interviews, self-administered questionnaires
- Other stakeholders
  - Observation & site visits
  - Questions on disasters & emergencies in DEPP countries, DEPP contribution to humanitarian responses

OTHER ASSESSMENTS

- Project staff, organisational staff & external stakeholders
  - Observation & site visits
  - Participation in country-level and global learning events, visits to organisational partners and external stakeholders during data collection
- N/A
  - Document review
  - Matrices
  - Review of programme and project level documents and resources

Table 2.4: Methodology, study tools, sample population and data collection site for each type of assessment

ETHICS

Ethical considerations for this evaluation were carefully assessed and the data collection was designed to ensure protection of individuals participating in the study. Human subjects research approval for the evaluation protocol and study instruments was obtained from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) as well as from relevant bodies in each of the intensive set countries. In the four intensive set countries, the evaluation team partnered with local research organisations who implemented the data collection. These included the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics (Kenya), The Ethiopian Public Health Association (Ethiopia), and Innovations for Poverty Action (Myanmar, The Philippines). These local research partners hired the study staff. The evaluation team conducted site visits at T1 and T2 to participate in the enumerator training, piloting of instruments and protocols, and several days of data collection to ensure data quality. Following this, the evaluation team was in close contact with the in-country research teams in order to remotely supervise the ongoing data collection. This involved regular meetings and debriefing sessions with the evaluation team, as well as regular and frequent checks of incoming data to ensure quality. Questionnaires were piloted and programmed into KoBo Toolbox, an electronic data collection software which permitted the evaluation team to closely monitor incoming data from the field teams.

SAMPLE SIZE

The sample size for the evaluation is detailed in Table 2.5. In total, 2675 quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews were completed during T1, including 422 in the minimum set of evaluation activities and 2253 in the intensive set of evaluation activities. In T2, a total of 3440 quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews were completed, with 250 in the minimum set and 3190 in the intensive set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum Set</th>
<th>Intensive Set</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>VFM</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5: Sample size for evaluation activities
EVALUATION OF THE DEPP - SUMMATIVE PHASE REPORT

METHODS FOR THE INTENSIVE SET OF EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

A local research manager based in each intensive set country oversaw and coordinated all of the field work. The study instruments were written in English and translated to the local language in all countries except Kenya, and adapted to the local context, piloted and modified to ensure that the meanings of questions and responses were correct. Updated instruments were approved by the appropriate IRBs. Male and female data collectors as well as supervisors were recruited in each country taking into account relevant characteristics needed for each type of survey. For example, for the community and household surveys, enumerators who could speak the local language were recruited from the study areas. The enumerators were trained for a minimum of five days, and conducted field practice over three to five days with organisations or communities which were not part of the sample population. This permitted enumerators to practice administering the surveys under real-world conditions, and to assess the translated instruments and address errors or problems with the translation prior to the start of data collection. At least one evaluation team member was present for and participated in the training, the piloting and the start of the data collection. After this, the evaluation team member remained in regular contact with the in-country data collection team to remotely supervise the field work. Regular meetings with in-country teams were held, and in-coming data were checked regularly to ensure high quality.

Verbal informed consent was obtained from participants and interviews were conducted in private settings to ensure confidentiality. In order to minimise bias and to prevent inducement to participate, no compensation was provided to respondents who participated. Instead, a certificate of participation was provided. Questionnaires were administered by local, trained enumerators using Kobo Toolbox on Android tablets in either English or in the local language. In-depth interviews lasted approximately one hour and were audio recorded on Android tablets. Quantitative and qualitative data were uploaded to a secure server, which is only accessible by key evaluation staff that have ethical clearance. Copies of the audio recording on the tablets were deleted to protect privacy and confidentiality. Data were monitored on an ongoing basis to ensure high quality. Any errors were corrected immediately. Enumerators were continuously provided feedback to improve their performance and data quality.

ORGANISATIONAL-LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the sampling approaches and survey instruments that were used for each of the sample groups in the organisational-level assessment. First, a list of organisations and communities associated with the DEPP projects was created in each intensive set country. In parallel, a list of comparison organisations were identified in each country through a variety of means. Lists of both national and international organisations working on emergency preparedness and response in each country were constructed with information from various sources including UNOCHA, humanitarian working groups, and national NGO registries. Organisations that were similar in size, scope, and with similar geographic focus as those working on the DEPP in each country were selected, and the proportion of international NGOs to national NGOs was kept constant across control and DEPP groups. In the event that there were more control organisations than needed that met the selection criteria, a subset of organisations was randomly selected. In countries where there were more than 50 DEPP organisations, a random selection of organisations was selected for participation in the evaluation. In countries where there were less than 50 DEPP organisations, all organisations
were selected for the sample.

For each organisation, the following surveys were conducted: 1) one organisational survey, 2) one organisational checklist, and 3) three knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) surveys. In addition, a random selection of 15% organisations in the sample were selected to participate in an in-depth interview (IDI) in addition to the surveys above.

**ORGANISATIONAL SURVEY, KAP SURVEY, ORGANISATIONAL CHECKLIST, AND IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS**

In-country research partners carried out the following procedures:

1) Email invitations were sent to the country directors, or main contact of each organisation in the sample to inform them that their organisation was selected to participate in the DEPP evaluation, and organisations were asked to provide the research partners with a list of humanitarian staff.

2) Appointments were made with country directors (or members of senior management when country directors were not available) to conduct an in-person organisational survey. In addition to completing the organisation survey, the individual was asked to a) name a staff member with in-depth knowledge of the organisational preparedness plans, procedures, and systems, to complete the organisational checklist; b) recommend another member of senior management to complete the in-depth interview (for organisations selected); and c) provide a list of staff within the organisation if this was not provided by the organisation prior to the interview.

3) The staff member identified by the country director or member of senior management was approached to complete the organisational checklist.

4) For the KAP survey, three staff members within each organisation were randomly selected from the list of humanitarian staff, and appointments were made with selected individuals for an in-person survey.

5) In the 15% of organisations that were randomly selected for the in-depth interviews, in addition to the quantitative surveys, country directors or members of senior management that did not participate in the organisational surveys were selected to participate in an in-depth interview.

**ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL SAMPLING**

*Surveys completed by different members of organisational management, depending on availability*
All surveys conducted based on the above procedures were carried out in-person, with the exception of a small number of surveys conducted over Skype or phone due to extenuating circumstances. The number of organisations varied per country as it was based on the number of DEPP implementing partners and beneficiaries in each country, and this was dependent on the projects themselves. In most cases, this did not exceed 50 DEPP organisations and 400 humanitarian staff working at DEPP organisations per country. An equal number of comparison organisations, humanitarian staff, communities and households which were similar in size and location or other factors to the DEPP study population were also selected using the same sampling approach.

COMMUNITY-LEVEL ASSESSMENT

A list of all villages where DEPP activities were implemented at the community level was compiled in Myanmar and Ethiopia. In Myanmar, DEPP villages in Kayin and Shan state were selected for the sample. To generate a list of comparison villages, in-country research teams worked with the local governments or other partners to obtain a list of all villages in the area, including their population size and other demographic characteristics. From this list, a set of comparison villages which were similar in size and demographics, but far enough from the DEPP villages to minimise risk of exposure to DEPP intervention, were selected.

In Ethiopia, the Gambella region was selected for the community assessment because two DEPP projects were implementing community-level activities there (PHEP Gambella, EWEA). DEPP interventions benefitted all villages within a district (woreda), and thus a list of DEPP woredas71 and non DEPP woredas, including the villages in each woreda, was constructed. Any areas or villages in that list, deemed inaccessible by the local government due to violence, security or flooding were removed from the sample. A random sample of villages that were accessible in the DEPP woredas were selected for data collection. For the comparison group, a random sample of villages in the non-DEPP woredas was selected for data collection.

COMMUNITY LEVEL SAMPLING

In each sampled community, the following surveys were conducted: 1) one community survey, 2) ~1000 household surveys 3) one community focus group discussion. All surveys conducted based on the above procedures were carried out in-person. Focus group discussion questions were adapted from the GOAL Community Resilience Toolkit72.

---

71 A woreda is the equivalent of a district.
COMMUNITY SURVEY, HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, COMMUNITY FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

In-country research partners carried out the following procedures:

1) Local research partners contacted local organisations and governments implementing activities in each village, who then introduced the research partners to relevant community leaders and informants.

2) The community leader from each village was selected for the community survey.

3) A random sample of households was selected for the household survey.

4) Community members involved in disaster preparedness were recruited for the community focus group discussion.

METHODS FOR THE MINIMUM SET OF EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

The study population for the minimum set in-depth interviews comprised UK-based project leadership, project leadership in DEPP countries, DEPP programme-level leadership and targeted stakeholders. A list of project and programme leadership was finalised and participants were recruited through person-to-person contact at DEPP learning events and through email invitations. For each DEPP project, the evaluation team aimed to sample both the UK-based leadership and the in-country leadership. If a project did not have leadership at the UK level, the in-country leadership were invited to participate.

For the DEPP targeted stakeholders, purposive sampling was applied. Using a list of contacts from the inception and formative phases, targeted stakeholders were invited to participate. There were several participants who were involved at the project level and programme level; in this case, those participants were interviewed only once. Some of the key stakeholders who took part were individuals who had previously worked on the DEPP but are no longer formally engaged with the programme. Additional effort was made to locate and invite these individuals for participation in the interviews.

Verbal informed consent was obtained for all interviews. Interviews were conducted by one of three evaluation team members in English. The interviews were conducted either in person or by Skype, and lasted approximately 45-75 minutes. The interviews were recorded using CallNote software or mobile audio recording software for Skype interviews and on an Android tablet using a stock audio recording software. Evaluation team members transcribed the audio recorded interviews. Transcripts were imported into Dedoose qualitative analysis software.

Following the in-depth interviews conducted at T2, all interview participants were emailed a link to an optional online questionnaire on Kobo Toolbox to capture additional perspectives on project delivery and impact that were not covered during the interviews.
ONLINE ORGANISATIONAL SURVEY AND KAP SURVEY

The study population for the minimum set online quantitative questionnaires comprised 1) organisational leadership and 2) humanitarian programming staff from implementing organisations and beneficiary organisations in DRC, South Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Jordan. A list of DEPP organisations was finalised with the UK-based project leads and Regional Learning Advisors (RLAs). Participants were recruited by the evaluation team through email invitation.

Abridged versions of the organisational survey and KAP survey from the intensive set of evaluation activities were sent via email invitation through links to online surveys using KoBoToolbox. Online questionnaires for all participants were administered in English except in the DRC where it was translated to French. Questionnaires were emailed to DEPP implementing and beneficiary organisations and were completed using Kobo Toolbox. Participants provided consent prior to beginning the questionnaire.

No rewards or compensation were provided to participants. A certificate of study participation was provided to participants in project countries who completed the online questionnaire.

ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (VALUE FOR MONEY)

Interviews for the VfM analysis were conducted in person and via Skype by the evaluation team’s economist and VfM adviser. Purposive sampling was applied. The study population for the economic data collection included DEPP portfolio management team members, DEPP board members and project staff.

A review of budgets, financial information and project reports, was also conducted to assess VfM at the project and programme level. In addition, data from select questions on cost and efficiency from the organisational-level assessment of the evaluation (organisational and KAP surveys) were analysed. Cost per result indicators were created through the financial review process. The extent to which VfM recommendations from formative phase were implemented by the projects was also assessed.

NETWORK ANALYSIS

The network survey was carried out in two phases at both time points. The first phase included administering questions on networks and collaborating partners that were embedded within the quantitative organisational and KAP surveys. In the network section of these surveys, organisational leadership and humanitarian staff were asked to identify the organisations they collaborated with over the last six months and to describe the nature or purpose of the collaboration. They selected from a list of 32 collaboration areas in which humanitarian actors are likely to engage. Respondents were also given the option to name their own areas of collaboration. Respondents then identified their main contact at each collaborating organisation. The actors that were named by first phase survey participants are considered to be 1st degree actors; they are one degree of separation away from the survey informant. The in-country research partners then called each of the 1st degree actors and the standalone network survey was conducted with that individual over the phone. These individuals were then asked to identify their main contact at each collaborating organisation, and those contacts are considered 2nd degree actors, as they are two degrees of separation from the original survey informant. The standalone network survey was then conducted with the 2nd degree actors, with the exception of the Philippines due to limited time and resources.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE ASSESSMENT AND CASE STUDY

In-depth case studies were added to the evaluation methodology during the formative and interim phases to provide further perspectives on emergency preparedness and response
activities in the programme, and to assess whether improved preparedness translated into more efficient and timely humanitarian response. Simulation exercises were initially proposed during the inception phase as a method to measure DEPP beneficiaries’ performance during humanitarian response activities in a controlled manner. The intention was to collect such data during simulations that were planned by DEPP projects themselves. However, over the three-year programme, projects changed their plans regarding simulations, and it was also noted that several of the DEPP projects responded to actual disasters in the project countries providing an opportunity to assess contributions to real humanitarian responses. After reflection and discussion with the Learning Project, the evaluation team decided to conduct two in-depth case studies. The first case study was conducted in South Sudan to capture experiences and perspectives of project activities during the escalation of violence in the formative phase and how this impacted project implementation. The second case study focused on humanitarian responses in Ethiopia and Kenya during the course of the DEPP to capture the quality and speed of response activities in lieu of simulation-based data collection.

The case study approach allowed for deeper exploration and analysis of actual humanitarian responses that took place during the DEPP programme cycle. Purposive sampling was applied. Potential participants were contacted by email with a brief description of the case study to be conducted as part of the evaluation and invited to participate. In Kenya, response case study data collection also included site visits and observational data as well as inclusion of beneficiary population interviews. In Ethiopia, due to security concerns, a site visit was not conducted in Moyale district and a smaller sample of participants were included in the data collection.

In addition, during the dissemination and validation workshops conducted by the evaluation team in the intensive set countries, a self-administered questionnaire was circulated to document disasters and humanitarian response activities. The questionnaire asked participants to identify all of the disasters and emergencies that had occurred in their countries since the beginning of the DEPP, and to indicate which crises their project had responded to. These data allowed the evaluation team to assess the number and type of disasters and emergencies in each intensive set country, and provided a description of the type and extent of the response activities that the DEPP organisation conducted.

OBSERVATION AND SITE VISITS

Members of the evaluation team and local research partners had opportunities to visit projects and engage with project stakeholders in countries where the intensive set of evaluation activities took place and in countries where team members attended learning events. Prior to data collection, the evaluation team conducted site visits and facilitated induction workshops in each country selected for the intensive evaluation activities to introduce the external evaluation to DEPP project leadership and staff, and gather feedback on the proposed plan for that country. These sessions also provided an opportunity to engage in dialogue with project leadership and staff, which contributed to the refinement of the methodology, study protocol and data collection instruments.

Evaluation team members also participated in a number of learning and collaboration meetings and conferences (Table 2.6). These events permitted engagement with DEPP project teams and key stakeholders, and also more structured assessment and observation on the differences in perspectives of DEPP leadership and staff at the UK level and at the country level, contextual factors that impact project implementation, and the value of evidence and different research methodologies in the humanitarian field. During the summative phase, the evaluation team organised validation workshops in the four intensive set countries to disseminate findings and gather feedback at the country level. The results of the validation workshops provided further context and insight into the evaluation findings and helped to inform the recommendations.

Evaluation team members compiled notes during observation and site visits and extracted key themes. Observation data presented in this report are based on these field visits and conference attendance to enable the evaluation team members to interact with projects.
Table 2.6: Evaluation team member participation at DEPP events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBSERVATION AND SITE VISITS</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEL/Learning Project launch</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>March 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London collaboration day</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London collaboration day</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception phase workshops</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, the Philippines</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START Conference</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch of T1 data collection</td>
<td>Kenya, Myanmar, the Philippines</td>
<td>September - November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London collaboration day</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Learning Conference</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch of T1 data collection</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP Learning Conference</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>July 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation workshop</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>July 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch of T2 data collection</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, the Philippines</td>
<td>September - November 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formative phase dissemination events</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya</td>
<td>November 2017, January 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summative phase dissemination and validation workshops</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, the Philippines</td>
<td>March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing for Shock Conference</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>March 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DOCUMENT REVIEW**

The evaluation team engaged in continuous and comprehensive information collection and review of all available documentation and materials relevant to the programme and the projects throughout the programme cycle. Documents were obtained directly from project and programme staff, as well as via the DEPP’s online Box folders, and the online DEPP Learning Platform. This included project reports, documents, case studies, presentations and any other available materials in addition to data collected through each project’s monitoring and evaluation system. Documents and learning captured through the DEPP’s Learning Project activities were also obtained. Once the existing documents were obtained and compiled, the review and analysis involved assessing each document, categorising it, and extracting key data in a matrix where key themes, such as gender considerations, could be compared. Table 2.9 presents a summary of the documents reviewed as part of the document review.

Finally, a targeted literature review related to humanitarian capacity building activities was conducted and external documents were also consulted as part of this process to inform the overall interpretation of data. A complete list of documents reviewed is provided in Annex 7.

**ANALYSIS**

Data were analysed over the three-year evaluation period. Differences between subgroups and countries were assessed, and data were triangulated from multiple sources to strengthen and validate findings. Context-specific information and perspectives from the local research teams and country-level DEPP stakeholders (through validation workshops) were also applied to country-level data to ensure sound interpretations.

The Learning Platform can be found here: [https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/](https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/).
For the qualitative data, in-depth interviews conducted in other languages were translated to English. The analysis process included listening to audio recordings or reviewing transcripts which were then coded and analysed using Dedoose software for qualitative data analysis. Main themes, concepts, and quotes were extracted either from the audio recordings or from the transcripts and categorised in a detailed matrix to facilitate comparison and identification of patterns overall and within subgroups.

Quantitative data were analysed using Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software and STATA (version 13.1). Descriptive statistics were generated, with comparisons made between intensive set countries as well as across the entire sample of 10 countries when possible, and between the DEPP and comparison groups. T-tests and Chi-squared tests were conducted to assess whether differences between DEPP and control groups were statistically significant. Difference-in-Difference Estimation was used to estimate the effect of the DEPP interventions by comparing the changes in outcomes over time between the DEPP group and the comparison group. Data were also disaggregated by gender where relevant.

The economic and VfM analysis focused on the programme and country levels. The analysis involved review, by the evaluation team’s VfM advisor, of documents including quarterly reports, ad hoc VFM reports, Learning Project documents, the programme-level budget, and project and programme expenditure data. Interview data were coded and analysed and empirical data on costs and efficiency, collected as part of the intensive set data collection, were also analysed as part of the VFM analysis. Formative phase VFM recommendations were also assessed to determine the extent to which they were implemented. The assessment also included internal benchmarking of unit costs, cost effectiveness analysis (including cost per results assessment), analysis of adherence to procurement procedures and analysis of decision-making and project management within DFID and implementing agencies, and how VfM was considered. Findings were triangulated with the multiple data sources.

Network data were analysed by Root Change, an institution specialised in network mapping and network visualisations, using ORA, a customised network analysis tool and visualisation platform developed by CASOS at Carnegie Mellon. Collaboration patterns were identified and networks, groups and organisations from each country were compared. The statistical analysis software R was used for statistical significance tests between groups.

Document review included in-depth assessments of project reports, documents, case studies, presentations, logical frameworks and other available materials.

Any differences in opinions within the evaluation team were resolved through obtaining other sources of information for further clarification. This included the collection of additional data, further analysis or subgroup analysis. Findings supported by multiple data sources (including both quantitative and qualitative data) were weighted more heavily. Consensus was determined through the review of additional data and internal discussion. There were no unintended or unexpected findings in this phase of the evaluation. In general, while there was some variation in the perspectives of stakeholders, there was general consensus on most issues. Where opinions on issues were mixed, these have been described in the text. There were no differences of opinion within the evaluation team, no conflicts of interest and the evaluation team was able to work freely without interference.

**DISSEMINATION AND FEEDBACK TO BENEFICIARIES**

At various times throughout the evaluation, stakeholders were engaged to obtain feedback on the methodology and processes or to present findings from the evaluation. Some of these events are presented in Table 2.6. Findings were also disseminated via social media and through presentations with external stakeholders. A dissemination and communication plan for this final summative report is available in Annex 8.
COUNTRY OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

The evaluation has been implemented in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2015) principles\(^4\). The intensive set data collection activities were led by local research partners in Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar and the Philippines. The local partners adapted field protocols for the specific context, ensured sensitivity to local culture and considered local ethical and legal concerns. Capacity building activities for in-country staff occurred at various times and included training for each local research manager in overseeing the field work and managing the team, as well as trainings for data collectors on the instruments and protocols. Capacity building on evidence generation and how to appraise the quality of evidence was also conducted for a large range of DEPP stakeholders at a DEPP global event that took place in Nairobi, Kenya in 2016.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY POPULATION

In total, 2,315 interviews or surveys were conducted during T1, of which 347 were related to the minimum set activities and 1968 were part of the intensive set. In T2, 3,440 interviews or surveys were conducted. Of those completed, 250 were from the minimum set and 3,190 were from the intensive set.

Tables 2.7 and 2.8 below present the demographic characteristics of respondents interviewed as part of the evaluation’s quantitative methods: 1) organisational survey, 2) KAP survey, 3) household survey, 4) community survey. More detailed, country-specific demographic data are provided in Annex 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DEPP (N=172)</th>
<th>Comparison (N=78)</th>
<th>DEPP (N=143)</th>
<th>Comparison (N=64)</th>
<th>DEPP (N=479)</th>
<th>Comparison (N=138)</th>
<th>DEPP (N=333)</th>
<th>Comparison (N=119)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age, mean (SD)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>42.8 ± 9.7</td>
<td>47.4 ± 9.2</td>
<td>43.5 ± 10.0</td>
<td>46.6 ± 9.9</td>
<td>36.0 ± 9.1</td>
<td>40.0 ± 10.7</td>
<td>38.5 ± 9.6</td>
<td>40.4 ± 10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Female</strong></td>
<td>48 (27.9%)</td>
<td>19 (24.4%)</td>
<td>37 (25.9%)</td>
<td>16 (25.0%)</td>
<td>175 (36.5%)</td>
<td>40 (29.0%)</td>
<td>103 (30.9%)</td>
<td>36 (30.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School (some/completed)</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (2.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14 (2.9%)</td>
<td>4 (2.9%)</td>
<td>12 (3.3%)</td>
<td>4 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University (some/completed)</td>
<td>63 (37.8%)</td>
<td>25 (32.1%)</td>
<td>53 (37.1%)</td>
<td>18 (28.1%)</td>
<td>51 (53.0%)</td>
<td>71 (51.5%)</td>
<td>154 (6.6%)</td>
<td>66 (55.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's Degree</td>
<td>93 (54.1)</td>
<td>41 (52.6%)</td>
<td>73 (51.1%)</td>
<td>41 (64.1%)</td>
<td>184 (38.4%)</td>
<td>51 (37.0%)</td>
<td>142 (42.6%)</td>
<td>47 (39.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional / Advanced Degree</td>
<td>8 (4.7%)</td>
<td>2 (2.6%)</td>
<td>8 (5.6%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
<td>12 (2.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.7%)</td>
<td>11 (3.3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6 (3.5%)</td>
<td>10 (12.8%)</td>
<td>5 (3.5%)</td>
<td>3 (4.7%)</td>
<td>9 (1.9%)</td>
<td>5 (3.6%)</td>
<td>7 (2.1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Type of Organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation Type</th>
<th>INGO 198 (36.6%)</th>
<th>National NGO 214 (36.6%)</th>
<th>Local NGO 198 (36.6%)</th>
<th>International Organisation (UN, World Bank etc) 34 (5.8%)</th>
<th>Government 50 (8.5%)</th>
<th>Private Sector 2 (0.3%)</th>
<th>Academic Institution 2 (0.3%)</th>
<th>Other 20 (3.4%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>(36.6%)</td>
<td>(36.6%)</td>
<td>(34.2%)</td>
<td>(5.8%)</td>
<td>(8.5%)</td>
<td>(0.3%)</td>
<td>(0.3%)</td>
<td>(3.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Years Working in the Humanitarian Field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1 year</td>
<td>11 (10.7%)</td>
<td>3 (3.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>10 (9.7%)</td>
<td>4 (6.3%)</td>
<td>3 (3.2%)</td>
<td>6 (6.3%)</td>
<td>9 (10.8%)</td>
<td>9 (10.8%)</td>
<td>11 (8.0%)</td>
<td>11 (8.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td>7 (6.8%)</td>
<td>8 (10.3%)</td>
<td>16 (17.2%)</td>
<td>7 (10.9%)</td>
<td>69 (14.4%)</td>
<td>17 (12.3%)</td>
<td>53 (15.9%)</td>
<td>19 (16.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 years</td>
<td>30 (29.1%)</td>
<td>16 (20.5%)</td>
<td>26 (28.0%)</td>
<td>16 (25.0%)</td>
<td>123 (25.7%)</td>
<td>44 (31.9%)</td>
<td>95 (28.5%)</td>
<td>42 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 years</td>
<td>17 (16.5%)</td>
<td>16 (20.5%)</td>
<td>20 (21.5%)</td>
<td>17 (26.6%)</td>
<td>72 (15.0%)</td>
<td>27 (19.6%)</td>
<td>63 (18.9%)</td>
<td>27 (22.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15+ years</td>
<td>28 (27.2%)</td>
<td>31 (41.0%)</td>
<td>25 (26.9%)</td>
<td>20 (31.3%)</td>
<td>43 (9.0%)</td>
<td>31 (22.5%)</td>
<td>31 (9.3%)</td>
<td>22 (18.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.7: Demographic data for organisational and KAP surveys across all countries at T1 and T2.
ORGANISATIONAL-LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Characteristics of Organisational survey respondents at T1

The response rate for the organisational survey at T1 was 62.6%. Overall, DEPP study participants of the organisational survey at T1 were 27.9% female and 72.1% male and averaged 42.8 years of age. Most participants held a university degree (33.1%) or master’s degree (54.1%) and worked at international NGOs (36.6%), national NGOs (26.2%) and local NGOs (30.2%). The majority of participants were in senior-level positions (90.1%). Nearly half of the participants had been working at their current organisation between 10 and 15 or more years (56.3%) and had been working in the humanitarian field for 10 to 15 or more years (72.8%).

Characteristics of Organisational survey respondents at T2

The response rate for the organisational survey at T2 was 72.1%. Overall, DEPP study participants of the organisational survey were 25.9% female and 74.1% male and averaged 41.9 years of age. Most participants held a university degree (32.9%) or master’s degree (51.0%) and worked at international NGOs (34.3%), national NGOs (30.6%) and local NGOs (32.6%). The majority of participants were in senior-level positions (87.4%), had been working at their current organisation between 5 and 10 years (25.8%) or between 10 to 15 or more years (31.1%). Nearly half had been working in the humanitarian field for 10 to 15 or more years (48.3%).

Characteristics of KAP survey respondents at T1

The response rate for the KAP survey at T1 was 79.8%. Overall, DEPP study participants of the KAP survey were 36.5% female and 63.5% male and averaged 36 years of age. Most participants held a university degree (49.5%) or master’s degree (38.4%) and worked at international NGOs (43.2%), national NGOs (19.2%) and local NGOs (30.0%). The majority of participants were in mid-level (40.9%) or senior-level positions (44.5%). Nearly half of the participants had been working at their current organisation between 1 and 3 years (25.9%) or 3 and 5 years (19.0%) and had been working in the humanitarian field between 3 and 5 years (14.4%) or 5 and 10 years (25.7%).

Characteristics of KAP survey respondents at T2

The response rate for the KAP survey at T2 was 72.1%. Overall, DEPP study participants of the KAP survey were 30.9% female and 69.1% male and averaged 38.5 years of age. Most participants held a university degree (42.0%) or master’s degree (42.6%) and worked at international NGOs (37.2%), national NGOs (18.0%) and local NGOs (31.5%). The majority of participants were in mid-level (44.4%) or senior-level positions (47.2%). Nearly half of the participants had been working at their current organisation between 1 and 3 years (24.0%) or 3 and 5 years (21.0%) and had been working in the humanitarian field between 3 and 5 years (15.9%) or 5 and 10 years (28.4%).

COMMUNITY-LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Characteristics of Household Survey Respondents at T1

The response rate for the household survey at T1 was 98.1%. Demographic characteristics of the 1,004 respondents who participated in the household survey in Myanmar are presented in Table 2.8 and Annex 9. The average age of respondents was 44.2 years and the sample was
roughly half male (49.2%) and half female (50.8%). The majority of respondents had attended some schooling (75.5%) and were literate (71.9%). The average household size was 5.2 individuals per dwelling, and approximately 64% of the sample reported to be Christian.

**Characteristics of Household Survey Respondents at T2**

The response rate for the household survey in Myanmar at T2 was 99.9%. The average age of respondents was 44.7 years and the sample was roughly half male (48.9%) and half female (51.1%). The majority of respondents had attended some schooling (78.0%) and were literate (74.3%). The average household size was 5.4 individuals per dwelling, and approximately 68% of the sample reported to be Christian.

**Characteristics of Community Survey Respondents at T1**

The response rate for the community survey at T1 was 100%. This survey was completed with community leaders within 19 villages in Myanmar. The average age of respondents was 41.8 years. 94.9% of sample respondents were male, while only 5.1% of respondents were female.

**Characteristics of Community Survey Respondents at T2**

The response rate for the community survey at T2 was 100%. This survey was completed with community leaders within 20 villages in Myanmar. The average age of respondents was 40.8 years. 97.4% of sample respondents were male, while only 2.6% of respondents were female.

**MINIMUM SET OF EVALUATION ACTIVITIES**

**Qualitative Interviews – Minimum Set of Evaluation Activities at T1**

A total of 51 individuals participated in the minimum set qualitative interviews at T1 with a response rate of 83.6% (i.e., 61 were approached and 10 people did not participate in the study). Of the 51 study participants interviewed, six were DEPP stakeholders, 28 country-level project leadership, and 17 UK-based project leadership. Overall, study participants were 37.3% female and 62.7% male with an averaged 39.8 years of age. Most study participants have been working at their current organisation between 1 and 3 years (49%) and 3 and 5 years (19.6%), and have been working in the humanitarian field between 1 and 3 years (15.7%), 3 and 5 years (21.6%), 5 and 10 years (23.5%), 10 and 15 years (13.7%) and more than 15 years (19.6%).

**Qualitative Interviews – Minimum Set of Evaluation Activities at T2**

A total of 51 individuals participated in the minimum set qualitative interviews at T2 with a response rate of 88.1% (i.e., 60 individuals were approached and 9 individuals refused or did not respond). Of the 51 study participants interviewed, five were DEPP stakeholders, 31 were country-level project leadership, and 15 were UK-based project leadership. Overall, 57.7% of study participants were female and 42.3% were male. The average age of study participants was 40.1 years. Most study participants have been working at their current organisation between 1 and 3 years (48.9%) and have been working in the humanitarian field between 5 and 10 years (37.0%), 10 and 15 years (13.7%).

Optional qualitative follow-up questionnaires were sent at T2 to 43 project and programme stakeholders following in-depth interviews to provide respondents with an additional opportunity to share information and perspectives. Of this sample, two participants responded. The response rate for the qualitative questionnaires at T2 is 4.7%.

**NETWORK SURVEY**

Table 2.9 below provides the overall number of organisations who responded to the network survey, the total number of organisations they identified as collaborators and the total number of links between organisations identified in each country. Links correspond to different forms of collaboration and are described in more detail in Chapter 5.
During T1, the total number of organisations who responded to the survey was nearly the same in the Philippines and Kenya (72 and 73 respectively), however the number of links identified was more than double in the Philippines. In T2, the number of organisations who participated in the network survey in Kenya increased from 73 to 142, with nearly four times the number of total links. Organisations in the Philippines who took the survey increased by approximately one third, however there was a 48% decrease in the total number of links. During the validation workshop in the Philippines, event participants attributed the decrease in number of links to survey fatigue. Large numbers of organisational partners increased the time required to complete the network survey. Therefore, after their experiences in T1, respondents limited the number of organisations they reported as collaborating partners, as they knew that a larger number of partners increased the time needed to complete the survey.

In Myanmar, fewer organisations completed the network survey in both time points because of the small number of DEPP projects active there relative to the other countries. Fewer collaborating organisations were identified, which in turn resulted in the identification of fewer links. In Ethiopia, the time between T1 and T2 was less than the other countries due to the delays in contracting outlined in the limitations section, and therefore the number of organisations identified was similar in both time points. However, the number of links increased by 44% at T2. Analyses of the networks in the intensive set countries are described in further detail in Chapter 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY AND TIME OF DATA COLLECTION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ORGANISATIONS WHO COMPLETED NETWORK SURVEY</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER OF ORGANISATIONS IDENTIFIED</th>
<th>TOTAL NO. OF LINKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.9: Number of organisations participating in the network survey, identified organisations and links by country
In total, 634 documents, including reports, case studies, videos, podcasts, articles, handbooks and other materials were reviewed (Table 2.10). This included 334 learning and evidence items that are available for download on the DEPP Learning Platform, which represents about 52.7% of the total items reviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF RESOURCE</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER REVIEWED</th>
<th>NUMBER (%) AVAILABLE ON LEARNING PLATFORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly Reports</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77 (96.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report/ Review</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50 (65.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43 (63.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video/ Twitter Video</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53 (88.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Findings/ Key Learnings/ Lessons Learned</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37 (97.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines/ Minimum Standards</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15 (71.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9 (47.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme and Project-level Logical Frameworks</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podcast</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Project Evaluation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Report Narratives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Template/ How-to Guide/ Toolkit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8 (88.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept Note</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary/ Executive Summary/ Report Summary</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbook/ Field Guide/ Framework</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of Reference/ Proposal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (75.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/ Analysis</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Paper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Catalogue</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Case</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slides</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile App</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsletter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection Journal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>334 (75.7%)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.10: Summary of documents reviewed

*Does not include documents that are not applicable
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE ASSESSMENT AND CASE STUDY

A total of 22 in-depth interviews were conducted for the Kenya and Ethiopia case studies. In Kenya, 16 in-depth interviews were conducted and analysed. Of the 16 respondents, 11 (68.8%) were male and five (31.2%) were female with a mean age of 36.7 years. A total of seven organisations were represented in the interviews. Respondents reported working on average 7.6 years in the humanitarian sector and 6.2 years for the respective organisation.

In Ethiopia, six in-depth interviews were conducted. Of the six respondents, five were male (83.3%) and one was female (16.7%). The mean age of interviewees was 42.8 years. The six organisations represented were local beneficiary organisations affiliated with the Shifting the Power project. Respondents reported working on average 7.8 years in the humanitarian sector and 9.2 years for the respective organisation. In South Sudan, three interviews were conducted. Given the small number of interviews, demographic data are not provided to protect the identity of the study participants.

LIMITATIONS

There are notable strengths to the evaluation activities and design. These include the wide range of study instruments to capture data at different levels of action and a diverse sample of DEPP organisations, programme leadership, and project leadership across DEPP countries and projects who were interviewed and surveyed; however, it is important to consider the study’s limitations.

The response rate for the intensive and minimum set of evaluation activities was, in general, very high at both time points and within an expected range given the evaluation targeted sample. At T1, the response rate was 79.8% response rate for the KAP, 62.6% for the organisational survey, 98.1% for the household survey, 100% for the community survey and 83.6% for in-depth interviews. At T2, the response rate was 72.1% for the KAP, 72.1% for the organisational survey, 99.9% for the household survey, 100% for the community survey and 85% for in-depth interviews. Response rate was lowest for the organisational survey at both time points.

The organisational survey was administered to country directors of organisations, who were often difficult to involve because of busy schedules and travel. To mitigate any potential biases a low response rate for the organisational survey might introduce, various strategies were employed to increase participation. These included multiple contact attempts, flexibility in terms of interview dates and times, and an option for a remote interview if the individuals’ travel schedules did not permit a face-to-face interview. For the other types of surveys and interviews, non-responders were primarily organisational leadership and humanitarian programming staff from implementing and beneficiary organisations that were unavailable to participate due to scheduling conflicts.

Household and community surveys were conducted in Myanmar in both time points, but were conducted in Ethiopia only during T2 due to contractual delays with the local research partner. Therefore, the response rates for these community-level surveys reflect only data collected in Myanmar. The Ethiopia data were not used for the Difference-in-Difference analysis as this requires time series data.

The majority of non-responders (N=10 at T1; N=9 at T2) for the minimum set qualitative evaluation activities were primarily project leadership, and on subset analysis, they were relatively evenly distributed among countries and projects indicating that there was no systematic difference between responders and non-responders. Within the overall sample, there were fewer interviews conducted among programme leadership, as these participants constituted a much smaller group of staff members than the combined project leadership. The
evaluation team also contacted key programme and project staff who were no longer part of the DEPP to ensure that their views were included. The views of the respondents may not be representative of all of the programme staff, field staff and others; however, there were common themes among the people interviewed, and these data were triangulated with other evaluation data to ensure validity and accuracy.

It is important to consider the potential sources of bias for the aforementioned surveys and interviews. The lack of a true baseline is an important limitation for the evaluation. Data collection at the start of the programme, prior to any project implementation was impossible due to the timing of the selection and contracting of the evaluation team which occurred after projects had begun activities. Since the first quantitative data collection point (T1) occurred after DEPP implementation, the full impact of the DEPP may not be captured. Any changes in outcomes that occurred prior to T1 were not be captured in the quantitative analysis, which measures changes between the two data collection time points. However, non-quantitative components of the evaluation such as in-depth interviews and document review were assessed for evidence of any outputs and changes that occurred prior to T1.

The interviewers assured respondents that privacy and confidentiality would be respected at all times, however social desirability bias could have affected responses. Since many respondents are aware of the expectations of the DEPP and the evaluation, they may have limited their responses to what they thought DEPP management or the enumerator would want to hear. Our team utilised enumerators and staff who are external to the DEPP and ensured that respondents understood that their responses would not be shared, and would remain confidential. Respondents were encouraged to share their honest opinions and reassured that their responses would have no impact on their current employment. Feedback from data collection teams in all countries suggests that respondents were very forthcoming with both positive and negative feedback on the DEPP, and that social desirability bias was minimised. Recall bias may also have been an issue, as respondents may not always be able to provide an accurate account of past activities or experiences dating from the beginning of DEPP. In many cases, the recall period was limited to one year or less in order to minimise the potential impact of recall bias on the evaluation. Exclusion bias may also have affected the study since in some settings such as Kenya and Myanmar, security-related challenges limited access to certain organisations. In these settings, efforts were made to remotely include individuals who could not be physically accessed due to security issues. In addition, to permit the Difference in Difference analysis, many of the same questions were asked in the surveys during T1 and T2. There may have been a learning effect where respondents anticipated the questions asked and prepared their response accordingly. This effect is minimal but its impact may be seen in the network data for the Philippines, for example where respondents limited the number of collaborating organisations described during T2 so that their interviews would be shorter.

In most cases, qualitative interviews for the minimum set of evaluation activities were conducted via Skype and in English; therefore, it is possible that the perspectives of individuals who may have had limited Internet connectivity and/or who did not speak English were not included. However, the evaluation team sampled individuals systematically and no respondents declined to participate due to language issues. In instances where internet connectivity was an issue, an option to conduct a phone interview was provided. There were minor technical issues with the clarity and completeness of the audio files during the data extraction due to the programme platform used to record the Skype interviews. However, the interviewers took notes and the majority of files did not have any technical issues. Qualitative minimum set interviews were conducted by the same three individuals. Notes were compared and the same three interviewers extracted data from the interviews. It is possible that there was interviewer bias as each individual had varying amounts of exposure to and knowledge of DEPP. However, the interviewers followed a detailed semi-structured interview guide and asked similar questions with similar probes to minimise potential interviewer bias. Recall bias may also have been an issue, as respondents may not always be able to provide an accurate account of past activities or experiences. However, the evaluation team provided the question areas to the respondents ahead of time and encouraged them to share additional information with the team after the interview to address the issue of recall bias.
It is also possible that individuals who did not speak English were not fully represented in the quantitative questionnaires. However, the online quantitative questionnaires from the minimum set were translated to French to ensure inclusion of sampled respondents. Intensive set questionnaires were translated to the local languages and administered by local enumerators to ensure inclusion.

Another limitation which might have affected the evaluation is the high turnover of DEPP programme and project leadership. A number of respondents interviewed during T1 were unable to speak directly about the design process of the DEPP programme and of individual projects, as they were hired to replace staff who may have been engaged in the design process. High staff turnover is a recurring theme that has emerged both with respect to the design and implementation of the DEPP and that has had notable effects. One consequence with respect to this evaluation has been the loss of internal knowledge about topics such as the design process and relevant lessons learned. To counter this potential bias, we included staff who were no longer part of the DEPP in our sample, and made substantial effort to ensure that their perspectives were included.

Another potential weakness is the inclusion of community-level data in only two of the four intensive set countries (Myanmar and Ethiopia). The inclusion of two countries was part of the evaluation team’s methodology as outlined in the inception phase and was partially due to budget constraints. However, this design also takes into account the fact that community-level effects were not expected in every country, as project activities targeting the community level were not implemented uniformly across the programme. The two countries selected for community-level data collection were appropriate for assessing DEPP at the community level.

The document review was dependent on what was shared by the Learning Project, and available on the Learning platform and on Box, an online platform used to store project and programme documents. Documents and resources uploaded to Box varied by project and programme leadership, as certain stakeholders did not upload documents systematically. Every effort was made to locate certain documents if they could not be located in the shared folders.

There were unanticipated delays during the in-country data collection for the intensive set of evaluation activities which necessitated additional time to maintain the integrity and completeness of these data collection methods. In some cases, this was due to delays in setting up contractual agreements, obtaining respondent lists and contacts, challenges with security as well as limited access to areas where conflict or violence was occurring. For example, access to DEPP communities and households in Myanmar was limited due to insecurity and data collection was delayed until safe access could be guaranteed. In South Sudan, planned intensive evaluation activities were not conducted due to an escalation of violence that halted DEPP activities in country and instead data were collected remotely as part of the minimum set evaluation activities. Contractual delays were a substantial issue in Ethiopia, where an agreement could not be reached between the selected local research partner and HHI. Ultimately a new local partner was identified and contracted, however these delays led data collection to begin later in Ethiopia for T1 compared to the other intensive set countries. The time period between Ethiopia T1 and T2 for the organisational, KAP and network surveys in Ethiopia is therefore shorter than for the other countries. In addition, as mentioned above, due to these delays, data collection at the community level was only collected at one time point and therefore a Difference-in-Difference analysis was not possible with these particular data.

Finally, the study could also be potentially affected by bias at the level of the evaluation team. However it is important to note that there were no conflicts of interest, and the evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND APPROACH

The evaluation methodology was developed based on criteria adapted from the DAC principles for Evaluating Development Assistance, and in alignment with the modified causal chain developed by the evaluation team, rather than the programme’s theory of change presented in the business case which was found to be flawed, unnecessarily complex and not fully representative of the types and scopes of DEPP activities.

A randomised-controlled trial (RCT) was an important element of the initial evaluation proposal because of the rigorous evidence of impact that can be obtained with this method. One of the aims during the inception phase was to thoroughly investigate the feasibility of conducting an RCT. After extensive consultations during the inception phase and review of project documents and plans, the evaluation team concluded that an RCT would not be feasible for various reasons. First, project activities across the DEPP were extremely complex and broad in scope, and targeted multiple levels including communities, organisations, and systems. Additionally, in many cases the project activities had already begun and were being delivered to beneficiaries based on non-random criteria. Thus, the minimum conditions required for an RCT – a reasonably discrete intervention with a large number of units that could be randomised, and the ability to maintain unexposed control groups during the time frame – could not be met. The evaluation team therefore opted to integrate quasi-experimental designs, which include a pre-post design and an appropriate control group for comparison, where possible. This approach was supplemented with the other methods (qualitative data collection, document review, economic analysis, network analysis, and in-depth case study of emergency responses) to provide a mixed methods design with multiple sources of data captured at the different levels of action (individuals, communities, organisations and system). The results were triangulated to test the programme’s theory of change and its underlying assumptions and to answer key evaluation questions.

The evaluation methodology – combining multiple research streams in a mixed methods approach – attempted to capture the broad scope of the DEPP. The use of quasi-experimental methods drew upon innovative public health and medical research methodologies to rigorously evaluate capacity building, and was combined with qualitative and participatory approaches to create an integrated, multi-dimensional view of DEPP programming. Since the DEPP focus countries differ significantly in terms of contextual factors such as governance structures, and disaster and preparedness profiles, it was important to assess how these different contexts influence the theory of change, programme implementation and outcome changes. Contextual factors at each site were documented to contribute to understanding how non-DEPP factors influence programme delivery and outcome changes.

ADDRESSING CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

The evaluation methodology was developed to take into account the cross-cutting issues of gender, poverty, human rights, environment, anti-corruption, capacity building and power relations. HIV/AIDS was not a specific cross-cutting theme related to the programme and hence no data was captured on this issue. Note that the evaluation ToR only required assessment of gender, inclusion and violence against women and girls (VAWG) across the DEPP.

Gender: Document review, observation and site visits, in-depth interviews, and organisational assessment focused on project and programme’s activities and gender strategy and inclusion. In the community-level assessment household survey, the evaluation team sought to include a sample of 50% male and 50% female participants to gather information from both genders. All organisational-level assessment study tools also aimed for equal representation of both genders. In-country data collection teams were formed with particular attention to gender balance.

Poverty: Document review, observation and site visits, in-depth interviews, and organisational assessment explored issues relating to poverty and economic inclusion. Households in the community-level assessment were randomly selected to ensure representation from different socio-economic classes, and data were collected on socio-economic status. Other study tools assessed food security, shelter, education and access to services.
**Human rights:** Document review and observation and site visits explored issues relating to human rights and ensured the projects' activities did not discriminate against race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language or religion. The elderly and people with disabilities were prioritised within all community-level data collection to ensure that their perspectives were captured in the evaluation. Data collection protocols were developed to ensure protection of participants, minimise any potential risks and ensure confidentiality. Only those participants who provided voluntary, informed consent participated in the study.

**Environment:** Environmental factors related to disasters and emergencies were considered as part of the contextual factors influencing each setting and its disaster profile. At the community level, data on environmental factors and sustainable environmental management were also collected. All evaluation data were collected using electronic questionnaires programmed on tablets to minimise the evaluation's environmental footprint.

**Anti-corruption:** The local research partners were carefully vetted in accordance with Harvard University's anti-fraud and anti-corruption policies. The evaluation team worked very closely with in-country partners and monitored their work during on-site visits and through regular meetings. When possible, observation and site visits to DEPP projects allowed verification that activities had been implemented, including verification of purchased equipment in use.

**Capacity Building:** As a main focus of the programme, all study tools aimed to capture capacity building and effectiveness of activities among DEPP stakeholders.

**Power relations:** In-depth interviews and observation and site visits explored power relations between INGOs and N/LNGOs, and different levels of project and programme staff in order to better understand relationships within the programme and their effect on implementation.
RELEVANCE AND VALIDITY OF DESIGN
**Evaluation Question #1:** To what extent are the objectives of the programme intervention consistent with stakeholders’ requirements and the programme design logical and coherent?

Sub-questions:

a) Has the programme targeted the right people in the right places?

b) To what extent does the programme design (theory of change) support the projects’ design (logical framework)?

c) In what ways was the programme design process participatory? Were project beneficiaries adequately engaged before, during and after?

d) To what extent was the programme design logical and coherent?

da. Were the objectives of the programme clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?

e) Have prioritised target groups (people with disabilities, older people) and gender aspects been taken into consideration in the program design?

Data sources:

- Inception phase interviews (Qualitative)
- Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders (Qualitative)
- KAP and organisational surveys (Quantitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)
- Document review (Qualitative)

Key Findings:

- The five results areas (objectives) of the DEPP are appropriate, and the right people in the right places were targeted
- At high level, programme objectives are clear, relevant and aligned with DFID priorities. However, the three-year time frame was insufficient to reach programme objectives
- The country selection process was iterative, based on appropriate criteria but was not optimal due to lack of strategic direction and objectives at portfolio level
- There is good alignment between the project’s design and the overall programme theory of change. However, the programme-level logical framework was finalised late in programme implementation and reporting against the final version began in August 2017, during the 3rd year of DEPP implementation
- The design process was not logical or coherent, especially during the first START network design phase when projects were retrofitted to the business case
- Design at the programme level was not adequately considered and projects were designed in isolation with limited local consultation and buy in. Despite the flaws in the design process, the selected projects did address country needs once they were contextualised during their implementation periods. However, programme systems and processes, the programme theory of change, definition of key terms, and expectations about how projects are intended to interlink and interact were not developed and articulated at the outset.
- Variation in number and type of projects in each country was a lost opportunity to maximise efficiencies and impact
- Resourcing was sufficient at the programme level, but individual project budgets were lean with inadequate resourcing for M&E, NPACs and collaboration
- All projects considered gender in their design, but the level of consideration varied. Some projects considered other prioritised groups such as the elderly and people with disabilities in their design
- Response to emergencies was not adequately considered during the design phase – the programme was designed to improve emergency preparedness but mechanisms to enable or facilitate L/NNGO contribution to humanitarian response were not explicitly integrated into the programme. Despite this, DEPP contributed to at least 42 humanitarian responses in 11 countries.
OVERVIEW OF THE DEPP DESIGN PROCESS

The design process for the DEPP as well as the individual projects within the DEPP portfolio is summarised below based on findings from in-depth interviews and document review. Figure 3.1 shows the sequence of steps in the design process.

In response to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) launched in 2011, which included a call to action for the British Government to substantially modify its way of responding to humanitarian crises, DFID launched the business case development process. Evidence suggests that early in the business case development process, DFID had already identified the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (which would later become the START Network) and the CDAC Network as potential partners. Once the business case development was underway, the START Network and the CDAC Network undertook their own, separate design processes related to the DEPP. The START Network secretariat solicited project ideas from its (then) 19 members in 2013 through a general call that was circulated internally to its members. In total, over fifty pre-generated ideas were put forward by START Network members. All fifty were considered at an Ideas Workshop held in September 2013, which involved primarily London-based headquarters staff who came together to discuss and consolidate the ideas. The ideas were reduced to 18 by the end of the day, but the process involved merging some projects together, leading to, in some cases, the formation of artificial or mandated consortia.

“The mashing workshop put together four streams of individual projects, projects that build individual’s capacity, and mashed them into something that perhaps if you had a blank sheet of paper shouldn’t have lived together… We were perhaps forcing people to collaborate who shouldn’t have been… this then affected the quality of the collaboration between the members.” (Programme Leadership)

The process of consolidating and merging projects was not based on any particular strategy or defined criteria and lacked involvement from in-country staff. There was a preference for projects that were already being implemented or that agencies were hoping to implement rather than new, innovative ideas. The creation of some artificial consortia had long reaching impacts. One of the authors of the DEPP design case study[75] provided one example: “Three agencies brought ideas for humanitarian training schemes that they were already running with great success. These three agencies were brought together and tasked with creating one consortium project out of the three. At face value, this seemed to make sense in the name of collaboration and efficiency; however, the high transaction costs of working in the consortium may arguably initially have outweighed any perceived advantage of working together.”

The case study also discusses some of the consequences of these mandated collaborations:

“Some consortia that were mandated to work together struggled to reconcile differing interests and opinions. Partners reported that these frustrations undermined the collaboration, and which required sustained effort to disentangle later in the project’s life-cycle, affecting efficiency and effectiveness during delivery.”

Figure 3.1: Sequence of steps in the DEPP design process

Following the Ideas Workshop, teams, which again were primarily UK-based staff, were given three months by the START secretariat to form their consortia, including generating detailed budgets and proposals before presenting them to a panel of six judges as part of an internal peer review process. However, at this time, the DFID business case had not yet been finalised, nor had the specific DEPP target countries been selected, which meant that projects could not be developed with those in mind. In addition, there was not enough time to involve country offices, and London-based staff did not feel it was justified to use the time and resources of country staff when there was no guarantee of funding. There was insufficient time to set up consortia or fully consider implementation details or appropriate resourcing. At the end of this three-month period, submissions were peer-reviewed and nine were selected to go forward to be presented to DFID. The peer review process took a low-risk approach. All of this work was conducted before the business case was finalised and approved. This process of developing projects before the final business case had several effects which are described later.

According to the DEPP design case study⁷⁶: “the decision-making on DFID’s investment included extremely limited consultation with NGOs and other experts to develop the business case, which meant that relevant lessons from the humanitarian sector’s broader experience of implementing preparedness projects was not systematically included in the evolving business
case for the DEPP.” In addition, evidence suggests that the DFID country offices did not feed into the decision-making process, and that there was also a lack of broader consultation. The final business case did not contain basic design details such as focus countries and project selection criteria, and there was only one month before the first board meeting to develop these substantial areas.

In April 2014, the business case was finalised and DFID announced £40 million of funding for the DEPP, of which £10 million would be allocated toward an “innovation window”; thus, leaving £30 million for DEPP projects. This was allocated to the two pre-selected networks, with the START Network receiving £27 million and CDAC Network receiving £3 million.

The first DEPP Board meeting was held during that same month in April 2014. Eleven countries – Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Mozambique, Jordan, Myanmar, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia – were selected, and DEPP project selection criteria and monitoring and evaluation plans were discussed.

The second Board meeting, in July 2014, led to the approval of the first five DEPP projects: Transforming Surge Capacity (TSC), Shifting the Power (STP), Talent Development (TD), the Age and Disability Capacity Building (ADCAP) project and the MEL project (which was later rebranded as the Learning Project). Three more projects were approved during the 3rd DEPP Board meeting in October 2014: Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response (LPRR), Financial Enablers (FE), and Protection in Practice. The Financial Enablers project was considered high risk by DFID and was scaled back substantially. It was approved for implementation in only one country rather than four as originally envisioned and with a budget reduced by £3 million. The ALERT project was approved in January 2015 during the 4th Board Meeting.

In comparison to the START Network, the CDAC Network instituted a different design process. Once the business case was finalised in April 2014, a small group of interested CDAC Network members worked over eight months to develop a project that specifically fit the DEPP business case and selection criteria. This project was submitted in November 2014 and approved during the 4th DEPP Board meeting in January 2015.

After the 4th DEPP Board meeting, the START Network had funds remaining (from the cuts to the Financial Enablers project) and decided to launch a second wave of proposal development, building on lessons learned during the initial project design phase. Contrary to the first round of project design during the development of the business case, and in an effort to improve the process, it significantly encouraged and incentivised national project staff from its member organisations to take the lead, and to involve local stakeholders. One-page proposals were sought on projects that focused on early warning systems in order to fill a noticeable gap in the DEPP portfolio with respect to result area two focused on development of early warning systems. The shift to very short proposals was done to enable national project staff to be significantly involved. Consortia were permitted to develop naturally around shared interests, and local ownership was encouraged. A committee of technical experts conducted a review of proposals, and significant involvement of in-country teams was a selection criteria. Four projects selected through this process were submitted to the DEPP Board and were ultimately approved in April 2015. The external evaluation was approved in May 2015.

The following sections present evaluation findings related to the relevance and validity of the design process, as well as its successes and limitations.
**QUESTION 1.A**
**HAS THE PROGRAMME TARGETED THE RIGHT PEOPLE IN THE RIGHT PLACES?**

The established five results areas (objectives) of the DEPP are appropriate, and the right people in the right places are being targeted. However, the country selection process, while iterative and based on appropriate criteria, was not optimal due to lack of strategic direction and objectives at the portfolio level.

The evaluation assessed this question with three main lenses: first, whether the right countries were chosen and whether the country-selection criteria were clear; second, how decisions were made about the number of DEPP projects per country; and third, whether the DEPP design is consistent with beneficiary needs and requirements within countries.

**DEPP Targets and Country Selection Criteria**

In general, the targets of the DEPP are appropriate, and the right people in the right places were targeted. The focus on building national capacity, improving emergency preparedness and targeting vulnerable groups to ensure their inclusion during humanitarian response activities is consistent with needs identified during the evaluation team’s literature review conducted during the inception phase. The focus remains aligned with newer global commitments related to humanitarian system reform and for localisation of humanitarian aid.\(^{77}\)

Documents suggest that the country selection process was iterative and based on several criteria – humanitarian need and likelihood of natural disasters using the INFORM Index,\(^{78}\) followed by feasibility and opportunity to make the greatest impact. These are appropriate criteria. However, according to the DEPP design case study,\(^{79}\) agencies perceived that DFID preferred implementation in countries where it already directly worked in, implementation in fewer countries to maximise impact and to work in settings at risk of natural disasters rather than manmade as it would be less risky. In addition, since the two networks had already been selected, the DEPP could only operate in countries where those networks had an existing presence. Ultimately, however, some respondents felt that key countries and priority geographic areas with strong humanitarian need were not included and attributed this mainly to the limitations of operating only in countries where the START Network and the CDAC Network members had a presence. By operating through pre-selected networks, there is a possibility that stronger organisations and interventions were not included. Minimum set interviewees also described a lack of strategic direction and objectives at the portfolio level, which hindered the potential of selecting countries and projects based on strategic criteria (e.g., context with ability to make biggest impact, highest disaster risk, greatest need, and/or most value for money).

Another interviewee stated that the selection of DEPP countries by the DEPP Board had been a convoluted process with too much input from the START Network, and emphasis placed on existing member coverage within the network. This is consistent with the DEPP design case study which presented problems with the country selection process, with one agency referring to the final set of focus countries: “an almost random list”.\(^{80}\)

**Coverage of DEPP Interventions Across Target Countries**

Of the 11 target countries that were finally selected, projects were implemented in only 10 countries (Indonesia ultimately was not targeted by any DEPP projects). Despite the commitment towards the five result areas, the portfolio of interventions in each country also varied greatly, with some countries receiving very few projects and others many more. This seemed to be due to minimal consideration at the portfolio level of the distribution of DEPP interventions across countries and the optimal level of exposure to DEPP interventions needed to maximise potential impact. This coverage strategy, as described later in the report,

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77 Such as the Grand Bargain - Workstream 2 and The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.
diminished the potential effectiveness of the programme in some of the DEPP focus countries with fewer numbers of projects. One respondent felt that there was a higher level of learning in countries with more projects due to a greater critical mass. For example, Pakistan had seven projects, and this led to a lot of organic activities and cost efficiencies, with people sharing resources and starting new projects. The findings on programme implementation later in this report support the hypothesis that there was more collaboration in settings where there were more DEPP projects. In some cases, this was further enhanced by the presence of Regional Learning Advisors, or later the Country Learning Advisors (CLAs), that were embedded in many of the DEPP countries to stimulate collaboration and sharing of learning.

The findings from the primary data are further supported by the DEPP design case study. The report cites several challenges with the country selection process, indicating that this was neither efficient nor effective in terms of aligning projects with needs systematically identified upfront. The report states:

“As a result of setting geographical criteria both after the business case and after most of the projects had been designed, humanitarian need for preparedness was not the primary incentive. Some projects sought approval to implement in countries not on the list, and one of the official countries received no investment at all. And although the DEPP was designed with the aim of achieving five results, the focus of interventions varied between countries.”

**Beneficiary Needs in DEPP Target Countries and Relevance**

At the project level, many projects did not conduct needs assessments during the design process, which calls into question whether the most appropriate individuals were targeted and whether their needs and requirements were adequately addressed within each country. The process of retro-fitting pre-designed projects to specific contexts once the geographic locations were selected by the DEPP board and lack of involvement of the in-country stakeholders, likely affected the initial relevance of the projects. Once the projects and countries were approved by the DEPP board, most projects reported spending a substantial amount of time contextualising their projects to each country or site. While this led to delays, it was aimed at ensuring relevance of the design. However, data suggest that this process still often did not include consultations with beneficiaries such as communities, households, and L/NNGOs, which remains a significant weakness of the approach.

As part of the quantitative minimum and intensive set surveys, DEPP respondents (n=245) across all 10 DEPP focus countries were asked about the relevance of the DEPP interventions in their country (see Table 3.1). The majority of respondents reported the interventions to be either relevant or extremely relevant (93.9% overall). The highest reported relevance was in Ethiopia where 98.2% of interviewees reported the DEPP to be relevant or extremely relevant.

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81 Ibid.
82 These findings are consistent with the findings of the project final evaluations which find each of the projects to be relevant to existing needs.
| Evaluation of the DEPP - Summative Phase Report |

**ON A SCALE OF 1-5, HOW RELEVANT ARE THE DEPP INTERVENTIONS FOR THE COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU ARE WORKING?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All DEPP countries</th>
<th>Local Organisations</th>
<th>Minimum set</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>The Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=245 (%)</td>
<td>N=152 (%)</td>
<td>N=250 (%)</td>
<td>N=54 (%)</td>
<td>N=63 (%)</td>
<td>N=31 (%)</td>
<td>N=60 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all relevant</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>1 (0.4)</td>
<td>1 (0.7)</td>
<td>1 (2.7)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat relevant</td>
<td>14 (5.7)</td>
<td>10 (6.6)</td>
<td>4 (10.8)</td>
<td>1 (1.85)</td>
<td>2 (3.2)</td>
<td>2 (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>150 (61.2)</td>
<td>94 (61.8)</td>
<td>14 (37.8)</td>
<td>38 (70.4)</td>
<td>41 (65.1)</td>
<td>19 (61.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely relevant</td>
<td>80 (32.7)</td>
<td>47 (30.9)</td>
<td>18 (48.7)</td>
<td>15 (27.8)</td>
<td>20 (31.8)</td>
<td>10 (32.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Relevance of the DEPP interventions

**QUESTION 1.B**

**TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PROGRAMME DESIGN (THEORY OF CHANGE) SUPPORT THE PROJECTS’ DESIGN (LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS)?**

There is fairly good alignment between the project's design and the overall programme theory of change. However, the programme-level logical framework was developed late in programme implementation and reporting against the final version of the logical framework began in August 2017, during the third year of DEPP implementation.

The DEPP business case includes a theory of change for the DEPP and focuses on five key results areas as described earlier. This theory of change was presumably utilised during the design of some of the projects. However, evidence on the extent to which the programme theory of change was used to guide project design or refinement of project activities is limited. Data from the interviews and document review support the fact that individual projects in the first START Network design phase were not developed specifically to fit the business case or programme theory of change. However, despite this, there is fairly good alignment between the projects’ designs and the overall programme theory of change. This could have been stronger had the design process unfolded in a logical sequence. One other significant weakness was the lack of an overall DEPP programme-level logical framework as well as guidance for individual projects in developing logical frameworks and M&E systems that align together and with the programme. A programme-level logical framework was developed very late in programme implementation and was informed by the existing individual project logical frameworks – this process should have been reversed with the programme-level logical framework developed at the beginning of the programme. The final version of the programme-level logical framework was approved and reporting against it began in August 2017, in the third year of the DEPP implementation. Consequences of this are described later in the report.
**QUESTION 1.C**  
**IN WHAT WAYS WAS THE PROGRAMME DESIGN PROCESS PARTICIPATORY? WERE PROJECT BENEFICIARIES ADEQUATELY ENGAGED BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER?**

The DEPP design process was participatory, but it did not adequately involve in-country beneficiaries and stakeholders, or local needs assessments.

Overall, the design process for the DEPP was participatory in that it involved consultation with various stakeholders. However, beneficiaries at the local institutional level and in targeted communities and countries were not adequately engaged in the process, especially with respect to the START Network projects developed during the first phase (See Table 3.2). The consultations that did occur tended to be primarily at the UK level only and were led by large INGOs and London-based staff. Given the lack of involvement of in-country partners and smaller agencies, the design process did not follow current best practices related to participatory design approaches. Furthermore, the DEPP design process focused mainly on developing individual projects in isolation, with limited consideration about systems at the portfolio level, and about how projects might align together.

Furthermore, interview data suggest there was limited involvement of local stakeholders in the design of the individual DEPP projects, as well as a lack of needs assessments within the target countries\(^83\),\(^84\). This led to inadequate contextualisation and understanding of the projects at the country level. Projects then had to use the initial project implementation period to adapt their projects to the local context which in turn contributed to delays in project implementation\(^85\).

More time and resources built into the projects’ inception phase could have helped projects to develop a more realistic project timeline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL DEPP COUNTRIES</th>
<th>UK-BASED PROJECT LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>IN-COUNTRY PROJECT LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>PROGRAMME LEADERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 51</td>
<td>N = 17</td>
<td>N = 28</td>
<td>N = 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The design process was</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x/✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The design process in-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x/✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volved local stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was sufficient</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time for collaborations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during design process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Perceptions of the DEPP design process

- ✓ Most respondents agree with statement
- x Most respondents disagree with statement
- x/✓ Responses were mixed

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83 This finding is supported by document review. For example, TSC Final Evaluation Report, p 17 states: “Most country platform stakeholders and some regional and international stakeholders felt the original design did not adequately reflect the priorities at the country level (for example, the focus on access to funding for national organisations was a strong priority in the Philippines that was not reflected in the original design).” The ADCAP Final Evaluation Report, p 2 states: “there was criticism that country offices and NGOs were not involved or involved quite late in the process.”

84 The PHEP Gambella project was one of the few that conducted a baseline that was used to guide program implementation. PHEP Final Evaluation Report, p 4: “The project benefited from a baseline assessment which helped to identify where capacity should be targeted and effort prioritized.”

85 For example, see Shifting the Power Final Evaluation Report, p 30, or Transforming Surge Capacity Final Evaluation Report, p 31.
These issues in the design of both the DEPP and the individual projects were due to key flaws in the design process – an unfavourable sequence of steps in the process, the selection of projects in tranches, and inadequate time and resources to engage smaller organisations with limited resources. As illustrated in Figure 3.1 and described earlier, most of the DEPP projects and proposals were designed before the business case was finalised, and the country selection occurred after the business case was approved. Until the country selection occurred, it would have been difficult to engage local stakeholders in the project development. An alternative scenario would have been to conduct a global assessment during the development of the business case and before the country selection was made, to identify countries and beneficiaries in greatest need. One respondent stated:

“The first round of the DEPP projects were a bit too London centric...I think also it has to do with the fact that the business case came very late from DFID and that also the country focus came very late. We didn’t know until the very last minute which country was going to be the focus. So, it was very difficult to engage with our country teams on one side and also local partners, because you create a very high expectation and you’re not even sure that that country is even eligible.” (Project Leadership)

Several exceptions exist; interviewees confirmed that the four projects that were funded during the last tranche (Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA), Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar (SEPS), Ethiopia Early Warning Early Action (EWEA), and Public Health Preparedness in Gambella (PHEP)) were designed through a more participatory process and did involve consultation with local stakeholders. This was linked to smoother and timelier project implementation.

“For the second round of projects that were the early warning projects, there was a clear directive that they had to be developed with the country office directing them, and I think that is possibly one of the reasons why these projects have managed to catch up so quickly even though they started almost a year later than some of the other projects. It’s because they’ve been developed in collaboration with the country offices so the country office already had the buy-in and the drive to get going.” (Project Leadership)

As these four projects underwent a more streamlined design process that took into account some of the shortfalls of the first phase, this finding is not surprising.

**QUESTION 1.D**

**TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE PROGRAMME DESIGN LOGICAL AND COHERENT? WERE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME CLEAR, REALISTIC AND LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE ESTABLISHED TIME SCHEDULE AND WITH THE ALLOCATED RESOURCES (INCLUDING HUMAN RESOURCES)?**

The design process was not logical or coherent, especially during the first START Network design phase when projects were retrofitted to the business case. At the macro level, programme objectives are clear, relevant and aligned with DFID priorities but the three-year time frame was insufficient to reach programme objectives. Resourcing was sufficient at the programme level, but individual project budgets were lean with inadequate resourcing for M&E, Non-project Attributable Costs (NPACs) and collaboration.

To a large extent, the DEPP programme design process did not follow a logical and coherent approach. As described earlier, most projects under the START Network were designed prior to the finalisation of the DFID business case, logical framework and the selection of target countries. Upon finalisation of the business case, nine of these pre-designed projects were retrofitted to align with the business case, presented to DFID and approved in tranches. The CDAC Network adopted a different, more logical approach with respect to the design process. Projects were developed over a longer period of time and were designed to fit the business case and selection criteria. National project staff and local stakeholders took a larger role in the design of the second round of START Network projects and consortia were developed based
on shared areas of focus. Thus, the evidence supports that the sequence of steps in the design process, particularly for those projects designed during the first START Network phase, were not taken in a logical and strategic order.

Were objectives clear and achievable within the timeframe?

The evaluation team reviewed the objectives of the DEPP as a whole and of the individual projects. At a macro level, the objectives are clear, relevant, aligned with DFID’s humanitarian priorities\(^{86,87}\) and aimed to fill a clear gap in humanitarian capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters. As described in the literature, increased funding is needed for preparedness activities and for strengthening capacity of national level actors rather than international actors\(^{88}\). There is a shortage of people and systems with sufficient capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters in countries at high risk for disasters, particularly at the national level\(^{89}\). The DEPP objectives to strengthen national capacity to respond to disasters and increase preparedness levels in countries at risk for disasters are relevant for the ten DEPP focus countries. However, the three-year time frame to achieve the selected objectives was unrealistic. A five-year timeframe would have been more appropriate for these specific objectives \(^{90}\). In fact, the business case had included a conditional commitment of two years additional years which would have extended the programme duration to five years. Data from the document review supports the need for a longer timeframe\(^{91,92,93}\).

These findings related to the design process, objectives and timeframe are supported by interview data and other data collected across all ten DEPP countries during the formative phase. Interviewees were also asked about the validity of the DEPP design in order to understand how specific activities related to DEPP objectives. Overall, most agreed that the DEPP objectives are clear or mostly clear (See Table 3.3). However, some individuals felt that the objectives and five results areas that project activities target were too broad and would have benefitted from increased specificity and refinement. However, the broadness of the results areas was also considered a positive point as it permitted the diversity of different projects that existed within the DEPP portfolio. There may have been some ambiguity around the precise meaning of the different results areas, such as results area four (Improved institutional arrangements and policy environments so that national systems for humanitarian response and preparedness are better supported and more suitable). Different agencies appear to have interpreted key terms and phrases differently. The programme would have benefitted from clearly defining key concepts such as collaboration and institutional arrangements early on. This in turn would have enabled projects to use standardised measurements and develop standardised indicators.


\(^{90}\) Based on interviewee responses and evaluation team expert opinion.

\(^{91}\) Shifting the Power Final Evaluation report, p 30. “Progress was achieved by STP in what was effectively a project implementation timeframe of 2 to 2.5 years. However, in order to fully achieve what the project set out to do a timeframe of double the length would have been more realistic.”

\(^{92}\) Transforming Surge Capacity Final Evaluation Report, p 27. “Overall the project timeframe was largely considered too short to achieve everything it planned to achieve.”
Table 3.3: Design validity of the DEPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL DEPP COUNTRIES</th>
<th>UK-BASED PROJECT LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>IN-COUNTRY PROJECT LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>PROGRAMME LEADERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives are clear</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives feasible within the timeframe</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration adequately included in project design</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources (human and financial) were adequate</td>
<td>✗/✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓/✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most respondents agree with statement
Most respondents disagree with statement
Responses were mixed

When mapping how the objectives and activities of each project feed into each of the five results areas, as illustrated on page 16 of the DEPP Learning Report 2015, it is clear that while some projects only targeted a few of the five results areas, as a group of projects, all five results areas were addressed in every country except Jordan and Mozambique. This is, in part, due to the addition of the four early warning projects which, as described earlier, were developed through a second design process that was initiated when stakeholders identified a large gap in projects targeting result area two (improve preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk of disasters) after the first ten projects had been approved. While most respondents considered the objectives to be clear, the majority felt they were not likely to be achieved within the established time frame.

DEPP stakeholder and respondent perspectives on this issue were assessed across all ten countries, and five VFM project case studies were also conducted. Overall, respondents felt that resourcing for the DEPP at the portfolio level was sufficient (see Table 3.3). However, in general, most interviewees felt that project budgets were stretched, and resources were insufficient to undertake activities to their full potential. There was a need for in-country resources rather than for UK staff. Non-project attributable costs (ranging from 7% to 12% of the total programme budget) were considered insufficient by almost all interviewees. There were also discussions about insufficient allocation of funds for collaborative activities. Monitoring and Evaluation budget allocations varied, as did the quality of individual M&E plans. There was a need to increase M&E resources for certain projects and recommendations were made in the formative phase evaluation report. In many cases, respondents reported that financial challenges were also linked to implementation delays. As discussed in more depth later in the report, the implementation delays were primarily due to underestimating the time required for collaboration and setting up the consortia and contracts, as well as the additional time required to contextualise projects within the countries.


For example, the Financial Enablers Final Evaluation reports an: “overall under-development of project MEL. No overarching M&E framework was developed. An early logframe was never embraced”, and the Talent Development Final Evaluation reported (p 77-81) that its M&E frameworks relied too much on self assessments, lacked qualitative information and that the project: “lacked a single coordinated M&E system.”
Do the projects align as a portfolio?

The individual projects were designed without direct communication between projects and hence were not designed to complement each other. For this reason, the DEPP’s design is limited in terms of its ability to function as a portfolio. One stakeholder stated:

“We were under a lot of pressure from DFID to basically jigsaw together the projects to each other...They [DEPP projects] weren’t designed to sit alongside each other and complement each other. So, there is a bit of a design flaw in that sense as we were under a lot of pressure to make the projects interoperable, more interlinked when actually they were designed to be individual projects. They just happened to sit in the same pot.” (Programme Leadership)

Portfolio-level systems should have been developed early on, potentially through a separate inception phase, to ensure that the DEPP could function well as a programme. For example, the lack of an overarching DEPP logical framework at the programme level was a substantial weakness. Had such a logical framework been developed early on together with other systems and processes, it might have led to more cohesion and alignment across the projects and perhaps greater validity of DEPP as a whole.

Was collaboration at the programme level addressed during the design phase?

DEPP’s emphasis on collaboration emerged relatively late during the design process and expectations and objectives related to collaboration, especially inter-project collaboration, were unclear for many stakeholders. There was an assumption that collaboration would occur organically, however, there was an underestimation of the general knowledge and skills among members on how to collaborate effectively. Further, collaboration was interpreted differently by different agencies, and there was insufficient time and resources to effectively engage in collaborative processes during the design phase. In the case of the projects developed during START Network’s first design phase, some collaborations were mandated, and this led to tensions and lower quality collaborations where substantial time was spent in trying to reconcile differing opinions, undermining the efficiency of delivery.

QUESTION 1.E

HAVE PRIORITISED TARGET GROUPS (PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, OLDER PEOPLE) AND GENDER ASPECTS BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE PROGRAMME DESIGN?

All projects considered gender in their design, but the level of consideration varied. Some projects considered other prioritised groups such as the elderly and people with disabilities but this was not an explicit requirement for project selection.

The DEPP Programme Board criteria for project selection required inclusion of a gender statement, but did not provide further guidelines with respect to gender inclusion. As such, all DEPP projects considered gender in their proposals and outlined their planned gender approach in the concept notes submitted to the START and CDAC Networks. However, since the requirement was only to include a gender statement, the level of detail provided and the proposed level of inclusion varied substantially across projects\(^\text{96}\). Some project proposals described disaggregating data by gender, others proposed ensuring gender equality in participation, and others described incorporating a strong focus on gender within the content of training materials and curricula. Others were more vague and indicated that gender dimensions would be considered without any specifics about how, or stated that the approach would be further developed in the project inception phase, though this did not occur for most projects.

\(^{96}\) For example, the Transforming Surge Capacity Final Evaluation Report, p 38 states: “The project design did not have a strong focus on women’s rights.” The Urban Early Warning Early Action Final Evaluation Report, p 16 reports: “though project was designed to address the most vulnerable, it did not explicitly outline cross-cutting issues like gender mainstreaming, VAWG in its design.”
Prioritised target groups were also not explicitly included as a requirement in the design of the projects and were not targeted in most projects’ activities. However, while not a project requirement, prioritised groups, including the elderly and people with disabilities, were considered and included in many projects across DEPP. For example, the Age and Disability Capacity Programme’s inclusion efforts are described later in this report to be leading the field and extremely influential amongst other DEPP projects.

**Design Considerations with Respect to Emergency Preparedness and Response**

Response to emergencies was not adequately considered during the design phase – the programme was designed to improve emergency preparedness but mechanisms to enable or facilitate contribution (especially of L/NNGOs) to humanitarian response efforts were not explicitly integrated into the programme. For example, access to resources, especially response funds, were not systematically built into the programme. This meant that in many cases while DEPP beneficiary organisations felt they had the capacity to respond, they were unable to secure additional response funds. The lack of consideration to the link between preparedness and response could have potentially led to reduced effects of the programme. Despite this, DEPP contributed to at least 42 humanitarian responses in 11 countries (See Chapter 4 and Annex 10 for further details on DEPP contribution to humanitarian response efforts).
RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS
**Evaluation Question #2:** In what ways have DEPP capacity building programmes strengthened preparedness and response capacity amongst participants?

**Sub-questions:**

a) What delivery mechanisms are working effectively and why?

b) To what extent is DEPP contributing to greater preparedness and response among local organisations and communities?

   a. Has local capacity to respond to disasters changed since the start of DEPP? If yes, how has it changed? If not, why not?
   
   b. Has DEPP led to improved knowledge and understanding of best practices relating to disaster and emergency preparedness and response? If yes, in what ways?

**Data sources:**

- **Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders** (Qualitative)
- **KAP and organisational surveys** (Quantitative)
- **Organisational checklist** (Quantitative)
- **Community and household surveys** (Quantitative)
- **Intensive set IDIs** (Qualitative)
- **Document review** (Qualitative)

**Key Findings:**

- Implementation delays were universal and due to three main factors:
  - Limited contextualisation and involvement of in-country teams in design phase
  - Underestimation of time required for collaboration
  - Administrative and contractual bottlenecks
- Delays led to increased costs and budget reallocations, and reduced period for activities and potential impact
- Overall, 33,388 individuals were exposed to DEPP capacity building exceeding the ultimate programme target of training 4,200 individuals by 795%. However, the gender target was missed by 5% (45% of trainees are women).
- Both DEPP and non-DEPP participants from comparison organisations were exposed to more didactic individual-level capacity building activities related to preparedness and response than to other active skill and competencies building exercises such drills and simulations across all four intensive set countries. Exposure to other DEPP activities was higher in DEPP than non-DEPP beneficiaries
- DEPP has contributed to the four output areas (corresponding to the causal chain); it has contributed to increased capacity building efforts, collaboration, early warning system development and learning in beneficiary organisations, but success has been variable
- The most effective individual-level capacity building approach reported by beneficiaries involved in-person training combined with a strategy to reinforce knowledge (simulations, mentoring, coaching)
- Flexible funding approaches, though initially considered high risk, have high potential for effectiveness
- Outcome-level changes were variable. Overall, there have been no significant improvements in knowledge on core humanitarian competencies of humanitarian staff, on self-reported knowledge on disaster preparedness, response to disasters and emergencies or age or disability-related issues in disasters
- There was no change in perceived level of individual preparedness, but there were significant improvements in preparedness of DEPP organisations across all intensive set countries, and in particular for L/NNGOs. Access to early warning system information was significantly higher in DEPP communities than in non-DEPP communities, the perceived level of community preparedness significantly decreased in both DEPP and non-DEPP communities.
- Qualitative data suggests improvements in preparedness that may be difficult to detect with quantitative data
- DEPP contributed to at least 42 humanitarian responses in 11 countries; 16 of these responses occurred in the Philippines (and 14 of these 16 responses were driven by one project – the Financial Enablers project)
- Qualitative data indicate contribution of DEPP beneficiaries towards improved response in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, but many other DEPP beneficiaries were unable to respond due to lack of response funds
- Individual project evaluations suggest some positive outcomes, but this has not translated to global programme effects likely due to short programme period and lack of project alignment
QUESTION 2.A: WHAT DELIVERY MECHANISMS ARE WORKING EFFECTIVELY AND WHY?

1. PROJECT AND PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

A. What was Implemented?

A diverse range of activities of varying quality targeting all five results areas was implemented.

To explore intervention delivery, key activities that were conducted by the DEPP projects have been grouped together by each of the five DEPP results areas (Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESULT AREA</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF KEY ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED</th>
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</table>
| 1 – Improve knowledge and understanding of individuals by sharing best practice of humanitarian preparedness and response | • Targeted capacity strengthening plans  
• Training schemes for all levels of humanitarian aid workers through job placements and extended courses  
• Sharing of good practices and learning on surge mechanisms across humanitarian actors and DEPP projects  
• Trainings and workshops to increase multi-sector knowledge and barriers to age and disability inclusion in preparing and responding to disasters  
• Between and within sector consultations to improve knowledge and best practices  
• Trainings to improve the capacity of health care workers to detect and respond to emergencies  
• Communication and trainings targeted at non-specialist and non-humanitarians to inform a broader understanding of humanitarian systems |
| 2 – Improve preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk for disasters | • Toolkit developed with guidelines for setting up an urban early warning system in other settings  
• Participatory approaches are being used to develop new preparedness and response systems at the organisational level utilising feedback from users  
• Improved early warning and preparedness efforts targeted at health facilities to ensure adequate response during an outbreak  
• Pursuit of community-led and owned preparedness and response activities through identification of community-specific risks and vulnerabilities  
• Use of bottom-up approach to ensure successful adoption of early warning systems |
### Table 4.1: Key DEPP activities implemented by DEPP result area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result Area</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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</table>
| 3 – Increased number of coalitions, partnerships and networks which, working together, are able to address humanitarian needs in a wide range of emergency situations. | - Initiation of disaster response and management trainings at the government level in collaboration with organisations  
- Sharing of rosters and evaluation of satisfaction for surge practices at national, regional and international levels  
- Encouragement of thematic programming outside of DEPP through networks formed at conferences and other non-DEPP events  
- Cross-project and cross-agency collaboration to improve and enhance project prototypes, goals and objectives for maximum success  
- Transfer of project ownership to the local level across different sectors using a flexible funding mechanism  
- Creation of local consortia to improve ownership, sustainability, and capacity at the national level through locally distributed grants |
| 4 – Improved institutional arrangements and policy environments so that national systems for humanitarian response are better supported and more suitable | - Supporting local and underrepresented actors to be better represented and heard in their relevant platforms and networks  
- Organisational creation and adaptation of tools and policies for age and disability inclusion  
- Utilisation of a participatory approach to transfer ownership of health centre preparedness and response plans to government  
- Direct advocacy at the local and national level for adoption of an urban early warning mechanism at the government level |
| 5 – Strengthened evidence base for what works to help build humanitarian capacity at scale | - Assessment of capacity of individuals participating in humanitarian response rosters and trainings at baseline and endline  
- DEPP/non-DEPP workshops, conferences and learning events  
- Evidence sharing and dissemination  
- Individual assessments and trainings catered toward gaps in capacity  
- Utilisation of case studies and community member’s feedback and perspectives for informing programmatic preparedness and response recommendations  
- Creation of a DEPP learning platform (https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/) |

Based on the document review, it is evident that a range of diverse activities targeting each of the five results areas was implemented across the programme. Examples of these activities include in-person trainings, development of training packages and guidelines, development of early warning systems, collaboration activities such as learning events and conferences, development of case studies and evidence sharing and dissemination. Fewer activities were implemented around result five. The quality of these activities was variable - some were notably high in quality (for example they utilised quantitative methods with a large sample size), but in other cases quality is lower and/or may be difficult to independently verify due to inadequate monitoring and evaluation or documentation.

Of the 336 respondents across ten countries that were surveyed as part of minimum set or intensive set evaluation activities, 70% reported that their organisations had implemented capacity building activities, 37.8% reported that early warning systems had been developed and 32.2% reported implementation of drills and simulations (See Figure 4.1 below). Fewer respondents reported drills and simulations in Ethiopia, and participants in results validation workshops attributed this to the disaster and emergency profile in Ethiopia where drought is one of the most common emergencies. Close to 68% reported training of national staff and 44.4% reported community preparedness activities. Only about a quarter of respondents reported that evaluation or research activities were undertaken as part of their DEPP project.

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97 For example, the Financial Enablers Final Evaluation Report, p 19 states: “Very little is known about the quality or the usefulness of the trainings due to a lack of measurement by consortia or the project.”
B. Whose Capacity was Built? (Who Benefitted from DEPP Activities?)

Both DEPP and non-DEPP comparison participants in the four intensive countries were exposed to individual-level capacity building related to emergency preparedness and response, but both groups were less exposed to drills and simulations. Exposure to other types of DEPP activities was higher in DEPP participants. In terms of exposure to individual-level capacity building activities, 89% of humanitarian staff at DEPP organisations surveyed during the KAP survey had participated in a capacity building activity in the last 12 months compared to 76% for humanitarian staff within the comparison group organisations. Further, 46% of DEPP respondents had participated in a disaster drill or simulation within the same time period compared to approximately 30% in the comparison group (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). These figures demonstrate that comparison group participants in the KAP survey were exposed to a fairly high level of capacity building on emergency preparedness over the same time frame, though exposure was still higher by 13 percentage points in the DEPP group. In addition, exposure to simulations was higher by 16 percentage points in the DEPP group. This suggests that if the individual-level capacity building efforts in both DEPP and comparison groups were similarly effective, then there may be improvements in some outcomes such as knowledge change in both groups. However, this would not apply to other outcomes related to activities such as early warning system development, or organisational capacity change where exposure was significantly higher in DEPP groups98. In those cases, significant outcome changes in the comparison group are not expected. Overall, the exposure data do demonstrate high penetration of the DEPP within sampled organisations, which is a positive finding.

For example, Figure 4.9 shows that DEPP communities in Myanmar were significantly more exposed to early warning systems than non-DEPP comparison communities.
C. Timeliness

Project-level implementation was variable in terms of timeliness and delays led to increased costs, and reduced potential impact.

Universally, there were significant delays in implementation due primarily to three factors. Deficiencies in the design process, including limited contextualisation of projects and low involvement of in-country teams, required significant time to address during project start-up and contributed to implementation delays. For example, the lack of in-country involvement during the design process meant that once projects were approved and contracted, time had to be taken for in-country teams to understand the project activities, contextualise them for the specific setting and target audience and ensure buy-in of key local stakeholders.\(^99,100,101\)

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time required for these processes was also underestimated and further contributed to delays in many projects. This was compounded by the fact that some projects had not included an inception phase\textsuperscript{102}, which would have reserved time specifically for these processes. Those that had included an inception phase stated that the amount of time was insufficient.

The second factor contributing to delays was underestimation of the time and resources required for collaboration including setting up consortia\textsuperscript{103,104,105,106}. Finally, lengthy administrative and contractual processes contributed significantly to implementation delays\textsuperscript{107,108,109}. Due to these delays, the 14 projects across the DEPP portfolio had shorter project timelines than initially planned reducing the potential for measurable impact within the programme period. The delays also contributed to increased costs and reduced efficiencies. As a result of the delays, projects also confronted challenges in completing activities on time. Six of 14 projects have requested and obtained no-cost extensions to lengthen project periods (See Figure 4.4). According to interviewees and document review, implementation did become more efficient over time as projects intensified efforts.

**Figure 4.4: DEPP project timelines**

**D. Perspectives on Implementation**

Despite significant widespread project delays, stakeholders consistently reported effective implementation of the DEPP (particularly at the project level). In fact, 82.8\% of stakeholders interviewed (N=232) across all 10 DEPP countries reported that delivery of the DEPP has either been effective or very effective. However, despite these positive perspectives,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} For example, Figure 4.9 shows that DEPP communities in Myanmar were significantly more exposed to early warning systems than non-DEPP comparison communities.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Financial Enablers Final Evaluation Report, p 18.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar, Final Evaluation Report, p 19.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Transforming Surge Capacity Final Evaluation report, p 31.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Urban Early Warning Early Action Final Evaluation report, p 14.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Financial Enablers Final Evaluation Report, p 2: “FEP was the last of the DEPP projects to be signed off by DFID, roughly a year after discussions began about it, eating into the time frame for implementation.”
\item \textsuperscript{108} Urban Early Warning Early Action Final Evaluation Report, p 6: “It took almost 6 months to conclude the project. implementation plan and close to 9 months to finalise sub-grant agreements and overarching consortium agreement. This ‘ate’ into the time that was to be used to implement the project activities.”
\item \textsuperscript{109} CDAC-N Final Evaluation report, p 16.
\end{itemize}
Evidence demonstrates that programme implementation was fraught with significant challenges.

Many of the challenges related to programme implementation were previously outlined in the formative phase report.110 These include a lack of systems and processes at the programme level, the absence of a finalised programme-level logical framework (until August 2017) against which progress could be tracked as well as inadequate human resources at the programme level to effectively manage the programme. The number and type of projects being implemented within each country also varied. In countries with fewer projects implemented, such as in Mozambique, Jordan, and Myanmar, there were fewer opportunities for collective action, lower overall investment and therefore, a lower likelihood of embedding long-term change. Again, these problems can be traced back to the weaknesses in the design including the fact that intervention intensity at the country level was not adequately and strategically considered. Impact could have been maximised by ensuring a suite of complementary projects in each country that fully addressed all levels of the programme-level theory of change. As no new projects were funded after the evaluation formative phase, and with the exception of the CDAC-N project which shifted country locations from South Sudan to the Philippines, no changes in intervention intensity at the programme level occurred. Unfortunately, the design flaws could not be undone and continued to have repercussions throughout the course of the programme’s three-year duration.

2. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOUR OUTPUT AREAS

DEPP contributed to increased capacity building efforts, collaboration, early warning system development and learning in beneficiary organisations, but achievements were variable.

To assess achievements of the DEPP, a systematic assessment of direct programme outputs drawing on primary data collected via the in-depth interviews, quantitative data and secondary data from the document review, and referring back to the simplified causal chain developed by the evaluation team (see box below) was conducted. The four key output areas assessed include: 1) collaboration, 2) capacity building, 3) generating and sharing learning and 4) early warning system development. Note that these correspond with the evaluations team’s simplified causal chain (and thus the programme-level theory of chain) and are distinct from the five DEPP results areas. A later section will present outcome-level findings (improved emergency preparedness and improved response) of the DEPP. Note that DEPP impacts (reduced mortality, morbidity and economic impacts) were considered too far downstream from the DEPP activities and assessment of these indicators was not within the scope of the evaluation.

For example see p 67-68 of the Formative Phase Evaluation Report.
1. Evaluation Output Area 1: Collaboration

The DEPP has contributed to increased collaborations and strengthened networks in several settings, but numerous issues impeded potential effectiveness.

The activities conducted by DEPP projects were expected to, if the theory of change holds, lead to enhanced collaboration, and ultimately strengthened networks, coalitions and partnerships. The collaborative approach was essentially the cornerstone of the DEPP; each of the 14 projects was delivered via consortia and in total 45 primary organisations made up the DEPP. Collaboration within project consortia, but also between DEPP projects and with external stakeholders was an expected output of the DEPP, though as described previously the time required for this level of extensive collaboration was not well built into the design, workplans or budgets. Interview data reveal that the collaborative approach, including collaboration within project consortia and among organisations, was ideologically embraced by all projects and was perceived to be an effective and appropriate approach to capacity building as well as response. However, as described below there were varying degrees of implementation success.

While the emphasis was on localisation, and ensuring a more equal balance and role of L/NNGO partners, this objective was not fully met. For example, in addition to the 45 primary DEPP organisations, there were 222 unique organisational partners, but most of these were INGO partners. International NGOs represent the largest share within the DEPP and that while efforts to be more inclusive towards L/NNGOs have certainly increased involvement, they have not translated to equal opportunities to collaborate, engage and participate in decision-making. Even in those projects with higher shares of L/NNGO partnerships, primarily INGOs make up the project consortia and still play the “gatekeeper” role suggesting that the power dynamics remain in favour of INGOs. There are a few notable exceptions to this such as the Financial Enablers and the Shifting the Power projects where L/NNGOs were able to take a more equal role. Both of these projects aimed to directly alter power imbalances – Financial Enablers through a hands-off approach which permitted local organisations to steer their capacity building activities, and Shifting the Power by strengthening the capacity of local organisations using a process of self-assessments.

Collaboration within DEPP Project Consortia

Evaluation data demonstrate the strong perceived value of collaboration and working through consortia, but also highlight the challenges of this approach. These include the substantial time, effort and resources to set up consortia and lack of clear expectations, objectives and protocols related to collaboration. For example, the Age and Disability Capacity Programme stakeholders
expressed frustration about the lack of consortia decision-making protocols and lack of clarity on who had final authority. These challenges were amplified in cases where collaborations were mandated or forced rather than organic, and globally arose due to lack of adequate planning during the design phase. These challenges, in turn, are one of the three main factors that have contributed to implementation delays.

Additional challenges of working in consortia included varying governance structures, administrative processes and individual and organisational aims. Staff turnover, and the lack of incentives to participate in collaborations on a volunteer basis placed additional stress on project implementation. In addition, the large number of formal organisational partners that make up each consortia became a hindrance in terms of speed of decision-making and effectiveness of project implementation. Project delivery would have been more streamlined with fewer, more strategic consortia members and also potentially different governance arrangements. In addition, in some projects, the consortia partners at the UK level were different or functioned independently from in-country consortia partners. This setup was reported to be problematic especially when there was limited communication between UK and in-country consortia partners resulting in confusion, lack of engagement and implementation delays. In the ALERT project, the consortia members were never formalised which led to a loss of efficiency and limited support from other partners during the early phases of the project.

Collaborations that built on established partnerships, and around common goals and ways of working were the most successful. Newer collaborations or consortia, including those that felt pressured to work together (such as those who were mandated to work together during the first START design phase) tended to struggle the most and were least efficient.

**Collaboration across DEPP Projects**

Cross-project collaboration was not well articulated as a programme objective and activity during the design phase, leading to different interpretations of collaboration, and underestimation of the time and resources needed. Cross-project collaboration was expected to occur organically but since projects were designed as standalone projects rather than an integrated portfolio this type of collaboration required concerted effort. Geographic imbalance between the UK and target countries in terms of collaboration intensity across projects was evident since the beginning, though efforts to stimulate in-country collaborations through in-country and international learning events, international conferences (Kenya-December 2016, the Philippines- July 2017) and by embedding country-level learning advisors (CLAs) intensified during the second half of DEPP and in some cases were successful.

Cross-project and cross-country exchange visits to learn directly from other projects and in different contexts were one outcome of the Learning Conferences that were reported to be particularly effective. Other efforts to engage local stakeholders to participate in local learning events and other types of cross-country collaboration have had varying levels of success. For example, interviewees stated that in Pakistan, despite substantial efforts to engage stakeholders, participation at learning events remained low, leading to the decision to reallocate funds for four remaining learning events to another activity.

In order to further facilitate sharing of learning and evidence, the DEPP’s Learning Project also...

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112 The other two factors contributing to delays in implementation were lengthy administrative and contractual processes, as well as retrofitting of pre-designed projects to the business case which then required substantial time at the project start-up to contextualise and secure buy-in from local stakeholders.  
113 Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response Final Evaluation Report: "different organisational cultures, time commitment, and the short duration of actual ‘implementation’ held the collaboration back from flourishing; as such, the project missed opportunities in terms of seizing new opportunities, particularly related to joint funding or developing new project initiatives."  
114 This finding is also supported by document review. For example see ADCAP Final Evaluation Report, p 5.  
115 ALERT Final Evaluation Report, p 5.  
116 This finding is also supported by document review. For example, see Shifting the Power Final Evaluation Report, p 24.  
117 102 DEPP and non-DEPP stakeholders from 13 countries attended the Kenya Learning Conference.  
118 127 stakeholders from 9 countries attended the Philippines Learning Conference.  
119 Country Learning Advisors were assigned to the Philippines, Kenya, DRC and Bangladesh.
set up an online collaboration platform\(^\text{120}\) in May 2017. The platform contains a compilation of blog posts, reports, videos and other materials generated by the projects, as well as a forum for discussions. The platform and its use will be assessed in more detail under evaluation output area 3: generating and sharing learning.

In many cases cross-project collaborations did not go beyond sharing of information and learning. There is limited evidence of projects working jointly with other projects within a country towards the common goals and objectives of the DEPP, and there was minimal to no joint advocacy or communication efforts. This represents a lost opportunity and likely diminished the potential impact of the DEPP at the country level.

**Collaboration with External Partners**

The external evaluation assessed linkages of the DEPP to other key external partners. The DEPP business case outlines expectations for the DEPP to work closely with the Humanitarian Leadership Academy (HLA), a global learning initiative set up to facilitate partnerships and collaborative opportunities and to enable individuals to better respond to crises in their own countries. Current data demonstrate that the connection between DEPP and HLA was limited, resulting in a lost opportunity. Only three interviewees discussed HLA, and these were primarily individuals at the programme level. One respondent described a joint DEPP project and HLA output, and another described the involvement of HLA in the Philippines Learning Conference as a partner who provided live streaming of the event sessions through their online platform. This conference video is still available on the HLA Facebook page where it has received 334 views. In total, the Learning Project estimates that there were over 10,000 viewers online during the event. Aside from these two examples, the interconnectedness between the DEPP and HLA has been minimal. Several other interviewees described an intention to develop linkages with HLA but that these were not pursued due to lack of time and resources. Further efforts to build a connection between HLA and DEPP projects would have reinforced DEPP’s activities and also allowed for coordination of capacity building efforts.

The START Fund, which provides rapid financing to underfunded small to medium scale crises, also has had minimal linkages to the DEPP, despite being an initiative within the START Network. At the time of this report, there was at least one example where DEPP project partners in the Philippines were able to access START Fund resources to respond to a crisis. Access of START Fund resources will be discussed further in the response section below.

A number of projects initiated collaborations with partners external to DEPP including governments, ministries, and the UN. These types of collaborations and partnerships were viewed as essential for project success and important for sustainability, but were challenging to develop, formalise and maintain. Notable difficulties included lengthy bureaucratic processes within governments, staff turnover within the UN and changing priorities or directions within the government that were difficult to navigate to ensure continuity over a longer period of time. In addition, the challenges of working with governments when they are poorly functioning or restrictive were also described. The few solutions proposed to overcome these challenges included ensuring adequate time and resources to engage with governments, and building in time within project timelines to develop these relationships as early as possible.

**Strengthened Networks**

Analysis of organisational networks within four countries (Myanmar, the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia) provides some evidence that the DEPP has contributed to increased collaborations and stronger networks. Please see Chapter 5 for further details on the findings from the analysis of humanitarian and response networks.

### 2. Evaluation Output Area 2: Capacity Building

Overall, DEPP exceeded its numeric targets for capacity building, though gender targets were not achieved. The most effective individual-level capacity building approach involved in-person training combined with a strategy to reinforce knowledge (i.e., simulations, mentoring, or coaching). At the organisational level,
approaches that permit organisational self-assessments, and capacity building approaches tailored to organisations’ needs were most effective. Supporting the development of administrative policies, procedures and systems especially among L/NNGOs was also reported to lead to improvements.

Eleven of the 13 projects (not including the Learning Project) implemented a total of 13 different capacity building interventions. These interventions were implemented in 9 of the DEPP focus countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Jordan, DRC, the Philippines, South Sudan), but also in 5 non-DEPP countries including Indonesia, Lebanon, Turkey, Thailand, UK, and Colombia. No capacity building activities were implemented in Mozambique, a DEPP focal country. Projects conducted capacity building interventions that targeted individual, organisational, community and systems levels (See Figure 4.5).122

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short courses</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>COMMUNITY</th>
<th>SYSTEM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Long courses</td>
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<td>Training of trainers</td>
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Figure 4.5: DEPP capacity building strategies at individual, organisational, community and system levels

The evaluation team collected independent data from each project regarding capacity building indicators and triangulated these against project quarterly reporting and programme logical framework reporting (see Table 4.2 below). As can be seen in the table, all projects described

121 While the DEPP included in total 14 projects, the Learning Project was designed to capture learning only, and thus is not included in this total.

122 Developed using Learning Project’s DEPP Capacity Building Map (https://kumu.io/Eamsmith/depp-capacity-building-activities-map#depp-capacity-building-activities-map/financial-enablers) and project reports and data.
implementing short courses (represented by green shaded cells in the first row). The next most common strategy was training of trainers with 10 projects employing this approach. Cumulatively, across the programme, the triangulated data show that 33,388 individuals (55% male, 45% female) were exposed to DEPP humanitarian capacity building activities across a number of key subject areas. Note this is a higher figure than reported by the programme logical framework data (N=24,304; see Table 4.2). This is likely due to inaccuracies in logical framework reporting that were described in the interim phase evaluation report. The key subject areas for DEPP capacity building efforts include:

1. Age and disability inclusion
2. Communication with communities
3. Disaster and conflict resilience and preparedness
4. Early warning, early action/response
5. Protection
6. Organisational capacity building
7. Surge
8. Health surveillance in emergencies
9. Core humanitarian competencies
10. Management and leadership
11. Research, data collection skills
12. Wellbeing in response
13. Logistics, finance, administration

The number of individuals exposed to DEPP capacity building activities exceeds the ultimate target of the programme of training 4,200 individuals by 795%. However, the goal that half of the trainees should be women has not been met. Only 45% of trainees were women, which represents an improvement from the interim report where only 41% of trainees were women. This likely represents some of the corrective actions taken by projects to increase accessibility for women, but unfortunately because of the late implementation of programme logical framework reporting, corrective action only began in the last quarter of 2017, towards the end of project timelines. At that point, it was difficult to catch up within the remaining time. It is also important to note that collection of gender disaggregated data was weak and some projects were not able to provide fully gender disaggregated data for all trainings. In future programme and/or project iterations inclusion of women should be strengthened. It is also important to note that these capacity building data were self-reported, and most projects were also unable to provide data disaggregated by training approach. The total (N=33,388), therefore, includes all types of capacity building activities, some of which involve minimal exposure (webinars, forums, short trainings). It is thus a suboptimal indicator as it may not accurately reflect the true number of individuals whose capacity has been built by the DEPP. This may also explain the large overshoot of the training target number. In fact, data presented later in this chapter on lack of significant change in knowledge at the individual level also supports this.

### Table 4.2: Types of capacity building strategies employed by DEPP projects and number of individuals trained

* Yellow shaded cells indicate that the project implemented that particular capacity building strategy. (e.g., LPRR implemented short courses and mentoring).

In terms of individual-level capacity building, universally, a multi-pronged approach employing several strategies together was perceived to be the most effective by DEPP stakeholders. In general, this involved an in-person training combined with another strategy such as mentorship, coaching or simulations. Distance or remote learning was not reported to be as effective as in-person approaches. As described later in this chapter, as there were no measurable changes in knowledge, it is not possible to quantitatively assess which capacity building approach was most effective. In addition, a number of interviewees described institutional barriers to applying knowledge or skills gained through individual capacity building and this was supported by findings from the document review. 

Organisational capacity building, especially of L/NNGOs was also seen as critical for strengthening humanitarian response and the greatest perceived organisational-level changes appear to be occurring when several strategies are combined and tailored to the specific gaps of each organisation. The greatest successes described by project stakeholders have often involved projects such as Shifting the Power and Financial Enablers where beneficiary organisations...
are empowered to self-assess gaps in capacity and identify their own strategies and plans. The Financial Enablers project, in particular, also took the step of re-imagining the funding and reporting mechanisms of its local grantees in order to make the funds more accessible. The Protection in Practice project provided cash awards rather than grants to minimise reporting burden on L/NNGOs and increase flexibility of how funds were utilised. In both cases, this approach seems to have worked well. The Shifting the Power project reported that strengthening the administrative policies, procedures and processes (such as finance systems, human resources and procurement processes) greatly benefitted organisations and improved their overall level of professionalism.\(^\text{125}\)

3. Evaluation Output Area 3: Generating and Sharing Learning

Generation and sharing of learning was high across the programme but this learning was not based on empirical evidence. In addition, there is no quantitative evidence that the learning translated to behaviour change. Accessibility to learning products especially for local stakeholders was an issue.

The third evaluation output area focuses on learning and is directly linked to result area five which aims to strengthen the evidence base for what works to build humanitarian capacity at scale. The DEPP was unique in that one of its projects, the Learning Project, was devoted entirely to the goal of generating and sharing learning and evidence. Overall, findings related to the Learning Project were mixed and have been documented extensively in previous reports. For example, certain aspects such as the in-country learning advisors were effective in a number of contexts, and events such as the international conferences stimulated cross-project collaboration. On the other hand, the in-country learning advisors were ineffective in other settings, and the emphasis in general of generating large quantities of learning with less emphasis on rigorous high quality evidence was problematic. However, the Learning Project incorporated previous recommendations made by the external evaluation, which in turn led to some improvements in terms of the quantity of evidence generated.

In addition, several pieces of research were commissioned by the Learning Project including a return on investment (ROI) study, as well as a case study on localisation during the humanitarian response to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and another focused on women’s leadership.\(^\text{126}\) The ROI analysis in particular may not have been undertaken at the appropriate time during the programme cycle, and likely would have been more appropriate prior to the start of the programme. Given that it was implemented as the DEPP was coming to a close, it could potentially have used actual outcome data but instead relied on hypothetical, projected changes in outcomes. This limitation of the ROI analysis is important, especially given the ROI findings have led to confusion among stakeholders with respect to the evaluation of overall programme outcomes versus projected or hypothetical outcomes. This brings into question the utility of conducting an ROI analysis post-programme versus before the programme was implemented. While this particular ROI study was never intended to produce the actual rate of return, such an approach would have been a valuable exercise at the end of the programme.

\(^{125}\) Shifting the Power Final Evaluation Report, p 9.
\(^{126}\) The final products from these three studies were not available at the time of the document review.
Table 4.3 presents the type and number of documents that the evaluation team consulted as part of the document review process. The number and availability of documents certainly increased since previous reports, and accessibility to documents was enhanced through the online Learning Platform. However, the majority of available outputs do not constitute rigorous evidence (Table 4.4). The generated content is based on stories and perspectives related to key DEPP concepts including collaboration, localisation, and capacity building, which were valuable for project implementation and could also potentially help provide lessons for future project design. Of the 334 documents and reports on the Learning Platform, 28% did include empirical findings but they were of variable quality. Overall, the document review revealed that the quality of evidence generated across the DEPP by the Learning Project and the individual projects was low, as it was primarily anecdotal and lacked scientific rigor. Part of this stems from the limited guidance provided to projects during the design and inception phases about what type of learning and evidence are required, and part is due to the limited capacity of project staff and partners related to M&E. The Transforming Surge Capacity final evaluation also noted the emphasis on quantity over quality and reported that: “Fewer, better targeted products may have been more effective.”

Table 4.3: Types of documents produced by projects and reviewed as part of the document review

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Table 4.4: Types of evidence shared on the Learning Platform

Accessibility of documents for project and programme stakeholders improved but the bulk of learning products produced are available only in English. Based on previous recommendations of the external evaluation, technical support was provided to strengthen individual project M&E and all projects were required to undertake an end of project evaluation. All projects have fulfilled this requirement, though again the quality has been variable.
There were some improvements in inclusion of gender disaggregated data, and VFM data, but these remained below expectations. In any future implementation of the DEPP or similar programmes, guidance and support for VFM assessment strategies should be provided early and consistently throughout the design and implementation phases.

4. Evaluation Output Area 4: Early Warning System Development

Six diverse early warning systems were developed in three countries and all six are at least partially operational, though the use and testing of each system was limited. Early warning system development was a key target area for the DEPP. Five different projects in a number of different contexts focused on this particular objective. These included:

1. ALERT
2. Improved Early Warning Early Action Ethiopia (EWEA)
3. Public Health Preparedness in Gambella (PHEP Gambella)
4. Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar (SEPS)
5. Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA)

These five projects aimed to develop six different early warning systems (See Table 4.5 below) in order to enable early response towards natural disasters such as flooding and drought, urban emergencies such as food insecurity and household shocks, as well as public health emergencies including disease outbreaks. One of the projects, PHEP Gambella, contributed to two systems. As described in previous evaluation reports, most of these projects faced significant implementation challenges and delays. In many cases, these delays were linked to challenges in procurement of equipment such as weather stations\(^\text{128}\), delays in setting up agreements with the government\(^\text{129}\), outbreak of violence in target communities\(^\text{130}\) or in delays in developing the system\(^\text{131}\). In fact, delays were severe enough that there was an evident risk that not all systems would be operational before the end of the programme. The interim report recommended acceleration of project activities to avoid this potential outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>TYPE OF SYSTEM</th>
<th>COUNTRY AND LOCATION</th>
<th>SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT USING GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT USING NGO, CSOs USING SYSTEM</th>
<th>SIMULATIONS CONDUCTED</th>
<th>CAPACITY BUILDING ACTIVITIES TO TRAIN ON SYSTEM</th>
<th>CONTINGENCY FUNDING USED IN RESPONSE</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Preparedness system (software)</td>
<td>Kenya, Pakistan, The Philippines, Bangladesh, Mozambique</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Trainings, Workshops</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWEA</td>
<td>Monitoring and early warning system</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔*</td>
<td>✔**</td>
<td>Trainings, Training of trainers, Workshops</td>
<td>×</td>
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</table>
At the time of this summative report, all six early warning systems had been fully developed, five were operational and two had been used in a response. However, because of the implementation challenges, many of the systems have been operational for a very short period of time which means that they have not had the opportunity to be fully tested or used in a meaningful way. It also prevents assessments of the effectiveness of the systems. The Urban Early Warning Early Action system in Nairobi City was operational the longest, and therefore had the longest period of testing and use. The main factor contributing to its quick (relative to other systems) deployment was that the system was conceptualised to build on a previous five-year project wherein the urban early warning indicators were developed and tested, and the surveillance methodology and system processes were articulated and refined. Given that it was able to build on the previous work that had been conducted, the system was not built from scratch, and thus the goal of developing a working system within a short project period was achieved. In fact, this system was able to detect three emergencies and trigger response actions. These are explored in further detail in the boxes later in this chapter. This was not the case for the other early warning systems. It was optimistic to set up and test an early warning system from scratch within a two- to three-year project, and future projects of this nature should set more realistic timeframes.

For example, the Improved Early Warning Early Action system in Ethiopia was reported to be only partially functional: The Automatic Weather Stations were “not installed as planned and still not functional due to internet unavailability in the areas”, Improved Early Warning Early Action Ethiopia Final Evaluation Report, p 6. Also, the ALERT Final Evaluation, p 4 reports: “no organisation had fully deployed the ALERT platform at the time of this evaluation.”

QUESTION 2.B, 2.C AND 2.D: TO WHAT EXTENT IS DEPP CONTRIBUTING TO GREATER PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AMONG LOCAL ORGANISATIONS AND COMMUNITIES? HAS LOCAL CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO DISASTERS CHANGED SINCE THE START OF DEPP? IF YES, HOW HAS IT CHANGED? IF NOT, WHY NOT? HAS DEPP LED TO IMPROVED KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF BEST PRACTICES RELATING TO DISASTER AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE? IF YES, IN WHAT WAYS?

1. Knowledge Change

Overall, there have been no significant improvements in knowledge on core humanitarian competencies of humanitarian staff, on self-reported knowledge on disaster preparedness, response to disasters and emergencies or age or disability-related issues in disasters.

A key area of assessment to evaluate the extent to which capacity has been built as a result of the DEPP training, is knowledge change among humanitarian staff in several key thematic areas related to disaster and emergency preparedness and response. Figure 4.6 presents data on knowledge change across six key areas using the pooled data from all four intensive set countries as well as the minimum set data. All 10 DEPP countries are therefore represented in this analysis. There was no significant change in the overall composite knowledge score relating to the core humanitarian competencies, or in any of the self-reported indicators related to knowledge on specific themes (disaster preparedness, humanitarian response, or age, disability or gender issues in a disaster) within DEPP or non-DEPP comparison humanitarian staff. Furthermore, there was no significant effect of the DEPP on any of these knowledge indicators, globally or when restricted to individual countries or to local organisation (See Figure 4.7). In addition, there was no significant effect of the DEPP when the sample was restricted only to those respondents who reported participating in capacity building within the last 12 months.

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<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
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<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>+1.0%</td>
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<td>Disaster Preparedness</td>
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<td>+4.2%</td>
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<td>Response to disasters and emergencies</td>
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<td>+3.4%</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
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<td>Age related issues in a disaster</td>
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<td>+0.6%</td>
<td>+0.5%</td>
<td>+1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues related to women in a disaster</td>
<td>+0.8%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>+1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.6: Individual knowledge change of humanitarian staff on key thematic areas

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant

These findings suggest that while many individuals have been exposed to the DEPP capacity building, according to both logical framework data and independent data collected by the evaluation team (Figure 4.6), significant knowledge change (both via objective measures such as the core humanitarian competencies indicator and through self-reported measures) in several expected thematic areas has not occurred.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DEPP Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Control Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Net DEPP Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+2.2%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>+3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>+1.9%</td>
<td>+0.9%</td>
<td>+2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>+1.6%</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>+0.7%</td>
<td>+2.8%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.7: Individual-level knowledge change of humanitarian staff on core humanitarian competencies by country

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

2. Emergency Preparedness

There were no significant quantitative improvements in perceived individual emergency preparedness levels in the DEPP group, but there were significant improvements in preparedness of DEPP organisations across all intensive set countries, and in particular for L/NNGOs. While access to early warning system information was significantly higher in DEPP communities than in non-DEPP comparison communities, the perceived level of community preparedness significantly decreased in both DEPP and non-DEPP comparison communities in Myanmar.

Emergency preparedness was assessed at the individual, organisational and community level through a series of indicators using perceived (self-reported) measures or more objective assessments (See Box below). The self-reported or perceived measures assess data from humanitarian staff who rated their own or their organisations level of preparedness as well as households who rated their community’s level of preparedness to respond to disasters and emergencies. At the community level, preparedness was also assessed through self-reported existence of an early warning system.

As self-reported data based on perceptions are known to be problematic and often biased, more objective measures were also included. At the time of the development of the methodology for this evaluation, there was an absence of standardised, objective indicators and tools to assess organisational and community emergency preparedness. The evaluation team developed an organisational checklist spanning seven domains to more rigorously assess organisational preparedness. The evaluation team also adapted the GOAL toolkit for assessing community resilience\(^{134}\) comprising a series of questions across 30 different domains in order to assess community preparedness (See Box below). The preparedness indicators therefore include a mix of perceived and also more objective measures.

**KEY PREPAREDNESS INDICATOR DATA COLLECTED AT 2 TIMEPOINTS**

**Individual level:**

- Perceived: KAP survey with humanitarian staff. As a responder, how would you rate your level of preparedness to respond to a disaster? Where 1=Very unprepared, 2=Unprepared, 3=Somewhat unprepared, 4=Prepared, 5=Very prepared

**Organisational level:**

- **Perceived:** KAP survey with humanitarian staff. At what level would you rate your organisation’s preparedness to respond to disasters and emergencies? Where 1=Very unprepared, 2=Unprepared, 3=Somewhat unprepared, 4=Prepared, 5=Very prepared

- **Actual:** Organisational Checklist conducted with each organisation and assessing seven domains: 1-Emergency preparedness plans, 2-human resources and capacity, 3-logistics and supplies, 4-Legal, documentation and policy, 5-Organisation and system processes, 6-Emergency response team and staffing, 7-Communication and media. Aggregate score out of 100 generated for each organisation.

**Community level:**

- **Perceived:** Household survey: How prepared do you feel your community is to respond to disasters in the future? Where 1=Not prepared at all, 2=Slightly prepared, 3=Somewhat prepared, 4=Prepared, 5=Very prepared

- **Perceived (early warning system):** Household survey: Does your area have an early warning system?

- **Actual:** Community focus group using a preparedness assessment tool conducted in each community, assessing 30 domains including emergency response and recovery, contingency planning, early warning systems, capacities in preparedness and response, access to healthcare in emergencies, and hazard assessment.

Figure 4.8 presents the findings related to each of the preparedness indicators using the pooled data from all countries. At the individual level, there were no significant changes in perceived levels of own preparedness in the DEPP group or the control group, and there was no net effect of the programme on individual preparedness. At the organisational level, on the other hand, significant improvements in organisational preparedness, both with the self-reported indicator, as well as with the more objective assessment using the organisational checklist within the DEPP group only have occurred. However, the Difference-in-Difference analysis shows no overall significant effect of the programme in terms of organisational preparedness, likely due to similar changes in the comparison group over the same period. Figure 4.9 presents the organisational checklist data (the rigorous indicator of organisational preparedness) for each country and for local organisations. There were significant improvements in organisational preparedness specifically within Kenya (an increase of 11.1%) and also within local organisations (an increase of 10.1%) across all intensive countries. Again, however, the Difference-in-Difference analysis, which takes into account changes in the DEPP and in the control group over time, shows no statistically significant net effect of the programme on organisational preparedness. The measured improvements in organisational preparedness in the DEPP organisations (especially local organisations) are also supported by in-depth interviews, document review and the case study (Chapter 8). For example, in Ethiopia, local beneficiary organisations of the Shifting the Power project noted the improvements in their organisations preparedness levels, and cited changed attitudes and mindsets, inter-departmental coordination, improved procurement plans and strengthened organisational procedures including creating emergency response teams.

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135 See case study #2 in Chapter 8. Also the Shifting the Power Final Evaluation Report, p 9, also describes these changes in organizational preparedness.
With respect to community preparedness, there was a significant 41% increase in the community access to early warning systems in DEPP communities in Myanmar compared to no change in non-DEPP comparison communities in the same area. With the Difference-in-Difference analysis, the net effect of the DEPP programme was a 40% increase in community early warning systems. However, surprisingly, this substantial effect did not translate to improved perceptions of community members on the preparedness level of their communities. In fact, perceptions on level of community preparedness significantly decreased by 13% in DEPP communities and 17% in non-DEPP communities. Attitudes related to the value of preparedness activities in improving response were not positive and did not change over time which may explain this finding. Furthermore, findings during the validation workshop suggest that changes in the government and other contextual factors may have led to increased pessimism on the part of community members. Finally, the objective assessment of community preparedness which aggregated indicators across 30 domains showed no significant change in DEPP, control or via the Difference-in-Difference analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DEPP Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Control Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+13.9%</td>
<td>-6.9%</td>
<td>+20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>+11.1%*</td>
<td>+7.6%</td>
<td>+3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>+5.0%</td>
<td>+4.6%</td>
<td>+0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>+6.2%</td>
<td>+4.6%</td>
<td>+1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>+10.1%*</td>
<td>+6.8%</td>
<td>+8.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to community preparedness, there was a significant 41% increase in the community access to early warning systems in DEPP communities in Myanmar compared to no change in non-DEPP comparison communities in the same area. With the Difference-in-Difference analysis, the net effect of the DEPP programme was a 40% increase in community early warning systems. However, surprisingly, this substantial effect did not translate to improved perceptions of community members on the preparedness level of their communities. In fact, perceptions on level of community preparedness significantly decreased by 13% in DEPP communities and 17% in non-DEPP communities. Attitudes related to the value of preparedness activities in improving response were not positive and did not change over time which may explain this finding. Furthermore, findings during the validation workshop suggest that changes in the government and other contextual factors may have led to increased pessimism on the part of community members. Finally, the objective assessment of community preparedness which aggregated indicators across 30 domains showed no significant change in DEPP, control or via the Difference-in-Difference analysis.

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<th>Country</th>
<th>DEPP Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Control Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP Effect</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+13.9%</td>
<td>-6.9%</td>
<td>+20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>+11.1%*</td>
<td>+7.6%</td>
<td>+3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>+5.0%</td>
<td>+4.6%</td>
<td>+0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>+6.2%</td>
<td>+4.6%</td>
<td>+1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>+10.1%*</td>
<td>+6.8%</td>
<td>+8.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.
3. Humanitarian Response

DEPP contributed to at least 42 different humanitarian responses in 11 countries; 16 of these responses occurred in the Philippines (and 14 of these 16 responses were driven by one project – the Financial Enablers project). Qualitative data indicate contribution of DEPP beneficiaries towards improved response in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, but many other DEPP beneficiaries were unable to respond due to lack of response funds.

Humanitarian response was not considered by most projects in the design phase as the DEPP was intended to function as a dedicated preparedness programme. As such links with response activities were not explicitly developed into the design of the programme. Many project stakeholders, in fact, now consider any DEPP contribution towards humanitarian response to be an unintended but positive consequence of DEPP activities.

Humanitarian response activities and outcomes were assessed in a number of ways in this evaluation. First, descriptive primary data were collected at the individual, organisation and community level on the types of disasters and emergencies that have occurred in the previous 12 months, as well as types of response activities implemented. Second, a number of quantitative indicators related to performance during past humanitarian responses and ability to respond in the future were measured at the two time points (See Box below). Third, the document review allowed systematic mapping of all responses that DEPP reportedly contributed to during the programme period. Fourth, additional response data was collected during the evaluation validation workshops in Kenya, Ethiopia, Myanmar and the Philippines in March 2018, to better understand which disasters and emergencies stakeholders in those countries were able to respond to and to understand factors related to both response and non-response. In addition, response data were collected from each project by email. Finally, additional qualitative interviews were conducted in Kenya and the Ethiopia to contribute to a more detailed humanitarian response focused case study (see Chapter 8).

Figure 4.10 below presents data on the percentage of DEPP and non-DEPP comparison organisations that responded to a disaster or emergency in the past 12 months. Of note, DEPP organisations were asked to report on any response activity regardless of contribution of the DEPP. As depicted in the figure, the vast majority of both DEPP and non-DEPP organisations implemented humanitarian response activities in the previous 12 months, and there was no statistical difference between T1 and T2 in either group. Furthermore, local NGOs who were DEPP beneficiaries were not more likely to respond to a disaster after exposure to DEPP or when compared to non-DEPP local organisations. The types of disasters did vary between DEPP and non-DEPP organisations, with flooding, drought and displacement being the most common across the DEPP organisations, and drought, flooding and infectious disease epidemics being most common among the non-DEPP comparison organisations (Figure 4.11). The types of response activities are summarised in Figure 4.12 highlighting the diverse range of activities, though food security and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities were the most common in both DEPP and non-DEPP organisations.
Figure 4.11: Types of disasters and emergencies that organisations responded to in the previous 12 months

Figure 4.12: Types of response activities implemented by organisations in the previous 12 months

Quantitative indicators to assess perceived performance during a previous response during the last 12 months, and as well as future ability to respond to a disaster or emergency are summarised in Figure 4.13. At the individual level, humanitarian staff at DEPP and non-DEPP comparison organisations were asked to rate their past response performance and their ability to respond in the future (see Box below for description of the indicators).
KEY RESPONSE INDICATOR DATA (RELATED TO RESPONSE IN THE PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS) COLLECTED AT 2 TIMEPOINTS

**Individual level:**
- Perceived past performance: KAP survey with humanitarian staff. How would you rate your performance during your last response? Where 1=Poor, 2=Fair, 3=Good, 4=Very good, 5=Excellent
- Perceived future ability: KAP survey with humanitarian staff. How would you rate your ability to respond to a disaster in the future? Where 1=Poor, 2=Fair, 3=Good, 4=Very good, 5=Excellent

**Organisational level:**
- Perceived past performance: Organisational survey with senior leadership. How would you rate your organisation’s overall response to the disaster or emergency (in the last 12 months)? Where 1=Poor, 2=Fair, 3=Good, 4=Very good, 5=Excellent
- Perceived future ability: Organisational survey with senior leadership. How would you rate your organisation’s ability to respond to a disaster in the future? Where 1=Poor, 2=Fair, 3=Good, 4=Very good, 5=Excellent

**Community level:**
- Satisfaction with previous response: Household survey. How satisfied were you with the previous response to disaster? Where 1=Not satisfied at all, 2=Slightly satisfied, 3=Somewhat satisfied, 4=Satisfied, 5=Very Satisfied

There is a downward trend amongst both DEPP and non-DEPP humanitarian staff reflecting declining perceptions of own performance and future ability to respond, though neither of these differences were statistically significant except for past performance in the non-DEPP comparison group. Overall there was no net DEPP programme effect for either of these indicators using the pooled data from the four intensive countries. There was also no net programme effect when restricting the sample to specific intensive set countries or to only local organisations. However, case study qualitative data from Kenya and Ethiopia demonstrate some individual-level changes in preparedness, including knowledge on procedures, resources, and improved confidence to respond (See Chapter 8). The CDAC-N project final evaluation report also reported that individuals benefitting from their project in South Sudan and Bangladesh feel more equipped and prepared to implement response activities, especially those related to two-way communication. This demonstrates that there have been documented improvements in qualitative indicators related to ability to respond, but that these have not yet translated into widespread quantitative change across the programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPP DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>CONTROL DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Perceived Past</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-4.9%*</td>
<td>+4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Perceived Future</td>
<td>-1.4%*</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
<td>+4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response (Perceived</td>
<td>-1.8%*</td>
<td>+3.4%</td>
<td>-5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Performance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the organisational level, there were no significant changes in the perceived past performance during a response, or in perceived future ability to respond in both the DEPP and non-DEPP comparison groups in the four intensive set countries, and there was no net effect of the programme on either of these indicators with the pooled or restricted samples. However, as described in more detail below, qualitative data, and data extracted from the document review do demonstrate some examples of improved organisational response activities. At the community level, drawing on household data from Myanmar, beneficiary satisfaction with humanitarian response in the previous 12 months significantly decreased by 15% in the DEPP communities and 17% in the control communities. Overall there was no significant net effect of the programme on beneficiary satisfaction in Myanmar. Discussion during validation workshops suggested this might have been due to worsening contextual factors and political climate within the country.

Document review and in-depth interviews demonstrate contribution of the DEPP to at least 42 different humanitarian responses in 11 countries (see Table 4.6 below, and Annex 10). There were no documented contributions to responses in Mozambique, one of the countries with the fewest DEPP projects (one project). The largest number of response contributions (N=16) occurred in the Philippines which also had the highest number of DEPP projects implemented (N=6). Note that Kenya and Pakistan also had 6 DEPP projects but in these specific contexts, DEPP contributed to substantially fewer responses than in the Philippines. This difference was also noted with independent response data collected directly from projects during validation workshops. In fact, according to data collected during these workshops, there was DEPP contribution to 33 responses in the Philippines (versus 16 responses extracted from the document review). Further discussion on why DEPP contributed to more responses than in other countries can be found below. Only three projects provided response information by email (Table 4.6). This is likely because the projects were wrapping up and project staff did not have time to contribute to this component of the evaluation. Complete details of the 42 response efforts are in Annex 10.
### Table 4.6. Contribution of DEPP to humanitarian response activities in DEPP countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>STP, PHEP, STP, PHEP, Gamella, EWEA, TD, (4)</th>
<th>PIP, STP, TSC, ADCAP, LPRR, ALERT (6)</th>
<th>PIP, STP, LPRR, TD (4)</th>
<th>STP, CDAC-N, LPRR, TD, ALERT(5)</th>
<th>PIP, CDAC (2)</th>
<th>TD (1)</th>
<th>ALERT (1)</th>
<th>TSC (1)</th>
<th>Response was not funded by the DEPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>n/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon, Syria***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>n/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India****</td>
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<td>n/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Learning Project was implemented in all DEPP countries and is not included, **Only four projects submitted data, ***One response reported by Talent Development in Kenya, ****TSC deployment

Findings based on the document review, qualitative interviews and validation workshops suggests that projects in the Philippines outperformed the other DEPP focal countries with respect to contribution to humanitarian responses. Note that universally, these contributions to responses were not necessarily designed outcomes from the outset but became objectives as projects and planning evolved. Some stakeholders expressed these response activities to be unplanned side effects. Qualitative data suggests that DEPP contribution to some of these responses led to more timely, locally driven responses. In other cases, it is not possible to assess timeliness or effectiveness of a particular response effort with available data sources. In contrast to the qualitative indicators, quantitative data on perceptions of improved speed and effectiveness of response activities did not show a significant measurable effect of the DEPP. Further analysis on the performance of the DEPP towards humanitarian responses in the Philippines reveals the following:

- The high performance in the Philippines in terms of absolute number of humanitarian response efforts was largely driven by the Financial Enablers project which cumulatively contributed to 14 different responses (out of 16 DEPP responses in the Philippines during the DEPP programme)
- Several factors contributed to the overall performance in the Philippines vis-à-vis other countries. These include:
  - The fact that the Philippines has a high frequency of disasters/emergencies each year to which projects could theoretically respond. This has created greater incentive for governmental and non-government partners to develop preparedness projects and more opportunity for these actors to build upon their
experience from each response.

- Networks in the Philippines are highly locally driven (see Chapter 5), and the government and other key actors provide space for civil society action.

- Flexible funding mechanisms (via the Financial Enablers project, and to a lesser degree Protection in Practice) allowed local actors to identify relevant needs, and implement accordingly. This included using funding towards response activities (via mechanisms such as a quick response fund). This was not the case in numerous other settings where DEPP beneficiaries who wanted to respond (and now believed they had the capacity to) were limited in what they could contribute due to absence of designated response funds. DEPP beneficiaries in the Philippines were also successful at securing response funds external to the DEPP such as via the START Fund, or through other donors.

- The large number of DEPP projects being implemented in the Philippines (N=6) provided a greater opportunity for collective action, and a larger overall investment.

- The DEPP projects in the Philippines showed a substantially high level of inter-project collaboration and were able to jointly contribute to certain responses (i.e., Marawi response). Overall, the DEPP projects in the Philippines, in many ways, operated more like a programme (and the initial vision of the DEPP) than in other focus countries, albeit despite the key programme-level systems and processes that were essential for portfolio functioning.

The contributions to humanitarian responses in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia were examined in further detail and are presented in the boxes below. All three settings provide some evidence of improved organisational response activities, and the Philippines and Kenya demonstrate the contribution of the collaborative approach and working through consortia to improved humanitarian response activities.

**Humanitarian Response: Focus on the Marawi Crisis**

**What:**
The Marawi Crisis began on May 23, 2017, when the government of the Philippines launched a military operation against pro-ISIS militants in the Lanao del Sur province of Marawi City. This five-month long incursion resulted in the displacement of roughly 98% of the population, or almost 360,000 people.

**Who:**
A total of six DEPP projects were implemented in the Philippines: Protection in Practice, Financial Enablers, Transforming Surge Capacity, LPRR, ALERT and the CDAC-N Communicating with Communities Project.

**Objective:**
To understand how these projects contributed to Marawi response efforts

**Data sources:**
- Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders (Qualitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)

---

Key Findings:

In total, at least 16 disasters and emergencies (including flooding, typhoons, earthquakes, fires) in the Philippines had response contribution by the DEPP, a substantially higher figure than any other DEPP country. Self-reported data indicate successful inter-project collaboration and coordination, where capacity building of local organisations working together in consortia contributed to a faster, more locally driven response effort. The most prominent example of significant contribution was the Marawi crisis. Four of the six projects responded to the Marawi crises including the following response activities:

- A protection network of 600 local responders in Mindanao able to implement inclusive programming was established
- Local consortia whose capacity was strengthened by the DEPP were the first to respond to the crisis (and did so independently without a lead INGO). They were recognised for the first time by UNOCHA on crisis response maps demonstrating increased presence and recognition of local actors
- Various consortia coordinated their responses together, allowing for efficient use of human resources and sharing of knowledge, contacts and resources
- Examples demonstrate beneficiary involvement in design and implementation of some response activities
- Local actors gained confidence and skills as they took on more responsibility during the response

Factors that enabled a faster more locally driven response included the following:

- In contrast to other country examples, consortia partners in the Philippines were able to access quick response funds through a number of mechanisms which enabled response activities to be implemented rapidly
- The Philippines is a disaster-prone context, with a humanitarian network that is highly driven by local actors. This is reflective of a context where the government and other actors provide space for civil society, which is deeply engrained in society and culture and considered to be the strongest in Asia\(^1\). The prominence of local actors within the Philippines allows collaborative action at the local level to occur more organically than in other country contexts
- A key enabling factor was the mandate by the government that only local NGOs could respond to this crisis. This provided the space and opportunity for local actors to actively respond

Conclusion:

Self-reported data suggest strong inter-project collaboration, coordination between DEPP organisations and unified response activities delivered by local consortia rather than individual organisations. Self-reported data suggest that the response was faster, more efficient, more inclusive and involved beneficiaries, and this was driven by the immediate availability of flexible funds and a context supportive of local actors. However, there is no way to objectively assess how the response might have differed in the absence of the DEPP in the Philippines.
**Humanitarian Response:** Focus on urban emergencies in Kenya

**What:**
- An urban early warning surveillance system in informal settlements in Nairobi county to monitor food security, household shocks and public health indicators on a routine basis (every two months) detected three emergencies and triggered response activities.

1. Diarrhoeal outbreak: February 2017 to June 2017
2. Cholera outbreak: April 2017 to February 2018
3. Food insecurity: October to March 2018

**Who:**
The DEPP’s Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA) Project developed and implemented the urban early warning system through its consortium members Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, and Kenya Red Cross Society, in seven sub-counties (Kibera, Kasarani, Ruaraka, Makadara, Starehe, Kamukunji and Embakasi East). The system aimed to identify slow onset or chronic emergencies in urban contexts through routine monitoring of a set of sensitive indicators that were developed along with specific thresholds prior to the start of the project and to set up a coordinated response mechanism within the Nairobi City Country Government.

**Objective:**
To understand how DEPP projects contributed to response efforts in informal settlements

**Data sources:**
- Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders (Qualitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)
- Document review (Qualitative)
- Response case study data collection: 16 IDIs, site visits and observations (Qualitative and Observational)

**Key Findings:**
- DEPP contributions to responses in urban settlements in Nairobi through early detection against a set of sensitive indicators with clear thresholds, stand out as being particularly innovative in their sound, data-driven approach to identifying urban emergencies and for their strong collaboration with government. This is one of the few systems specifically targeting urban contexts and fills an important need, especially as the populations in urban settings continue to grow. The following emergency response activities were triggered:
  - Diarrheal outbreak: health education, mass screening of children under 5 years (8,338 screened in Korogocho, 13,284 in Embakasi), and distribution of water purification products
  - Cholera outbreak: health promotion (171,139 households and 2630 students sensitised), solid and liquid waste management, and water quality and food safety monitoring
  - Food security: Mass screening of children under 5 years (44,825) and cash transfers of 2000 KSH (roughly 20 USD) provided to 3,034 households (2,085 women, 949 men) who were severely food insecure were made via mobile money in Korogocho and Kibera
- The first response was the slowest – no response package existed, and lack of immediate funding source led to delays. The response occurred in April 2017 approximately two months after initial detection.
Although the surveillance system was not the first to identify the cholera outbreak, the use of the consortium model enabled consortium members to collaborate in the cholera response outside of their DEPP activities.

Data collected suggest that response time improved significantly between the first response to diarrhoea to the most recent response to food insecurity which was undertaken within a few weeks of detection.

Factors enabling success include: conducting a needs assessment and research to inform the system, and developing the system alongside government actors to ensure coordination, buy-in, alignment with government priorities and sustainability

**Conclusion:**

Data collected suggests that the consortium management model as well as collaboration with government were critical to successful implementation of this system and permitted coordinated humanitarian responses that improved with each subsequent emergency. Availability of immediate response funds and previously agreed upon response actions were key to ensuring more rapid responses.

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**Humanitarian Response: Focus on drought in Ethiopia**

**What:**

Ethiopia has been affected by large scale droughts since 2015. Initially induced by the 2015/2016 El Nino, and further exacerbated by low 2016 Autumn rains, and below average 2017 Spring rains, at least 8.5 million people were in need of relief food assistance by mid-2017 in Southern and South-eastern Ethiopia. The effects of the drought have been further exacerbated by disease outbreaks, large scale loss of livelihood assets, and displacement. Conflict in the Oromia and Somali regions beginning in September 2017 further contributed to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people often in drought-affected areas.

**Who:**

A total of four DEPP projects were implemented in Ethiopia: Shifting the Power, Public Health Preparedness in Gambella, Talent Development and Improved Early Warning Early Action – Ethiopia.

**Objective:**

To understand how DEPP projects contributed to response efforts to drought in Ethiopia

**Data sources:**

- Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders (Qualitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)
- Document review (Qualitative)
- Response case study data collection: 7 IDIs

**Key Findings:**

Self-reported data suggest 6 out of 10 local partners of the Shifting the Power project, which had aimed to build L/NNGO capacity and preparedness, responded to the drought in the areas where they manage development programs. These included: Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance (CIFA), Community Development Initiative (CDI), Rift Valley Children and Women Development Organisation (RVCWO), Action for Development, SOS Sahel, and HUNDEE. Specific response activities led by these L/NNGOs in 2017-2018 included:
• CIFA targeted 35,060 households in the Moyale, Miyo and Guchi woredas to reduce livestock mortality and implemented a livestock vaccination campaign which reached 263,187 cattle

• CDI secured a £10,000 response grant from Oxfam and Shifting the Power which enabled distribution of seeds to 200 households in communities affected by the drought in West Arsi Zone, Oromia

• RCVWVO obtained a £60,000 grant from ActionAid to provide livestock feed support to a targeted 1,030 households

• Action for Development provided £60,000 in cash transfers to drought affected communities in Borena

• SOS Sahel secured $530,000 directly from UNOCHA’s Emergency Response Fund to provide animal feed in three woredas (Wachille, Dubuluq and Dire), indirectly benefitting 28,256 individuals. This is one of the only instances where a local Ethiopian NGO has been able to secure funds through this mechanism without an intermediary partner

• HUNDEE obtained $410,000 from Kindernothilfe (KnH) to provide emergency food assistance to 10,000 people in 4 Kebeles of two woredas in the Borena Zone

There was no available evidence as to whether speed, costliness or effectiveness of the response were affected. Factors that enabled these L/NNGOs to respond include:

• Shifting the Power set up a £50,000 response fund accessible to L/NNGO partners via a peer-reviewed application

• Support with proposal writing, and training on fundraising strategies including a donor mapping exercise facilitated access to direct response funding which in turn enabled response activities

• The magnitude of the drought crisis in Ethiopia created an opportunity to promote learning by doing; thus, creating a strong link between emergency preparedness and response. For example, L/NNGO partners obtained support and practice in applying for response funds via Shifting the Power’s response fund peer review process, and one partner was able to directly implement a response project as a result.

Conclusion:

Self-reported data suggest that experiential learning related to fundraising and implementation of humanitarian response activities, along with access to flexible response funding mechanisms contributed to six drought responses in Ethiopia.

4. Linking Emergency Preparedness Capacity to Disaster Response

Despite the contributions towards humanitarian responses that have been documented primarily via qualitative documents and through self-reported data, it is difficult to objectively (and quantitatively) assess increased speed, coverage, or efficiency of response in the 42 response examples and as well to trace these back to increased preparedness even with the diverse range of data sources. In fact, across the four intensive set countries, self-reported quantitative data on the speed, efficiency, and costliness of response activities were not different between DEPP and non-DEPP comparison organisations across the full sample. However, these data pertain to any response activities in the previous 12 months and may or may not have included the 42 response examples identified by the evaluation team. Further, the evaluation team is unable to compare these indicators among DEPP and non-DEPP comparison organisations that directly responded in the 42 emergency responses described above as there is limited available data about non-DEPP contribution to these same responses. This would have provided more concrete evidence on DEPP contribution to improved delivery of humanitarian response. Nevertheless, the best evidence across the DEPP for strengthened response is in the Philippines where there
is some self-reported link between improved capacity, improved preparedness and followed by earlier, more timely response. The quantitative data do show statistically significant increased preparedness (using the actual measure) among DEPP organisations in the full sample, and especially among local organisations. However, this was not significant in the Philippines, likely due to small sample size.

An important finding from the qualitative data as well as the case study on Ethiopia and Kenya in Chapter 8, highlight that in many cases emergency preparedness and response activities were disjointed. This is not surprising as most projects were designed as standalone preparedness projects without clearly articulating the link to response or incorporating activities that might better enable L/NNGOs to respond. Interviewees emphasised the need to strengthen this link between emergency preparedness and response activities, and also described the need to seek separate funding for response activities as a significant barrier.

**PROJECT VERSUS PROGRAMME OUTCOMES AND ADDED VALUE OF BEING PART OF THE DEPP**

Individual project evaluations suggest some positive outcomes, but this has not translated to global programme effects likely due to short programme period and lack of project alignment.

As the external evaluation focused on global programme-level outputs and outcomes as well as country-level programme results using pooled data from each country, individual project effects cannot be assessed. Previous evaluation reports, therefore, recommended strengthening of the individual project M&E systems and the implementation of end of project evaluations. The external evaluation team provided a detailed evaluation checklist as well as guidance on indicators to assess in an effort to harmonise measurement across projects. All projects have completed individual evaluations, which have been reviewed as part of the document review, though the quality and rigor of each evaluation varies.

A number of individual project evaluations report positive outcomes which should be interpreted objectively, in light of the quality of the specific evaluation methodology and approach and its limitations. With this in mind, as there was limited alignment of projects at the portfolio level, each project worked towards its own objectives and own theory of change. It is conceivable that an individual project might have contributed to positive outcome change on specific indicators, but that globally at the programme level, cumulative change in this indicator was not achieved. In fact, positive outcomes that have been suggested by project evaluations have not translated into cumulative global programme effects and this is likely due to the lack of project alignment and/or the short programme periods.

**Added Value of Being Part of the DEPP**

Given that the projects were designed independently and with limited consideration to portfolio functioning, and evaluation data demonstrated limited cohesion as a portfolio, the added value of being part of the DEPP programme has been limited. The most beneficial aspect of working under the DEPP has been the ability to share contacts and knowledge and leverage previously built connections and networks. However, the data suggest that the lack of cohesion across the project portfolio led to limited awareness and understanding of the DEPP, and lack of a sense of belonging or connection to the DEPP at the country level. During in-depth interviews, most interviewees could speak about their individual projects but in most cases, were unable to reflect on the DEPP as a whole and discuss its objectives and functioning within their country. This low programme awareness and identity affected programme-level advocacy, stakeholder buy-in and engagement at the programme level, coordinated project implementation and longer-term sustainability of the programme.

**DOSE–RESPONSE ASSESSMENT**

As described in the inception phase report, the external evaluation aimed to conduct a dose-response assessment wherein programme-level outcomes could be compared across countries taking into consideration the number of projects, size of investments and humanitarian context. The hypothesis to be tested was that countries with a higher investment, with more projects working collaboratively would display larger effects. In fact, the four countries selected for the intensive set data collection were selected to represent a range of DEPP “doses”. Unfortunately,
as there were very few quantitative programme-level outcome changes, a dose-response analysis is of limited value. It is worthwhile to highlight that the Philippines, the country with the highest level of DEPP projects and investment, had the largest contribution to humanitarian response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF DEPP PROJECTS (AT THE END OF DEPP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Number of DEPP projects by country (not including the Learning Project which was implemented in all 10 countries)

*CDAC Network's project moved from South Sudan to the Philippines, thus altering the project numbers in those two countries

**Myanmar originally had 2 projects, but LPRR decided to implement activities in Myanmar raising the number of projects to 3
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS
**Evaluation Question #3:** To what extent was the programme’s theory that capacity development is more effective when undertaken as a multi-agency collaborative approach proven?

**Sub-questions:**

a) Is the ‘collaborative’ approach of multi-stakeholder platforms an effective delivery mechanism?

b) Focusing on coalitions, partnerships and connectedness – what can be said about the effects of strengthened networks?

c) What have been the main patterns of collaboration, and the benefits and disadvantages of informal versus formal collaboration?

d) What unique contribution did collaborative relationships and ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ make toward deepening cross-programme learning?

**Data sources:**

- Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders (Qualitative)
- KAP, organisational and network surveys (Quantitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)
- Document review (Qualitative)

**Key Findings:**

- Despite the original vision, the DEPP focused more on consortia-based collaborative approaches rather than multi-stakeholder platforms at the national, regional and international levels. Collaborative approaches were consistently reported to be the most appropriate, preferred approach to deliver humanitarian capacity building, but respondents identified challenges in engagement, communication and coordination.

- As a delivery mechanism, collaborative and consortia-based approaches were particularly effective when the following conditions were met:
  - Existence of joint objectives, values and common ways of working
  - Collaborations were organic not forced
  - Sufficient time, space, resources, capacity and will to foster healthy collaborative relationships
  - Streamlined decision-making and contractual processes and fewer consortia partners
  - Building on existing relationships

- The top three collaboration areas (areas where humanitarian organisations may work together) in the four intensive data collection countries (The Philippines, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Myanmar) were advocacy, community capacity building and project implementation.

- There was some evidence of strengthened humanitarian response networks among three of the four intensive set countries (The Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, while the network in Myanmar remained unchanged).

- The Philippines network is highly locally driven (70% links are with L/NNGOs); network size increased but the network became less dense with fewer connections. The Ethiopia network is internationally driven with little input from local organisations, while in Kenya, the network is balanced between local and international actors. There was evidence of network growth in both settings. The Myanmar network is very small, isolated and dominated by international actors.

- Collaboration findings were mixed. Collaboration frequency (a proxy indicator of trust) and quality of relationships increased in Kenya and the Philippines but decreased in Myanmar and Ethiopia between T1 and T2.

- Collaboration within the DEPP cohort increased in Myanmar and the Philippines, but both did not increase engagement with non-DEPP actors. Ethiopia and Kenya had increases in relationships between DEPP and non-DEPP organisations.

- Overall, there was no quantitative evidence of increased localisation (no increase in proportion of relationships with local actors between T1 and T2) in any intensive country within the network data. In fact, the Myanmar network became even more dominated by INGOs by T2. However qualitative data suggests changes in attitudes around localisation are occurring (see CH 7).

- Not enough time passed between the data collection points to sufficiently document and test the hypothesis that strengthened networks and greater collaboration lead to better preparedness. Data at T1 picked up network effects caused by ever-shifting strategies common to first year implementation, T2 likely captured some distinctive programme impacts of DEPP, but sufficient time to follow network change requires at least an additional 12 months.

- Between project collaboration contributed to improved sharing of learning and evidence but this did not necessarily translate to behaviour change.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH TO MEASURING AND ASSESSING COLLABORATION AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Collaboration is considered to be one of the defining features of the DEPP and was used by all projects in a number of manners. This included collaboration within project consortia, collaboration among DEPP projects and collaboration with external stakeholders. Programme outputs related to collaboration are detailed in Chapter 4 in the section on output area 1. This chapter will further examine collaboration at these various levels including through strengthened networks. The analysis brings together several streams of data, including qualitative and quantitative data from the minimum and intensive set countries, as well as document review and the measurement and analysis of humanitarian preparedness and response networks in the four intensive set countries.

NETWORK ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING NETWORK STRUCTURES AND TOP COLLABORATION AREAS

A critical focus of the network analyses was to identify patterns of collaboration between DEPP and non-DEPP actors and between local and international actors in the four intensive countries and to detect any changes in these collaboration patterns due to the DEPP. In addition, the network analysis aimed to assess the extent to which strong organisational ties or relationships are associated with higher performance. Overall, 32 collaboration areas, or potential areas where organisations might work together within humanitarian preparedness and response, were assessed in order to determine the size and structure of humanitarian networks in Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar and the Philippines.

The network survey was administered in two phases. The first phase involved data collection with an established set of actors in each country who represented DEPP programme partners and beneficiaries, as well as others who were not part of DEPP (which served as the comparison group). The actors identified by phase one participants as collaborating partners are considered to be 1st degree actors as they are one degree of separation away from the survey respondent (See Figure 5.1). The 1st degree actors identified in phase one were then invited to participate in the network survey. The actors they identified are considered as 2nd degree actors, as they are two degrees of separation from the initial survey informant. The survey was designed to include actors up to three degrees of separation from the informant for all countries. Given time constraints, only 2nd degree actors were surveyed in the Philippines for both data collection periods.

EXAMPLE OF DEGREES OF SEPARATION

In this example, Action Aid took the first phase survey and named CARE Kenya. CARE Kenya took the survey in the second phase and named Islamic Relief. Islamic Relief is 2 degrees of separation away from Action Aid.

Figure 5.1: Degrees of separation in network analysis
All network survey participants were asked to identify the organisations they collaborated with over the previous six months, and to describe the nature or purpose of the collaboration. Participants selected from a list of 32 collaboration areas and were also provided the option to name their own areas of collaboration. This report concentrates primarily on the full country network, which is the combination of all collaboration areas, but also looks at individual collaboration area networks to paint a larger picture of country trends. The network data were analysed with ORA, a network analysis tool developed by CASOS at Carnegie Mellon. The statistical software package R was used for network statistical significance tests. Full network analysis details and findings are provided in the report in Annex 12.


Despite the original vision, the DEPP programme focused more on consortia-based collaborative approaches rather than multi-stakeholder platforms at the national, regional and international levels. Nevertheless, collaborative approaches were consistently reported to be the most appropriate, preferred approach to deliver humanitarian capacity building and response activities, while some challenges in finding efficient processes for engagement, communication and coordination remained.

**Multi-stakeholder Platforms**

“Multi-stakeholder platforms” comprise a large part of the original DEPP programme theory of change and in the DEPP business case were described as "platforms with a broad membership e.g., INGOs, national NGOs, local government, national government academia, private sector companies, the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies" which if successful, should “improve policy at national and international level”. The business case described implementing a single platform per country or region where the DEPP programme is active as well as an international platform. Possible products of the platforms that were envisioned included: synthesised lessons identified, joint evaluations and common position papers for advocacy. The platforms were hypothesised to be the mechanism across the DEPP through which policy change, evidence generation and dissemination would occur.

Despite this emphasis on multi-stakeholder platforms, only a few projects such as Transforming Surge Capacity and CDAC-N actually implemented this approach. The DEPP focused much more on consortia-based collaborative models rather than on larger multi-stakeholder platforms. Those projects that did employ platforms reported challenges in setting up and sustaining the platforms but did report some organisational change as a result. The platforms were more effective in contexts where existing humanitarian structures were more mature and with supportive governments. The CDAC-N final evaluation notes that the three country-level platforms it established or strengthened were “relevant to their context and an effective way of implementing joint preparedness activities” and effective in creating new links between local, national and international actors\(^1\). However, it was noted, that a stronger link to global policy and more advocacy efforts should be integrated into these approaches, and that further, systematic inclusion of local and national actors is needed to ensure contextualisation and local ownership. Transforming Surge Capacity established two national multi-stakeholder platforms, an Asia regional platform and a global platform for collaborative and localised surge mechanisms. The Transforming Surge Capacity final evaluation found that the national platforms were most effective and that regional and international platforms should take a more supportive or enabling role that is defined by the national platforms\(^2\). It was also reported that the national platforms did not adequately reflect country-level priorities as they were designed at headquarters level, and that future platforms should involve a nationally-led design process and implementation.

**Consortia-based Collaborative Approaches**

All 14 DEPP projects were implemented by consortia of organisations working together, with a wide range of types and sizes of consortia within the DEPP. Data collected among DEPP organisations and key stakeholders suggests that the consortia approach was appropriate in the

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DEPP focal country contexts, and a preferred approach to deliver humanitarian capacity building activities. Self-reported data from consortia members suggest that overall consortia functioned relatively well (see Figure 5.1 below), despite a number of identified challenges including in engagement, communication and coordination. These data suggest that consortia functionality also improved between the first (T1) and second (T2) data collection points. There were also several examples where the consortia approach facilitated the delivery of capacity building activities and also response efforts. For example, the case study in Chapter 8 highlights how the consortium structure of the Urban Early Warning Early Action project in Kenya, including the established procedures and management structure, facilitated a timely response to a cholera outbreak. The next section will focus on examining the degree to which collaboration occurred across the DEPP, the main patterns of collaboration and the reported challenges and benefits of informal and formal collaboration.

![DEPP Consortia Functionality](chart)

**Figure 5.2: DEPP consortia functionality at time point 1 (T1) and time point 2 (T2)**

**Is Collaboration Occurring and What Types of Organisations are Involved?**

Data from the network analysis, in-depth interviewees and intensive set surveys suggest that organisations in both the DEPP and comparison groups collaborated with one another during capacity building and humanitarian preparedness and response activities. Furthermore, both DEPP and control group organisations and staff strongly valued the approach of working in consortia and through networks. For example, approximately 94% of respondents in both DEPP and control group intensive set surveys stated that they would approach other organisations to collaborate during humanitarian response activities. Several changes in collaboration patterns between T1 and T2 have been identified from the network analysis including:

- Increased collaboration frequency (a proxy indicator of trust and quality of relationships)\(^{141}\) in Kenya and the Philippines, while both indicators decreased in Myanmar and Ethiopia
- Increased collaboration within the DEPP cohort in Myanmar and the Philippines, but difficulty engaging with non-DEPP actors in both settings
- Increased collaboration between DEPP and non-DEPP actors in Ethiopia and Kenya

These changes will be explored more fully in the section on strengthened networks later in this chapter.

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141. When an actor indicates frequent collaboration, we assume there is high trust and perceived value in continued engagement.
What Have Been the Benefits and Disadvantages of Formal Versus Informal Collaboration?

Both formal collaborations and informal collaborations occurred within DEPP projects, and informal collaborations occurred across DEPP projects and with external stakeholders. Formal collaboration was defined as any collaboration involving a signed contractual agreement defining roles and responsibilities of collaborating entities. Informal collaborations were defined as those collaborations that occurred more spontaneously and without formal agreements in place. Across all countries, humanitarian staff from DEPP organisations identified the advantages and disadvantages of formal and informal collaborations (see Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMAL COLLABORATION</th>
<th></th>
<th>INFORMAL COLLABORATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advantages</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disadvantages</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of resources</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>Difficult to collaborate effectively when organisations have different policies and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved networking</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>Slow and cumbersome decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of ideas</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>Setting up a formal collaboration is extremely time consuming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to access other sources of funding when applying as a consortium</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>Difficult to manage disagreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme delivery and design more effective</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>Unclear objectives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Advantages and disadvantages of formal and informal collaboration

Respondents could select more than one advantage or disadvantage for each type of collaboration.

Despite the identified challenges, formal collaborations were highly valued, with advantages such as networking, exchange of ideas and increased effectiveness of programme design and delivery. In general, many respondents highlighted the utility of informal collaborations, and emphasised that informal collaborations can stimulate new ideas and projects, which ultimately can turn into formal collaborations. Patterns of collaboration between local and international actors and between DEPP and non-DEPP actors will be further explored in Question 3.B using data from the network analysis.

As a delivery mechanism, collaborative and consortia-based approaches were particularly effective when the following conditions were met:

- Existence of joint objectives, values and common ways of working
- Collaborations were organic not forced
- Sufficient time, space, resources, capacity and will to foster healthy collaborative
relationships

- Streamlined decision-making and contractual processes as well as fewer consortia partners
- Building on existing relationships

**QUESTION 3.B: FOCUSING ON COALITIONS, PARTNERSHIPS AND CONNECTEDNESS – WHAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF STRENGTHENED NETWORKS?**

There was some evidence of strengthened humanitarian response networks in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, while the network in Myanmar remained unchanged. Not enough time passed between the data collection points in these four countries to sufficiently document and test the hypothesis that strengthened networks and greater collaboration lead to better preparedness.

This section aims to examine whether networks in four DEPP operational countries have been strengthened, and any effects of strengthened networks in these settings using network data collected at two time points in Kenya, Ethiopia, Myanmar and the Philippines.

**Collaboration Areas**

Looking across all four countries, advocacy, community capacity building, and project implementation were consistently among the most active collaboration areas during both data collection periods (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>THE PHILIPPINES</strong></th>
<th><strong>KENYA</strong></th>
<th><strong>MYANMAR</strong></th>
<th><strong>ETHIOPIA</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration Areas</td>
<td># of Links</td>
<td>Collaboration Areas</td>
<td># of Links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>Community Capacity Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Capacity Building</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>Community Capacity Building</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Implementation</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>Project Implementation</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Connections</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Facilitation</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Project Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Planning</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>Community Planning</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>Project Design</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>WaSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Based Risk Analysis</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Community Connections</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data resources</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Expertise</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Community Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>Climate Change and Adaptation</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Early Warning Systems Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change and Adaptation</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>Community-Based Risk Analysis</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Climate Change and Adaptation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that for Ethiopia, advocacy was ranked 18th in the first data collection and 13th in the second data collection.
Table 5.2: Top 10 collaboration areas by country at first time point (T1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>MYANMAR</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong># of Links</strong></td>
<td><strong>Collaboration Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong># of Links</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Advocacy</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>Community Capacity Building</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Project Implementation</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Community Capacity Building</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>Early Warning Systems Expertise</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Community Planning</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Community Connections</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Community Connections</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Community-Based Risk Analysis</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Funding</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Facilitation</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Facilitation</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Community Planning</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Data Resources including data sets, collection and analysis</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>Project Implementation</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Expertise</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Design</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Climate Change and Adaptation</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: Top 10 collaboration areas by country at second time point (T2)

In the Philippines, the top three collaboration areas (advocacy, project implementation and community capacity building) remained consistent at both data collection points, though the order differed. A notable change in this country was the jump in number of ties in the funding network, and its jump from rank 11 to rank 6 between the two time periods. The top collaboration areas in this country were also the most distributed networks.

In Kenya, two of the top three collaboration areas remained the same – community capacity building and advocacy. Early warning systems expertise was the third most popular collaboration area at T2 (up from rank 11 in T1). In Myanmar, the funding network dropped down the list, and the community planning network moved up the list. Otherwise, the top four collaboration areas in this network remained the same but with a different order. In Ethiopia, project implementation and project design were in the top three at both T1 and T2, but proposal writing jumped from rank 7 at T1 to rank 3 at T2. Top collaboration areas were also the most distributed networks.

A distributed network is one with many links between multiple actors in the network, allowing for more equal flow of information to all actors within the network.
Part 1: Have the Networks in the DEPP Intensive set Countries Been Strengthened?

The DEPP theory of change is built around the premise that strengthened networks and increased collaboration are critical to improving preparedness and response and shifting to a more localised approach. The network analysis enabled assessment of changes in the humanitarian preparedness and response networks over time and provides evidence of strength and quality of collaborations between various institutions. Specifically, this section will examine changes in the number of links between organisations, the frequency of collaboration as well as the quality of collaborative relationships.

A. Organisational Links

The charts below summarise the relationship data that was collected at both time periods. The average number of collaboration areas per unique link captures how many collaboration areas on average between two organisations. The average number of total links per surveyed organisation represents the contribution of each organisation to the full network. Finally, the average number of unique links per surveyed organisation represents the average number of organisations to whom that organisation is tied. Overall, the DEPP cohort across all countries represented only a small proportion of the entire humanitarian networks mapped as part of this analysis (between 9 and 24%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Time Point</th>
<th>ORGANISATIONS</th>
<th>LINKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total #</td>
<td>Total #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surveyed</td>
<td>Identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Organisations and links by country

In the Philippines, there was an increase in both the number of organisations surveyed and the number of unique organisations on the map, thus overall a larger network size. However, there was a substantial reduction in the number of relationships between organisations (the average number of links per organisation decreased from 9.4 to 5.3), which suggests a decrease in network density. However, this finding is likely due to bias as a result of the learning effect and survey fatigue. During the Philippines results validation workshop, respondents indicated that based on their experience with the first round of network data collection, they were aware that interview would take longer if they identified more collaborating organisations, thus they only listed main collaborators.
In Kenya, the number of links within the network almost quadrupled signifying a large growth during the time period. In addition to twice as many surveyed organisations at T2, each organisation also reported relationships that spanned across more collaboration areas and more organisations. Validation workshop participants in Kenya suggested they had intensified collaboration efforts, which might explain the observed network growth. The Myanmar country network remained the same in terms of overall size, though it is important to highlight it is substantially smaller than the three other country networks. In addition, in Myanmar, organisations reported relationships with fewer organisations at T2, though relationships spanned more collaboration areas signifying increased network density.

The data from Ethiopia showed a slight decrease in the number of organisations completing the survey but a small increase in number of organisations in the map. In addition, there were also almost twice as many links or connections between organisations at T2 – some of these were due to relationships with more organisations, but some were due to increased collaboration across more collaboration areas with the same organisations.

B. Quality of Collaboration

Two indicators were used to assess the quality of relationships within the network. The first was frequency of collaboration with each actor identified (See table 5.5) and the second was likelihood of recommending that organisation to others on a scale of one to 10 (also known as net promoter scale) (See table 5.6). Frequent collaboration (more than six times over the previous six months) suggests a high level of trust and perceived value in continued engagement. When an actor indicates a high likelihood (score of 9 to 10) of recommending the other actor, it suggests high trust and reverence. Since this measure captures both perceptions and actions, this metric better assesses true feelings one actor has of another. The net promoter scale is adjusted for bias by categorising only the highest scores as likely to take action; the others are likely to be passive or detractors.\(^{144}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaboration Frequency over Last 6 Months</th>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES*</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
<th>MYANMAR*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate Rarely (1-2 times)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 (N=5622)</td>
<td>558 (10%)</td>
<td>198 (7%)</td>
<td>95 (5%)</td>
<td>297 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 (N=2754)</td>
<td>1371 (24%)</td>
<td>449 (16%)</td>
<td>596 (28%)</td>
<td>815 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate Often (3-4 times)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 (N=2109)</td>
<td>1371 (24%)</td>
<td>449 (16%)</td>
<td>596 (28%)</td>
<td>815 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 (N=8027)</td>
<td>2107 (77%)</td>
<td>1418 (67%)</td>
<td>7038 (88%)</td>
<td>3038 (73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate Frequently (&gt;6 times)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 (N=2438)</td>
<td>3693 (66%)</td>
<td>1418 (67%)</td>
<td>1863 (76%)</td>
<td>146 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 (N=4150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5: Frequency of collaboration within the past 6 months by country

*\(^{2}\)X\(^{2}\) Chi-square Test indicates significant difference between T1 and T2 at the p<0.05 level

In all countries across both time periods, the actors interacted with one another frequently. In Myanmar and Ethiopia frequency of collaboration decreased between the two time points. Kenya saw the largest increase in frequency of interaction with an increase of 21% of ties that reported frequent collaboration. For traceable relationships, there was a statistically significant change in the frequency of interaction between organisations in the Philippines (p=0.009) and in Myanmar (p=0.028). However, the difference in the change for DEPP versus non-DEPP comparison groups was not significant in either country. This suggests that both DEPP and non-DEPP organisations’ levels of collaboration changed in similar ways over time.

\(^{144}\) The scale is based on Bain’s Net Promoter scale. Further details are available here: [http://www.netpromotersystem.com/about/measuring-your-net-promoter-score.aspx](http://www.netpromotersystem.com/about/measuring-your-net-promoter-score.aspx)
Likely to Recommend Partner (scale of 1-10) | THE PHILIPPINES* | KENYA** | ETHIOPIA** | MYANMAR
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
| T1 (N=5622) | T2 (N=2754) | T1 (N=2109) | T2 (N=8027) | T1 (N=2438) | T2 (N=4150) | T1 (N=207) | T2 (N=226)
Not Likely (Score 1-6) | 812 (14%) | 258 (9%) | 310 (15%) | 735 (9%) | 266 (11%) | 503 (12%) | 91 (44%) | 125 (55%)
Somewhat Likely (Score 7-8) | 2189 (39%) | 1028 (37%) | 814 (39%) | 2233 (28%) | 902 (37%) | 1555 (37%) | 74 (36%) | 63 (28%)
Very Likely (Score 9-10) | 2621 (47%) | 1468 (53%) | 984 (47%) | 5059 (63%) | 1270 (52%) | 2092 (50%) | 41 (20%) | 38 (17%)

Table 5.6: Likelihood to recommend organisations to others (net promoter scale) by country
*2X2 Chi-square Test indicates significant difference between T1 and T2 at the p<0.05 level
+ Statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between DEPP and non-DEPP organisations in this country

Myanmar was the only country to shift towards being less likely to recommend others between time period one and two. Over half of its relationships were reported as not likely to recommend the other actor by the second time point. In all other countries, over half of their relationships were reported as very likely to recommend the other actor. As with frequency of interaction, Kenya saw the largest increase in likelihood to recommend others with an increase of 16% of links reported as very likely to recommend. This again signifies strengthened relationships and is likely due to the increased collaboration and relationship building conducted by Kenya DEPP projects.

For all countries except Myanmar, the increase in likelihood to recommend others was statistically significant. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, the change in likelihood to recommend others within the DEPP cohort was significantly higher than the change in the non-DEPP cohort, providing evidence that DEPP has contributed to increased quality of relationships in these settings.

Taken together, these data show that networks in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Philippines have become strengthened and in general quality of relationships has improved across the networks. There is evidence in Kenya and Ethiopia that DEPP has contributed to strengthened relationship quality.

**Part 2: Is there Evidence of Improved Localisation?**

**Overall, there was no quantitative evidence of increased localisation (no increase in proportion of relationships with local actors between T1 and T2) in any intensive country within the network data. In fact, the Myanmar network became even more dominated by INGOs by T2. However qualitative data suggests changes in attitudes around localisation are occurring (see CH 7).**

**A. Patterns of Collaboration Between National and Local NGOs**

The DEPP has emphasised localisation and promoted a more locally-driven approach to emergency preparedness and response. The evaluation assessed patterns of collaboration with national and local organisations, and whether those patterns changed over time. Figure 5.3 presents data from the intensive set data collection on self-reported change in the number of partnerships with local or national organisations. As illustrated, approximately 70% of DEPP organisations reported an increase in partnerships with L/NNGOs at T1 compared with 65% at T2, representing a small, non-significant decrease. Only about 50% of non-DEPP comparison organisations reported an increase in partnerships with L/NNGOs at T1 but this increased to 59% at T2. These data suggest no significant self-reported increase in partnerships with L/NNGOs in either group. However, as discussed earlier, perceptions may be biased and potentially inaccurate. As part of the network analysis, partnerships and collaborations were directly measured to more objectively assess the number of relationships with L/NNGOs and whether these have significantly changed over time in each of the four intensive set countries.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 compare the overall network structures in the Philippines, Kenya, Ethiopia and Myanmar at T1 and at T2. In these figures, each organisation is represented by a node (diamonds represent DEPP organisations, and circles represent non-DEPP organisations), while active collaborations\(^\text{146}\) between organisations are represented by the lines connecting the nodes (or links). Arrows represent the direction of the collaboration. The size of the node is a key element of these figures as it represents the total degree centrality, or the number of links one node has to other nodes, which is a measure of influence. The more links or connections an organisation has, the larger the size of the node in the network. Given the DEPP theory of change, a distributed network where there is greater cohesion and links between multiple actors in the network, more equal flow of information to all actors in the network, and minimal bottlenecks, promotes sustainability and is more desirable than a centralised and isolated network. When we examined all the networks in all collaboration areas, in all intensive set countries except Myanmar, the top three collaboration areas listed in Table 5.2 and 5.3 were the most distributed networks. Table 5.7 complements the country network visualisations by presenting the percentage of relationships or ties that target\(^\text{147}\) L/NNGOs from various source organisations (INGO, L/NNGO or all). Ties targeting local actors represent localisation of the humanitarian response within the country. If localisation increased between the two time points, we expect the share of links to L/NNGOs from any source to increase.

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\(^{146}\) Active collaborations are those that have involved interaction within the last 6 months.

\(^{147}\) The source group is the group from which the tie is coming, and the target group is the group to which the tie is going.
THE PHILIPPINES T1

THE PHILIPPINES T2

KENYA T1

KENYA T2

**Green nodes:** National Actors
(e.g. government, CBOs/NGOs, private sector, academic institutions)

**Red nodes:** International Actors
(e.g. donors, INGOs, international businesses or academic institutions)

**Key Actors Highlighted:**
Total Degree Centrality
(The larger the node size the greater Total Degree Centrality the actor has)

Figure 5.4: Network visualisations for the Philippines and Kenya at time point 1 and time point 2
Figure 5.5: Network visualisations for Ethiopia and Myanmar at time point 1 and time point 2

**Green nodes:** National Actors
(e.g. government, CBOs/NGOs, private sector, academic institutions)

**Red nodes:** International Actors
(e.g. donors, INGOs, international businesses or academic institutions)

**Key Actors Highlighted:**
Total Degree Centrality
(The larger the node size the greater Total Degree Centrality the actor has)
Data suggest that networks in the Philippines were highly locally driven, with more than 70% of links occurring with L/NNGOs (Figure 5.4 and Table 5.7). This is consistent with other sources that suggest that civil society is deeply entrenched in this context and considered to be one of the strongest in Asia. However, there was no change in the proportion of links to L/NNGOs between T1 and T2, suggesting no change in the level of localisation. In the Kenyan humanitarian preparedness and response network, local actors were active, but the relationships evenly targeted international and local actors (Figure 5.4 and Table 5.7). There was no change in this distribution between T1 and T2 suggesting no increase in prominence of local actors within the network. In Ethiopia as well, the Ethiopian network has high dominance of the INGOs with little input from local organisations. Finally, the network in Myanmar was substantially different from the other country networks. It was significantly smaller, and highly isolated (Figure 5.5 and Table 5.7). This network moved from one that had an even split of relationships between international and local actors, to one dominated by INGOs. This may be due to the political situation in Myanmar. During the validation workshop in Myanmar, informed stakeholders reported that the government increased restrictions and this had affected NGO registration. In addition, local organisations might be coordinating and collaborating more during times of disaster and response but not in between.

### Table 5.7: Number and percentages of links targeting L/NNGOs from various types of source organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Organisation</th>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>KENYA*</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA*</th>
<th>MYANMAR*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/NNGO</td>
<td>2893</td>
<td>1259</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>2144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70%)</td>
<td>(68%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Organisations</td>
<td>3949</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>3802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td>(51%)</td>
<td>(47%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The source group is the group from which the tie is coming, and the target group is the group to which the tie is going. *2X 2 Chi-square Test indicates significant at the p<0.01 level

### B. Patterns of Collaboration Between DEPP and non-DEPP Cohorts

In order to understand collaboration within or across DEPP and non-DEPP groups, the analysis also examined the ties or links that target or are directed towards DEPP groups from various sources (see Table 5.8). In the Philippines, collaboration within the DEPP cohort increased (DEPP to DEPP connections increased from 17% at T1 to 29% at T2). However, overall while both DEPP and non-DEPP groups mostly targeted non-DEPP organisations at both times, it was an ongoing challenge to get the non-DEPP cohort involved and reaching out to DEPP actors. Non-DEPP actors were no more likely to reach out to DEPP organisations in T2 than they were in T1 (non-DEPP to DEPP ties at T2 was 20%).

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USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index ranks CSOs in the Philippines as the highest across 7 dimensions: legal environment, organisational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image.
Table 5.8: Number and percentages of links targeting DEPP organisations from various types of source organisations

Note: The source group is the group from which the tie is coming, and the target group is the group to which the tie is going.

*2X 2 Chi-square Test indicates significant at the p<0.01 level

Kenya’s full country network was made up of many relationships from non-DEPP actors, though this declined at the second data collection point. At T2, the absolute number of relationships from DEPP actors was approximately 3.9 times higher than at T1, whereas absolute number of relationships from non-DEPP actors at T2 was about 3.5 times that of T1. These large increases again highlight the substantial overall network growth that occurred in Kenya. In terms of collaboration in Kenya, a slight decline in the percentage of relationships between DEPP organisations occurred from T1 to T2 (from 59% to 51%). Also, there was no change in the percentage of non-DEPP to DEPP links. However, these data show high levels of collaboration between non-DEPP and DEPP actors, with about 35% of non-DEPP relationships targeting DEPP actors. Kenya is one setting where the DEPP cohort seems to have been able to form relationships with actors outside of its group, despite a small cohort size relative to the other actors in the network.

In Myanmar, on the other hand, the DEPP cohort was not very successful in reaching those actors outside of the DEPP programme. In fact, non-DEPP actors actually decreased their collaboration with DEPP actors from 19% to 9%. Collaboration between DEPP organisations increased by 35% from T1 to T2 with 40% of DEPP links targeting other DEPP organisations at T1 to 75% at T2. “Exclusivity,” or only engaging with one’s own group, seems to be a large factor in this country, though it has the least disparity between group sizes of any country with about one-quarter of all actors in the network in the DEPP cohort.

In Ethiopia, a fairly even split of network relationships came from DEPP versus non-DEPP actors. The non-DEPP group became slightly less exclusive after the second time point, as it formed more relationships with the DEPP group. Compared to other countries, this country’s DEPP cohort was fairly successful (along with Kenya) in forming relationships with non-DEPP actors, as 35% of non-DEPP ties targeted the DEPP group.

C. Influence of DEPP Actors Within the Networks

Table 5.9 presents the top 50 organisations in each country assessed through total degree centrality, a metric of the total number of ties of each organisation. Note that this metric does not take into account the direction or strength of individual ties, rather only the total number. The table shows the proportion of the top 50 organisations that belong to the DEPP cohort, as well as the share that are national/local compared to international. For example, in the Philippines at T1, 14 of the top 50 organisations are DEPP (28%), while the remaining 36 (72%) were non-DEPP organisations and 35 of the top 50 (70%) were national/local organisations compared to the remaining 15 (30%) which were international.
### Table 5.9: Top 50 influential organisations by DEPP versus non-DEPP and international versus national/local

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>T1 National/Local</th>
<th>T1 International</th>
<th>T1 All Organisations</th>
<th>T2 National/Local</th>
<th>T2 International</th>
<th>T2 All Organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP</td>
<td>9 (18%)</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>20 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DEPP</td>
<td>26 (52%)</td>
<td>10 (20%)</td>
<td>36 (72%)</td>
<td>22 (44%)</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
<td>30 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Organisations</td>
<td>35 (70%)</td>
<td>15 (30%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36 (72%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KENYA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
<td>11 (22%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DEPP</td>
<td>12 (24%)</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
<td>36 (72%)</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
<td>12 (24%)</td>
<td>31 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Organisations</td>
<td>20 (40%)</td>
<td>30 (60%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25 (50%)</td>
<td>25 (50%)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETHIOPIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
<td>9 (18%)</td>
<td>10 (20%)</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DEPP</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>18 (36%)</td>
<td>31 (62%)</td>
<td>10 (20%)</td>
<td>21 (42%)</td>
<td>31 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Organisations</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
<td>31 (62%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
<td>31 (62%)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MYANMAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPP</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
<td>16 (32%)</td>
<td>7 (14%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DEPP</td>
<td>16 (32%)</td>
<td>18 (36%)</td>
<td>34 (68%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>24 (48%)</td>
<td>37 (74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Organisations</td>
<td>24 (48%)</td>
<td>26 (52%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20 (40%)</td>
<td>30 (60%)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Influence is measured by total degree centrality (the total number of ties of the organisation). Statistical tests to determine statistically significant change between DEPP versus non-DEPP and International versus national/local were conducted but no significant differences were found at the p<.05 level.

Comparing T1 to T2 in the Philippines shows that the top 50 organisations remained largely local (around 70% of actors at both time points), but there was a 12-percentage point increase in the proportion of top actors that were from the DEPP cohort (from 28% to 40%). In addition, a 10-percentage point increase in the proportion of the top 50 organisations that were specifically DEPP national or local organisation is evident (from 18% to 28%). This change was statistically significant (p=0.046). In Kenya, the proportion of national or local organisations in the top 50 increased from 40% to 50% by T2, representing an even split between international and national/local. There was no change in the percentage of DEPP organisations in the top 50 organisations over time, or overall in the top actors between T1 and T2 (p=0.066). While the overall percentage of DEPP organisations within the top 50 in Ethiopia did not change, the distribution of national and international DEPP organisations shifted. At T1 12% of the top 50 were DEPP national and this increased to 18% by T2. There was significant (p=0.016 for T1, p=0.005 for T2) prominence of international non-DEPP actors in the top 50 organisations for both time periods. In Myanmar, there was a decrease from 32% to 26% in the percentage of DEPP actors in the top 50. The prominence of non-DEPP international organisations is evident, as almost half of the top 50 actors fall into this category.
D. Do Strengthened Networks and Greater Collaboration Lead to Improved Preparedness?

To examine the question of whether strengthened networks and greater collaboration lead to improved preparedness, the analyses assessed change in networking together with organisational preparedness over time. First a ‘networking score’ for DEPP and non-DEPP cohorts was created, combining in-degree, out-degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality measures. The T1 and T2 average networking scores were assessed using a paired t-test to analyse whether there had been any significant change in across time periods. The change in networking scores were also compared between DEPP and non-DEPP groups using t-tests for independent samples. Next, correlations between the networking score and the aggregated organisational preparedness score across seven domains (see Chapter 4) were assessed. This was compared with a disaster preparedness score for both groups. The only country with any significant change in networking score was Ethiopia, where there was a significant decrease (p=0.015). No country was found to have a significant correlation between change in networking scores and change in disaster preparedness scores.

However, not enough time passed between T1 and T2 to sufficiently document and test the hypothesis that strengthened networks and greater collaboration leads to better disaster preparedness and ultimately response. In 2016, DEPP field operations were still adapting to local feedback and interventions were still evolving. Data collection in T1 inevitably picked up network effects caused by shifting strategies that are common to first year project implementation. T2 more likely captured some of the distinctive programme impacts of DEPP interventions, but sufficient time to follow network change requires at least an additional 12 months, if not more.

QUESTION 3.D: WHAT UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION DID COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS AND ‘MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PLATFORMS’ MAKE TOWARD DEEPENING CROSS-PROGRAMME LEARNING?

Cross-project collaboration contributed to improved sharing of learning and evidence at the programme level but this did not necessarily translate to behaviour change.

As described in Chapter 4, there was emphasis on enhancing cross-programme learning through a number of approaches led primarily by the Learning Project. This included the deployment of two Regional Learning Advisors, one in Ethiopia to cover the Africa region, and the other in Pakistan to cover the Asia region. As these were reported to be helpful in terms of stimulating collaboration and cross-programme learning, the evaluation’s formative phase report recommended to additionally embed Learning Advisors at the country level to further amplify collaboration and learning. As reported in the interim report, Country Learning Advisors were assigned to the Philippines, Kenya, DRC and Bangladesh, in addition to Ethiopia and Pakistan. Country Learning Advisors appeared to have contributed to increased collaboration. One interviewee noted: “Initially, when we [did not have a] DEPP learning advisor here, we were working differently… there was… a standard approach. But after her arrival, we started collaborating with each other and took the opportunities form benefiting from each other… we shared learnings with each other and increased outreach.”

Organisational preparedness score: Organisational checklist conducted with each organisation and assessing seven domains: 1-Emergency preparedness plans, 2-human resources and capacity, 3-logistics and supplies, 4-Legal, documentation and policy, 5-Organisation and system processes, 6-Emergency response team and staffing, 7-Communication and media. Aggregate score out of 100 generated for each organisation.
Quantitative data from KAP surveys (Figure 5.6) show that at T2, 59% of interviewees reported that the Learning Project was either very useful or extremely useful in relation to the interviewees’ work. Approximately 11% reported that the Learning Project was either not useful at all, or slightly useful. In terms of evidence sharing, 89% of respondents reported sharing of evidence within their project, and 72% reported sharing of evidence across projects which suggests high levels of sharing both within consortia and at the programme level. This provides evidence of course correction, as cross-project sharing was reportedly lower earlier in the implementation of the DEPP.

Qualitative interview data also supports the fact that collaboration and evidence sharing between and across the DEPP has increased. This was catalysed to some degree by the Learning Conferences in Kenya (December 2016) and the Philippines (July 2017). Both events brought together large numbers of local partners and stakeholders at the country level over multiple days to share project learnings and challenges, and stimulate collaboration and sharing. The intention was to shift the action from the UK to the country level by maximising engagement of local stakeholders. At the conference in Kenya, 102 DEPP and non-DEPP stakeholders attended, representing 13 countries, while at the conference in the Philippines, 127 people attended from 9 countries, which is in line with the objective of including a diverse range of partners. The Learning Conferences were perceived by interviewees to be effective in sharing learning, creating bridges across projects and improving programme cohesion. For example, one respondent stated:

“[The] International Learning Conference [is] where we shared our achievements and barriers... at the end of the conference, there were 6-7 projects who agreed to work with ADCAP... after that, some of them even followed up with me here. So, working in the DEPP as a whole has a different kind of impact, because it helps us share our learning with other colleagues as well and helps us increase our outreach.”

Another interesting outcome of these conferences has been cross-project and cross-country exchange visits to learn directly from other projects and in different contexts. For example, Myanmar project staff visited the Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response project in Kenya following the Nairobi conference, and the Philippines conference agenda intentionally included project site visits. In addition, Urban Early Warning Early Action project stakeholders described plans to visit a project in Nepal, and the beginning of a collaboration with the ALERT project. Nepal is one of several non-DEPP countries in which DEPP projects are implementing activities. Staff from the Bangladesh communicating with communities (CWC) working group completed an exchange visit to the Philippines CWC group and this has led to ongoing collaboration between the two working groups. There have also been reports of the Talent Development project collaborating with the Protection in Practice project, and of many projects working with or including Age and Disability Capacity Programme’s Minimum Standards for Age and Disability Inclusion.

While there was evidence that collaborative relationships contributed to sharing of learning, there was less evidence on how learning was utilised and whether this translated into actual behaviour change.
EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY
**Evaluation Question #4:** How economically have resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) been converted to results? To what extent does preparedness improve the efficiency of humanitarian response?

**Sub-questions:**

a) Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the programme objectives?

b) Have resources been used efficiently? In general, do the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results be attained with fewer resources?

c) Have programme funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?

**Data sources:**

- Organisational surveys (Quantitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)
- Document review including financial information (Qualitative)
- IDIs on VFM (Qualitative)

**Key Findings:**

- Focusing on economy and efficiency, VFM shows good potential for the programme with areas for improvement.

- The collaborative model necessarily lends itself to a degree of inefficiency, high transactions costs and slow information flows. This model had substantial benefits however, and for some projects the benefits have likely outweighed the costs. For other projects the same benefits of the model could have been achieved at lower cost and greater efficiency if the contracting, M&E system and costing of activities had been more consciously planned from inception. The collaborative model that was tied to hierarchical long delivery chains and multiple tiers of contracts and funding flow likely compromised economy and efficiency to a degree.

- Good indicators of cost economy were evident, though some budgets were lean with insufficient resources for portfolio management and collaboration activities.

- There were shortfalls in terms of systems and resources set up for efficiency in governance and strategy, portfolio management, decision-making and consortium arrangements. The spending on Management functions at the programme level were too economical and would have benefitted from some funds and time being redeployed from the Learning Project to the DEPP management team in the form of M&E expertise, both at the programme and project levels. If, however, independence was desired, then more direct linkage and communication between the management team and the Learning Project team whereby data from M&E flows regularly and directly to the management team through both automatic reporting or direct data access through a dashboard followed by regularly bilateral meetings could have been considered.

- Positive findings in terms of VFM reporting, adaptive management and collaborative ways of working were identified.

- There are no strong quantitative VFM findings to suggest that preparedness improved the efficiency of humanitarian response. The empirical data found no significant difference between DEPP and comparison organisations with regards to perceived impact of DEPP on institutional speed and cost of response, and the extent to which institutional and policy environment affects the speed and cost of response.

- Cost per result indicator analyses demonstrated good VFM per result actually achieved.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH TO ASSESSING EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY

This chapter reports findings from the economic assessment of the DEPP programme which was led by the team’s Economic Advisor (See Annex 2 for biography). The economic analysis used the 4E framework (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and equity) to evaluate the DEPP’s Value for Money (VfM). Conclusions on effectiveness (cost of outcomes and impacts) and equity (distribution of impacts) are presented in Chapter 4 (Relevance and Effectiveness of Interventions) and Chapter 7 (section on inclusion of vulnerable groups). To limit duplication, this chapter focuses on efficiency and economy, but all of the findings are drawn together with the VfM work to build a complete VfM picture, with particular focus at the programme and the country level. The methodology is detailed in Chapter 2, but briefly it comprised quantitative and qualitative methods, in particular, budget and expenditure analysis, internal benchmarking of unit costs, cost effectiveness analysis (including assessment of cost per result indicators), key informant interviews within the DEPP management team, DEPP board and within the selected case studies, document review, analysis of adherence to procurement procedures, and analysis of how decision-makers and project management within DFID and implementing agencies consider VfM. Data collection instruments are found in Annex 7.

The formative phase of the economic evaluation covered portfolio level VfM – economy and efficiency. The country-level VfM analysis is covered in the summative report, largely because it relies on the outcomes analysis conducted by the wider evaluation team in the summative phase.

**QUESTION 4.A: HAVE RESOURCES (FUNDS, HUMAN RESOURCES, TIME, EXPERTISE, ETC.) BEEN ALLOCATED STRATEGICALLY TO ACHIEVE THE PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES?**

Programme Budget

Table 6.1 below shows the total programme budget for the DEPP. The conclusions have not changed since the formative phase report – management costs (less than 5% of DEPP total budget) are too lean for a programme of this size given the high responsibilities of monitoring, reporting, course correction, strategic direction and general steering of £25.5 million of project funds (excluding the Learning Project budget). The Learning Project had a healthy budget. Some of this could perhaps have been redeployed into the management functions. See below for further discussion on this issue. Alternatively, further investment could have been made in developing and implementing an electronic M&E information management system to track progress in real-time and enable more agile course correction. This system could have been independently set-up by the Learning Project with the management team having direct on demand viewing privileges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF COST</th>
<th>AMOUNT (£)</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL BUDGET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>START Network Management Costs</td>
<td>936,222</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes 12.6% NPAC rate and Programme Board Consultancy Costs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAC-N Management Costs</td>
<td>245,186</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes 7% NPAC rate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 6.1**: Total DEPP programme budget based on actual spending until Dec 2017 and forecast budget up to June 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Project Funds (excluding the Learning Project)</th>
<th>22,720,403</th>
<th>75.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning Project (includes £1 million for the independent evaluation)</td>
<td>3,343,375</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAC-N Project</td>
<td>2,754,814</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,000,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Value Chains and Transactions Costs within Projects**

The DEPP business case emphasizes at various points that the DEPP would be implemented using collaborative model through multi-stakeholder platforms. The business case states that the DEPP will "support humanitarian capacity through the collective, collaborative action of International Non-Governmental Organisations and their partners... Support will not be limited to skills building, but will promote pathways between local and international actors through the creation of joint platforms and networks, and build community preparedness systems. Partners may include other INGOs, local NGOs, local government, national government, academia, private sector companies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies and other civil society organisations." In addition, the business case highlights multi-stakeholder platforms as a means to build capacity: "Analysis suggests it is important to support networks and multi-stakeholder platforms to develop capacity, working with existing ones where ever feasible." It describes multi-stakeholder platforms as: "a 'multiplicity of organisations at different scales of governance working towards more coordinated and integrated actions.'"  

The business case articulated that DEPP interventions would be delivered through multi-stakeholder platforms that would be implemented: "from local to international levels that enable collective action and capture and share lessons and good practice. These platforms will have a broad membership - e.g., INGOs, national NGOs, local government, national government academia, private sector companies, the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies. Successful platforms should improve policy at national and international level. We envisage a single platform per country or region where the programme is active and an international platform. Possible products of the platforms are: synthesised lessons identified, joint evaluations and common position papers for advocacy."

There are clearly risks and costs of taking this approach. However, in the VFM section of the business case, there was no description of the risks of this approach in terms of layers of management overheads and high transactions costs. It would be difficult to implement such an approach without incurring some degree of extra transactions costs, compliance costs and risk management at every level. Overheads are necessary for agents to manage risk, and prevent fraud and corruption. Moreover, since the business case was written compliance assurances were strengthened by DFID; in December 2016, DFID issued a letter to all suppliers, stating that supplier should meet even greater requirements.

Given that the collaborative approach was agreed upfront, it would have been difficult for projects to avoid a lot of these costs, which arise in necessary management overheads at every level of the delivery supply chain. In some countries, regulatory bodies require agencies to be able to maintain certain due diligence processes that are covered by overhead costs. Whether this choice of model reflects good VFM depends on whether the benefits of the multi-sector collaborative approach outweigh these extra transactions costs. This differs depending on projects, but as described in Chapters 4, and 5, the majority of DEPP stakeholders describe strong value of collaboration and working through consortia and consistently describe the collaborative model to be the most appropriate approach to deliver humanitarian capacity building and response activities. There was at least one project (the Talent Development project) where the benefits of the collaborative model were not felt to outweigh the costs by a number

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of stakeholders. This particular project was a more traditional individual capacity building program that directly trained humanitarian staff in a number of DEPP countries. It did not include other DEPP components (such as early warning system development, and policy efforts) that perhaps may be better suited for the collaborative approach than traditional training.

During VFM interviews, several projects also expressed that the collaborative approach worked well for their projects. Examples were provided of specialisation in some projects with this structure leading to savings. For example, in the Transforming Surge Capacity project, CAFOD donated time and integrated project tasks into their own work. This type of structure is beneficial as it can also lead to increased sustainability and ownership and allow continuation of the work beyond the end of the projects.

There are two key issues to consider with respect to the collaborative model: 1) the collaborative model will necessarily result in higher transactions costs compared to an alternative model with less layers, and 2) there may be a case to suggest that the collaborative approach could have been achieved at greater efficiency and lower cost. The latter is considered in detail below. Notably, there are some examples of projects that appeared not to have overly high overheads at every level. For example, expenditure data from the Protection in Practice project demonstrate that overheads were not being applied at every tier. The original project budget was £804,634 and at June 2017 this was the budget and the delivery supply chain that DFID reviewed as part of their internal review of DEPP. The NPAC set for this was £89,594 which is roughly 11.13%. The project gained a further £66,998 for a total budget of £870,137. While this did have an NPAC charged to it, a grant to CEDIER (a local NGO) by the Protection in Practice project was then executed and no overheads were taken.

Table 6.2 shows the tiers of funding, one could misleadingly conclude that the difference between Tier 2 and 3 (which is £224,068 at the revised June 2018 budget) could be solely due to overheads. This is in fact not true as the actual overhead figure between these tiers was actually £96,846. In terms of the overheads taken at Tier 3, unfortunately, the financial management system was not set up to check whether overheads were taken or not, and to what extent if so.

Further investigation of the Protection in Practice example, shows that the costs related to project staff were listed as a combination of direct and indirect costs, but in reality all the staff were either protection technical specialists or finance staff. The protection technical specialists were hybrid protection advisor-managers (they were required to project manage their pieces of work but also to advise at workshops and on toolkit development). In addition, there were smaller percentages of two finance staff time included in the budget. This included one finance staff person at Oxfam and one at International Rescue Committee (IRC). These positions were essential to cover the mixture of regular internal accounts management alongside the flexible funding grants that went through both agencies. According to the delivery supply chain this included over 30 different L/NNGO organisations receiving grants. The chain does not give any indication of how much work behind the scenes this was, or whether the South Sudan conflict created more work for the financial management of the project.

The Talent Development Project Final Evaluation Report, p 12, notes: "At the end of TDP, there were mixed feelings about the consortium’s added-value. Half of respondents questioned the need for having a consortium because they thought the cost of running the consortium outweighed its benefits and would not want to commit to a TDP2, should they be given the opportunity."
### Table 6.2: Tiers of funding for Protection in Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 2</th>
<th>Tier 3</th>
<th>Tier 4</th>
<th>Tier 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>START Network Sub-grant to Oxfam</td>
<td>Oxfam Sub-grant to 6 L/NGOs and 1 INGO (IRC) Agencies</td>
<td>IRC Contractor Agreement with World Vision for Workshops; Sub-grant to 32 L/NGOs</td>
<td>World Vision Contractor Agreement (This Amount is a Straight Pass Through of Funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2017 Budget</td>
<td>£804,634</td>
<td>£571,129</td>
<td>£72,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised June 2018 Budget</td>
<td>£870,137</td>
<td>£646,069</td>
<td>£61,924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It’s worth noting that in the June 2017 budget, £250,684 was spent on capacity building and pilots (PIP budget line 12) and based on analysis of actuals expenditure, none of it was spent in the UK on overheads. Rather, it was spent in country on a combination of elements including salaries of the protection technical specialists, costs related to the L/NGO participants, costs related to training of trainer workshops, and pilot costs. This again emphasises that project content and activities are the major cost at each tier, and not overheads.

For the Protection in Practice example, there are a number of costs that sit across Tier 2 and Tier 3. This occurred because Oxfam directly provided funds to IRC and to six L/NGOs at the same tier. This means that money hit frontline L/NGOs at Tier 3, not at the end of a long chain. This is a good example in the DEPP of at least some L/NGOs not sitting down the end of an unnecessarily long delivery supply chain.

### A Reconsideration of the Collaborative Multi-stakeholder Approach and VFM?

It is clear that the collaborative approach was more appropriate for some projects and in those cases, the benefits likely outweighed the costs. For example, in some locations and projects it was necessary to work with the specialised organisations, especially when key relationships were not with the lead agency. As an example, in Gambella, Ethiopia, Christian Aid could not directly contract with the Ministry of Health and it was essential to work with local and national actors with the right language skills and contextualised knowledge, and existing partnership routes to manage the collaborative action. All work with national or local governments, and potentially non-state actors in conflict settings needed in-country stakeholders to do this.

But in other projects this may have been less of an issue. The projects were likely unnecessarily burdened with a hierarchy of flow of funds, high transactions costs with contracting, and compliance costs at every level. Another problem related to this has been around information flow – long supply chains prolonged the time taken for reporting, the approvals process at every level was likely unnecessary and information flow was slow as a consequence.

If the long supply chain issue had been consciously thought through at the inception phase, for example by mapping out the chain using the DFID approach for stakeholders and adapting it based on needs, it is likely that processes could have been streamlined resulting in lower costs overall, greater efficiency and better VFM. If the reporting approvals did not need to be tied to the supply chain, a more proactive MEL system could have been set up which bypassed cumbersome approvals at every level. Separating out the layers of the supply chain with the reporting requirements and information flows could have facilitated this. Also, developing better cost models on specific activities would have improved efficiency and lowered costs.

In conclusion, the collaborative model necessarily lends itself to a degree of inefficiency, high
transactions costs and slow information flows. This model had substantial benefits however, and for some projects the benefits have likely outweighed the costs. For other projects the same benefits of the model could have been achieved at lower cost and greater efficiency if the contracting, M&E system and costing of activities had been more consciously thought through from inception. The collaborative model that was tied to hierarchical and long delivery chains has likely compromised economy and efficiency to a degree.

**Allocation of Time and Resources for DEPP Management, Governance, Learning and M&E Functions**

In terms of resource allocation to the management functions of DEPP, as explored in the formative phase, this was not considered to be optimal as resources were too lean to undertake full portfolio management functions adequately, as one would expect for a portfolio of this size. No significant changes have been made to resources allocated to the DEPP management team since the formative phase report. As seen in Table 6.1 the management costs comprise over 4% of the budget. In-depth interviews indicated that management resources were not increased because START Network members felt that funding a central function was high cost and would take costs away from front line activities. Budget to fund a full-time advocacy post within the management team was provided from the learning team budget after it was realised (and ‘demanded’ by DEPP projects) that this was needed. The programme management also used consultancy for VfM advice – which is costed into the 4% figure of START Network administration costs. The DEPP team, therefore, did draw upon external expertise as and when required.

However, while many programmes are aiming to reduce high administrative cost, this was too lean for such a complex programme to be maximally effective. Based on findings from IDIs and the sheer volume of reporting from a fund of this size, extra resources in the management team would have been well spent. Such resources could have been spent on technical M&E expertise that would have better enabled the management team to scrutinise project progress via quarterly reports and other means, so as to better report results to the programme board. This would have better enabled the programme board to understand how results (outputs and outcomes) were unfolding, and to make strategic course correction decisions.

**Programme-level Resource Allocation**

The VfM review explored resource allocation at the programme/DEPP level, through IDIs and document review. In particular, questions were asked about whether the portfolio mix of projects was considered optimal.

Evidence suggests that DEPP did not function as a portfolio, and each project functioned as a standalone project. This was due to the design history of the DEPP – the set of individual projects was not designed as a balanced portfolio in terms of risk, types of activities, size, and cost. Ideally, in a portfolio, a range of experiments is needed in order to assess what works and this should lead to additional funds for more successful projects as implementation unfolds. This practically would translate into a series of pilots, followed by scale up and course correction where needed. Instead of this model, projects were designed in isolation, and retrofitted to the business case or to the selection criteria and focal countries using a top-down approach. In-depth interviews have indicated that the Programme Board was not able to adequately steer and course correct the fund and that they did not have a good handle on results of projects.

The other main vehicle for steering the DEPP Programme was the Learning Project. At the start of DEPP there was a strategic decision to allocate significant resources (£3 million) to this project. There were some successes in terms of the generation of learning from the project (presented in Chapter 4); the move of the DEPP Learning Project team to have Country Learning Advisors, and regional and national events was greatly appreciated by country staff, and gave more opportunities and spaces to discuss collaboration and share learning. Project staff indicated that they had useful support from the Learning Project to gather case studies for the project. For example, the Transforming Surge Capacity team indicated that they did not have the capacity to gather content for the Future for Surge event and the Learning Project team was able to support them. The DEPP online learning platform was considered useful as a more flexible space to showcase learning from the project. This also supports the sustainability
of projects.

Some interviewees indicated that while there were successes with the Learning Project, the demand of project resources such as time and efforts were too high and hence placed too much burden on projects. For example, interviewees stated that there was too much information requested from projects, and some duplication with information that was requested from regular reports and final evaluations. Respondents also stated that while UK learning events had been useful, the final global learning event in Geneva in March 2018 was demanding and confusing.

It is questionable as to whether the set-up of the Learning Project and strategic resource allocation was the right one. In-depth interviews indicated that the DEPP would have benefitted from much more results monitoring, reporting, analysing and data-driven decision-making. Arguably a programme needs good monitoring, reporting and evaluation before it can engage in learning activities. Strong, harmonised M&E has been distinctly missing at the project and programme level. Having some money allocated to M&E would have reaped benefits in terms of greater ability of projects to measure results, and feed these up to the Programme Board, so it could be more strategic in its actions and more efficiently course correct the DEPP. Stronger M&E would also have been complementary to Learning Project activities and would have served to enhance the fluidity of learning.

In-depth interviews also indicated that the Learning Project activities could perhaps have been better placed at the programme management team level, rather than as a competing project with its own agenda and objectives. Learning objectives should not be separate to programme management objectives, as they were in the existing DEPP structure. In-depth interviews indicated that the Learning Project team could have communicated their findings better to the management team and Programme Board. In general, there also could have been better communication between the management team and the Programme Board in terms of objectives and expectations related to the Learning Project activities. Programme Board members are not likely to read reports and instead needed more targeted and concise communications materials. Alternative innovative model of information and lessons learned communication channel should have been explored and implemented.

The Use of VFM Indicators and Methods

The use of VFM indicators have mainly been within the quarterly reports. After the formative phase recommendation to increase the use of VFM indicators, the DEPP management team made a strong effort to increase the project staff capacity around VFM concepts and reporting through the implementation of two half-day training events. This training had several outcomes. First, some projects carried out ad hoc reports on VFM. Second, most projects incorporated VFM as a component of their final evaluations. During the training, a VFM completion template for projects was introduced to record VFM qualitative and/or quantitative findings at completion. At the time of writing this report, the completed templates were not yet available and thus have not been reviewed by the Evaluation team.

Review of available documents provided several good examples of ad hoc VFM reports. The Talent Development project generated some useful VFM findings in their final evaluation report which focused on the cost effectiveness of different training models. In addition, the Transforming Surge Capacity project created two reports, one on the VFM related to collaboration which highlighted its high cost and one on the financial sustainability of surge capacity. However, it is not clear how these reports will be used going forward.

Table 6.3 summarises the VFM indicators reported in the May 2017 project quarterly reports which were the latest available report at the time the table was developed. At least two of the reports had no VFM sections. However, the evaluation team acknowledges that some project teams have integrated VFM thinking throughout different sections of their reports. While there are some useful indicators, to have had more meaningful reporting of VFM, it would have been necessary to use more specific and in depth VFM indicators for each project. Across the projects, a core set of cross-cutting indicators which can be aggregated and compared with each other, as described in formative phase recommendations would have been useful to adequately capture VFM. The remaining indicators should have been project specific and tailored to each project’s needs. Indicators should have been both quantitative and qualitative.
HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF VFM REPORTING IN MAY 2017 QUARTERLY REPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Cost savings, benefits in kind, Oxfam procurement procedures, use of local materials, pro bono work from London School of Economics, pro bono support for website development, discounted flights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leveraged other donor funding in Lebanon, DRC and South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFDA-funded consultation, leveraging and sharing of resources, working with other projects and sharing resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Efficiencies with integrated programming, where partners are already working, joint training, collaboration with partners to provide efficient support for conferences, Learning Advisors hosted by DEPP partners in country, proactive use of processes and tools, using data, prepositioning of goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Targeting the right people, partners and beneficiaries have been fully involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Community-level institutions, good coordination and communication with Government. Ensuring capacity and sustainability of in-country staff so programme can be more locally oriented in the future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: Summary of VFM reporting from May 2017 Quarterly Reports

The DEPP could have benefitted from the addition of indicators as it matured in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of VFM. In general, the most important drivers of VFM are effectiveness and equity and such data should be collected as projects and programmes mature. Some suggested indicators are shown below in Table 6.3. These are not necessary quantitative which makes direct comparisons less straightforward, but nevertheless, they offer useful data to inform decisions about strategy and funding. Such data are useful for assessing the programme as a whole, for learning and also to make changes dynamically. For example, those projects that perform particularly high on these indicators are those that likely show higher returns and thus could be promoted more than those that do not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggested VFM indicator</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy/Efficiency</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economy</strong>: Economies of scope through shared overheads across projects – measured by cost savings, or just narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of economies of scope and scale within operations and budget</td>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong>: Semi-qualitative, to demonstrate that operations were changed on the grounds of VFM; actual number of changes and supporting narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of operational adaptations resulting in better cost effectiveness or value generation</td>
<td><strong>Efficiency/Effectiveness</strong>: Partnership quality a key attribute of efficiency – a rating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness and equity (more important for strategic decision making)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rating of the quality of partnerships</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152 Highly economical and efficient programmes will not offer much VFM if they are targeting the wrong things/people (equity), or doing the wrong things (effectiveness).
Does the programme continue to meet needs identified upfront?

Useful to revisit what the project is actually aiming to achieve at key break points. If the answer to the question is no, this is a breach of effectiveness and resources are not being allocated to where they are needed. Narrative.

Is there an exit strategy or other measures to ensure sustainability?

Effectiveness: Without sustainability of the research uptake the interventions are compromised; i.e., what measures are in place to ensure that the interventions will continue post project completion? Explanatory narrative.

In terms of the methodology, is there a trade-off between cost and working with hard-to-reach populations, and if so, is this explicitly accounted for in the budget?

Equity: A key equity point – it is often more expensive to reach vulnerable groups, so this needs conscious budgeting to maintain VFM. Costs and narrative.

Table 6.4: Extra suggested VFM indicators for Quarterly Reports

In summary, in terms of strategic resource allocation, the evidence shows that the initial process of selecting projects was not strategic, and this may have impacted on the effectiveness of the whole programme. While the Learning Project interventions were useful, it might have been more strategic to redeploy some of its resources into the management team for expertise for technical programmatic and project-level monitoring and reporting of outputs and outcomes. This was not part of the Learning Project team’s remit. This would have permitted the Programme Board to have more regular and direct results to ensure on-time and on-demand decision making, and hence enable course correction as needed.

It is noted that as the logical framework data started to become available and regularly reported on a quarterly basis by the learning team the management team was then able to use this for reporting to DFID, board and take course correction measures such as increasing focus on gender considerations. However, this was insufficient in terms of monitoring reporting and course correction.


The discussion above on value chains and transactional costs demonstrate some inefficiencies within the programme and help to partially respond to this question. Further assessment of empirical data related to how DEPP preparedness activities affected the cost of disaster response, and the cost per activities and cost per results achieved will address the question on whether results achieved justify the cost of the programme.

**Empirical Findings on Disaster Cost**

To assess cost effectiveness of the DEPP projects, several lines of analysis come together. First, survey questions were included in the T2 organisational data collection (see Box below). These quantitative questionnaires were completed with senior management at both DEPP and comparison organisations in the four intensive set countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar and the Philippines), and the questions capture their perceptions about whether DEPP preparedness activities have improved the speed and cost of response. As this data was only collected at the second time point, it is not possible to estimate changes over time. Instead, the analysis focuses on assessing differences between the DEPP and comparison organisations in each country and overall with the pooled dataset. Statistical tests are used to analyse whether any observed differences between the DEPP and comparison group are statistically significant (p<0.05).
KEY COST EFFECTIVENESS DATA COLLECTED AT TIMEPOINT 2

Organisational level: Organisational survey with senior management.

- Perceptions on preparedness and speed of response: On a scale of 1-5, to what extent have the preparedness activities helped improve the speed of response?
- Perceptions on preparedness and cost of response: On a scale of 1-5, to what extent have the preparedness activities helped reduce the cost of response?
- Perceptions on timeliness of previous response: How would you rate the timeliness of your organisation’s response to the disaster? Where 1=Very untimely, 2=Untimely, 3=Untimely, 4=Somewhat timely, 5=Timely
- Perceptions on cost of previous response: How would you rate the costliness of your organisation's response to the disaster? Where 1=Very expensive, 2=Expensive, 3=Somewhat expensive, 4=Inexpensive, 5=Very inexpensive
- Perceptions on institutional and policy environment and speed of response: On a scale from 1-5, how much does the institutional and policy environment impact the speed of your response?
- Perceptions on institutional and policy environment and cost of response: On a scale from 1-5, how much does the institutional and policy environment impact the cost of your response?

Overall, none of the indicators assessed show any statistically significant difference between the DEPP and comparison organisations (i.e., any differences observed are by chance rather than any real difference). Table 6.5 below presents perceptions on preparedness and speed and cost of response by country and for the pooled sample. Most respondents in both DEPP and comparison organisations reported 3 to 4 out of the 5-point scale when asked whether preparedness activities helped to improve the speed of response. A similar trend is seen when asked whether preparedness activities helped to improve the cost of response. Overall, there was no significant difference in any of the countries between the DEPP and comparison group or in the pooled data. The findings suggest that DEPP preparedness activities have not improved the efficiency of response. However, it must be noted that the comparison group had been exposed to some capacity building activities (though to a lesser degree than DEPP organisations) and this might explain the lack of findings.

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<tr>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES</th>
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<td>Comparison</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>(55.6%)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(61.1%)</td>
<td>(30.0%)</td>
<td>(55.0%)</td>
<td>(50.0%)</td>
<td>(57.9%)</td>
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</table>

153 In principle, a statistically significant difference is a result that is not attributed to chance. More technically, it means that if the null hypothesis is true (which means there really is no difference between the two groups), then there’s a low probability of getting a result that large or larger.

154 A higher score indicates a higher level of perceived preparedness.
Table 6.5: Contribution of preparedness activities to speed and cost of response

Table 6.6 presents the perceived costliness and timeliness of organisational response activities carried out in the previous 12 months. In theory, if DEPP preparedness activities did affect the speed and costliness of response activities we would expect DEPP organisation’s responses to be less costly and more timely compared to the non-DEPP group. However, there was no significant difference between DEPP and comparison organisations for either of these indicators in any of the countries or in the pooled sample. These findings are in line with other quantitative indicators presented in Chapter 4 which show no significant difference in perceived performance during a past response for DEPP, comparison group and overall.

Contrary to these quantitative findings, qualitative data and case study data presented in Chapter 4 suggests improvements in speed and efficiency of response in certain contexts (see Chapter 4). While qualitative change has started to appear, quantitative change requires longer and more sustained efforts to achieve. It may be too early to assess whether the results achieved justify the cost.

How would you rate the costliness of your organisation’s response to the disaster?

1 = not costly at all
5 = very costly

Table 6.6: Perceived costliness of organisational response activities

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<tr>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES</th>
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<td>(13.3%)</td>
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<td>(0.0%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>(0.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>
How would you rate the timeliness of your organisation’s response to the disaster?

1= not timely at all
5= very timely

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>THE PHILIPPINES</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>(33.3%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(7.7%)</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

Table 6.6: Perceived costliness and timeliness of organisational response activities

Table 6.7 presents findings related to the effect of the institutional and policy environment on the speed of response. Again, most respondents confirmed that the institutional and policy environment influences the speed and costliness of their own organisation’s response. This highlights the fact that improved preparedness alone may not be sufficient to improve efficiency of response. Institutional and policy issues would also need to be addressed in order to improve response performance. This is important to consider during future project and programme design processes.

On a scale of 1-5, how much does the institutional and policy environment impact the speed of your response?

1 = no impact
5 = very strong impact

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<td>(5.3%)</td>
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<td>(3.6%)</td>
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<td>(15.8%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(32.1%)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>(68.4%)</td>
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<td>(70.0%)</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(10.5%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(10.0%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

On a scale of 1-5, how much does the institutional and policy environment impact the cost of your response?

1 = no impact
5 = very strong impact

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<td>Comparison</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>(5.3%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(3.6%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.7: Perceptions about the influence of the institutional and policy environment on speed and costliness of response

The lack of significant differences between DEPP and comparison groups within the empirical findings would suggest that the resources invested in DEPP have not led to a programme-wide improvement in efficiency of the humanitarian response. However, it must be noted that it may well be too soon to measure impact, and these findings are therefore not indicative of potential impact. Moreover, the sample size is relatively small and this particular analysis is based on perceived timeliness and efficiency of response rather than actual, and perceptions data can be biased. The fact that some qualitative data suggests improved speed of response provide preliminary indicators that DEPP has good potential to lead to improvement in efficiency of the humanitarian response. In general, some of the in-depth interviews also reiterated that it is too soon to monitor results and impact (e.g., CDAC-N).

**Cost Per Result Indicators**

A second line of enquiry to assess cost effectiveness of the programme is to assess the cost per activity and cost per result achieved. Projects were asked to provide expenditure data broken down by specific activities, to enable estimation of the expenditure that was incurred to achieve emergency preparedness and capacity-related outcomes. Projects were asked to break down their costs according to the activities listed below:

- Individual capacity building
- Organisational capacity building
- Systems-level capacity building
- Individual preparedness
- Organisational preparedness
- Community preparedness

This enables an analysis of the actual cost to achieve changes in preparedness levels and capacity in different contexts. The unit costs can then be compared over time (if time-series data are available, which is not the case for this evaluation), or across countries. The goal of the country comparison is to assess which country outcomes cost more, and to understand why.

The methodology involves linking the financial data with the outcomes from the wider findings from the KAP and organisational response surveys. As discussed in Chapter 4 of the report, there were few significant differences in the degree of change over time between DEPP and comparison groups for most of the quantitative indicators. Because of the nature of the humanitarian system, and the fact that there was some exposure to capacity building within the comparison group (though at a lower level than the DEPP group), there might have been some improvements in the comparison group over time. For this reason, there is some merit in assessing the change in outcomes from T1 and T2 in the DEPP organisations only in each of the intensive set countries, and then estimating the cost per unit change for these outcomes. To conduct this type of analysis, a full financial data set is needed per country which had a statistically significant finding.

Table 6.8 summarises the financial data which we received from projects. The evaluation team acknowledge that this was not a straightforward task for projects, which explains why some projects were not able to provide the data in time, given the burden of other tasks.
Table 6.8: Summary of financial data provided by each project

Without a full financial data set that matched up to any of the relevant questions and countries, missing data were estimated from project quarterly financial reports as they provided figures for the costs per the five DEPP results areas for each project.\(^{155}\)

Table 6.9 below summarises the results with statistically significant findings from the KAP surveys, and the corresponding cost per unit change. As the table illustrates, the highest VfM is for Myanmar, which yielded a cost per percentage point increase in perceived organisational preparedness of only £1,138 compared to the Philippines where the cost per percentage point increase in the same indicator was £71,287. Qualitative data suggest that SEPS was able to implement activities at a lower cost due to the smaller number of consortia partners and the fact that the economic cost of living and operating in Myanmar is lower than other countries. Generally, it is not advisable to make direct comparisons between countries because of the differences in cost bases within countries, and the many other contextual factors that come into play. Kenya also had a very low unit cost compared to the Philippines. This methodology would be more meaningful if more data points over time were available and, in more countries, so that comparisons over time and across countries to understand reasons for the findings could be made.

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\(^{155}\) The five DEPP results areas are: 1) Improved knowledge and understanding of individuals by sharing best practice for humanitarian preparedness and response; 2) Improved preparedness systems for early action with communities at risk of disasters; 3) Increased number of coalitions, partnerships and networks which, working together, are able to address humanitarian needs in a wide variety of emergency situations; 4) Improved institutional arrangements and policy environments so that national systems for humanitarian response and preparedness are better supported and more sustainable; and 5) Strengthened evidence base for what works to help build humanitarian capacity at scale.
### Table 6.9: Summary of cost per result indicators

For the individual performance indicator in the Philippines (it is possible to match up the data on the number of people trained in the Philippines by DEPP, divided by the total cost. The number of people trained is 8,404 and dividing this figure by £253,784 gives an annual unit cost figure of £30.20. It is difficult to make a value judgment on this figure because there is no basis for comparison; however, given the fact that we see a significant improvement in the satisfaction rating, and that from our experience of other projects, £30.20 is not outside the reasonable range and appears to be a good VfM finding.
QUESTION 4.C: HAVE PROGRAMME FUNDS AND ACTIVITIES BEEN DELIVERED IN A TIMELY MANNER?

Use of Resources during Set-up and Lags

As explained at length in the formative phase report, resources and time necessary for set up were underestimated, and the process of setting up and contracting was inefficient. This continued to have repercussions throughout the course of the DEPP, as there was less time for implementation given that time was used for set up. See Chapter 4 for further discussion on implementation delays and no-cost extensions. Projects at the outset did not have clear decision-making processes, which caused further delays. There was lack of strong ownership of decisions which caused additional delays. Greater clarity was needed on structures and accountability within the projects. Also, projects were unclear what the function of the Programme Board was, and some felt it came across as an "Exam Board," rather than a function to help improve the programme.

Underspending due to Delays

The delays described above contributed to ongoing underspending across the programme. Table 6.10 shows the variance between budget and actual expenditure from a selection of projects using data from the March 2017 quarterly reports. As can be seen, there is high variance in the level of underspending ranging from 73% to less than 10%.

However, data suggest that after 18 months the spend rate picked up, and since mid-2017 the variance between budget and expenditure has been much more reasonable. The variances at the time could partly be explained by time lags in big expenditure items (such as software systems or procurement of public equipment) which occurred early on, but actual expenditure is lagged. This has since been harmonised.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>UNDERSPEND IN MARCH 2017 QUARTERLY REPORT</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UEWEA</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHEP Gambella</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Asked for a no-cost extension to allow for underspend. Delays in signing MOUs with government, and recruitment was a challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPS</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWEA</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STP</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Grants delayed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCAP</td>
<td>less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning Project</td>
<td>less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.10: Variance in spending against budgets for selection of projects reported in March 2017 Quarterly Report
CHAPTER 7

SUSTAINABILITY & LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT
Evaluation Question #5: To what extent and in what ways have the benefits of the programme become embedded?

Sub-questions:

a) What contribution has the programme made in strengthening national preparedness systems?
b) Has the programme taken into consideration prioritised target groups (people with disabilities, older people, women, children and youth)? What contribution has the programme made in strengthening inclusion of target groups and gender aspects at the level of national and local institutions?
c) In what ways has DEPP influenced institutional and policy environments?
d) What is perceived (qualitative analysis) to be the most significant change attributed to DEPP, and why?

Data sources:

- Minimum set IDIs with programme and project stakeholders (Qualitative)
- KAP and organisational surveys (Quantitative)
- Intensive set IDIs (Qualitative)
- Document review (Qualitative)

Key Findings:

- In some settings, DEPP has contributed to strengthening national preparedness systems but typically on a small geographic scale, and by individual project consortia
- The lack of mainstreaming of inclusion of gender and prioritised groups across the programme resulted in a fragmented programme wide approach and uneven results. There was no evidence of individual knowledge change on inclusion; there was evidence of organisational change on inclusion, in particular in Ethiopia and among local organisations across the intensive set countries
- Monitoring of gender data improved over the programme; reporting on other prioritised groups remained low.
- There have been several concrete examples where DEPP has impacted government policies or systems or increased political commitment:
  - UEWEA project’s advocacy and sensitisation efforts led to an amendment of the Disaster and Emergency Management Act (DEM Act), 2015 to include food security (Kenya)
  - LPRR project demonstrated changes at the institutional level (Christian Aid adopted the updated resilience framework)
  - Financial Enablers’ CSO partners were able to secure seats in the national government Disaster Risk Reduction Management council (Philippines)
- There was no statistically significant change in policy-related quantitative indicators in the four intensive set countries
- Changes in quantitative indicators related to localisation have not yet occurred within three out of four intensive set countries. In Ethiopia, however, the percentage of DEPP organisations with policies inclusive to L/NNGOs increased by 16% between T1 and T2
- Attitudinal changes towards localisation have also occurred, including in how INGOs consider, address, and involve local actors and communities. This adoption of the localisation approach is considered to be DEPP’s most significant change by key informants
- There is some evidence of benefits being embedded within organisations and systems. The potential for longer-term effects is dependent on the extent to which programme components can continue beyond the end of DEPP
- The likelihood of sustainability was enhanced for projects or project components that demonstrated the following characteristics:
  - Built on existing work and existing partnerships/consortia
  - Partnered with the national and local government
  - Had/developed a policy or advocacy element
  - Worked towards systems level change
  - Paid greater attention to exit plans earlier in the project cycle
  - Developed tools, guidelines, or systems that fill an important gap
  - Involved beneficiaries and/or local stakeholders
  - Exhibited good VFM
  - Built linkages with other entities and other DEPP projects
  - Implemented in contexts that were more fertile for change
QUESTION 5.A: WHAT CONTRIBUTION HAS THE PROGRAMME MADE IN STRENGTHENING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEMS?

In a few settings, DEPP contributed to strengthening national preparedness systems though typically on a small geographic scale, and by individual project consortia rather than by DEPP as a whole.

Document review, logical framework data and stakeholder interviews indicate some evidence of influence of the DEPP on national preparedness systems. For example, the Urban Early Warning Early Action system to detect urban emergencies and enable rapid response has been adopted by the Nairobi County government in Kenya, who’ve also committed to addressing urban food security issues. The Public Health Preparedness project in Gambella, Ethiopia, worked with the government to improve disease and outbreak surveillance, leading to improved surveillance and reporting at various levels of the health system in several districts and in the strengthened capacity to test for pathogens at the regional laboratory. In Pakistan, management of the surge platform developed under the Transforming Surge Capacity project has been taken over by the National Humanitarian Network (NHN), with an MOU in place with the local government body to ensure implementation after the project ends. The Marsabit County Government in Kenya adopted Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response’s conflict-sensitive approach during humanitarian response (including during the 2016-2017 droughts) thus providing evidence of DEPP’s contributions to national preparedness systems. In other settings, however, the degree to which the DEPP has influenced national preparedness systems and government disaster plans has been less clear.

These positive influences are important and represent significant investment and efforts. However, it should be noted that generally these effects have been on a smaller geographic scale – often at the district or county level and in most cases, each positive example of change was directly attributable to an individual project. By design, the DEPP programme did not implement all 14 projects in each of the 10 focal countries and an individual project may not necessarily have been implemented across an entire country. In addition, not all projects targeted systems-level change. In future programming, more systematic consideration to cumulative results within a geographic scale are necessary to maximise impacts.

The short 3-year programme period and the way that DEPP projects were unevenly programmed in the 10 countries, impeded the ability to achieve significant system-wide changes. Influencing government systems is a complex task that requires sustained and evolving contextualised efforts at multiple levels, along with adequate time and flexibility. Interviewees noted that while partnerships with government actors have been instrumental in influencing national and systems-level change, building these types of relationships can be a slow and lengthy process due to bureaucratic and administrative challenges including changing governments and shifting priorities. In certain fragile and conflict-affected contexts such as South Sudan, partnerships with the government may be even more challenging or potentially pose risks to the project. DEPP stakeholders in South Sudan described these challenges (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, due to delays in contracting, the external evaluation could only begin data collection after some projects had already begun implementation. Furthermore, it was required to complete its scope of work at about the same time DEPP projects closed. This led to a shorter time period between data collection points and further reduced the ability to capture any potential impact DEPP may have had at the system level.

Further assessment of DEPP effects on institutional arrangements and the policy environment are detailed later in this chapter.

QUESTION 5.B: HAS THE PROGRAMME TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION PRIORITISED TARGET GROUPS (PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, OLDER PEOPLE, WOMEN, CHILDREN AND YOUTH)? WHAT CONTRIBUTION HAS THE PROGRAMME MADE IN STRENGTHENING INCLUSION OF TARGET GROUPS AND GENDER ASPECTS AT THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS?

The lack of mainstreaming of inclusion of gender and prioritised groups across the programme resulted in a fragmented programme wide inclusion approach and uneven results. While there was no evidence of individual knowledge change, there was evidence of organisational change with respect to inclusion, in particular in Ethiopia and among local organisations across the intensive set countries.
While the DEPP business case underscored the disproportionate impact of disasters and humanitarian emergencies on women in particular, and emphasised that the programme would strategically address inclusion – at least in regard to gender and Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) – such a focus was largely absent from the programme. The business case stated that the management team would be responsible for "ensuring priority areas including gender, violence against women and girls...are addressed throughout the programme management cycle process", and that "projects will be encouraged to build the capacity of their partners on Violence Against Women and Girls and this will be a key criteria for the designed component to deliver against." While this may have been the intention, only one of the 14 projects (Protection in Practice) focused on protection and to some degree VAWG. CDAC-N’s project in South Sudan and Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response’s work in Myanmar also had small VAWG-focused elements. It is noteworthy that the business case did not articulate well inclusion of other prioritised target groups including people with disabilities, older people, children and youth or highlight this a priority area for the DEPP.

This absence of definitions and details in the business case and subsequent lack of emphasis on inclusion of prioritised groups during the conceptualisation of the programme had several downstream effects. First, while the project selection criteria did require gender considerations to be outlined in project proposals, projects were not mandated to provide detailed inclusion plans. Without definitions and clear guidance, differing approaches to inclusion were incorporated in project designs driven mainly by project or organisational leadership. This yielded varying degrees to which inclusion was integrated into project activities and ultimately a fragmented programme wide approach. Violence against Women and Girls was not taken on as a key cross-cutting theme and as such the programme did not deliver well against any intended VAWG criteria.

Across the programme, in addition to Protection in Practice’s focus on protection, the Age and Disability Capacity Programme focused on inclusion of the elderly and people with disabilities. Both of these projects made strides to build protection and inclusion capacity and in some cases influenced the work of other projects. ADCAP in particular strongly championed inclusion efforts including at programme-level events and helped shape programme-level dialogue on this issue. However, the extent to which priority groups (women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities and other vulnerable/marginalised groups) were holistically included across the programme and inclusion efforts adequately monitored were minimal. Arguably, a more integrated approach where inclusion and protection were mainstreamed across the programme rather than the specific focus of one or two projects might have yielded better results.

In terms of monitoring and reporting, previous DEPP evaluation reports highlighted a consistent lack of disaggregated data and minimally documented gender considerations across projects. Recommendations to strengthen gender reporting within project data were taken up after the formative phase evaluation report. There was some evidence of corrective actions leading to an increase in data disaggregation by gender over the course of the programme. However, reporting on other prioritised groups remained low, making it difficult to assess the true extent to which these groups have been reached by capacity building or other activities.
Analysis of intensive set data collected in the four intensive set countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Myanmar and the Philippines) provides additional evidence on how programme activities actually incorporated and influenced inclusion at the individual, organisational and community level. The box above describes the specific inclusion-related indicators that were assessed at T1 and T2 among both DEPP and comparison groups and analysed for change over time.

Perceived knowledge changes with respect to inclusion (also presented in Chapter 4) and VAWG is presented in Figure 7.1. As can be seen, there was no perceived change in self-reported knowledge levels across any of the four indicators among randomly selected humanitarian staff at DEPP organisations, comparison organisations or overall as a result of the DEPP. In addition, there were no significant changes in any of the intensive set countries or when the sample was restricted only to local organisations. This finding suggests that DEPP did not impact individual-level knowledge on inclusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>DEPP Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Control Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Net DEPP Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age Related Issues in a Disaster</td>
<td>+1.0%</td>
<td>+1.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability Related Issues in a Disaster</td>
<td>+0.6%</td>
<td>+0.5%</td>
<td>+1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues Related to Women in a Disaster</td>
<td>+0.8%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>+1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
<td>+1.2%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>+2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.1: Perceived individual knowledge related to inclusion and Gender-based violence

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.
At the organisational level, using the pooled data from all four countries, there were no significant changes in the inclusion of prioritised groups in preparedness programming in the DEPP group or in the comparison group (See Figure 7.2). However, DEPP organisations in Ethiopia showed a statistically significant increase in inclusion of the elderly in preparedness programming (+26.8%, \(p<0.05\)), and in inclusion of people with disabilities (+30.9%, \(p<0.05\)) between T1 and T2 (Figure 7.3). There was no similar increase in the comparison organisations in Ethiopia. There was in fact a statistically significant net DEPP effect for inclusion of people with disabilities (+52.2%, \(p<0.05\)). This is positive, but somewhat surprising finding as Ethiopia was not one of the countries where the Age and Disability Capacity Programme was directly active. In Kenya where ADCAP inclusion advisors were active, there was no significant change in disability inclusion during preparedness activities in DEPP organisations or overall as a result of the DEPP. Improvements in Ethiopia could have been due to programme leadership’s increasing emphasis on the inclusion of prioritised groups as best practice, dissemination of ADCAP’s Minimum Standards for Age and Disability Inclusion in Humanitarian Action through their own efforts and/or through global DEPP events, or the influence of the Shifting the Power project which included some inclusion efforts, or a combination of these.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPP DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>CONTROL DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women involved in design and implementation of preparedness programming</td>
<td>+0.7%</td>
<td>+6.7%</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly involved in design and implementation of preparedness planning</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>+0.3%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with disabilities involved in design and implementation of preparedness planning</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>+0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.2: Perceived inclusion of prioritised groups during design and implementation of preparedness programming

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>DEPP DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>CONTROL DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+28.8%*</td>
<td>+6.5%</td>
<td>+20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-8.1%</td>
<td>+14.3%</td>
<td>-22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>+0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-11.2%</td>
<td>-23.9%</td>
<td>+12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>+1.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>+1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPP DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>CONTROL DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+30.9%*</td>
<td>-21.2%</td>
<td>+52.2%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-&lt;11.7%</td>
<td>+4.8%</td>
<td>-16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
<td>+18.8%</td>
<td>-24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-7.5%</td>
<td>-7.7%</td>
<td>+0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
<td>+5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.3. Perceived inclusion of the elderly (Panel A) and people with disabilities (Panel B) during design and implementation of preparedness programming by country.

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

Inclusion of vulnerable groups during response activities was assessed only at T2, and thus a Difference-in-Difference analysis is not possible. T2 data is instead analysed for statistical significance using Chi square tests. Table 7.1 presents the findings. Overall, there are no statistically significant differences between DEPP and comparison organisations in any country or in the full sample. However, Ethiopia data show a trend of increased inclusion during response activities (70% in Ethiopia DEPP organisations reported very good or excellent compared to 61.1% in the comparison organisations). This trend is consistent with the significant improvements in inclusion during preparedness in Ethiopia described above.

Table 7.1: Perceived inclusion of prioritised groups during humanitarian response at T2

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

Ethiopia also shows positive findings with respect to changes in organisational policy on the inclusion of prioritised groups. As shown in Figure 7.4, there was a non-significant increase of 3.5% of DEPP organisations in Ethiopia with inclusion policies related to prioritised groups between T1 and T2. However, overall compared to the comparison group, there was a significant net DEPP effect of +9.9% (p<0.05). This aligns well with the previous findings for Ethiopia and when taken together demonstrate consistently, across a series of indicators, evidence of improved inclusion at the organisational level in Ethiopia that can be attributed to the DEPP. With respect to organisational policy, strong positive findings are also evident when the sample is restricted to local organisations (See Figure 7.4). Among all local DEPP organisations, there was a statistically significant increase of +6.5% (p<0.05) in organisations with policies on the
inclusion of prioritised groups, and this translated into a statistically significant overall DEPP effect of +14.0% (p<0.05). This is a notable finding demonstrating the DEPP efforts culminated in strengthened inclusion policies in local organisations across the programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPP DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>CONTROL DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>+3.1%</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>+5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+3.5%</td>
<td>-6.4%*</td>
<td>+9.9%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>+4.2%</td>
<td>-3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>+1.9%</td>
<td>+0.8%</td>
<td>+1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-12.2%</td>
<td>-7.9%</td>
<td>+20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>+6.5%*</td>
<td>-7.5%</td>
<td>+14.0%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.4: Organisations with policies on the inclusion of prioritised groups

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

Inclusion within communities was also analysed. At the community level, household data from Myanmar was used to construct indicators on the perceived inclusion of women, the elderly and people with disabilities within community preparedness plans. As illustrated in Figure 7.5, perceptions on the level of inclusiveness of community preparedness plans actually significantly decreased between T2 and T1 in both DEPP and non-DEPP comparison communities. There was no statistically significant overall effect of the DEPP. These declines in perceived inclusion may have been linked to changes in contextual factors such as political climate, insecurity or other factors, or the tendency of people to judge themselves or their communities more realistically once exposed to capacity building or other activities. Since perceptions on inclusion decreased strongly in both DEPP and non-DEPP comparison communities at roughly the same level, there is no evidence that DEPP improved inclusion within community preparedness plans.
### Figure 7.5: Perceived inclusion of prioritised groups in community preparedness plans

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prioritised Groups</th>
<th>DEPP Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Control Difference (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>Net DEPP Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar: Inclusion of women in community preparedness plans</td>
<td>-6.2%*</td>
<td>-5.0%*</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar: Inclusion of the elderly in community preparedness plans</td>
<td>-5.4%*</td>
<td>-4.4%*</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar: Inclusion of people with disabilities in community preparedness plans</td>
<td>-6.0%*</td>
<td>-4.8%*</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the lack of integration of activities to promote inclusion across the programme resulted in a fragmented programme wide approach and uneven results. While there was no evidence of individual knowledge change, there was evidence of organisational change, in particular in Ethiopia and among local organisations across the intensive countries. While monitoring of gender data improved over the course of the programme, reporting on other prioritised groups remained low.

### QUESTION 5.C: IN WHAT WAYS HAS DEPP INFLUENCED INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY ENVIRONMENTS?

There have been several concrete examples where DEPP has impacted government policies or systems or increased political commitment but there was no statistically significant change across the DEPP in policy-related quantitative indicators.

Institutional and policy environment changes were captured at the programme level through logical framework data and through indicator data provided to the evaluation team by projects. This was triangulated with documents reviewed as part of the document review. According to logical framework data, a number of projects have created policy briefs, recommendations and reports to influence policy on a range of topics such as collaborative platforms, localisation of aid and age and disability inclusion. Engagement with the government, the UN and other influential actors along with advocacy events were also undertaken as strategies to create change in institutional and policy environments.

There are several examples where these efforts have impacted government policies or systems or increased political commitment. For example, the Urban Early Warning Early Action project’s advocacy and sensitisation efforts led to an amendment of the Disaster and Emergency Management Act (DEM Act), 2015 to include food security and an MOU with the Nairobi City County Government to ensure the government’s role in addressing urban food security issue. The Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response project demonstrated changes at the institutional level. For example, Christian Aid adopted the updated resilience framework, a Violence to Peace strategy and a Violence to Peace strategy. Financial Enablers’ reported examples where CSO partners were able to secure seats in the national government Disaster Risk Reduction Management councils and technical working groups providing opportunities for engagement and collaboration.

The CDAC Network Project advocated for inclusion of Communicating with Communities in the Bangladesh Government’s national Standing Orders on Disasters (SOD), which is currently under revision (see Section 9). The final version of the SOD has yet to be released but is expected

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to include the desired changes.

In order to further examine influence of the DEPP on institutional and policy environments, a number of indicators collected within the four intensive set countries were analysed (see Box below).

### KEY POLICY INDICATOR DATA COLLECTED AT TWO TIMEPOINTs

#### Individual level:
- Perceived individual influence within organisation: How would you rate YOUR ability to influence the institutional and policy environment within your organisation? Where 1=No Voice or Influence, 2=Minimal Influence, 3=Some Influence, 4=Significant Influence, 5=Strong Influence, seen as equal partner

#### Organisational level:
- Perceived influence of organisation on institutional and policy environment: Organisational survey with senior leadership. How would you rate your organisation's ability to influence the institutional and policy environment? Where 1=No Voice or Influence, 2=Minimal Influence, 3=Some Influence, 4=Significant Influence, 5=Strong Influence, seen as equal partner
- Perceived influence of organisation on national preparedness systems: Organisational survey with senior leadership. How well is your organisation or country office able to influence government policies related to national preparedness systems [in country of survey]? Where 1=No Voice or Influence, 2=Minimal Influence, 3=Some Influence, 4=Significant Influence, 5=Strong Influence, seen as equal partner
- Inclusiveness of organisational policy towards L/NNGOs: Organisational survey with senior leadership. On a scale of 1 to 5, how inclusive is your organisation's policy / approach to working with local / national NGOs? Where 1=Very Exclusive, 2=Exclusive, 3=Somewhat Inclusive 4=Inclusive, 5=Very inclusive
- Change in organisational policy on working with L/NNGOs: Has there been any change in your organisation’s policy and/or approach to working with local or national NGOs in the last 1 year? Where 1=More inclusive, 2= No change, 3=Less inclusive

The indicators focus on individual influence within one’s own organisation, as well as the organisation’s influence on the policy environment in general or specifically related to National Disaster Management Plans. To assess changes related to localisation policy, data on inclusiveness of organisational policies towards L/NNGOs as well as changes in these policies were collected and analysed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPP DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>CONTROL DIFFERENCE (T2 - T1)</th>
<th>NET DEPP EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Organisation</td>
<td>+1.6%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>+3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on Institutional &amp; Policy Environment</td>
<td>-4.7%</td>
<td>+1.1%</td>
<td>-5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on Policies related to National Preparedness Systems</td>
<td>+2.4%</td>
<td>+3.1%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7.6: Change in Individual and organisational policy-related indicators

* Denotes statistical significance. Absence of * indicates that none of the measured changes were statistically significant.

Table 7.5 provides the findings across all countries. As can be seen, despite some of the positive policy change examples that have emerged from the document review processes, there are no observed significant changes in any of the six policy-related indicators over time. These indicators measure both perceptions, as well as the level of influence within a complex policy environment. The latter may take significant time to change and may not fully capture other types of policy change or shifts in the landscape that are more difficult to measure quantitatively.

Changes in quantitative indicators related to localisation have not yet occurred except in Ethiopia where the percentage of DEPP organisations with policies inclusive to L/NNGOs increased by 16% between T1 and T2.

On the issue of localisation, an area that has been a strong focus of the DEPP since its conception, qualitative data collected as part of the evaluation and during evidence validation workshops in each of the four intensive set countries suggest slow but steady changes in attitudes and mindset favouring a more localised approach. The speed and extent of this type of change seemed to depend to some degree on the specific contextual setting, political climate and other external factors. In Kenya, for example, several respondents described an anti-localisation effect occurring as INGOs set up local branch offices and in doing so pushed out L/NNGOs. The repercussions of this have already been felt as one L/NNGO described their annual budget dropping by 90% due to the influx of INGOs into local areas. Despite this, more positive instances of changes in power dynamics, greater access of L/NNGOs to leadership positions and funding have been documented in several contexts. These are explored in more detail in the next section.

The question of whether this perceived shift in mindset and attitudes contributed to any meaningful change in terms of organisational policy or number of partnerships with L/NNGOs was also assessed. With respect to inclusiveness of organisational policies to L/NNGOs and change in policies related to working with L/NNGOs (Figure 7.5), there was no statistically significant change over time due to the DEPP in the pooled data or in any of the country-level data except for Ethiopia. Respondents from DEPP organisations in Ethiopia reported a 16% increase in the level of inclusiveness of their organisation’s policies toward L/NNGOs, and this was significant at the 0.05 level. However, due to small increases in inclusiveness of Ethiopian comparison organisations, the net DEPP effect was not statistically significant in Ethiopia. In other settings, there is no evidence that localisation-related policies have changed as of yet.

In addition, further data related to localisation are presented in Chapter 5. Network analysis shows no change over time in the proportion of local/national NGOs within the humanitarian networks in the intensive set countries and limited change in terms of the number of relationships with L/NNGOs. Those findings are consistent with the finding above that organisational policy related to L/NNGOs has not changed.

Taken together these findings suggest that while change in quantitative indicators related to localisation have not yet occurred (except in Ethiopia), there has been some progress towards qualitative attitudinal change that is necessary to eventually lead to more system-level changes.
It is not clear how close we are to a tipping point where changes occur and can be statistically detected, but momentum is growing, especially in certain contexts, and it is critical that these gains not be lost. Perceived qualitative change around localisation will be further discussed in the next section and sustainability and leveraging DEPP’s investments into longer-term change will be explored later in this chapter.

QUESTION 5.D: WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE ATTRIBUTED TO DEPP, AND WHY?

Qualitative data captured attitudinal change towards the localisation approach including in how INGOs consider, address and involve local actors and communities, which is considered to be DEPP’s most significant change.

Consistently, project and programme level stakeholders identified the adoption of the localisation approach as the most significant change attributable to the DEPP. Stakeholders noted observing a shift in the way INGOs consider, address and involve local actors and communities, and attributed it to the DEPP. For example, one interviewee stated:

“[DEPP] has pushed the localisation agenda at super speed and it’s really happening. Probably all of the elements were there, but as a system they really needed just a tiny push to make it happen. The DEPP allowed that.”

The often-cited tendency to consider local organisations as sub-contractors or implementers, rather than as decision makers or equal partners was also perceived as changing in certain countries. An in-country respondent in Pakistan described this change:

“The most significant change among international organisations, I believe, is the realisation that local organisations are not only the implementing agent but they are partners and they need to be treated as partners. This is something that I have observed in the behaviour, the change that I have observed in the mentor organisation... revisiting their partnership modalities and process through which they can kind of reduce the subverting approach. That kind of approach is now discouraged and new models are coming in by these international organisations. Before this, it was just kind of a donor and receiver kind of relationship, like a grant partnership. But now it’s beyond that. International organisations are committing to investing more while the local actors are having a long-term engagement with them.”

Other examples of this type of change were described in Bangladesh where local actors became involved in decision-making processes within a large national preparedness platform, and in the Philippines where local organisations were the first to mobilise and respond to the crisis in Marawi. These types of shifts contributed to increased confidence among local organisations and not only became an opportunity for experiential learning but also provided momentum to the cause. Additionally, the opening of the UN Pooled fund to L/NGOs (for example, Shifting the Power local partners in DRC and Pakistan became eligible for these funds) and the greater access of L/NGOs to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee cluster system signalled notable progress towards the localisation agenda within a humanitarian architecture typically known for its slow pace of change.

It was noted that further progress in this domain towards a concrete “re-balancing” of the humanitarian system would require enhanced understanding of the barriers to the localisation approach in different contexts. For example, in Ethiopia, where there are government restrictions on civil society organisations, advocacy efforts may need to take a different shape than in the Philippines where civil society is engrained in the cultural fabric and provided space by the government. Nevertheless, across programme countries, DEPP stakeholders agreed that ideologically, a localisation approach is critical to improving preparedness and humanitarian response and that incremental changes are beginning to occur on the ground. These views and the observed changes that have been documented above align well with the global discourse around localisation of humanitarian aid which has gained ground, especially since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. To ensure further progress beyond the end of the DEPP will require sustained efforts to build upon the changes that have begun to emerge.
CONCLUSION: TO WHAT EXTENT AND IN WHAT WAYS HAVE THE BENEFITS OF THE PROGRAMME BECOME EMBEDDED?

There is some evidence of embedded benefits and the potential for some longer-term effects but this is dependent on the extent to which different programme components are able to obtain support to continue beyond the end of DEPP.

DEPP’s three-year programme cycle to establish and implement 14 projects in 10 countries with differing disaster profiles through a consortia-focused approach ends in June 2018; all projects except the Learning Project completed their activities by the end of March 2018. To assess the extent to which benefits of the programme have become embedded and have the potential to achieve longer-term effects, documents, project end evaluations and qualitative data were analysed across several areas: sustainability/exit planning over the course of the DEPP, take up of sustainability-focused recommendations, the sustainability of programme/project outputs and outcomes, and likelihood of future impact. It is important to note that most projects had approximately two years or less to implement their activities due to approval of projects in waves as well as the delays in start-up. This provided limited time to support sustainability.

Sustainability / Exit Planning

The interim report highlighted a number of weaknesses related to sustainability planning at the project and programme levels. Individual projects were required to provide sustainability plans in their proposals; however, these generally were not very detailed with respect to the projects’ sustainability models, did not include sufficient information regarding costs of sustaining the project, potential revenue sources, integration into communities or local systems or specific actions to be taken for handover, and in most cases they were not further developed throughout the course of the project. An overall programme-level sustainability plan was not adequately outlined during the design of the programme, which was a considerable weakness. Based on stakeholder interviews, there was little direction provided from the programme level to the projects on the issue of sustainability which has been problematic for projects and contributed to uncertainty.

The lack of adequate sustainability planning may have also been influenced by the explicit description of a contingent allocation of £60 million for a future phase of the programme by DFID in the business case: "An extension to the programme, possibly for 2 years, will be considered subject to the findings of a mid-term review supported by the independent evaluation (in 2015). The previous Secretary of State (Andrew Mitchell) has given in-principle agreement for up to £100 million over 5 years." Despite this statement, further clarification on when such a decision would be made or the process was not made transparent to DEPP stakeholders over the course of the programme, but nevertheless set high expectations. This reportedly influenced how intensively DEPP stakeholders pursued other funding sources as well as likely delayed the development of an exit plan. For example, one respondent stated:

"I think [sustainability] has been a challenge because I think if people knew that [more funding from DFID] wasn’t an option they could have thought from the very beginning how to strategically plan for that."

In October 2017, DFID announced that it would not be funding a second phase of the programme. This announcement came only five months before the programme close rather than at the mid-point of the programme as laid out in the business case. At this late stage, little time was left for both the overall programme management team and individual projects to seek alternative sources of funding. However, from a risk management perspective, DEPP programme management and leadership should have attempted to raise alternative funding or diversified its funding sources and strengthened other processes of sustainability such as embedding DEPP within local systems earlier on in the programme cycle.

The interim phase evaluation report provided strong recommendations for more deliberate, strategic sustainability planning and the need for guidance on sustainability planning and open discussion initiated with projects about the availability of continued funding to extend the
DEPP. Current data shows that these recommendations were taken on board and a number of projects have made progress with respect to sustainability planning. All project end evaluations and final project narrative reports also included a sustainability section. In addition, the START Network recruited a consultant to evaluate options for carrying the DEPP forward including funding options.

Current status of exit planning

At the time of this report, a number of projects demonstrated substantial progress in terms of exit planning. For example, the Urban Early Warning Early Action project’s surveillance system has been adopted by the Nairobi County government, and management of the Pakistan Surge roster has been taken over by the National Humanitarian Network (NHN), with an MOU in place with the local government body to ensure implementation after the project ends. In addition, local consortia that received support from the Financial Enablers project have made plans to continue to collaborate. On the other hand, other projects face disruption due to lack of sustained funding and loss or dispersion of project staff. This may limit potential for sustaining any positive effects and building on current accomplishments. There is also the potential to lose some of the gains that were made by the DEPP. Staff members who continue within the same organisations, together with the learning products generated across the DEPP and by the Learning Project, will constitute the largest part of DEPP’s institutional memory. While some projects and project components show indications of becoming embedded and may continue on after the DEPP in some form, it is clear, that the programme as a whole will not continue in its current configuration and would need to be remodelled for any future phases.

Sustainability of programme/project outputs and outcomes

At the time of the programme close, there have been positive signs of emerging system-level changes, including shifts in attitudes towards localisation and changes in organisational and governmental policies as reported earlier in this chapter, as well as strengthened networks. Most interviewees expressed that more time was needed to embed these changes. Data from project end evaluations, narrative reports and in-depth interviews were analysed to further assess the extent to which DEPP outputs and outcomes have become embedded.

Sustainable Outputs – Achievements and Contributions to the Four Output Areas

At the output level, a number of achievements of the projects contribute to the sustainability and demonstrate that benefits have become embedded.

Collaboration

Collaboration and partnerships are important contributors to achieving sustainability. Relationships built through collaboration and consortia were perceived to be one of the most enduring elements of the DEPP, however these were contingent on the structure and set-up of consortia and also were influenced by factors such as strong leadership, political will, competing allegiances, and availability of funding. For example, the Financial Enabler’s final evaluation suggests that several of the consortia funded by the project in the Philippines will likely break down or struggle to continue to work together due to reasons including incompatible plans and lack of strong commitment amongst leadership to prioritise future collective action. One of the consortia reportedly stood out as having a much higher likelihood of sustainability due to a shared commitment to location, prior experience of joint action, complementary competencies, demonstrated learning and committed leadership. Stakeholders also emphasised that building sustainable collaboration and partnerships was challenging to accomplish within the provided timeframe. For example, one interviewee stated:

“I don’t think what we are trying to achieve, it could be achieved in this time frame. I think because it’s not only with delivering project activities and done, its actually doing more than delivering activities because it’s paired with changing organisational culture, changing organisational behaviour, bringing change in the minds of disaster practitioners, so I think it requires more time than it’s dedicated for.”

161 Ibid.
Capacity Building

Building capacity has an inherent potential for sustainability at all levels of action (i.e., individual, organisational, community capacity). However, these capacities need to be maintained or reinforced or risk being lost. Likelihood of sustainability is higher among capacities built beyond knowledge change such as those that involve skill building and behaviour change at the individual level. If retained, improved skills and behaviours can continue to effect change and can also be transferred to others beyond the life of the project. At the organisational level, improved capacity in the form of changed policies or governance or putting in place systems (human resources, finance, procurement) to operationalise capacity building were also noted to contribute to increased sustainability. It was also noted that sustainability at the organisational level would be dependent on internal approval of the new strategies and policies and their implementation, but that this would be influenced by the nature, size of operations and scale of humanitarian activities of the organisations. There were also examples of Shifting the Power beneficiary organisations in Pakistan with improved governance, who are now eligible for additional funding because of these improved internal systems – demonstrating how improved governance can help to ensure future sustainability.

Generating and Sharing Learning

The generation of learning, another key DEPP focus area, also contributed towards the goal of sustainability. The development and creation of DEPP project infrastructure such as protocols, tools, procedures and guidelines are sustainable in that they will continue to exist after the end of the project period. For example, the Age and Disability Capacity Programme’s the Good practice guide; embedding inclusion of older people and people with disabilities in humanitarian action, Transforming Surge Capacity’s The Future of Humanitarian Surge, and Protection in Practice’s GPC Protection Mainstreaming Toolkit, are examples of some of the tools, learning products and guides that will have a continued effect after the DEPP ends. Notably, a number of these are available in multiple languages and through different channels increasing their potential for continued use. For example, the Protection in Practice GPC Protection Mainstreaming Toolkit is available in Urdu, Bengali, Burmese, French, Arabic and available through a website and as a mobile app through the Google play and iTunes App Store. To ensure that these learning products and tools become more embedded into the humanitarian sector will also require some degree of continued advocacy, awareness building and promotional efforts which may be dependent on availability of additional funds and organisational commitment. As the lead of the Learning Project, ACF has made the commitment to keep the digital learning platform for an additional two years after the closing of DEPP and will continue outreach and dissemination efforts.

Early Warning System Development

Functioning early warning systems also increase the potential of programme sustainability as they are likely to continue after the programme period. However, sustaining these systems is dependent on securing organisational and government buy-in, ensuring the adoption and use of the systems, and having funding earmarked for maintenance. Several of the early warning projects, including the Urban Early Warning Early Action, Improved Early Warning – Early Actions to Strengthen Disaster Preparedness in Ethiopia and Public Health Preparedness in Gambella, have a higher likelihood of systems change and have become embedded within local and national structures which will ensure longer-term sustainability. These three projects have in common the approach of working within established systems and structures and involving key external stakeholders such as the local governments and local health systems. These three projects have confirmed sustainability plans with Kenyan and Ethiopian governments, respectively, who have begun incorporating project activities into their work plans and budgets. With some influence from the Urban Early Warning Early Action project, the Kenyan government passed legislation requiring counties to establish emergency and disaster committees at the county and sub-county level. This has helped to ensure sustainability for project activities after the DEPP funding cycle finishes. In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Health and Regional Health Bureaus

162 Shifting the Power Final Evaluation Report.
163 Ibid.
provided exit strategies and guidelines to ensure sustainability of activities. These three projects established concrete, feasible strategies to ensure long-term sustainability and can therefore provide important lessons for the other projects in the portfolio. However, it is important to note that unless funding is secured to ensure continued functioning of the systems, there is a potential risk that the impact of the investment in these systems will be diminished or lost.

Table 7.2 provides examples of achievements and contributions to the four output areas from the final project narrative reports, final evaluations and interviews that are likely to be sustained beyond DEPP with sufficient maintenance and follow-up.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF ACHIEVEMENT/CONTRIBUTION</th>
<th>OUTPUT AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADCAP</td>
<td>• Developed and finalised version of the humanitarian inclusion standards for older people and people with disabilities, which are available to agencies throughout the world in various accessible formats and languages&lt;br&gt;• Developed complementary training resources and guidance on good practice relating to organisational change</td>
<td>Capacity building; Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>• Created ALERT early warning system platform&lt;br&gt;• Contributed to creation or revision of organisational preparedness plans</td>
<td>Early Warning System Development; Capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAC-N</td>
<td>• Created message libraries for use during disasters and emergencies&lt;br&gt;• Developed toolkits and resources for two-way communication with disaster-affected communities&lt;br&gt;• Established multi-stakeholder platforms&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened capacities to support two-way communication</td>
<td>Capacity building; Collaboration; Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWEA</td>
<td>• Established early warning system in Ethiopia&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened capacity of district (woreda) experts and the community&lt;br&gt;• Developed/strengthened community contingency plans</td>
<td>Capacity Building; Early Warning System Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>• Strengthened local coordination mechanisms and networks&lt;br&gt;• Empowered and strengthened confidence and experience of local actors to respond to disaster&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened technical competencies of partners&lt;br&gt;• CSO partners were able to secure seats in the national government Disaster Risk Reduction Management councils</td>
<td>Capacity Building; Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPRR</td>
<td>• Changed attitudes on community involvement in resilience&lt;br&gt;• Kenya Marsabit County Disaster Risk Management draft Bill has recognised the role of local organisations in coordination of emergency/disaster-related events&lt;br&gt;• Tools and strategies were integrated by INGOs and LNGOs&lt;br&gt;• Platform of NGOs and peace dialogue at village level was established&lt;br&gt;• Integration of LPRR's conflict-sensitive approach into Marsabit County Government response</td>
<td>Capacity Building; Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| PHEP Gambella | • Provided equipment to health facilities  
• Trained existing health staff to implement government strategy  
• Improved surveillance and detection of disease and outbreaks  
• Developed toolkits  |
| PIP | • Local partners attending Oxfam’s Global Protection Peer Group meeting shared learning with international staff and other local partners  
• Developed GBP Protection Mainstreaming Toolkit  
• Developed infrastructure to support protection initiatives  
• Contributed to changes in organisational policy  |
| SEPS | • Established early warning systems at community level  
• Supported the development of community preparedness plans  
• Contributed to changes in organisational policies; systems and capacities  |
| STP | • Contributed to changes in organisational policies; systems and capacities  
• Supported development of Emergency Preparedness Plans  
• Set up NGO platforms/networks in five countries  |
| LD | • Organisational systems developed  
• Trained trainers  |
| TSC | • Open-access training, tools, and resources were created  
• Funding secured for future use of the Philippines and Regional rosters  
• Pakistan roster has been taken over by the National Humanitarian Network (NHN), with an MOU with government body to continue collaboration  |
| UEWEA | • Developed and tested an urban surveillance system that has been adopted by the Nairobi county government  
• Contributed to an amendment of the Disaster and Emergency Management Act (DEM Act), 2015 to include food security and a MOU with the Nairobi City County Government to ensure the government’s role in addressing urban food security issues  |

Table 7.2: Contributions of projects towards sustainable outputs

**Sustainable Outcomes**

At the outcome level, sustainable changes were more difficult to detect due to the short programme time frame. As described in Chapters 4 and 7, there have been no significant improvements in knowledge on core humanitarian competencies of humanitarian staff, on self-reported knowledge on disaster preparedness, response to disasters and emergencies or on gender, age or disability-related issues in disasters. Conversely, there have been notable improvements in organisational and community preparedness among DEPP beneficiaries,
especially among local organisations. Qualitative data have also demonstrated the contribution of DEPP beneficiaries towards improved response in several of the intensive set countries (the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia).

The extent to which these outcomes are sustainable remains uncertain at the time of the programme’s close. Sustaining preparedness levels and response capacities are dependent on maintaining skills, knowledge, and competencies at the individual, organisational and community levels. These capacities are also affected by shifts in human resources and staff turnover, which were reported as consistent and recurring issues throughout the programme. Furthermore, increased capacity also leads to the potential for individuals to be recruited elsewhere, and local organisations that participated in DEPP capacity building activities risk losing key staff to INGOs. As long as these resources remain in the disaster preparedness system, however, they will be sustainable despite the transfer and exchange of resources.

Additionally, preparedness and response are influenced by many factors external to DEPP including organisational policy, leadership, and culture, and challenges engaging government. In most cases, the contributions that DEPP has made in improving outcomes around preparedness and response will largely be dependent on securing additional funds to continue project activities, maintain systems, infrastructures, and capacities built, and ensure quick responses to disasters.

The Role of Community and Beneficiary Stakeholders in Design and the Impact on Sustainability

As outlined in Chapter 3, beneficiaries at all levels as well as key local stakeholders were not adequately involved in the design stage for most projects. While this had significant effects on the relevance and potential effectiveness of the selected interventions, and led to delays in implementation as projects had to be contextualised, it also is a threat to the long-term sustainability of the projects and in turn the programme. Overall, beneficiary engagement and feedback mechanisms to the community should be prioritised as a strategy to increase sustainability. In future such programmes, beneficiaries should be involved in the design phase in order to achieve higher likelihood of sustainability. Across the board, interviews and site visits demonstrated that using a bottom-up approach of supporting organisations and individuals to lead their own capacity building processes influences the likelihood of building sustainable capacities.

Programme Visibility and Sustainability

Programme visibility, often built through strategic communication about a programme, contributes to community, stakeholder and government level support and is an important consideration with respect to sustainability. Site visit observations by the evaluation team and interviewee reports indicated that both internal and external programme visibility at the country level were low. Internal visibility, or awareness of the DEPP by in-country staff and consortia members involved in DEPP projects increased through the DEPP learning events, but remained limited. External visibility, or awareness of the DEPP by non-DEPP stakeholders was even lower at the country level. While both types of stakeholders were aware of specific DEPP projects, most were unaware of the larger DEPP portfolio in their own country suggesting strategic communication about the portfolio may have been suboptimal.

As many local DEPP project staff did not identify themselves as being part of the DEPP, or work jointly with the other in-country projects towards the common goals and objectives of the DEPP, it is unsurprising that there were minimal joint advocacy or communication efforts. While most project staff did feel a strong sense of connection to their own projects and own organisations, the lack of connection to the DEPP brand and the limited focus on overall programme objectives affected longer-term programme sustainability through reduced community and stakeholder dialogue and programme-level buy-in. Ultimately there was less integration of the programme into relevant structures in DEPP countries. At the regional or global level, one stakeholder described limited awareness and understanding of the DEPP at important external events, such as the World Humanitarian Summit. A number of respondents also suggested that increased advocacy initiatives and promotion of the DEPP were needed to raise the local profile of the programme.
Innovation, Sustainability and Contingency Planning

The DEPP portfolio was envisioned to include a mix of flagship projects that employed more traditional strategies and approaches as well as other more innovative and sometimes riskier projects with a higher potential to fail. Elements of the portfolio that were particularly innovative include:

- Flexible funding mechanisms (i.e., FE, PIP, CDAC-N, LPRR)
- Urban early warning systems to enable detection and response of emergencies in urban settings including related to food security (i.e., UEWEA)
- Regional pooled surge platforms (i.e., TSC)

In cases where innovation means higher risk of failure, sustainability planning does not make sense and is not a good use of resources until results can be demonstrated. These should be treated as pilot projects and therefore should not be required to establish sustainability planning and considerations during the design phase. Instead these projects should be required to have strong monitoring and evaluation plans in order to inform course correction and potential scale-up. In addition, all projects, regardless of level of risk, should have appropriate contingency plans in place to navigate expected or unexpected contextual factors such as disruption of project activities due to disasters and emergencies. There was at least one example where such plans were not in place (CDAC-N project in South Sudan), resulting in critical effects on the project when a disaster occurred. There were several other examples, albeit on a smaller scale, where project activities were affected by emergencies (i.e., reporting and Learning Activities related to CDAC-N in Bangladesh were limited due to focus on Rohingya crisis\(^\text{164}\), and both drought and insecurity hindered EWEA project implementation in Ethiopia\(^\text{165}\)).

Likelihood of Impact and Summary

Overall, more attention to sustainability was needed earlier in the course of the programme, with a more holistic view on sustainability going beyond simply securing funding streams. A longer period for programme implementation may have led to greater changes in outcomes and increased the likelihood of programme sustainability. The data suggest that likelihood of sustainability was enhanced for projects or project components that demonstrated the following characteristics:

- Built on existing work (i.e., UEWEA, TD), and existing partnerships and consortia (i.e., STP Bangladesh and National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors Bangladesh (NAHAB); CDAC-N in the Philippines where the CWC groups are embedded within pre-existing structures)
- Worked with government and/or had a policy or advocacy element (i.e., LPRR in Kenya, PHEP Gambella in Ethiopia)
- Worked towards systems-level change (i.e., UEWEA)
- Paid greater attention to exit planning earlier in programme cycle (i.e., UEWEA)
- Developed tools, guidelines, or systems that fill an important gap (i.e., ADCAP’s minimum standards, PIP’s protection mainstreaming toolkit)
- Involved beneficiaries and/or local stakeholders (i.e., UEWEA)
- Exhibited good VFM (i.e., CDAC-N foundational training called “unsustainably expensive” suggesting low VFM and challenges bringing this component to scale)
- Built linkages with other entities (i.e., START Fund) and other DEPP projects (i.e., the Philippines)
- Implemented in contexts that were more fertile for change (i.e., the Philippines)

\(^{164}\) CDAC-N Final Evaluation Report.
\(^{165}\) Early Warning Early Action Final Evaluation Report.
HUMANITARIAN PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CASE STUDIES
Evaluation Questions: What are the impacts of violence on project implementation and lessons learned on implementing emergency preparedness and response programming in a conflict-affected setting? How has disaster preparedness translated into actual response?

Sub-questions:

a) In what ways have DEPP capacity building programmes strengthened preparedness and response capacity amongst participants?

b) To what extent is DEPP contributing to greater preparedness and response among local organisations and communities?

c) Has local capacity to respond to disasters changed since the start of DEPP? If yes, how? If not, why not?

d) Has DEPP led to improved knowledge and understanding of best practices relating to disaster and emergency preparedness and response? If yes, in what ways?

e) What was the role of government and/or pre-existing systems? How did these facilitate the responses? Or how did a lack of these inhibit response?

Method and data sources: Two case studies were conducted. Case Study #1 examined the impact of escalation of violence in South Sudan on DEPP project implementation and Case Study #2 assessed the relationship between emergency preparedness and humanitarian response in Ethiopia and Kenya. The following data formed the findings of the two case studies:

- Document review (Qualitative)
- Semi-Structured interviews (Qualitative)
- Site Visits (Kenya only; site visits in South Sudan and Ethiopia were not possible due to security issues)
- Data collected during the minimum set data collection (Qualitative)

Key Findings:

Case Study #1 on South Sudan demonstrated that operating in a conflict-affected context requires procedures that allow for flexible and adaptive management, rather than traditional and rigid contractual relationships. The findings emphasised the importance of having clear agreements about the responsibilities of care for the host agency in relation to consortium partners. Findings also highlighted the need to have a contingency plan including budget contingencies in case of disruption to the project. Finally, the case study cited challenges of operating in conflict settings where engagement with government stakeholders is not always possible and that capacity building approaches and materials may need more adaptations for conflict settings.

Case Study #2, on Ethiopia and Kenya, demonstrated that the consortium model and collaboration with government were critical to successful implementation of early warning systems and permitted coordinated humanitarian responses that improved with each subsequent emergency in Kenya. Availability of immediate response funds and previously agreed upon response actions were key to ensuring more rapid responses. In Ethiopia, self-reported data suggest that experiential learning related to fundraising, resource mobilisation and implementation of humanitarian response activities, along with access to flexible response funding mechanisms contributed to responses by seven L/NNGO beneficiaries of the DEPP to address the drought. Key themes that emerged included:

- Community and government engagement were essential to successful project design and implementation
- Community and organisational capacity building strengthened preparedness and response through improved awareness of humanitarian standards, coordination, and procedures, and increased visibility of the organisations and the credibility of their emergency preparedness and response activities to donors and other stakeholders
- Collaboration improved communication and efficiency of resources used
- Surveillance and early warning systems were fundamental to both projects (Kenya and Ethiopia), and were described as the pillars of emergency preparedness and response. Beyond collecting data, respondents noted that these also served as mechanisms of collaboration and provided opportunities for behavioural change for communities and organisations. Definitions of disasters differed between urban and rural contexts. Poverty and food insecurity are rarely considered disasters and get varied levels of attention from donors and stakeholders.
- Engagement with DEPP provided opportunities for organisations to share learning and best practices
- Individual confidence to respond to a disaster increased; however, there were few examples of behaviour change
- Organisational policies and procedures were strengthened, and collaboration with the government in Kenya allowed for systems-level changes, including alignment and integration of project activities within broader platforms such as constitutional priorities and national policies
- The connection between emergency preparedness and response activities were disjointed and need to be closely linked

...
In-depth case studies were added to the evaluation methodology during the formative and interim phases to provide further perspectives on emergency preparedness and response activities in the programme, and to assess whether improved preparedness translated into more efficient and timely humanitarian response. Simulation exercises were initially proposed during the inception phase as a method to measure DEPP beneficiaries’ performance during humanitarian response activities in a controlled manner. The intention was to collect such data during simulations that were planned by DEPP projects themselves. However, over the course of the three-year programme, projects changed their plans regarding simulations, and it was also noted that several of the DEPP projects responded to actual disasters in the project countries. This provided an opportunity to directly assess contributions to actual humanitarian responses. After reflection and discussion with the Learning Project, the evaluation team decided to conduct two in-depth case studies. The first case study was focused on South Sudan to capture experiences and perspectives of project stakeholders related to the July 2016 escalation of violence and how this impacted project implementation. The second case study involved assessing humanitarian responses in Ethiopia and Kenya during the course of the DEPP to capture the relationship between preparedness, in particular early warning systems, and response efforts.

South Sudan was selected as one of the five countries where intensive data collection would take place during the evaluation. Data collection, however, was postponed due to increased violence in July 2016, which significantly affected the DEPP projects operating in that country. After discussions with the two projects that were operating in South Sudan (CDAC-N and Protection in Practice), and monitoring of the security situation in South Sudan, a decision was made in October 2016 to discontinue the in-country data collection planned for South Sudan. Instead, the evaluation team planned to develop a case study, to explore how these two projects were affected by the violence and the lessons that can be extracted from this experience. This case study will be presented first as it will provide insight how a crisis can affect project operations.

The second case study focused on preparedness and response efforts in two selected countries: Kenya (Urban Early Warning Early Action project) and Ethiopia (Shifting the Power project). As part of the external evaluation’s document review process, a list was generated of countries in which at least one response to a disaster or emergency was noted in DEPP project reports up until end of 2017. For the case study, the countries in which intensive data collection was conducted as part of the external evaluation were considered (Kenya, Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Myanmar). The Philippines was excluded as a country of focus given a case study had been recently conducted by the Learning Project. Myanmar was excluded given ongoing insecurity. Response efforts in Kenya and Ethiopia were therefore selected to be the focus of the case study.

The two case studies aimed to explore the following evaluation questions:

- What are the impacts of violence on project implementation and lessons learned on implementing emergency preparedness and response programming in a conflict-affected setting? (South Sudan)
- In what ways were DEPP’s design and core components (capacity building, collaboration, early warning systems, and learning) effective or ineffective in strengthening emergency response in DEPP target countries? (Ethiopia and Kenya)
- In what ways have DEPP capacity building programmes strengthened preparedness and response capacity amongst participants? (Ethiopia and Kenya)
• To what extent is DEPP contributing to greater preparedness and response among local organisations and communities? (Ethiopia and Kenya)
• Has local capacity to respond to disasters changed since the start of DEPP? If yes, how has it changed? If not, why not? (Ethiopia and Kenya)
• Has DEPP led to improved knowledge and understanding of best practices relating to disaster and emergency preparedness and response? If yes, in what ways? (Ethiopia and Kenya)
• What was the role of government and/or pre-existing systems? How did these facilitate the responses? Or how did a lack of these inhibit response? (Ethiopia and Kenya)
CASE STUDY #1: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN SOUTH SUDAN

BACKGROUND

Following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, political struggles led to renewed conflict in 2013\(^{166}\). Within the context of ongoing conflict, violence escalated in July 2016 between government and opposition forces in Juba, affecting both civilians and aid workers\(^{167,168}\). Deepening an already complex humanitarian crisis, the violence resulted in displacement and famine, with an estimated six million South Sudanese in need of humanitarian assistance by August 2016\(^{169}\). The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate, and at the time of this case study in 2017, there was ongoing violence in other states of South Sudan targeting both civilians and aid workers\(^{170}\). The violence and insecurity affected two DEPP projects in South Sudan: 1) the CDAC Network Communicating with Communities (CWC) project and 2) the START Network Protection in Practice project\(^{171,172}\).

The CWC project was delivered as part of a consortium among World Vision, Internews, BBC Media Action and national and local organisations, and aimed to improve emergency preparedness by increasing information exchange and community engagement\(^{173}\). The CWC project supported novel, experimental ideas, and models to increase information sharing to improve response and enable those most affected to inform the response. The project had five different components: 1) a flexible funding mechanism whereby local organisations applied for funds through the broader projects, 2) a CWC in Emergency Working Group of agencies co-chaired by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 3) CWC trainings, 4) exchange visits and networking, and 5) a simulation\(^{174}\). Preliminary proposals for major work streams were presented at the March 2016 meeting of the South Sudan CWC working group. As of July 2016, the working group had been established, a foundation training had been conducted, and as part of the flexible funding mechanism, five potential sub-projects were identified right before the violence escalated in Juba.

The Protection in Practice project was delivered as part of a consortium among Oxfam, World Vision, and International Rescue Committee, and aimed to increase protection expertise and capacity in national-level organisations\(^{175}\). The project had three interlinked aims: 1) to build greater capacity for protection mainstreaming among national humanitarian staff, NGOs,

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173 Ibid.

and community-based organisations (CBOs); 2) to help five national NGOs or CBOs become protection specialists by assisting them to implement protection activities and coordinate with protection actors; and 3) to create an effective evidence base of what works in practice and share this with other projects and initiatives. As of July 2016, the Protection in Practice project had implemented the first output on protection mainstreaming. Workshops and trainings on mainstream protection had been conducted and local organisations had created their action plans to identify and address protection gaps. In addition, local organisations had been identified and selected to receive funding.

The violence in Juba directly impacted the staff and partners of the CWC project176,177. The violence also impacted project implementation and activities for both the CWC project and Protection in Practice project. This case study, conducted as part of the DEPP external evaluation, aims to explore how violence impacted project implementation and lessons learned on implementing emergency preparedness and response programming in a conflict-affected setting.

FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDY

In total, four individuals were invited to participate in an interview and three individuals agreed to participate. Demographic data were not collected during the case study interviews to respect the privacy of individuals interviewed.

Key themes emerged from the interviews related to the following broad categories: 1) impacts of violence and insecurity on project implementation; 2) impacts on project management and decision-making processes; 3) impacts on project multi-stakeholder platforms and collaborative partnerships with national and local organisations; 4) emergency preparedness and response in a conflict-affected setting; and 5) lessons learned. Within those categories, multiple sub-themes emerged as described below. Direct quotes from the interviews are not included in order to protect the privacy of respondents.

1.1. Impact of Violence and Insecurity on Project Implementation: Project Activities, Management, and Staffing

Beyond the direct impact on project staff based in Juba, the violence impacted project activities, project management, and the budget in different ways between the two projects in South Sudan.

As a result of the violence in Juba, the decision was made to temporarily suspend the CWC project. In the immediate period following the violence, international staff members were evacuated from South Sudan. Decisions related to staff protection were determined by the in-country host organisation as per duty of care protocols. While the host organisation of the CWC project also relocated its international staff, it was able to continue its daily operations throughout the period of violence through its network of local partners and staff. The project manager position, previously an international staff position, shifted to a national staff position. Project implementation was delayed by several months between the period of evacuation of international staff and the re-entry of staff with respondents noting lengthy negotiations among consortium partners about re-entry terms and conditions. With that said, respondents also noted that implementation delays could arise in any project operating in a challenging context.

Several months later discussions resumed among consortium partners to consider the future of the CWC project, re-entry, and contracting of the flexible funding mechanism projects. After conducting a risk assessment, the in-country host organisation determined that three of the five previously identified sub-projects could proceed as planned. It was ultimately decided to implement the three projects but at a reduced scale and scope. The contracting process for

the three projects was started in November 2016, was completed in December 2016, and the projects began implementation in January 2017. A national staff project manager was hired. In February 2017, budget revisions and reductions were finalised.

Following the escalation of violence in Juba, the Protection in Practice project also temporarily evacuated its international staff, while its local partners continued with project implementation. One of the facilitating factors was that the local and national organisations supported by the project were located in areas of South Sudan that were relatively unaffected by that particular violence in Juba; hence, the project experienced fewer delays in implementation. The project had also completed its first output on protection mainstreaming by the time the violence occurred, which meant fewer delays in overall project implementation and project activities. However, the second output of the project (focused on supporting local and national organisations) was affected by the violence because the international staff members responsible for administration of this output were evacuated.

A respondent from the Protection in Practice project also cited that the adaptive project design inherently allowed for more flexibility in implementation during the escalation of violence. The project was designed from the outset around the national conflict, such that the more the violence increases, the more flexibility project management had in terms of implementation. As noted by project management most other projects in this context would have been halted completely; however, there was flexibility built into the project design to respond to changes in violence, from the donor to the project manager to the in country staff. The project was designed so that in the event of an escalation of violence there would be less reliance on international staff, in that anything that would normally be delegated to an international organisation would be handled by the local and/or national organisation.

1.2. Impact of Violence on Project Implementation: Flexible and Emergency Funding Mechanisms

Both projects were designed with a flexible funding mechanism; however, the violence and subsequent decisions on project implementation had different impacts on the flexible funding available to local and national organisations.

Following the violence in Juba, the contracting process for the flexible funding mechanism within the CWC project was put on hold. As part of the re-entry negotiations, it was determined to proceed with three sub-projects and a revised project activity mix as described above. However, given the CWC project end date of September 2017, the project activities and the overall budget needed to be realigned to account for the delays. While the consortium partners considered applying for a no cost extension, it was determined that this would not be sufficient to cover the costs of salary support for project management that would be needed if the extension was granted. Therefore, the overall budget was reduced and funds (approximately one-third of the budget) were reallocated to a CWC working group in the Philippines. Additionally, there was supposed to be a second round of flexible funding to support the growth of those pilot projects that were successful. Due to the delays and the window within which to apply for project funding, a second round of flexible funding was not possible.

For the Protection in Practice project, within the budget available to local and national organisations, there was a sum of money (approximately £10,000) set aside as emergency funds. These emergency funds did not have to be allocated at the beginning of the project and could be drawn upon if there was an emergency or escalation in violence. The project was designed such that this emergency funding could be accessed and utilised with the least amount of administration as possible, such as by sending a message to the project manager that the money was needed. The funding was disbursed directly from the INGO to the local organisations as a cash award, thus, increasing the flexibility of the funding rather than administering it as a grant with reporting. Beyond the funding provided to the local and national partners, there was a contingency plan built into the funding so that in the event international NGO staff were evacuated, the international NGO could support the local partners remotely, providing mentoring on project implementation and support with logistics and advocacy, so as not to delay the local implementation of the project.
As described by one respondent, funding translates into different value in different contexts—such that the impact of funding in South Sudan, given the high costs of operating in the country, is potentially reduced compared to other humanitarian settings. This respondent described the expensive context of operating in South Sudan and that this should be accounted for in future projects.

2. Decision-making Processes and Project Management

Respondents from both projects described the complexities of the decision-making processes in the months following the violence. While the immediate consideration was toward staff safety and security, several other key factors emerged during the interviews. Respondents from both projects reported the necessity to adapt to changing circumstances in South Sudan and offered reflections on project management in a conflict-affected setting.

For the CWC project, the decision options were to resume project activities as planned, resume activities but with reduced scale and scope, or move the funding from South Sudan to another country. It was decided, as described above, to implement three of the planned five sub-projects. As plans were outlined to implement those projects, differing opinions emerged among the consortium partners about the planned approach. At that time, given travel restrictions, the international staff members for the in-country organisation were still based outside of South Sudan. The prime recipient organisation of the grant advocated for an office with permanent office staff to allow for direct supervision. The in-country host organisation noted that it had strong local teams on the ground. It was here in the decision-making process that important questions emerged, exposing a lack of clarity and uncertainty about the roles of each consortium partner. Who makes the decisions? Is it the in-country host organisation or the organisation managing the grant, or is it the donor? Where does duty of care fall? It was noted that the dialogue around the decision was particularly challenging due to the multiple levels of people involved, that even minor decisions became overly complicated.

Respondents from the CWC project described the complexities of bringing numerous organisations, each with their own individual mandates and organisational procedures, to reach a decision. Despite attempts to outline organisational decision-making matrices even before the violence, there was still a lack of clarity about the roles of the donor, project manager or global grant holder, and the host agency, which also acted as a donor for its local partners. This was further complicated by the fact that the one branch of the host agency also hosted the CDAC Network. Eventually, a decision was made through consensus between the global grant holder and the in-country host organisation. A management advisory group provided further support during the negotiations. The in-country host organisation noted strong working relationships with its local partners and staff, but it was not clear what level of engagement national organisations had in the negotiations around re-entry. Another challenge noted by a respondent from the CWC project was how the trauma experienced by organisations and their staff as a result of the violence affected decision-making. As people were still adapting to the traumatic events that had taken place, there was the need to continue to make decisions for the project and organisation, which was noted to be challenging.

The Protection in Practice project, on the other hand, had designed the project in South Sudan to be administratively flexible and with few bureaucratic procedures. As a respondent from the project noted, without that flexibility, the project would have failed in South Sudan, as they would not have been able to implement output 2. The decision-making processes for the project were described as adaptive, direct, and streamlined. It was the direct line of communication from the field with decision makers that was described as the most important to support ongoing project implementation in the context of insecurity. Facilitating factors cited included open communication, trust, and delegated responsibility to the project managers who are the people in closest communication to the field teams. Project managers reported an element of control and that they felted trusted to make decisions. As an example, the project was designed such that the person managing the funding is also able to make project decisions.

For the Protection in Practice project, one of the key factors noted that allowed for adaptive management was trust. This was described on one level as trust between DEPP and the consortium organisations and then on the next level as trust between the consortium organisations.
organisations and local and national partner organisations. The trust between project managers and the technical team in the country was attributed to the belief that the local and national organisations understand the protection needs and how to best serve those needs.

3. Impact on the Multi-stakeholder Platforms and Collaborative Partnerships

When asked about the impact of the violence on the multi-stakeholder platforms and on collaborative partnerships with local and national stakeholders, both projects acknowledged the impact of the project suspension on the local and national organisational partners.

In regard to the CWC project, as noted above, the in-country host organisation was able to continue project implementation through its network of local partners. Respondents also positively noted that the CWC working group did meet during the period of project suspension. However, there was concern that the group lost momentum during the period of project suspension and that the meetings may not have been as effective. As one respondent noted, within the context of violence and with the resulting famine and humanitarian crisis, the CWC working group may not have been prioritised given the competing priorities for OCHA, the working group co-chair. Another respondent acknowledged that the group was at a nascent stage when the violence occurred.

One of the Protection in Practice respondents described the impact that the evacuation of international organisations had on the local and national organisations that remained in South Sudan with active programming. Recognition of the work being done on the ground by local and national organisations changed the way the INGOs viewed their partnerships within the project. These partnerships shifted to be viewed as complementary partnerships, rather than a partnership built on unidirectional capacity building. In doing so, power dynamics shifted between the INGO and the local and national partner organisations and the relationships evolved to be more reciprocal in nature. While the violence brought to light the importance of reciprocal relationships, this approach to building partnerships existed within the project even prior to the violence. As an example, from the beginning of the project design, the local and national organisations were given an opportunity to decide which international protection partner organisation could provide the training and capacity building they were seeking, rather than the INGO deciding what and whom to teach.

When considering these data together with the data from the evaluation’s minimum set interviews, it was noted that the departure of INGOs following the violence left a void in the humanitarian community and led to a complete lack of responsibility. The respondent felt that this void encouraged further violence by armed groups and encouraged unnecessary competition between NGOs remaining in South Sudan.

4. Emergency Preparedness and Response in a Conflict-affected Setting

Respondents from both projects had opinions and broader reflections about focusing on emergency preparedness in the midst of a conflict-affected setting.

The CWC project was positioned in South Sudan as an emergency preparedness project and not an emergency response project. Meanwhile, the in-country host organisation’s broader portfolio, beyond the CWC project, was partially focused on emergency response activities. One respondent reflected on whether it is appropriate to try to focus on preparedness in such a context where there is ongoing insecurity and how to most effectively consider emergency preparedness in such settings. This respondent noted that it is difficult to get people to think about preparing when they need to be thinking about functioning and how to respond.

Within the CWC project, the host organisation operated as both a development project and a humanitarian project. Because of its internal flexibility, the organisation is able to pivot activities and funding in response to violence. But because of the mandate of the DEPP on preparedness, this kind of pivoting was not possible. The mandate of emergency preparedness applies to the entire consortium and maintaining the attention on preparedness among consortium partners, some of whom also have response activities, was noted to be particularly challenging in the midst of an active conflict and famine.

A respondent from the Protection in Practice project described the importance of linking
preparedness and response—that these are not necessarily two separate concepts. This respondent noted that one of the best ways to strengthen preparedness was to also respond, so that the lessons learned while responding in turn strengthen preparedness activities. The process of responding in and of itself allows for preparedness, and allows for learning to be applied if the same situation happens in a different location at a different time. Combining preparedness and response activities also allows for opportunities for combined training, mentoring, and learning, in addition to a perceived better value for the investment and ultimately a better response.

It was noted in interviews that much of the evidence on preparedness to date comes from natural disaster settings, in which there is a certain predictability of events that can be prepared for in an organised manner. However, preparedness for conflict was described as a different process that has not been explored in as much depth as emergency preparedness and response to natural disasters. Most of the evidence on preparedness focuses on disaster-affected areas and development settings that have a tendency to become humanitarian contexts at certain times during the year (due to a drought or typhoon, as examples). Respondents identified a gap in the learning and evidence on preparedness in conflict-affected settings.

5. Lessons Learned about Implementing a DEPP Project in a Conflict-affected Setting

Respondents were asked to reflect on lessons learned as part of project management in the context of violence. Prominent points raised related to duty of care and to the management arrangements that were in place.

5.1 Protocols, Duty of Care and Operating in a Conflict-affected Setting

Respondents were asked about project planning and implementation in South Sudan and what learning could be applied to other DEPP projects operating in settings at risk of violence and insecurity. In regard to security protocols, it was noted that the violence in Juba was unexpected and that the security planning had prioritised other areas in South Sudan that were thought to be higher risk. In addition to security protocols, respondents emphasised the importance of having clear agreements about duty of care when creating multi-lateral agreements among multiple institutions in a consortium and the responsibilities of care for the host agency in relation to consortium partners.

5.2 Clarifying Consortium Agreements and Streamlining Contractual Arrangements

In addition to having clear agreements of duty of care, respondents highlighted the importance of streamlining the contractual arrangements among organisations. Key to operating in a conflict-affected context was to have procedures that allowed for flexible and adaptive management, rather than traditional and rigid contractual relationships. As an example, CWC respondents suggested that future projects ensure that the global grant holding organisation and the in-country organisation are the same when possible, such that if World Vision UK is the global grant holder that the in-country organisation would be World Vision in South Sudan, as an example. This was suggested to streamline administrative procedures, flow of funds, and duty of care.

5.3. Lessons Emerging from Minimum Set Interviews on the DEPP Approach in South Sudan

The interviews conducted for the case study were analysed in conjunction with data previously collected during the Minimum Set evaluation activities. These interviews offered additional perspectives on project implementation in a conflict-affected setting and reinforced the importance of considering context in project design and implementation. The data were also analysed with the external evaluation theory of change in mind, considering the core components of DEPP (capacity building, collaboration, early warning systems, and learning).

One of the observations on DEPP’s consortium approach and emphasis on collaboration with stakeholders is that engagement of government stakeholders in projects is not always possible in conflict-affected settings, such as in South Sudan. Given the government’s involvement in the conflict, the DEPP projects in South Sudan were unable to collaborate with the government as a partner.

In regard to capacity building on emergency preparedness and response, most of the existing
training tools and approaches are designed for other disaster and emergency contexts, and not for conflict-affected contexts. A respondent from the CWC project utilised case studies during trainings to increase capacity; however, those case studies were too different from the South Sudan context and weren’t as effective as intended.

Respondents reflected on challenges predicting violence in conflict-affected settings, citing a lack of standardised risk assessments or indicators, such as early warning systems, to inform programming. As an example, a respondent reflected how other sites outside of Juba had been identified as at higher risk of violence and thus programming was centred on this assumption.

In regard to learning, one respondent noted that expectations need to be realistic to the context. This respondent observed in South Sudan that organisational culture and policies and ownership of communication messages differed among organisations, such that organisations, including INGOs, national and local NGOs in South Sudan, were noted to be less willing to share information compared to other DEPP project countries.

**KEY FINDINGS**

- The key to operating in a conflict-affected context was to have procedures that allowed for flexible and adaptive management, rather than traditional and rigid contractual relationships. Aspects of one of the projects were able to continue because of this flexible mechanism.

- In addition to security protocols, respondents emphasised the importance of having clear agreements about duty of care when creating multi-lateral agreements among multiple institutions in a consortium and the responsibilities of care for the host agency in relation to consortium partners.

- Engagement of government stakeholders in projects is not always possible in conflict-affected settings, such as in South Sudan. Given the government’s involvement in the conflict, the DEPP projects in South Sudan were unable to collaborate with the government as a partner.
CASE STUDY #2: STRENGTHENING PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

The second case study focused on preparedness and response efforts in two selected countries: Kenya (Urban Early Warning Early Action project) and Ethiopia (Shifting the Power project).

**URBAN EARLY WARNING EARLY ACTION PROJECT**

The Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA) project in Nairobi, Kenya, was implemented by a consortium comprised of four NGOs (Concern Worldwide, Kenya Red Cross, Oxfam, and World Vision) and Nairobi County Government. The project aimed to develop early warning systems and early action responses to food insecurity and health-related crises in selected urban slums of Nairobi (Kibera, Mukuru, Korogocho). The project built on Concern Worldwide’s 5-year Indicator Development for the Surveillance of Urban Emergencies (IDSUE) project to establish thresholds for humanitarian response related to food insecurity and related health crises. The project aimed to achieve four key outcomes:

- Facilitate the set-up of and capacity-build a coordinated urban early action mechanism within the Nairobi County Government with agreed actions
- Strengthen the capacity of six Nairobi sub-counties and one informal settlement community to mitigate and respond quickly to the impacts of slow-onset emergencies
- Ensure routine surveillance in urban informal settlements in Kenya by the County Disaster Management Committee (CDMC) by the end of 2017
- Advocate for UEWEA as a best practice and most cost-effective model for responding to urban emergencies in the world

**SHIFTING THE POWER PROJECT**

The Shifting the Power project was implemented in five countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Kenya) by a consortium comprised of five NGOs: ActionAid and CAFOD (co-leads), Oxfam, Concern, Tearfund, and Christian Aid.

These organisations worked together supporting 55 of their local and national NGO partners (10 in Ethiopia) who share the vision and ambition of playing a leading role in decision-making and responding to crises in their countries and regions. The aim of the project was to support local actors to take their place alongside international ones in order to create a balanced humanitarian system. The project was to produce five outputs to achieve one overall outcome:

Outcome 1: National organisations in five countries have increased their capacity to determine and deliver emergency preparedness and response

- Output 1: National partner organisations in five countries have the knowledge, skills, processes, and policies to prepare for and respond effectively to emergencies
- Output 2: National organisations are better represented and have a stronger voice in

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relevant humanitarian platforms and networks in their countries

- Output 3: Shifting the Power consortium member INGOs recognise and respond to local/national organisations’ capacity, leadership and voice
- Output 4: Shifting the Power collaborates with the other DEPP projects to maximise collaborative advantage
- Output 5: The project provides evidence of good practice in strengthening national organisations’ humanitarian preparedness and response work and their role and influence in humanitarian action

FINDINGS

A total of 22 in-depth interviews (N=16 in Kenya and N=6 in Ethiopia) were conducted for the case study (Table 8.1) with a response rate of 100% (16/16 in Kenya and 6/6 in Ethiopia). Due to security reasons, the team could not reach all of potential respondents in Ethiopia and hence a smaller number of interviews were pursued and conducted in that setting.

Kenya

In Kenya, of the 16 respondents, 11 (68.8%) were male and 5 (31.2%) were female with a mean age of 36.7 years [25-56 years] (see Table 8.1). Each of the organisations and key government partners (ministries and county government) of the project was represented in the interviews. Respondents reported working on average 7.6 years in the humanitarian sector and 6.2 years for the respective organisation.

Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, of the 6 respondents, 5 (83.3%) were male and 1 (16.7%) was female with a mean age of 42.8 years [36-62 years]. The six organisations represented beneficiary organisations in Ethiopia affiliated with the Shifting the Power project. Respondents reported working on average 7.8 years in the humanitarian sector and 9.2 years for the respective organisation.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>ETHIOPIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sex of Respondent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11 (68.8%)</td>
<td>5 (83.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5 (31.2%)</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Age of Respondent (Years)</td>
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<td>42.8 years [36-62 years]</td>
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<td>Bachelor Degree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government (i.e., Ministry,</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>County Offices)</td>
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</table>

Table 8.1: Demographic characteristics of respondents in Kenya and Ethiopia
Respondents were asked to summarise the types of emergencies that occurred during the project period and corresponding preparedness and response activities. Data from site visits and project reports were compiled to describe the response activities and are presented below (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2).

**Humanitarian Response: Focus on urban emergencies in Kenya**

**What:**
An urban early warning surveillance system set up in informal settlements in Nairobi county to monitor food security, household shocks and public health indicators on a routine basis (every two months) detected three emergencies and triggered response activities.

1. Diarrhoeal outbreak: February 2017 to June 2017
2. Cholera outbreak: April 2017 to February 2018
3. Food insecurity: October to March 2018

**Who:**
The DEPP’s Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA) project developed and implemented the urban early warning system through its consortium members Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, World Vision and Kenya Red Cross Society, in seven sub-counties (Kibera, Kasarani, Ruaraka, Makadara, Starehe, Kamukunji and Embakasi East). The system aimed to identify slow onset or chronic emergencies in urban contexts through routine monitoring of a set of sensitive indicators that were developed along with specific thresholds prior to the start of the project and to set up a coordinated response mechanism within the Nairobi City Country Government.

**Response Activities:**
The DEPP’s Urban Early Warning Early Action (UEWEA) project developed and implemented the urban early warning system through its consortium members Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, World Vision and Kenya Red Cross Society, in seven sub-counties (Kibera, Kasarani, Ruaraka, Makadara, Starehe, Kamukunji and Embakasi East). The system aimed to identify slow onset or chronic emergencies in urban contexts through routine monitoring of a set of sensitive indicators that were developed along with specific thresholds prior to the start of the project and to set up a coordinated response mechanism within the Nairobi City Country Government.

- Diarrhoeal outbreak: health education, mass screening of children under 5 years (8,338 screened in Korogocho, 13,284 in Embakasi), and distribution of water purification products
- Cholera outbreak: health promotion (171,139 households, 2,630 students sensitised), solid and liquid waste management, and water quality and food safety monitoring
- Food security: Mass screening of children under 5 years (44,825) and cash transfers of 2000 KSH (roughly 20 USD) provided to 3,034 households (2,085 women, 949 men) who were severely food insecure were made via mobile money in Korogocho and Kibera

Figure 8.1: Humanitarian Response: Focus on Urban Emergencies in Kenya
**Humanitarian Response: Focus on drought in Ethiopia**

**What:**
Ethiopia has been experiencing large scale droughts since 2015. Initially induced by the 2015/2016 El Nino, and further exacerbated by low 2016 autumn rains, and below average 2017 Spring rains, at least 8.5 million people were in need of relief food assistance by mid-2017 in Southern and South-eastern Ethiopia. The effects of the drought were further exacerbated by disease outbreaks, large scale loss of livelihood assets, and displacement. Conflict in the Oromia and Somali regions beginning in September 2017 resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people often in drought affected areas.

**Who:**
- Four DEPP projects were implemented in Ethiopia: Shifting the Power (STP), Public Health Preparedness in Gambella, Talent Development and Improved Early Warning Early Action – Ethiopia.
- Self-reported data suggest 7 out of 10 local partners of the Shifting the Power project, which had aimed to build local and national NGO capacity and preparedness, responded to the drought in the areas where they manage development programmes. These included: Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance (CIFA), Community Development Initiative (CDI), Rift Valley Children and Women Development Organisation (RVCWO), Action for Development, SOS Sahel, HUNDEE and AVHO.

**Response Activities:**
Specific response activities led by these L/NNGOs in 2017-2018 included:
- CIFA vaccinated 263,187 cattle from 35,060 target households in Moyale, Miyo and Guchi woredas. Improved response time due to strengthened organisational procurement policies was reported.
- CDI secured a £10,000 response grant from Oxfam and STP which enabled distribution of seeds to 200 households in communities affected by the drought in West Arsi Zone, Oromia.
- RCVWO obtained a £60,000 grant from ActionAid to provide livestock feed support to 1,030 households.
- Action for Development provided £60,000 in cash transfers to drought-affected communities in Borena.
- SOS Sahel secured $530,000 directly from UN OCHA’s Emergency Response Fund to provide animal feed in three woredas (Wachille, Dubuluq and Dire), indirectly benefitting 28,256 individuals. This is one of the few instances a local Ethiopian NGO has been able to secure funds through this mechanism without an intermediary partner.
- HUNDEE obtained $410,000 from Kindernothilfe (KNH) to provide emergency food assistance to 10,000 people in 4 Kebeles of two woredas in the Borena Zone.

Figure 8.2: Humanitarian Response: Focus on Drought in Ethiopia

Below are key themes identified during the data analysis, with excerpts from the interviews or summaries from interview notes.

**I. Key project design and implementation factors that strengthened emergency preparedness and response included community and local organisational engagement, government engagement, and flexible funding mechanisms.**

**Ia. Community Engagement and Emergency Preparedness and Response**
Among key project design and implementation factors, respondents highlighted the importance of community engagement, especially in the design of the surveillance system, the selection of beneficiaries, and the response activities.

In both countries, key community members and stakeholders were identified as part of the project design and engaged in various roles throughout the project. Community engagement not only meant providing input, but also being engaged in selecting beneficiaries and designing the response package of activities. As described by a respondent in Ethiopia: “You have to be transparent and involve all the people, not only majority or dominant people in the community, as well as women. During beneficiary selection, everyone should be involved and help with the verification.” As a result of engaging the community in the selection of beneficiaries and the response activities: “…there were no complaints from beneficiaries about the selection. There usually are complaints about selection error but this time there was not...Community members were able to give opinions which made it successful.”

Respondents in both countries commented that community engagement helped to manage community expectations, especially in regard to surveillance or needs assessments. One of the challenging aspects, as described by the respondent, was “pushback” from the community during data collection because community members are asked to provide data, but may not receive any direct aid. To address this problem, the project in Ethiopia created several community-based committees, including a beneficiary selection committee and an emergency items management committee. This allowed the processes to be more transparent to the community and provided a mechanism by which community members could bring forth concerns or complaints. Similarly, the project in Kenya identified community focal people and created opportunities for dialogue among stakeholders from community representatives to food and water vendors to garbage collectors.

Ib. Government Engagement and Emergency Preparedness and Response

Respondents in both countries noted that partnership with government was crucial to project design and implementation from facilitating administrative procedures to fostering trust.

Government engagement was noted overall to facilitate project implementation. On one level, inclusion of government in the project design and implementation facilitated administrative procedures. As noted by a respondent in Ethiopia: “This time it was different because the government has helped us with facilitating the signing of the agreement. Even though already the effect of the drought has started to be observed, after the fund [was] released...we have been able to intervene after a month or two. This is different from other interventions because the previous bottlenecks and bureaucratic steps have been alleviated and we were allowed to proceed with some of the important procedures after we have started the project.”

On another level, engagement with government fostered trust between project organisations and the government. For example, in Kenya, the engagement with the government, early on in project design and implementation, allowed for trust in the surveillance system and in the surveillance data collected by project organisations. This trust was especially important when surveillance data indicated an outbreak of cholera in the urban slums, and helped to facilitate a more timely response.

Ic. Funding Mechanisms and Emergency Response

Respondents from both projects reported that timely access to funding and flexible funding are essential to the speed and timeliness of humanitarian response.

In Kenya, the UEWEA project had a flexible funding mechanism, known as a “crisis modifier”, which is funding set aside within the project to allow organisations to act and respond to surveillance indicators that detect an emergency. As part of the project, a system was designed such that a response would be required in relation to five surveillance indicators and that this would in turn trigger the flexible funding mechanism.

A respondent in Kenya explained that the crisis modifier was essential to their response to the diarrhoea outbreak in February 2018. However, it was noted that even though the crisis modifier existed, there wasn’t initially a system in place by which to trigger the crisis modifier. This system was subsequently refined during the course of the project.
While the crisis modifier was aligned with surveillance indicators, there was concern expressed that it may have not been linked to the most urgent need, such as cholera. “I think they’d already planned or had in their mind what they’d use it [crisis modifier] for, they were monitoring food prices those have gone up, and they’ve been up in Nairobi for a couple of years so, but you know they had triggers that were there and that triggered a food security cash transfer response. But to me it was frustrating that indicators may have pointed towards a cholera outbreak and that’s clearly for me one of the biggest, one of the biggest threats, immediate threats is a cholera outbreak.” The delays in recognising and planning for the emerging cholera outbreak led to a slightly delayed response compounded by the need to seek funds from outside the DEPP to respond to the cholera outbreak.

While the project in Kenya had a flexible funding mechanism built into the project budget from the outset, none of the respondents in Ethiopia reported having access to a DEPP flexible funding mechanism to support emergency response activities. Document reviews, however, found that Shifting the Power did provide a small fund for response activities. Organisations that aimed to implement response activities reported submitting proposals to external donors to seek rapid funding when an emergency was detected. Noting that this was a challenge for many local organisations due to limited capacity, the Shifting the Power project should continue to strengthen organisational capacity to prepare and submit these funding proposals.

Despite the increased capacity around fundraising for a response, interviewees in Ethiopia noted that response efforts were significantly delayed due to the time required to seek response funding from outside sources. For example, one interviewee in Ethiopia explained that a search for funds led to a nearly six-month delay in implementation of response activities. Another interviewee in Ethiopia described how the process of seeking funding for response activities also affected their ability to respond to shifting needs: “Develop a proposal and within 72 hours there should be a response, but it’s actually not like that. Instead you actually have to wait one month or two months, prepare a proposal, get comments, then get paid for 1-3 months. The calls for proposals aren’t in context of the current position...thus, some immediate needs don’t get an immediate response.”

One of the positive outputs of the Shifting the Power trainings in Ethiopia was that organisations had proposals ready that can be adjusted immediately to the context. However, despite strengthened capacity to seek funding for response activities, many national NGOs in Ethiopia do not qualify to receive funding from certain donors because they do not have the required foreign currency bank accounts. Another respondent noted that local organisations often aren’t eligible for a multitude of reasons to receive funding directly and that the funding streams are based outside of the country, such as in the United States, United Kingdom, and European countries, leading to additional delays in response activities. For this reason, more flexible funding options that could potentially overcome these barriers would be an effective solution to increasing timeliness of response.


Iia. Capacity Building and Emergency Preparedness and Response

Capacity building through trainings at community and organisational levels strengthened emergency preparedness and response through improved coordination, surveillance, proposal development, and project implementation.

The majority of respondents provided examples of organisational capacity building as part of the DEPP. However, there were also several examples of capacity building at the community level. A respondent in Kenya reported that after a community-level capacity building training, community members were able to respond effectively without further assistance. The project in Kenya also targeted community health volunteers and community health workers to share messaging and build community capacity in regard to emergency preparedness and response.

As described by another respondent in Kenya, “We have been doing capacity building of [NGOs], capacity building of the county government in the surveillance, and capacity building of coordination. The bigger part of this project is to build the capacity. And also, capacity building in preparedness, capacity building in response, capacity building in the overall thinking.” During
the cholera outbreak in the Nairobi slums, Oxfam provided technical capacity building over a period of several months to organisations involved in the response and to community networks affiliated with the Kenya Red Cross, including health workers and volunteers. However, a respondent described the challenges in building capacity and measuring change in capacity in such a short period: “From a cholera response perspective I think it is very difficult to build capacity in three months period other than working with each other, trusting, learning from that. How you then measure that past three months is a different question.”

The most common capacity building activities mentioned among respondents in Ethiopia included training provided by the Shifting the Power project on conducting rapid needs assessments, preparing proposals, and implementing cash transfer programmes. The capacity building extended beyond the organisation itself, as one respondent in Ethiopia noted “…the Shifting the Power project has helped us a lot. We are working with the zonal task force in relation to capacity building. We have not kept silent after our capacity is built; we have gone down to the woreda level and we have given trainings in order to build the capacity of the staff.”

IIb. Collaboration and Emergency Preparedness and Response

Collaboration strengthened emergency preparedness and response in the project target areas through improved communication, coordination, and resource efficiency.

Collaboration supported improvements in communication, coordination, and sharing of ideas. As an example from the UWEWEA project in Kenya, the formal DEPP consortium facilitated meetings, bringing together the organisational representatives and government officers, to decide and agree on inputs and the intervention strategy. “Basically, there is a lot of sharing [of] technical ideas on what will work best, on what will not work based on both partners’ experiences on the ground...So you are not working in isolation.”

The roles of collaborating organisations and institutions in Kenya as part of the UWEWEA project were clearly outlined and described by respondents. Organisational mandates and roles were described to be well aligned with the technical expertise of each organisation. One theme that emerged during the analysis of the Kenya interviews is the importance of including advocacy roles and responsibilities within the mandate of the consortium (i.e., an organisational partner who is focused on advocacy—whether this be a formal role or a media partner).

Local NGOs interviewed in Ethiopia developed a similar model of collaboration between the organisations, government, and other NGOs; however, this was more often through a humanitarian cluster-based system rather than a formal consortium. Collaboration allowed for delegation of responsibilities and duties among organisations and organisational staff. It also allowed for improved resource efficiency and avoided duplication of preparedness and response activities. As described by a respondent in Ethiopia: “When we say it is cluster-based it means the approach is not single-based. In Borena we were working with UNOCHA, CARE, ACF...we have been working together in order to identify the areas we collaborate and we were working together in order to avoid duplication of efforts because there is constraint of resources...we have to use our resources in an efficient way and we have been doing that. So, by cluster-based we mean every stakeholder was involved and collaborated in that operational area.”

One of the most notable successes described by UWEWEA project respondents in Kenya was that the consortium structure facilitated the response to the cholera outbreak. While the funding for the cholera response was separate from the DEPP funding, the structure of the consortium that was already in place facilitated a timely response as they were able to “inject into the consortium to do a cholera response through the Kenya Red Cross—through the same consortium system.” Beyond financing, the consortium structure, including its procedures and management structure, facilitated an effective response to the cholera outbreak.

When asked about challenges related to the consortium approach, respondents in Kenya noted that there were inevitable challenges to bring multiple partners together, including government and county offices. They also described the length of time that it took to get agreements and MOUs signed among partner organisations and government officials, especially considering the DEPP timeline expectations. Despite these challenges, there was overall consensus that a consortium approach strengthened preparedness and response activities. As noted by a respondent in Kenya: “It’s [the consortium] always going to create challenges, and it wouldn’t be interesting if it didn’t. But it’s clearly going to have more impact if you locate it within county structures both in terms of rollout, but also in terms of influencing in the future.”
Ilc. Early Warning Systems and Emergency Preparedness and Response

Surveillance and early warning systems were fundamental to effective preparedness and response in the project target areas by providing data, systems, and procedures.

As a respondent in Ethiopia conveyed: "The fundamental pillar of any emergency—it could be an emergency or it could be development—you have to have an early warning information [system]. You have to have adequate information. There needs to be an information sharing system at a community level." A respondent in Kenya echoed the importance of data: “Preparedness requires data. It requires data about a set of indicators...no one would have known that food insecurity is a real disaster in our informal settlements in Nairobi. It [data] also tells you about who suffers or...where is the potential of this disaster hitting most.”

Surveillance Systems and Procedures

The surveillance system of the UEWEA project in Kenya comprised data collection on key indicators, data entry, and used a dashboard to highlight alerts and trends. Respondents reported that the process of determining indicators was collaborative among consortium partners and took time, nearly four years (the surveillance system had been in development prior to the DEPP.) The respondents in Kenya also described some of the intricacies needed to conduct surveillance on food insecurity in an urban context. As noted by respondents, food insecurity tends to have a slower onset, as opposed to a sudden, natural disaster; thus, requiring a different surveillance system and set of indicators.

Similarly in Ethiopia, there was surveillance in the form of needs assessments. One respondent reported that after collaborating with the Shifting the Power project, needs assessments were incorporated into the organisations’ response activities. These assessments aimed to include relevant stakeholders, community, and government offices, such as the disaster risk and pastoral office. The needs assessments subsequently identified food insecurity, malnutrition among women and children, contamination of water sources, and compromised health status. Needs assessments and surveillance systems were also described as providing mechanisms for collaboration with government partners and strengthening these partnerships.

Early warning systems: people, coordination, community engagement, and trust

Data are not the only important components of an early warning system. Respondents also emphasised that these early warning systems require people, coordination, community engagement, and trust. In the case of the UEWEA project, community ambassadors were critical to the surveillance system. As an example, a respondent in Kenya reported: “Based on those variables they are able to tell and the ambassadors raise the red flag. So, the red flag can be raised to the county officials that we think there is a problem. So, it doesn’t need to wait for the national government minister to announce that we have a problem.”

Early warning systems require coordination. Having an established surveillance system is important, but it does not guarantee a timely response as noted by this respondent in Kenya. “The response is dependent on how strong is the coordination...Because the time should be short...As we move on, we need to improve because the success will be how timely it is. And how timely is dependent on how the preparedness is done very well. Because the more you prepare the less time you need. So, the mechanism [early warning system, surveillance] and other things helped a lot but still now there is a room to [improve].”
Furthermore, community involvement in the design and implementation of the early warning system is crucial. A respondent in Ethiopia provided an example of community engagement in the surveillance activities: “Every month members of the community sit and discuss livelihood issues of the community (availability of water, livestock market info, conflicts, anything that relates to livelihoods.” Several respondents acknowledged that engagement of community members and stakeholders helped to foster trust in the early warning system and surveillance data.

Emerging from the interview data, it was evident that respondents believed that early warning and surveillance systems allow not only for improved preparedness, such as in prediction of events and prevention, but that they also provide an opportunity and mechanism for behaviour change. It is this behaviour change that was noted to lead to more effective response efforts, such as noted by this respondent in Kenya: “Having been [involved] in the systems, my take has been now that if we move to risk management which you get the early warning signs and act on them, early action you act on them its less costly, you save a lot of resources and avoid deaths.”

IId. Learning and Emergency Preparedness and Response

Respondents identified various platforms, including committees within projects and learning events within the DEPP that facilitated sharing of best practices on emergency preparedness and response.

Respondents in both countries shared examples of learning and sharing of best practices. However, it was notable that respondents in Ethiopia attributed improved access and visibility to a broader platform as a result of DEPP. Respondents in Ethiopia reported accessing platforms within the Shifting the Power project that facilitated sharing and learning among organisations. As described by this respondent in Ethiopia: “There is a humanitarian forum which is established by the Shifting the Power project. We are member of the steering committee there, so all members were asked to share their experiences.”

Respondents in Ethiopia also described the impact of DEPP learning events as mechanisms for learning: “These are very important, preparedness and response is not enough by itself, collaboration with other organisations is important. Our participation in learning events and engaging in different platforms has helped us a lot. Thanks to the DEPP programme we have been able to participate in different platforms which we appreciate. Because we can learn from each other in these platforms. It has given us an opportunity to reflect our ideas and also hear different studies from other participants.”

While not directly assessed during the interviews, respondents did not mention any learning and sharing between DEPP projects in the same country.

Ile. Enhanced Visibility of Organisations as a Result of DEPP

Working as an organisation within the DEPP programme also helped to enhance visibility and credibility of local organisations to donors, government, and other stakeholders.

The training and capacity building allowed for L/NNGOs to become more visible to donors and other stakeholders. As an example, the Shifting the Power capacity building activities in Ethiopia helped local organisations evaluate their communication and dissemination platforms and to develop websites to communicate their project activities.

One of the respondents in Ethiopia commented how the DEPP components, especially capacity building and collaboration, helped the organisation gain visibility and recognition as an organisation that could respond to disasters. Prior to the capacity building activities and collaboration with the Shifting the Power project, the organisation would be invited to attend district meetings; however, now, after the capacity building activities and collaboration with local government, they are called not only to district meetings but also to UNOCHA meetings.

III. Levels of action – Examples of individual, organisational, and systems-level changes in emergency preparedness and response

Illa. Individual-level Changes Related to Emergency Preparedness and Response

Emergency preparedness and response capacity building activities resulted in increased confidence among individuals to respond to a disaster.
While most of the capacity building activities as part of the UEWEA project and Shifting the Power project focused on improving preparedness and response at the organisational level, many respondents noted impact at the individual level. For those respondents reporting individual-level changes, the capacity building activities led to improved skills, knowledge of procedures and resources, and confidence.

As an example, a respondent in Ethiopia recounted that with adequate resources and training, confidence in emergency response increased such that “you now know where to start and where to end”. A respondent from in Kenya who received training in search and rescue and first aid, reported improved capability to respond and to “respond without fear”.

IIlb. Organisational-level Changes Related to Emergency Preparedness and Response

Emergency preparedness and response capacity building activities resulted in strengthened procedures and systems at the organisational level

All respondents identified organisational-level changes as a result of capacity building activities, with the most detailed examples coming from the respondents in Ethiopia who received capacity building training from the Shifting the Power project. The most common changes reported included shifts in mindsets, inter-departmental coordination, and strengthened organisational procedures—in other words, "institutionalising preparedness". Some of the organisational changes included creating an emergency response team within the organisation with defined delegation of responsibilities and improved procurement policies. Development of organisational emergency preparedness plans was reported to be critical to improved organisational capacity to respond. The capacity building activities also helped beneficiary organisations to link preparedness and response activities to humanitarian standards and guidelines.

As described by this respondent in Ethiopia: "After we have implemented the project we have also started to think as a team. The big thing is there is a shift in our mindsets...After Shifting the Power we started to look [at] things in detail. We identified our gaps and we were able to identify the areas we must engage. Even though there is no stand-alone department, we have organised and formed an emergency response team.”

As another respondent in Ethiopia reflected: “Previously there was no emergency preparedness, everything was done once the emergency occurred but now we have emergency preparedness plans and job descriptions of each member of response teams ready-made. Hazards are identified. Who does what is identified...In this case whenever emergency occurs we are ready. It is not difficult to transfer from preparedness to response. We already have prepared proposals on the shelf. Thanks to Shifting the Power we are part of the team now and we get the information from the national, regional and local levels and our visibility has increased and information is readily available.”

IIlc. Systems-level Changes Related to Emergency Preparedness and Response

Collaboration with the government resulted in numerous systems-level changes to improve emergency preparedness and response.

While the respondents in Kenya commonly reported organisational-level changes, the respondents in Kenya reported numerous systems-level changes as a result of the UEWEA project. As a respondent in Kenya reported: “...[when] the consortium was trying to get into government, to transfer this technology to the government, initially, they went to the assembly. And they managed to convince the assembly to pass a motion to establish Early Warning Early Action Centres in every ward.

A respondent in Kenya also highlighted how the project was aligned with broader platforms, including the Constitution in Kenya: “The other activities—the chance of being integrated in the county is high. Why? ‘Cause it is [one of the] fundamental activities that needs to be addressed by the Kenyan Constitution. Kenyan Constitution says any Kenyans who live whether in informal settlements or in a town has a right to get basic services, which was not the case before... Before six years, the old Kenyan Constitution, informal settlements are informal so you are not supposed to provide those services. So now, the constitution is now giving that as platform...So it is a path...it is not an isolated activity.”
IllId. Emergent Themes on Project Sustainability

Government engagement was key to sustainability of emergency preparedness and response projects.

The interviews were conducted as the projects were reaching the end of the DEPP timeline in Kenya and Ethiopia. As such, many respondents reflected on the sustainability of project activities.

The respondents from the UEWEA project in Kenya highlighted the importance of government engagement to project sustainability. As a respondent in Kenya reported: “This project is finishing in March [2018] now. The county government is going to take it forward. The county [representative] said, “We are privileged to have this programme. It should be us to go and ask you, can you join us? But you did all the jobs that we are supposed to do. And it is our duty to take it forward. For me that is big success.” The respondents from the local organisations in Ethiopia expressed concern about local staff being able to continue and provided fewer examples of project sustainability during the interviews.

IV. Emergent themes on disaster preparedness and response

IVA. Innovation is Needed in the Definitions of Disaster, Preparedness, and Response

Definitions of disasters and approaches to emergency preparedness and response differ between urban and rural contexts.

Many respondents reported the need for innovation in how the humanitarian community defines disasters. As an example, poverty and food insecurity, especially in urban contexts, are rarely considered as disasters; but rather as development issues, and as such get varied levels of attention from donors and other stakeholders during emergency preparedness and response programming. One respondent noted that poverty and food insecurity get packaged into drought and famine response in a rural context, but not in urban contexts. As a respondent in Kenya noted: “It’s also very difficult to raise money quickly for short term response and urban areas in particular...they [the donors] love funding people in rural areas.” This also highlights that disaster and in this case, drought, affects rural and urban populations differently where rural populations directly lose access to food whereas urban populations may still have access but at higher costs which they cannot afford.

A different respondent in Kenya described the challenges of addressing food security as part of preparedness and response programming: “The food security aspect of it is a bit new...In developing the response package, we are starting from scratch because every system that is there in response to food security is rural-based, so you cannot do the same things - livestock things and things they do there for livelihood - that does not work here.”

One of the noted successes of the UEWEA project in Kenya and a systems-level change is that the project was able to bring attention to food insecurity as part of disaster management: “…Right now they just put it into the law. Disaster, county disaster management, and emergency management [act]. They’ve just inserted food security as part of the disaster so that it attracts the attention of, of budgeting, because now they have to implement that law. And [through] that law, a fund, the disaster emergency fund is created that will fund part of the responses that will emerge.”

Respondents in Ethiopia also described challenges in seeking funding to address disasters in a rural context. Comprehensive response programmes in a rural context need to include life-saving measures not only for human beings, but also for livestock. A respondent in Ethiopia reported that due to budget restrictions and donor preferences, it is more difficult to seek funding for livestock programmes as opposed to those programmes with human beneficiaries.

IVB. Standards on Emergency Preparedness and Response

Knowledge of and adherence to humanitarian standards strengthened emergency preparedness and response.

Respondents in both countries described the importance of humanitarian standards, particularly those focused on emergency preparedness and response, to allow for a common understanding,
framework, and measure. The Shifting the Power project was successfully noted to have strengthened capacity among local organisations on development of emergency preparedness plans according to defined standards. As a respondent in Ethiopia described: "When we work on saving the livestock we are working using the Livestock guideline standard. Now we have as a team become aware of the sphere standard and core humanitarian standard and so as a team having a common understanding is big achievement."

IVc. Linking Emergency Preparedness and Response Programming

Emergency preparedness and response were described as disjointed activities that need to be linked for effective response.

In general, respondents highlighted the importance of linking preparedness, in this case, surveillance, with response activities. Many acknowledged that the two were disjointed in the project, with one respondent in Kenya pointing out that their work and partner agreements were focused only on surveillance, and not on response: “A quick surveillance, a quick response. But more importantly, in my view, you’d save lives. There is one saying we have with this project, “Act early, save a life”. That is our motto. Act early, save a life. So, what we want is surveillance to feed into response and preferably, immediately so that no life is lost. Yeah, but the two as of now are disjointed.”

Respondents were asked to provide their perspectives on whether preparedness leads to more effective response. In general, respondents identified that the cohesion between emergency preparedness and emergency response needed to be strengthened. A respondent in Kenya acknowledged that it should but that it wasn’t yet doing so, and there are steps being taken in that direction. As this respondent noted: “It should. It should but it is not happening. For reasons, we are learning.” One of the reasons mentioned by respondents is that funding sources are often separate for emergency preparedness and emergency response, which impedes the transition from emergency preparedness to response.

IVd. The Transition from Preparedness to Response

Key components to transition from preparedness to response included community engagement, response training, and systems.

A respondent in Ethiopia highlighted the importance of community engagement in facilitating the transition from preparedness to response. As an example, their Community Risk Reduction Approach provides community members with pre-disaster information, training on preparedness, and training on what to do if a disaster occurs.

Another respondent in Ethiopia also noted the importance of not only preparedness activities, but also response training and reported that the Shifting the Power project has filled the gap between preparedness and response. Before the project, the organisation only knew preparedness and that now, after the capacity building training from the project, they know what they need to do to respond.

Respondents also identified the importance of having a system in place to transition from preparedness to response to facilitate reactivity and decision-making. However, preparedness plans are one component of a system that is needed to facilitate an emergency response as a respondent in Kenya noted: “That transition from preparedness to actual response needs a very robust system. And you have to be ready also to change some key things very fast if they don’t work in the real case scenario.”

IVe. The Transition from Development Activities to Emergency Response

Capacity building activities on emergency preparedness and response strengthened organisations’ capacity to transition from development activities to emergency response activities.

In Ethiopia, several of the DEPP project beneficiary organisations were focused on development and not on direct humanitarian aid provision. As a result of the DEPP, the organisations gained capacity on how to respond to a humanitarian crisis. Even though they noted that development activities, such as addressing food insecurity, were not that different from humanitarian activities, they needed to change their systems. As a respondent in Ethiopia noted, they revised their
organisational strategy. They changed procurement and policies, and alerted stakeholders and government that they are now implementing humanitarian activities. The training from Shifting the Power helped to support this process of expanding what was previously considered to be development activities and shifting the organisational strategy to now focus on emergency preparedness and response activities.

IVf. Measuring Success of Emergency Response

Respondents lacked clear measures by which to evaluate the success of emergency preparedness and response activities.

Respondents were asked to identify examples of successful emergency preparedness and response activities and also share examples of less successful programming. The most common criteria identified were a timely response and the ability to minimise suffering. One respondent in Ethiopia described: "One of the objectives of the response was to minimise death and human suffering... Because we responded on time, we were able to minimise the suffering." The respondent continued: "[We] do these activities to save lives and improve wellbeing of human beings. When we see the effect of drought, it is the worst. It causes huge loss. Vision is to see a world whereby all human beings live in dignity and respect each other in prosperity."

While respondents in both countries highlighted the importance of minimising human suffering, they lacked a framework by which to evaluate the success of programming. Few respondents were able to provide post-disaster monitoring frameworks or data. One reason provided was that there were budget restrictions on emergency response activities that did not include post-disaster monitoring.

KEY FINDINGS

Summary

This qualitative case study provides an in-depth analysis of two DEPP-funded projects operating in two different emergency contexts—the Urban Early Warning Early Action in the slums of urban Kenya and the Shifting the Power project in rural Ethiopia. In both contexts, the populations were affected by poverty, food insecurity, and poor health outcomes including malnutrition and diarrheal disease. While there were similar components to the emergency preparedness and response activities between the two projects, respondents from each project offered unique perspectives on strengthening emergency preparedness and response. The case study integrates perspectives from international and national NGOs and county government representation part of a formal DEPP consortium in Kenya and from local NGOs benefitting from a DEPP funded project in Ethiopia.

Major Result Areas

Results were analysed and grouped into four broad categories:

1. Identification of key project design and implementation factors that strengthened emergency preparedness and response

2. Characterisation of the ways in which key components of DEPP (capacity building, collaboration, early warning systems, and learning) strengthened emergency preparedness and response

3. Description of the levels of action (individual, organisational, and systems level) of emergency preparedness and response activities

4. Recognition of gaps between emergency preparedness and response activities and opportunities to strengthen the linkage and transition

Key Findings

- Community and government engagement was noted to be essential to project design and implementation, especially in the design of the surveillance system, response activities, and beneficiaries. Importantly, engaging community members and government officials fostered trust and strengthened partnerships that facilitated project implementation.
Government engagement, especially for the project in Kenya, was noted to be key for sustainability and integration into future programming beyond the DEPP timeline.

- Capacity building, in the form of community and organisational trainings, strengthened emergency preparedness and response through improved awareness, coordination, and procedures. These trainings also strengthened awareness of humanitarian standards. For local organisations in Ethiopia, these capacity building activities helped to strengthen the visibility of the organisations and also the credibility of their emergency preparedness and response activities to donors and other stakeholders.

- Collaboration, both formally through project consortia and informally through humanitarian networks, improved communication and efficiency of resources to avoid duplication of activities in the targeted areas. The consortium approach for the UEWEA project in Kenya provided an effective mechanism for responding to emergent disasters that arose during the project duration, such as a cholera outbreak.

- Surveillance and early warning systems were fundamental to both projects, described as the pillars of emergency preparedness and response. Beyond collecting data, respondents noted that these also served as mechanisms of collaboration and provided opportunities for behavioural change for communities and organisations.

- Engagement with DEPP provided opportunities for organisations to share learning and best practices through wider networks and platforms. DEPP learning events were noted to be particularly helpful platforms for learning for those who attended. Engagement with DEPP improved visibility of organisations among key stakeholders, including government and donors.

- At the individual level, emergency preparedness and response capacity building activities resulted in increased confidence to respond to a disaster; however, there were fewer examples of individual-level changes. At the organisational level, capacity building, especially among organisations in Ethiopia, strengthened procedures and policies such as the development of emergency preparedness teams and plans. Collaboration with the government for the project in Kenya allowed for numerous systems-level changes, including alignment and integration of project emergency preparedness and response activities with broader platforms, such as constitutional priorities and local and national policies.

- Definitions of disasters differed between urban and rural contexts. Poverty and food insecurity, especially in urban contexts, are rarely considered as disasters and get varied levels of attention from donors and other stakeholders.

- Emergency preparedness and response activities were described by respondents as disjointed. They described a need for a system to link preparedness and response. Facilitators of this transition from preparedness to response include community engagement, response training, and organisational procedures and standards. The need to seek separate funding for response activities was described as a barrier to transitioning from emergency preparedness to response.

- When asked to evaluate the success of emergency preparedness and response programming, respondents lacked clear measures or frameworks by which to evaluate effective response programming.

Overall Conclusion of the Two Case Studies

The South Sudan case study demonstrated that it is possible for projects to operate in high-risk, conflict-affected contexts; however, security protocols, flexible and adaptive management and budgets, contingency plans, as well as engagement and integration of local partners and staff are vital. While the case study in South Sudan found that engagement of the government stakeholders was not always possible, the case study in Ethiopia and Kenya demonstrated that the consortium management model and collaboration with government were critical to successful implementation of early warning systems and permitted coordinated humanitarian responses that improved with each subsequent emergency. Both case studies stressed the importance of having flexible budgets and rapid funding mechanisms either to make changes in original project planned activities or to support response activities when a disaster occurs.
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
OVERALL CONCLUSION

The DEPP was a 3-year, £40 million humanitarian capacity development programme funded by the Department for International Development (DFID). It included 14 distinct projects aiming to build humanitarian capacity of local actors using a collaborative approach in 10 countries at risk for both natural and manmade disasters. The programme was designed in 2014, and was ahead of its time in many ways, especially with its strong focus on localisation and multi-stakeholder consortia. It included a mix of both flagship projects using more traditional approaches (i.e., in-person individual capacity building) with some more innovative elements (i.e., a £10 million Innovation Window; flexible funding mechanisms to finance both local capacity building but also emergency response; pooled surge platforms; urban early warning systems and inclusion of food security as an emergency).

As it suffered from a number of design challenges including a three-year time frame that was unrealistic to meet the objectives, and universal implementation delays, the decision by DFID to no longer fund the programme limits potential long-term impact of the DEPP. Regardless of the funding decision, DEPP’s focus on emergency preparedness and localisation is still a relevant one. It aligns well with the growing dialogue among the global humanitarian community and with more recent policy commitments such as the Grand Bargain and the Charter for Change which advocate for increased voice for local actors, and for rebalancing of power and relationships within the existing humanitarian architecture.

Despite its initial design flaws, positive findings related to the collective action of the DEPP and to individual DEPP projects have been documented. These include the following key achievements:

- Based on project reports, 33,388 individuals were exposed at varying degrees to capacity building
- Stakeholders across the programme noted that the most significant change due to the DEPP was a change in attitudes toward and increased support of localisation (i.e., contributing to the Grand Bargain)
- Changes in capacity of local organisations (in terms of systems and processes, fundraising, conducting needs assessments) and their preparedness levels, that led to outcomes such as becoming eligible for UN pooled funding, success in securing external response funds, and being given leadership roles
- Significant changes in organisational policy with respect to inclusion of vulnerable groups (Ethiopia, local organisations across all intensive set evaluation countries), and localisation (Ethiopia)
- Some evidence of strengthened networks and increased collaboration (Ethiopia, Kenya, the Philippines)
- Contribution to at least 42 humanitarian responses in 11 countries and some qualitative evidence in several settings (The Philippines, Kenya) of improved speed, efficiency and inclusiveness of response
- Cross-country learning in terms of the amount of learning documents produced, and sharing of ideas across countries and projects
- Strong cross-project collaboration in the Philippines demonstrating benefits of collective action

Nevertheless, a greater impact, as originally envisioned, could likely have been achieved had there been a more cohesive design, a longer time frame, a more robust programme M&E system and a more strategic approach with regards to the type of capacity building implemented at each level of action (individual, organisational, community, systems) and the balance between these levels. Overall, the external evaluation found the following findings that need to be examined further in future evaluations and programming related to emergency preparedness:
• No quantitative evidence to date that the three-year programme led to measurable impact with regards to more efficient, and timely humanitarian response

• No quantitative evidence to support the hypothesis that strengthened networks can lead to improved emergency preparedness and response (mainly due to the short observation period available to assess this)

• No quantitative evidence that DEPP improved individual knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, preparedness, inclusion of vulnerable groups, or protection issues in the four intensive set countries

• Few changes in quantitative policy-related indicators, though there were some examples of improved policies documented by projects

• Too wide of a variety of individual capacity building initiatives and lack of strategy on type of capacity building approaches at each level (individual, organisational, system, community) and effect desired at each level

As noted above, the three years allotted for an emergency preparedness programme to achieve five macro results in 10 countries was an ambitious timeline and agenda. The level of exposure to the DEPP programme activities was unevenly distributed across the 10 DEPP focus countries; each country received only a subset of the 14 projects. For example, three DEPP countries benefitted from six projects each, while two countries had only one project each (Not including the Learning Project; see Table 4.7 for the full list of project numbers per country). This uneven level of exposure to DEPP compounded with varying country-specific contextual factors led to varying results in specific countries. Had the DEPP been able to continue for another three years or more and been able to integrate its learnings into a revised programme strategy (i.e., permitting time to restructure its management structure, scale up projects that show promise and revise projects that are less promising), there would be a more feasible time period to obtain more conclusive findings about DEPP’s achievements towards its five result areas.

FINDINGS AND THE PROGRAMME THEORY OF CHANGE

The evaluation was not built around the original programme theory of change as presented in the business case due to the fact that it did not align well with the types and scope of DEPP activities that were approved for implementation. However, it may still be worthwhile to examine the DEPP findings against that theory of change and to assess whether the assumptions made during the business case development have been proven true. Table 9.1 presents the three key DEPP activities in the original theory of change (capacity building, improving preparedness systems for communities, establishing multi-stakeholder platforms), and the expected outputs, shorter-term outcomes and longer-term outcomes against the results that were achieved by the DEPP. Table 9.2 presents the assumptions that were articulated in the original theory of change and the available evidence corresponding to each assumption.

As can be seen, the evaluation findings demonstrate that the original programme-level theory of change (as presented in the business case) could not be proven or disproven. Most of the assumptions were not met and a number of components of the original theory of change were not implemented as originally described. For example, “multi-stakeholder platforms” comprise a large part of the theory of change and were described in the business case as “platforms with a broad membership e.g., INGOs, national NGOs, local government, national government, academia, private sector companies, the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, and UN agencies. Successful platforms should improve policy at national and international level. We envisage a single platform per country or region where the programme is active and an international platform. Possible products of the platforms are: synthesised lessons identified, joint evaluations and common position papers for advocacy.” These platforms were hypothesised to be the mechanism through which policy change and evidence would occur. The DEPP focused much more on consortia rather than on larger multi-stakeholder platforms as described in the business case (though some projects as Transforming Surge Capacity, CDAC’s Communicating with Communities project did include this). Similarly, advocacy was not as large of a programme emphasis as originally intended. Ultimately, because of the differences in what was implemented and the fact that most of the assumptions did not hold, it is impossible to prove or disprove the theory of change. It should be revisited, revised and re-tested in any future programme design process.
<table>
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<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>LESSONS</th>
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| 1. Capacity Building                          | Capacity development interventions reach national actors (national staff of INGOs and national partners, government staff) and improve the organisational and social environment necessary for effective response | 33,388 individuals were exposed to capacity building, but equal gender target not met                                                                 | • Level of exposure was variable (many short trainings or webinars)  
• Focus on quantity over quality  
• Did not meet equal gender target  
• Accessibility issues related to lack of availability of trainings and materials in local languages  
• Comparison group also exposed to capacity building indicating that there are many individual-level capacity building initiatives being implemented |
| Raising awareness of good practice in preparedness and response | Organisational and social environment not consistently or systematically targeted through activities | Learning events, conferences, dissemination of learning products helped raise awareness                                                                 | • Structural barriers related to organisational and social environment not adequately targeted; difficult to achieve organically |
| Enhancing skills (personal and technical)     | Many capacity building projects focused on skill building (learning by doing, simulations etc.) | Activities emphasised strengthening collaborative ways of working                                                                 | • A more systematic strategic awareness raising approach might have broadened reach and been more impactful |
| Improving team work                            | Activities focused on strengthening coalitions and networks             |                                                                                                                                 | • Perhaps too much emphasis on collaboration without enough consideration for more nuanced approaches and contextual differences such as key influencers in the country-specific humanitarian networks |
| Fostering coalitions and networks              | Advocacy efforts were limited and there was no programme wide strategy |                                                                                                                                 | • There was limited capacity building on how to effectively collaborate  
• Greater emphasis on consortia strengthening than the broader humanitarian networks |
| Advocacy strengthens policy                    |                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                 | • Mainstreaming of advocacy and policy efforts across programme might have enhanced results |


### Activities

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<th>2. Projects to improve preparedness systems for response for communities at risk of disaster</th>
<th>Projects to improve preparedness systems implemented</th>
<th>4 projects focused on developing or improving preparedness systems for communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enabled collective action for capacity development</td>
<td>Collaborative structures were supported across the programme, including multi-stakeholder platforms in several settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captured lessons and evidence</td>
<td>Over 600 learning products were produced across DEPP, but quality was variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocated for change based on emerging evidence</td>
<td>Some advocacy efforts were implemented but no systematic advocacy component at the programme level, and not necessarily based on evidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Outputs / Short-term Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Improved knowledge and understanding of people in the system regarding best practices for humanitarian preparedness and response</th>
<th>Improved knowledge and understanding</th>
<th>No quantitative evidence of improved knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, preparedness, inclusion of prioritised groups, VAWG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative data suggests some improvement in knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Increased number of coalitions and partnerships developed</td>
<td>Increased number of coalitions and partnerships</td>
<td>Increase in numbers of coalitions and partnerships across DEPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence of strengthened networks in Ethiopia, Kenya, the Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Outputs / Short-Term Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Emerging evidence base for what works in building humanitarian capacity</th>
<th>Evidence base established</th>
<th>Evidence base that has been created is mainly learning-centered but not for project monitoring and improving. Not enough empirical evidence generated throughout the programme cycle by individual projects.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Improved institutional and policy environment for building humanitarian capacity</th>
<th>Improved institutional and policy environment</th>
<th>Some qualitative evidence of strengthened policy but only in some settings.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Improved preparedness systems for communities at risk of disaster</th>
<th>Improved preparedness systems for communities at risk of disaster</th>
<th>5 of 6 preparedness systems are fully operational.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Long-term Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvement in effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to disaster affected communities by national individuals and organisations</th>
<th>Improved effective delivery of humanitarian assistance</th>
<th>Some qualitative evidence of improved delivery of humanitarian response in a few settings.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Table 9.1: Assessment of the original programme theory of change against findings from the evaluation**

**DID NOT ACHIEVE**  | **PARTIALLY ACHIEVED** | **FULLY ACHIEVED** | **CAPACITY BUILDING AND DOWNSTREAM OUTPUTS/OUTCOMES** | **PREPAREDNESS SYSTEMS AND DOWNSTREAM OUTPUTS/OUTCOMES** | **MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PLATFORMS AND DOWNSTREAM OUTPUTS/OUTCOMES**
**DETAILS** | **RESULTS**
--- | ---
Capacity sufficiently improved to meet humanitarian standards relevant to target group | • Data suggest that the capacity building interventions did not lead to significant quantitative improvements in individual capacity

Trained staff and local leaders with enhanced skills participate and remain in sector | • Staff and local leaders were exposed to training and there is no evidence to suggest that trained staff and local leaders left the humanitarian sector

Platforms are the appropriate mechanism to strengthen vertical and horizontal practice, learning and accountability networks | • Some data found that collaborative structures (i.e., consortia) can contribute to improved preparedness, response and learning • Not enough evidence around platforms and accountability networks

Platforms and emphasis on M&E allows project learning to be taken up across both organisations and the system | • Programme M&E was weak • Some evidence of take up of project learning within organisations • Limited evidence of take up across the system • Unable to test the assumption that platforms plus strong M&E contribute to take up of project learning due to the weak M&E

Platforms improve collective advocacy or higher-level change (e.g., organisation and policy) | • Challenges in setting up and sustaining multi-stakeholder platforms

Sound analysis of hazard and differential capacity / vulnerability risks form basis of projects | • Multi-stakeholder platforms were not as widely implemented as originally intended • Platforms contributed to organisational change, but limited evidence that they contributed to improved advocacy

Projects inclusive of all relevant population groups under good local leadership | • Needs assessments and involvement of local stakeholders and beneficiaries did not occur during design phase • Projects faced challenges with inclusion of both women and of prioritised groups (both in terms of design, implementation and inclusiveness of activities and capacity building efforts)

### Table 9.2: Assessment of the assumptions of the original programme theory of change

**RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR PROGRAMME COMPONENTS**

Given the key evaluation findings, there is scope to replicate and further test, or scale up some components of the programme. This will ensure that the previous investment in DEPP is sustained, and that any additional resources will be used effectively, efficiently and strategically. As can be seen, none of the DEPP programme components have been recommended to be ceased and not be pursued in the future. This in itself is a strong indication that the DEPP core theory of change and initial assumptions are worthy of being re-examined for future investment. Specially, nine components were recommended to be modified and re-tested, while eight were recommended to be replicated in different contexts and potentially on a larger scale, enabling more rigorous evaluations. Note that in a programme each of these components would not be expected to function in isolation, and the interaction between components should also be considered.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPP PROGRAMME COMPONENT</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED ACTION</th>
<th>KEY FINDING / LESSONS LEARNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Individual Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Prioritise multi-pronged approaches (in-person + coaching, mentoring, simulations)  
• Quality of trainings should be prioritised over quantity of individuals trained (webinars can reach a lot of people but may be less effective)  
• Consider structural barriers within organisations that may impede application of learning |
| Organisational Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Prioritise approaches that permit organisational self-assessments and capacity building approaches tailored to organisations’ needs  
• Focus on strengthening of administrative policies, procedures and systems (i.e., human resources, procurement, finance systems) has been effective for L/NGOs  
• Approaches should be better adapted to different contexts  
• Access to funding is key for organisations to put learning into practice  
• Conduct comparative assessments of the effectiveness of different approaches |
| Community Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Few projects addressed this, but those that did indicated some potential; further evidence is needed on how best to build community capacity |
| Systems Capacity Building | Modify and re-test | • Few projects directly addressed this, but there has been some evidence of qualitative attitudinal change that could be a precursor to eventual systems- level change; more time and further evidence are needed on how best to build capacity at the systems level |
| Early Warning Systems | Replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts | • UWEA’s urban surveillance system should be tested in other urban settings  
• Other early warning system projects could be adapted for and implemented in other contexts with sufficient project timelines |
| Pooled Surge Platforms | Replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts | • Pooled surge platforms, especially national-level platforms have shown some evidence of effectiveness. Pooled surge platforms should ensure a locally driven design process and implementation to ensure contextualisation and local ownership  
• Replicate and test these in different contexts to generate more rigorous evidence on their effectiveness |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexible Funding Mechanisms</th>
<th>Replicate and test on larger scale in differing contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Flexible funding mechanisms were found to be a promising approach to support L/NNGOs self-directed capacity building efforts. In addition, flexible funds were essential to translating emergency preparedness into timely and efficient response activities, especially for L/NNGOs.</td>
<td>• Flexible funding mechanisms (both for capacity building and response efforts) should be replicated in other settings, and more rigorously evaluated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-stakeholder Platforms</td>
<td>Modify and re-test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These platforms were more effective in contexts where existing humanitarian structures were more mature and with supporting governments.</td>
<td>• Further modification and testing of the approach is needed to understand how best to utilise this strategy and in which specific settings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Consortia | Modify and re-test |
|• Use knowledge and data on country networks to create more targeted approaches to strengthen networks; allow enough time to test whether stronger networks can lead to increased emergency preparedness. |• Some advocacy efforts were implemented but there was no systematic advocacy component at the programme level. It was recognized that advocacy and policy change are needed to overcome barriers to change and to increase programme sustainability. |
| Strengthening Networks | Modify approach and re-test |
| Advocacy and Policy | Mainstream across programme |
|• The approach of having an individual project dedicated to learning and generating evidence is unique but findings were mixed due to the lack of programme monitoring and the lack of a direct link to the management team. Alternative models for an independent learning project could be envisioned and potentially assessed in a future programme. |• Prioritise quality over quantity |• Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy related to advocacy and policy |
| Learning Project | Modify and re-test |
| Evidence Generation | Modify approach |
|• Prioritise quality over quantity |• Include empirical evidence generation |• Adapt evidence use and knowledge translation strategies |
| Protection | Mainstream across programme |
|• Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy related to protection |• Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy on inclusion of prioritised groups (such as women, the elderly and people with disabilities). |• Ensure a cohesive programme-wide strategy related to protection |
Localisation

- Define localisation (what it is, which entities are considered local); and test approaches to enable INGOs to take a more supportive role towards L/NNGOs, and better operationalise localisation in different contexts.

Table 9.3: Recommended actions for each DEPP programme component

In addition, a number of best practices related to the DEPP programme components have been compiled to guide future programme design and implementation. These best practices can be found in Annex 11.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (SUMMATIVE PHASE)

This section presents specific conclusions and recommendations related to each evaluation question.

1. RELEVANCE AND VALIDITY OF DESIGN

CONCLUSION 1: While the objectives and targets of the DEPP were appropriate, relevant and aligned with DFID priorities, the DEPP design process suffered from numerous weaknesses that hindered its potential for impact. Any future programme would require a significant redesign based on the lessons learned and the evidence generated from the DEPP. For future design, programme results that are realistic within a three-year time frame must be set, or the project time frame should be extended to allow for more time to meet longer-term outcomes. A more logical, coherent design process, which is locally led, draws on needs assessments, and uses participatory approaches should be prioritised to ensure that projects are contextualised and based on existing needs at the country level. The design process should adequately consider project alignment and complementarity as well as risks at the programme level. It should also ensure the development and implementation of programme-level systems and processes, such as a robust M&E system, to ensure course correction and that projects function as a portfolio rather than as standalone projects. This includes elaborating a programme-level theory of change, definition of key terms, cross-project linkages, and streamlined inclusion of gender and prioritised groups along with appropriate consideration of cross-cutting themes. Emergency preparedness and response projects should also consider urban contexts and issues such as poverty and food insecurity which lie at the humanitarian-development nexus. Budgets should include higher allocation for NPACS, programme management functions and M&E across all projects.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1: [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] The design process should be re-envisioned to consider alternative programme models and governance structures. To increase the local relevance and effectiveness of the programme, the design process should be locally driven from the outset (i.e., led by
local stakeholders), and include sufficient time and funds for project design, localisation, consortia development and collaboration.

**Potential Model 1:** The process could involve several stages: After the overall programmatic business case and theory of change are developed, global goals could be established and local and national ownership prioritised. A programme-level focal point could be appointed in each country to conduct contextualised needs assessments which would feed into the development of the portfolio-level strategy. The project design process would occur at the country level, under the oversight of the focal points and the Programme Board. This approach would drive the localisation agenda and allow for country-based organisations to determine the most needed initiatives within the goals of the overall theory of change as well as risk assessment. It would help align projects toward common programme goals, identify complementary elements of different projects, main actors and those that need to be bolstered as well as more risky projects worthy of support. It would also ensure sufficient investment in each country in order to accomplish the theory of change, and would enable more comprehensive assessments of risks. Also, a return on investment assessment could be conducted to inform the final investment. Focal points could work with a regional or country M&E and Learning Advisor to develop and implement programme- and project-level M&E systems. As a programme-level actor, the focal point would help build cohesiveness and enhance the visibility of DEPP as a unified programme in each country.

**Potential Model 2:** Alternatively, consider a multi-phase programme in which a series of pilot interventions are developed and implemented on a small scale with strong but targeted M&E systems integrated to evidence changes and provide accountability mechanisms. Successful pilot interventions could be scaled up during the subsequent phase, building on the lessons captured during the pilot. A strong programme- and project-level M&E system during the scale up phase would be integral to measuring change and ensure regular tracking of outputs to modify the programme when needed. In addition, this type of multi-phase programme could include a pre-pilot phase where seed funding is provided to develop promising ideas, to conceptualise projects and to build consortia around the projects.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.2:** [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] The programme portfolio should be balanced in terms of risk, types of activities, size of projects, geographic scope and cost. To maximise impact, the link between emergency preparedness and response should be better articulated; preparedness programmes should strongly consider embedding flexible funding mechanisms in order to facilitate contribution to humanitarian response by local actors.

The portfolio should include a mix of more established ideas and projects, those that are considered riskier and with a higher likelihood of failure, as well as innovative elements. Prioritising humanitarian need, examining country disaster and emergency profiles, as well as aligning with overall programme strategy during country selection process would ensure a more optimal, balanced set of focus countries. For a fund of this size, concentrating on a smaller group of projects (at least in any scale up phase of a multi-phase programme), and potentially fewer overall countries may help to ensure that investments are not spread too thin and that there is both sufficient investment and a large enough number of projects in each country to reach a critical mass and achieve systems-level changes. A complementary and strategic mix of activities at the programme level and especially at the country level is warranted to maximise impacts; but this too needs to be focused. For example, the DEPP’s open approach led to too many different types of capacity building, too great an emphasis on individual capacity building, and lack of consensus on desired effects at each
level. Instead, a more deliberate and evidence-based global capacity building strategy is needed, with more balance between levels of action (individual, organisational, systems), as well as consideration of structural barriers to change that might hinder behaviour change or operationalising organisation-level changes. In many cases, advocacy, policy change or other system-based approaches may be critical to easing some of these obstacles; integrating a programme-wide advocacy or policy component should be further explored. Emergency preparedness must not be thought of in isolation and mechanisms to embed linkages to humanitarian response (including response funding) are needed.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.3:** [PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] Portfolio-level harmonisation should be prioritised, including mainstreaming of gender and inclusion of prioritised groups. To ensure alignment of the projects and a cohesive programme-wide approach, portfolio objectives, as well as key terms (e.g., collaboration, preparedness and localisation), and approaches (e.g., types of capacity building efforts) should be fully defined, and the definitions standardised across the programme. Cross-cutting themes that are prioritised by the donor and/or programme and project stakeholders, such as gender and addressing VAWG, must be given adequate attention and embedded across the programme. Inclusion of prioritised groups and gender considerations are equally important and should be mainstreamed.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.4:** [PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] Ensure objectives are realistic and feasible within the programme's time frame. Develop programmes with realistic objectives that are feasible within a three-year time frame. These most likely would focus on outputs and shorter-term outcomes. Alternatively, consider creating longer (i.e., five-year or longer) programme timelines if longer-term outcomes must be included. While longer programme timelines may not correspond to current DFID funding cycles, a multi-phase programme could be an effective solution that is compatible with funding terms as well as activities aimed at longer-term impact.

**RECOMMENDATION 1.5:** [PROGRAMME BOARD AND DFID] Ensure M&E processes are integrated within the programme design from the outset and that there is an appropriate balance between M&E and learning activities. It is imperative that a programme-level logical framework be in place prior to implementation of any programme or project activities. Development of this framework should occur in parallel with the programme and with input from local stakeholders. Ideally, indicators should be streamlined across the programme, and should contain a core set of programme indicators against which all projects report, with potentially a series of additional site-specific or project-specific indicators where relevant. Incorporate quantitative VFM indicators within the core set of indicators to ensure VFM and efficiency can be tracked across the programme. The M&E system should enable the collection and reporting of data disaggregated by sex and other prioritised groups. In at least one programme focus country, consider prioritising a randomised controlled trial (RCT) or other rigorous evaluation design to evaluate programme effectiveness. This would require involving the evaluation team in the initial stages of the programme design process to ensure alignment of the evaluation questions, randomisation of the intervention sites, and adequate baseline data collection. This would allow for testing of the effectiveness of targeted components of the programme as well as the programme overall, isolating the role of different contextual factors. Technological solutions such as dashboards with real-time data visualisations of key indicators could help enhance routine monitoring, and allow for more rapid course correction. Sufficient training for programme and project focal points with respect to the M&E system must be provided and appropriate mechanisms to ensure higher quality data must be in place. Learning is important but requires a well-designed M&E system in order to be of most value.
RECOMMENDATION 1.6: [DFID] Re-examine the development of the business case, as well as its timing and its content, and broaden definitions of disasters, emergency preparedness and response. For any future programme at the scale of the DEPP, to facilitate project design, the business case should provide timely and sufficient details such as focus countries, the criteria for country selection, a set of definitions of key concepts (such as collaboration, institutional arrangements, emergency preparedness and localisation), and a concise summary of the DFID policy on inclusion of prioritised target groups in programme and project design. Further considerations for how to think about emergency preparedness in urban contexts and conflict-affected settings are needed. Considerations for issues such as poverty and food insecurity which lie at the intersection of development and humanitarian sectors should be considered when designing emergency preparedness and response projects depending on the context.

2. RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERVENTIONS

CONCLUSION 2: DEPP interventions were overwhelmingly found to be relevant and appropriate and were demonstrated to fill important gaps that have not been previously well addressed (surveillance of emergencies in urban settings, conflict-sensitive emergency preparedness, inclusion of aging and disability, etc). However, start-up delays limited project implementation periods and reduced potential impact. Optimising the design process as described above and streamlining administrative and contractual processes would ensure smooth and timely project start-up and minimise implementation delays. At the programme level, there was no evidence of improved knowledge on core humanitarian competencies, inclusion, or emergency preparedness due to the DEPP but significant changes in organisational capacity and preparedness among DEPP beneficiaries occurred, in particular among local organisations. Furthermore, DEPP organisations contributed to improved response in several contexts (The Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia). A greater impact could likely have been achieved with a longer implementation period, and with easier access to emergency response funding. There is scope for certain programme components to be replicated or scaled up or modified and further tested.

Conclusion 2a: Collaboration and Consortia

Functioning of consortia was suboptimal and contributed to implementation delays and slow decision-making. A smaller, more strategic set of consortia members, with more consistency between UK and in-country members for each project would streamline project delivery and should be considered in future programmes. Inclusion of more L/NNGOs within consortia might help shift power balances and contribute to localisation. Collaborations with external stakeholders including government and UN, though essential, were difficult and lessons learned should inform future programming. In two sequential diarrhoeal outbreaks in Kenya, the consortia model and collaboration with the government enabled coordinated effective response activities that improved with each subsequent emergency.

Conclusion 2b: Capacity Building

Overall individual training targets at the programme level were exceeded suggesting successful implementation of DEPP capacity building activities. However, these data included individuals who participated in capacity building efforts with minimal exposure such as webinars and forums. Accessibility to training remained uneven. The target of including 50% women trainees across the programme was not met, and some trainings were only available in English. Structural barriers, such as organisational and management arrangements, were
a key barrier to applying and integrating knowledge gained from DEPP capacity building efforts at the organisational level and should be addressed in future programmes. Multi-pronged capacity building efforts that include practical approaches to sustain and apply knowledge were perceived to be most effective, but quantitative data show no evidence of knowledge change. Organisational-level capacity building efforts where several strategies were combined and tailored to the specific gaps of each organisation were perceived to be effective, and evidence of increased organisational capacity of local organisations was demonstrated in a number of settings.

**Conclusion 2c: Evidence Generation and Learning**

Generation of learning and evidence was high in terms of quantity, but evidence was mainly anecdotal and lacking in scientific rigor. Arguably too much emphasis was placed on generation of learning products compared to routine monitoring. Differential reporting by projects against the programme-level logical framework (once it was finalised and fully implemented in August 2017) occurred, and there was evidence of weak quality assurance. In addition, there was a lack of disaggregated data collected with respect to important subgroups. Sharing of learning did occur but there is no evidence that this translated to behaviour change. Learning events were a useful approach to share learning, however an increased focus on the dissemination of evidence at these events would have been valuable. The Learning Platform was an important resource (that now serves as part of the DEPP’s institutional memory) but it was not used consistently across projects and featured varying amounts of evidence and learning shared by each project. Such platforms should be more heavily promoted to increase use by in-country partners, represent resources from all projects and ensure availability of resources in relevant languages. The DEPP Learning Project had been originally conceptualised to take on the M&E functions of the DEPP in addition to learning. While a unique idea, this model did not work well – M&E functions and responsibility would have been better placed at the programme management level. Placing these functions as one project alongside the others with limited authority led to diffusion of accountability and responsibility. As a standalone learning project, it has had mixed results, but could be re-envisioned for future programmes.

**Conclusion 2d: Early Warning Systems**

Early warning systems are important as they provide (in theory) accurate, predictive and timely data to support emergency preparedness. However, findings with respect to implementation of early warning systems are mixed. Six diverse early warning systems were developed and five were fully operational at the time of this report. However, because of implementation delays, the length of time these systems were functional was very limited. Several of the systems have been well integrated into appropriate structures contributing to increased likelihood of sustainability and impact. Only two systems (UEWEA, PHEP Gambella) have been used in an emergency response. UEWEA in particular was shown to be an effective system that was able to detect several emergencies that would have otherwise gone unnoticed in informal settlements around Nairobi and this contributed to improved timely and effective response. This system had been operational the longest, and also established a concrete exit strategy, with the local county government taking over management of the system. This project benefitted from a longer “effective” timeline compared to the other projects as
it took forward work from a previous project\textsuperscript{181} that conceptualised the system, developed and tested the indicators and established government collaborations. Without that existing work to build on, UEWEA would likely have faced similar challenges as the rest of the cohort in terms of establishing a functional system with the programme period.

**Conclusion 2e: Emergency Preparedness and Response**

There are some emerging examples in several countries of perceived improvements in emergency preparedness at the organisational and community level. Document review has demonstrated that the DEPP has contributed to at least 42 responses in 11 countries and there are several self-reported examples of strengthened, more localised response.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.1** [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] The Learning Project and its placement should be re-examined, with its role, responsibilities, objectives and accountability mechanisms clearly defined at the outset of any future programme. Programme-level M&E should sit within programme-level management, but the case could be made to test a differently structured standalone learning project in a future programme. Further considerations to ensure a balance between quantity and quality of learning and evidence generated, including the burden and time requirements placed on projects, and the timing of M&E activities to begin before projects start implementing are needed.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.2** [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] Project-level M&E systems should directly feed into programme-level systems (via a common, core set of indicators), and should be in place prior to implementation with timely reporting to permit agile course correction. Stronger M&E systems including collection of empirical data would support projects in accessing additional funding and yield better quality projects with a greater likelihood of impact. Accountability mechanisms, including accountability to beneficiaries, should be strengthened.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.3** [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] To increase the effectiveness of capacity building interventions, emphasis should be placed on quality not on quantity. At the individual level, approaches that build skills and reinforce learning, and combine several strategies, should be prioritised. At the organisational level, approaches that are tailored to identified gaps and aim to strengthen systems and processes should be emphasised. Flexible funding mechanisms providing small or in some cases micro grants for capacity building were one successful approach to empower local organisations to build their capacity and should be considered in future programmes. Systems-level capacity strengthening should also be further pursued. Further attention to the balance of activities across these different levels and the desired effect at each level will be needed to maximise impacts. Structural barriers need to be addressed, and capacity building interventions should be better tailored to specific contexts.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.4** [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] Development of early warning systems should be taken forward within future programmes but only when sufficient implementation periods are available. A three-year time frame was insufficient to design and operationalise an early warning system; more realistic timelines are needed to ensure completion of the system and allowing time to test the system within emergency responses (or simulations). Community members and government officials should be

actively involved in designing the surveillance systems, beneficiary criteria, and response package details. Consensus on indicators and early warning systems should be reached in collaboration with community and government stakeholders. Early and sustained engagement should be emphasised to foster trust and strengthen partnerships.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.5 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** Future programmes must consider emergency preparedness and response on a continuum with more attention paid to the response component. The programme should strategise on how best to enable improved response through emergency preparedness activities and ensure such mechanisms are embedded within the programme, rather than expecting response contribution to occur organically as a natural by-product of preparedness activities. This could take various forms. Flexible response funds could be built in to the programme (and potentially the individual projects) to provide a rapid mechanism for local programme beneficiaries to implement response activities. As this approach at the project level has worked well in several contexts it should be viewed as a promising strategy worthy of replication in more settings and tested as a programme-level component. Alternatively, or in addition, more formal links with existing emergency response funds (such as the START Fund) could be pursued. In addition, further thinking around emergency preparedness in conflict-affected settings and in urban contexts is needed.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.6 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** To leverage the global momentum around localisation of humanitarian response and build on the contribution of DEPP in advancing this agenda, more nuanced considerations on localisation are needed. This includes articulating a clear definition of what localisation means, which entities are considered local and what the implications of these definitions are from a practical standpoint. Strategically, laying out and potentially testing approaches which could enable INGOs to take a more supportive role, and better operationalise localisation (move from theoretical to actual). Organisational policies around localisation could be one target, but understanding how to operationalise the policies into actual processes would be an important element. Additionally, the humanitarian landscape in different settings and its relationship to localisation need to be considered to ensure that appropriate, contextually relevant strategies to support localisation are implemented. Finally, localisation from the donor perspective should be further explored to understand strategies which might enable donors to more easily support local counterparts within the context of risk aversion and due diligence processes.

### 3. EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

**CONCLUSION 3:** Collaboration is highly valued and DEPP’s consortia approach was universally deemed to be the most appropriate, preferred delivery mechanism for humanitarian capacity building and emergency preparedness and response activities. There was some evidence that the consortia model enabled coordinated, timelier response in some settings. Globally, effectiveness of consortia could be increased in future programmes through a smaller, more strategic set of consortia members, improved communication, opportunities for better coordination of activities, and provision of sufficient resources for strategic and organised collaborations. Inclusion of more L/NNGOs within the consortia could contribute to the localisation agenda. Network analyses demonstrated evidence of strengthened humanitarian response networks in the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, while the network in Myanmar remained unchanged. A range of different types of emergency preparedness and response networks exist in these countries, from highly isolated (Myanmar) to highly distributed, locally led (The Philippines). In any future programme aiming to strengthen networks, these differences in the size, scope and priorities of networks across countries should be appropriately considered during the
both design and implementation. Humanitarian landscapes and existing networks across focal
countries should be considered, particularly in the design of the projects and at the programme
level to leverage existing collaborations and local partnerships. Targeting of network members
for capacity building and evidence sharing should be more strategic and include relevant key
influencers.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** In future programmes,
refine and optimise the consortium model building on lessons from the DEPP, ensuring
context-specific considerations. Working effectively with collaborative structures in the
future will require better understanding of what types of consortia are appropriate and
effective within different contexts. Overarching factors which should be incorporated
in programmes of this nature include supporting collaborative structures that build on
existing successful relationships and that work with a smaller number of members, and
that work towards strategic collaborations. To increase the speed of decision-making and
effectiveness of consortia, streamlined contracting and reporting processes should be
established. Ensuring L/NGOs are included in consortia, and assessment of strategies to
address risk aversion among donors to supporting such consortia are needed.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.2 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** Network assessments
could better inform targeted strategies to enhance collaboration and to effectively
strengthen emergency preparedness and response networks. Country-specific network
mapping and assessments should be undertaken, when appropriate, to facilitate the use
of more targeted approaches to building networks and partnerships, such as through the
identification and targeting of key influencers. Deeper exploration on the level of influence
and role of different organisations (i.e., as resource hubs, knowledge brokers etc.) within
the network in focal countries would be extremely valuable to inform strategies around
which organisations to target and how. These assessments could also enable optimisation
of collaboration with local and national actors. For example, localisation efforts could be
refined in the Philippines where national NGOs are already very strongly involved within
emergency preparedness and response networks.

### 4. EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM)

**CONCLUSION 4:** Good indicators of cost economy were evident, but in some cases project
budgets were too lean with insufficient resources for consortia management and collaborative
activities. At the portfolio level, resources dedicated to portfolio management and collaboration,
M&E and to NPACs were insufficient with respect to desired programme objectives. In future
programmes, more strategic allocation of funds should be undertaken. In addition, systems and
resources for governance, strategy, portfolio management, decision-making and consortium
arrangements should be restructured to improve efficiency. Adaptive management processes
permitted course correction and revisions of project plans to reflect changing contexts, and
VFM reporting improved over the course of the programme. Future programmes should better
adopt and standardise VFM indicators in order to collect data for internal project purposes,
cross-project comparisons and general learning. There were no strong VFM findings to suggest
that emergency preparedness improved the efficiency of humanitarian response within the
programme duration.

**RECOMMENDATION 4.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD]** Streamline contractual
processes, management decisions and flow of funds. While recognising the importance
of subcontracting processes and organisations’ internal procedures, future programming
should take steps to minimise and streamline contractual processes. For example, pre-
agreement letters of commitment could help clarify some contractual issues prior to the
start of projects. The programme management could also provide a template for sub-
contracts and consider setting a standard timeline for contract turnaround. If projects are structured with a global grant holder and in-country host or partner, streamlining management decisions and flow of funds so that the same organisation serves in both roles whenever possible could be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 4.2 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND PROJECTS] Adopt and standardise VFM indicators at programme and project levels and implement routine reporting. DFID guidance on VFM in humanitarian programmes or other relevant VFM guidance should be used to enhance VFM monitoring and reporting in future programmes. Adopting VFM indicators at the programme level, as well as the project level will ensure that VFM can be closely tracked and analysed at both levels.

RECOMMENDATION 4.3 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD] In a future programme, strategically allocate funds to achieve programme objectives, with greater funds designated for programme management costs, M&E and NPACs. For a large portfolio, programme management costs should be in the range of around 10%, to enable sufficient resources to undertake its key functions of management, M&E and strategic tasks. NPACs can be up to 20% and as high as 25%, but should be considered realistically to ensure that in-country and back office costs are covered. With respect to M&E, ensure sufficient resources are available at the both the programme and project levels to efficiently implement both routine monitoring and more rigorous evaluations.

5. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTION AND LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME

CONCLUSION 5: In some settings, DEPP has contributed to strengthening national emergency preparedness systems but typically on a small geographic scale, and by individual project consortia. There have been several concrete examples where DEPP has impacted government policies or systems or increased political commitment. Stakeholders noted a shift in the way organisations consider, address and involve local actors and communities, and attributed it as one of DEPP’s most significant contributions. However, there was a lack of a detailed strategy for the inclusion of gender and prioritised target groups at the programme level resulting in a fragmented programme wide approach and uneven results. In addition, cross-cutting themes such as addressing VAWG were not adequately integrated into the programme. Rather than only including one or two projects with an inclusion and protection focus within a portfolio, a more integrated approach involving mainstreaming across the programme should be prioritised. This should entail dissemination of detailed expectations and guidelines on inclusion of gender and other prioritised groups and reporting requirements during the design phase to ensure that projects are developed accordingly. As well, consistency in implementation of gender and inclusion considerations with regular monitoring should be established. In addition to inclusion, sustainability planning was weak and was not clearly planned or documented at both the programme and project levels. This failure seems to have been linked to expectations around the possibility of receiving additional funds from DFID for a second phase of the DEPP, as articulated in the business case, combined with lack of guidance from the programme on sustainability. In any future programme, more deliberate, strategic sustainability planning is needed at all levels, beginning during the design phase, and with transparency around the possibility of further funding. At the programme level, there is some evidence that benefits have become embedded – with examples of system and policy change as well as strengthened national preparedness systems, albeit on a small geographic scale. However, the potential for longer-term effects is dependent on the extent to which different components are able to continue beyond the close of the programme. Future programmes should prioritise longer implementation peri-
ods to increase likelihood of impact, and incorporate government collaboration, systems-level change, policy or advocacy components, involvement of beneficiaries and good VFM in order to promote sustainability.

RECOMMENDATION 5.1 [DEPP PROGRAMME BOARD AND PROJECTS] Develop a strategy for inclusion of gender and prioritised target groups at programme level, ensure projects adopt an approach which aligns with this strategy and monitor implementation at all levels. In the governance criteria, consider broadening the gender statement to a statement on inclusion of prioritised target groups. Develop guidelines for projects on requirements for this statement. This could include links to key documents on best practices and the law and policies governing inclusion of prioritised target groups in development programming and project design. Ensure gender considerations are consistently implemented and reported.

RECOMMENDATION 5.2: [DEPP PROGRAMME AND PROJECTS] Within any future programme, integrate deliberate, strategic sustainability planning that takes a more holistic view on sustainability going beyond simply securing funding streams. Programme and project sustainability plans should be developed as early as possible, preferably in the design phase and updated regularly. However, for riskier projects with a high possibility of failure, sustainability planning does not make sense and is not a good use of resources until results can be demonstrated. Future programmes should increase the likelihood of sustainability and longer-term impacts by building on previous efforts and existing partnerships/consortia, working with governments (when appropriate), incorporating a policy or advocacy element, developing sustainable outputs such as tools, guidelines or systems, increasing cross-project linkages, fostering sustainable relationships that can continue beyond the DEPP, improving beneficiary engagement, and strengthening feedback mechanisms for the community. Good VFM should also be prioritised to maximise sustainability. Programme visibility at the country level should be maximised through increased advocacy initiatives and the development of streamlined communication with external stakeholders.