HARVARD HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE

BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL

PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE

UNIVERSITY OF MOSUL

NEVER FORGET

VIEWS ON PEACE and JUSTICE WITHIN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

JUNE 2020

Al-Saiedi A, Coughlin K, Irwani M, Khalil W, Pham PN, Vinck P. *Never Forget – Views on peace and justice within conflict-affected communities in northern Iraq*. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. June 2020.

Cover:
Children playing in an IDP camp, Erbil
© Patrick Vinck

Design:
Patrick Vinck with support from Michael de St. Aubin

This study was conducted as part of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Peace and Human Rights Data Program.

The **Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI)** is a university-wide initiative with a mission to advance the science and practice of humanitarian response worldwide through research and education. HHI serves as the humanitarian arm of Harvard University and brings an interdisciplinary approach to building the evidence base of humanitarian studies and professionalizing the field of humanitarian aid. Through its research and educational programs, HHI is an influential forum for humanitarian innovation, effectiveness, and leadership.

HHI's **Peace and Human-Rights Data Program uses** rigorous quantitative and qualitative research methods to assess needs, perceptions and behaviors among individuals affected by conflict and other forms of violence, with a focus on justice, peacebuilding, and social cohesion. The program builds local research capacity in countries experiencing complex emergencies and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law to ensure that the views and needs of the populations are recognized and addressed by governments, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to the respondents who shared their stories and the interviewers from Duhok and Mosul Universities who worked under difficult circumstances to gather these stories.

This research was made possible with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. We are thankful to Marieke Wierda for her direct support to this project. The sponsor, however, had no role in the design, analysis and interpretation of the results or in the decision to publish. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinion of the sponsor or the institutions involved.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

NEVER FORGET

VIEWS ON PEACE and JUSTICE WITHIN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

JUNE 2020
(DATA COLLECTED SPRING 2019)

ABDULRAZZAQ AL-SAIEDI
KEVIN COUGHLIN
MUSLIH IRWANI
WAAD IBRAHIM KHALIL
PHUONG N PHAM
PATRICK VINCK

HARVARD HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE – BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOPSITAL – PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE – UNIVERSITY OF MOSUL

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES

Between 2014 and 2017, jihadists from the Islamic State (IS) seized vast areas of northern Iraq before, ultimately, being defeated by an Iraqi-led coalition after a brutal civil war. At the height of the conflict, IS controlled over 10 percent of Iraq's territory, including Nineveh Governorate and parts of Al-Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates in the northwestern part of the country. Under its brutal regime and extreme ideology, civilians, particularly minorities, were targeted for forced conversion, mass killing, abduction, and sexual slavery. Mosul, the second largest city of Iraq, capital of Nineveh Governorate, and center of the so-called IS Caliphate, became a symbol of the bitter and prolonged fight against IS, leaving the city plundered, empty, and destroyed by the time it was liberated in early 2017.

The territorial defeat of IS has not brought an easy peace to the region. The sectarian divisions and mistrust in the Iraqi Government that fueled IS's rapid rise have continued to plague peacebuilding efforts. At the same time, attempts to confront the legacy of IS atrocities, including the genocide of Yazidis, have stalled, with limited progress toward accountability and reparations for victims. To date, survivors of IS have had few opportunities to express their views and opinions about how to deal with the past violence, what justice means to them, and, if possible and desired, how justice can be achieved. To fill that gap, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative collaborated with the Public Policy Institute in Iraq and the University of Mosul to assess perceptions of justice and accountability within communities affected by the conflict in northern Iraq, with a focus on Nineveh Governorate, which has one of the most diverse populations in Iraq.

This report presents an analysis of views on peace and justice within two population groups: (1) internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Nineveh who currently reside in or outside of camps in Nineveh and the surrounding governorates of Duhok and Erbil, and (2) residents of the city of Mosul and residents in surrounding areas outside of Mosul city. A total of more than five thousand randomly selected adults were interviewed over a three-month period in early 2019. Conceptually, this research concentrates on the link between the demand for justice and trust in institutions that serve the population. The results outlined in this report show that despite other significant priorities, there is a strong demand to establish the truth about what happened, including factors leading to the rise of IS, and to hold accountable as well as severely punish a broad set of actors for their actions during the conflict. Although trust in national institutions, including the ordinary justice system, is low and international support is viewed positively, there is a demand for accountability mechanisms that are accessible and local. These general findings constitute the body of the report, following a brief background and methodological sections.

Figure 1:
Map of Iraq's governorates and areas occupied by IS



CONTEXT

TURBULENCE IN POLITICS AND SECURITY SINCE THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. On April 9, 2003, Baghdad, Iraq's capital and political epicenter fell to U.S. forces, thereby marking the official collapse of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime that had long controlled nearly every aspect of Iraqi society for more than 24 years. The collapse of the regime and the subsequent occupation by U.S. forces, however, led to further destabilization, ultimately inciting insurgent operations against Iraqi national forces, coalition forces, and civilians across the country. Since this time (2003), Iraq has experienced political turbulence and violence unprecedented in both frequency and nature.[1]

Following the collapse of Saddam and the Ba'athist regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)—a transitional government established by the United States and other nations—began implementing a series of vetting and disqualification policies, including de-Ba'athification. On May 16, 2003, the CPA issued order No.1, removing high-ranking members of the Ba'ath Party from the public sector,[2] and then a few days later, on May 23, issued order No.2, disbanding the Iraqi army and other security organizations.[3] As a result, tens of thousands of Ba'athists as well as hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers, security officers, and educators suddenly lost their jobs and much of the power, privilege and income they had enjoyed during Saddam's Ba'athist regime. This massive security vacuum provided opportunities for insurgent groups to form and gain new recruits.[4]

On July 13, 2003, the CPA established the Governing Council to serve as the temporary Iraqi administration. The 25-member council appointed by the CPA used a governing formula based on Iraq's ethno-sectarian proportions. As a result, 13 Arab Shi'a, 5 Arab Sunni, 5 Kurds, 1 Christian and 1 Turkmen were appointed to the Council.[5] This power-sharing formula has been applied to every governmental body established in Iraq since 2003. Power-sharing, however, helped unveil deep rifts within Iraqi society, with most Sunnis rejecting the Shi'a majority's governance of the country and sparking a wave of sectarian violence.[6]

Taking advantage of Sunni disempowerment, anger, and the security vacuum left in the wake of U.S. de-Ba'athification, vetting and both disqualification policies and domestic politics, Al-Qaeda, the militant organization founded by Osama bin Laden, gained a foothold in Iraq in 2004. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and officially established the militia group, *Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*, otherwise known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[7] Up until Zarqawi's death in 2006, Zarqawi and AQI galvanized many Sunni insurgents, including former members of the Ba'ath regime and security forces, to conduct widescale attacks against military, governmental and civilian targets. One such attack was the destruction of the Alaskarri Shrine in Samara, considered one of the holiest shrines in Shi'a Islam, on October 22, 2005. This particular attack sparked widespread sectarian violence, triggering one of the most violent chapters of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi'a in Iraqi history.[8]

While both sectarian violence and civilian deaths overall decreased after 2007,[9] Iraq was not free from strife, violence, and displacement. The government's inability to provide security, stability, and protection remained. The withdrawal of American forces, announced by U.S. President Barack

Obama on August 31, 2010, contributed to the creation of another security vacuum that Iraqi forces were ill-equipped to fill. Politically, socially, and economically, Iraq's Sunnis continued to feel marginalized. In 2012 and 2013, Sunni protests against then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's policies resulted in clashes with Iraqi security forces. Unfortunately, many underlying grievances that sparked those protests remain unaddressed. After several changes in leadership, the extremist group formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) found itself under the leadership of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who subsequently rebranded the group as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

THE ISLAMIC STATE

In 2014, ISIL took control of Fallujah and other towns in Anbar Governorate. Then, on June 10, 2014, after forcing thousands of Iraqi security forces to retreat, ISIL attacked and gained control over the city of Mosul in Nineveh Governorate of northern Iraq. They then swept across the west and north of Iraq, attacking and occupying other major cities, including Tikrit and Biji.[10] Shortly thereafter, on June 28, 2014, Al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of a caliphate in the territories occupied by ISIL. In doing so, Al-Baghdadi also officially changed the name of ISIL to the Islamic State (IS) and chose Mosul as the caliphate's capital.[11] By August 2014, IS occupied nearly one-third of Iraq, stretching from the Syrian and Jordanian borders to the outskirts of Baghdad.[12]

In practice, IS imposed a radical version of the Islamic Shari'a—Islamic religious law principally based upon the teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad—upon its followers and others within its occupied territories. According to this interpretation of Shari'a, non-Sunni Muslims and other minority religious groups were considered apostates. No ethno-religious group was spared. IS targeted anyone, regardless of ethnicity or religion, who refused to adhere to their extremist ideology, including, among others, Iraq's Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidi, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Shabak, Sunnis, Shi'as, and Christians.[13]

Iraq's Yazidi population, a minority ethno-religious group indigenous to northern Iraq known for its unique religious beliefs and practices, was specifically targeted by IS and was subjected to extreme violence, crimes, and abuse. In August 2014, IS attacked the Yazidi homeland of Sinjar, committing massive human rights violations against the Yazidi community.[14] Thousands of Yazidi women and girls were forced into sexual enslavement, and men were systematically murdered. The crimes committed by IS (and some local tribes who endorsed IS) were later classified by the United Nations as genocide.[15] At the time of writing, more than 3,000 Yazidi women and children remain missing.[16]

On September 10, 2014, following the Islamic State's attack on Sinjar, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the U.S. military plan to fight IS in Iraq and Syria.[17] The same month, the Global Coalition against Daesh, a partnership consisting of 82 countries, was established to counter and defeat IS.[18] On the frontlines, the coalition would be led by Iraqi armed forces and counter-terrorism teams. The Iraqi forces, with the assistance of coalition forces, would move from province to province liberating territories from IS control. On July 10, 2017, the Iraqi Government announced the liberation of Mosul and the surrounding areas,[19] and over three years after the attack on Sinjar, on December 9, 2017, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, announced the full liberation of Iraqi territories from IS.[20]

The Islamic State's occupation of Mosul city and other Iraqi territories is considered one of the most tenuous and politically fraught periods in Iraqi history. It is a period marked by gross human rights violations, massive infrastructural damage, especially in Mosul and Nineveh Governorate, as well as overwhelming population displacement, with nearly 3.5 million internally displaced at its peak in 2016.[21]

CITY OF MOSUL

With a population of more than 1.8 million, Mosul is the second largest city in Iraq. [22] A diverse city in itself, Mosul is home to, among others, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidi, Chaldeans, Assyrians and Shabak. Sunni Muslims are the largest religious sect in the city, with smaller populations of Shi'a Muslims, Christians, and Yazidi throughout. Affectionately called the "mother of two springs", Mosul was a popular tourist destination, well-known for its strong educational institutions, cultural diversity and rich history.

The character of the city itself and life for Maslawis—Mosul residents—significantly changed under IS occupation. After assuming control of the city, in June 2014, IS issued "The Madina (City) Document" stipulating the rules governing territories under IS control.[23] For three years (2014 – 2017), Maslawis were subjected to the most stringent interpretation of Shari'a law: international crimes against civilians were committed;[24] property was confiscated; journalists were kidnapped and executed;[25] television stations, newspapers and other media organizations were shut down;[26] educational institutions closed their doors; women were prevented from working in certain jobs and studying certain subjects;[27] and ancient archaeological heritage and religious sites were systematically destroyed.[28]

The face of Mosul was also further changed by the military operation to liberate the city from IS control. From October 2016 to July 2017, the Battle of Mosul, a coordinated effort between Iraqi and coalition forces, caused widespread infrastructural damage and loss of life. Coalition airstrikes and IS resistance reduced much of the city to rubble, with Mosul's Old City seeing the greatest destruction.[29] Reports indicated that approximately 9,000 people were killed during the fight to liberate Mosul.[30] By July 2017, over a million Maslawis had been displaced due to occupation and fighting in Mosul.[31]

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Since the conflict with IS began in 2014, Iraq has experienced waves of displacement and return, typically following the loss and regaining of territory from the Islamic State. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the conflict with IS caused the displacement of nearly 6 million Iraqis, roughly 15% of Iraq's overall population.[32] And while IS has been territorially defeated, millions of Iraqis remain displaced and the future of those who have returned to their area of origin remains uncertain. The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) for Iraq shows that, as of the time of this writing, over 1.4 million Iraqis remain internally displaced while 4.5 million have returned to their area of origin.[33] Meanwhile, the latest figures from the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC)—an institution established by the KRG to assess, monitor and manage the displacement crisis in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)—reveal that over 787,000 internally displaced Iraqis are residing in either formal camps or with host communities in KRI, with the majority in the Erbil (354,524) governorate.[34] Overall, the displaced population in KRI reflects northern Iraq's ethno-religious diversity—40% of the IDP population is Arab Sunni,

30% Yazidi, 13% Kurdish, 7% Christian, and 10% are a mix of Shi'a, Turkmen, and other smaller ethno-religious minorities.[35]

JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY POST-SADDAM REGIME

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) sought criminal accountability against senior members of the Saddam regime. A special Iraqi court was established for this purpose, known first as the Iraqi Special Tribunal and later as the Iraqi High Tribunal. The tribunal had jurisdiction over major international crimes committed from July 17, 1968 (when the Ba'ath party seized power in Iraq), to May 1, 2003 (the end of the Ba'ath party's rule). Saddam Hussein and dozens of regime officials were tried and convicted for committing international crimes, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.[36]

From its inception, the Iraqi High Tribunal and other transitional justice initiatives led by the CPA were ill-conceived and poorly implemented. The success and impact of the initiatives were greatly inhibited by the country's lack of security after the U.S. invasion and, by extension, were weakened by allegations of illegitimacy due to U.S. influence.[37] Moreover, the CPA was over-reliant on the expertise and influence of Iraqi exiles in informing transitional justice in a country they had only just returned to, failed to consult conflict-affected Iraqi communities and local institutions to better understand needs and potential challenges, and ignored lessons learned from other countries' contexts. Altogether, these missteps further fueled the perception that the transitional justice initiatives were illegitimate and prejudiced.[38] Seen as a form of punitive collective punishment against the country's Ba'athists, the transitional justice initiatives were largely perceived through a sectarian lens: with newfound strength, Shi'a nationalists felt empowered, while Sunni populations suddenly felt they were being specifically targeted and marginalized.[39]

In 2005, Iraqi policymakers issued Law No. 13, the Anti-terrorism Law, a response to the unprecedented scale and number of terrorist attacks experienced post-2003. At the time, the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedures was insufficiently equipped to address the crime of terrorism; hence a new law was deemed necessary. The Central Criminal Court (counter-terrorism court), established by the CPA in 2003, was charged with the implementation of the new law, which was criticized because of its vague definition of "terrorism."[40] Despite its controversial past, the 2005 Anti-terrorism Law is still in effect and is currently being used to prosecute members and affiliates of Islamic radical groups, including those of the Islamic State.

JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY POST-IS

In 2017, the Government of Iraq (GoI), in response to public demand and a recognition of their limited capacity to conduct a thorough investigation, requested United Nations assistance to hold the Islamic State (IS) accountable for their crimes. In response, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2379, thereby establishing an independent investigative team to collect, preserve and store evidence of crimes committed by IS in Iraq that could amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.[41] Specific language was added to the resolution to respect Iraq's sovereignty such that the GoI could maintain a key role in the process of documentation, investigation, and prosecution, although the resolution does not state that the perpetrators of the international crimes should be prosecuted in Iraq.[42] At this time, evidence-gathering is continuing, with efforts focusing primarily on

(1) IS attacks against Yazidi in Sinjar, (2) crimes committed by IS in Mosul, and (3) the mass killing of Iraqi Army cadets at Camp Speicher in Tikrit.[43]

Concurrently, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), having accepted millions of internally displaced Iraqis, established a special committee, the Committee for Investigation and Gathering Evidences (CIGE), led by an investigative judge, to obtain evidence of the crimes committed by IS against the Yazidi and other minorities on and after August 3, 2014, in Sinjar and Nineveh Plain.[44] Since the CIGE does not have any arrest or prosecutorial powers, the goal of the Committee is to bring evidence and cases before international courts. Despite mounting evidence of international crimes, however, there continues to be disagreement, both internationally and nationally, about which courts should prosecute IS crimes. To date, the CIGE has documented more than 2,500 cases.[45]

These efforts to investigate, document, and prosecute IS members for their crimes are not without their shortcomings. For example, the UN investigative team's mandate is to investigate only crimes committed by IS in Iraq, while ignoring crimes that might have been committed by other entities and actors,[46] potentially the Iraqi security forces, Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), Peshmerga, or coalition forces. The Iraqi Penal Code does not cover most international crimes, and its coverage of sexual and other gender-based violence is severely limited, failing to meet international standards.[47] In addition, individuals are being tried under Iraq's counter-terrorism laws, which do not distinguish between involuntary and voluntary IS actors, or between those who may be loosely affiliated with IS and those who committed crimes on behalf of IS.[48]

Testimonial evidence suggests that these counter-terrorism trials do not satisfy international legal standards. They are often characterized by defendants without lawyers to represent them, a notable absence of victim and family participation, and trials often lasting less than 10 minutes.[49] In such circumstances, it has been unclear what evidentiary standards were being used to prosecute IS suspects and how such suspects were able to defend themselves. As of spring 2019, some Iraqi counter-terrorism courts have started to implement higher evidentiary standards; however, these new standards are not being applied universally across Iraq, and evidence of forced confessions, torture, and speedy trials continue to be uncovered by local and international human rights organizations.[50] According to UN estimates, about 55,000 IS fighters and their families have been detained in Iraq and Syria, with nationalities representing approximately 50 countries.[51]

Figure 2: Study area and distribution of sampling sites



THE STUDY

DESIGN AND SAMPLING

This study captures the needs, perceptions and attitudes of conflict-affected communities in northern Iraq as they relate to peacebuilding, transitional justice efforts, and ethno-religious relations after the military defeat of the Islamic State. The study focused particularly on the city of Mosul and internally displaced persons (IDP) from Nineveh Governorate who currently reside both within and outside of camps in the Nineveh, Erbil, and Duhok governorates. In particular, the study aimed to collect relevant and reliable data on issues described below.

A mixed-methods approach was used for this study, which included consultations with local and international organizations, key informant interviews, and a population-based quantitative survey among 5,213 randomly selected adult Iraqis. To address the diversity of northern Iraq's ethno-religious groups and their varying experiences with the Islamic State, the survey was designed to provide results representative of the region's ethno-religious populations and to be disaggregated by gender. Data were collected from January to March 2019 among four key population groups (see figure 3):

1. Residents of Mosul randomly selected to represent the population at the level of municipal subdivisions (Mosul city residents);
2. Residents of areas surrounding Mosul city, randomly selected in 3 areas to serve as a comparison group (residents outside of Mosul city);
3. Internally displaced persons from Nineveh living in camps (IDPs in camps, randomly selected from camps in the Erbil, Duhok, and Nineveh Governorates;
4. Internally displaced persons from Nineveh not living in-camps (IDPs not in camps), randomly selected from a list of sites of IDPs not in camps provided by IOM in Erbil and Duhok governorates.

The selection of respondents for the survey was based on a random sampling procedure. The procedure varied slightly depending on study sites:

- Mosul city residents: A total of ten randomly selected sets of geographic coordinates (GPS points) were generated for each of the seven inhabited sectors of the city of Mosul, using a geographic information system. The coordinates were mapped to generate an approximate address using street intersections or landmarks for reference. Once at the location, interviewers randomly chose a direction and selected every fifth dwelling. The sampling goal was to conduct a total of 24 interviews (12 men and 12 women) at each point, for a total of 240 per sector and 1,680 in the city of Mosul. In the end, 1,739 interviews were conducted in the city.

- Residents outside of Mosul city: A total of ten randomly selected sets of geographic coordinates (GPS points) were generated for three selected areas outside of Mosul city. Once at the location, interviewers randomly chose a direction and selected every fifth dwelling. The goal was to conduct 24 interviews (12 men and 12 women) at each point, or 240 per area, resulting in 720 interviews in total among residents outside of Mosul city. Because the selected areas were small, the actual sample size was smaller—493 randomly selected adults, but nevertheless enough for the purpose. of comparison.

- **IDPs in camp:** The latest data from the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were used to identify a total of 31 camps hosting IDPs from Nineveh governorate. We randomly selected 15 camps using a probability sampling procedure accounting for the size of the camps. Camps are organized in blocks. Teams of interviewers were randomly assigned to each block to conduct a minimum of 4 interviews per day, for a total objective of 120 interviews per camp (60 with men and 60 with women), with a total objective of 1,800 interviews. Interviews could not be completed in two of the camps because of the presence of IS family members with a resulting security risk for the interviewers. As a result, only 1,575 interviews were conducted with IDPs in camps.

- **IDPs not in camps:** The latest data from IOM (mid-2018) available at the time of the survey were used to identify a total of 10 subdistricts with identified IDPs residing not in camps. From this list, we randomly selected 5 subdistricts, proportionate to the IDP population size in each subdistrict. Within the subdistricts, we randomly selected 3 sites (neighborhoods) identified by IOM as hosting IDPs, proportionate to the IDP population size. In one subdistrict, we selected four sites due to the small population at each site. Once at the site, interviewers randomly selected a direction and approached every fifth household. If the household did not host IDPs, they were skipped. The target sample size for each site was 240 interviews (120 with men and 120 with women), for a total of 1,200 interviews. Because of the small number of IDPs present at each site, an additional 9 sites (neighborhoods) were sampled, resulting in a final sample size of 1,406 IDPs not living in camps.

Figure 3: Sample by study groups



INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

The research team designed and developed a standardized, semi-structured questionnaire and consent form in English, Arabic, and Kurdish, after consulting with local experts and representatives from NGOs, government, and academic institutions, including the University of Mosul. The resulting questionnaire consisted of 14 sections:

1. Demographics and wealth
2. Immediate priorities, services
3. Security
4. Communication
5. Peace
6. Accountability
7. Justice
8. Truth
9. Resilience and self-esteem
10. Community relationships
11. Governance
12. Displacement
13. Exposure to violence and its effects
14. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Respondents were asked open-ended questions without the enumerator's suggesting answers, except in some cases in which a scaling format was used (e.g., the Likert scale, ranging from very good to very bad). For non-scaled questions, response options based on pilot interviews were provided to the enumerator for coding, but enumerators did not read these options to respondents. If responses for non-scaled questions could not be accurately coded, an open-ended answer option was available for enumerators to record responses. Prior to data collection, the study instruments were validated using pilot surveys to ensure translation accuracy, clarity of questions and answers, as well as cultural and conflict sensitivity.

Once final, the questionnaire was programmed into Nexus 7 tablets using KoBoToolbox, a free and open source data collection and management tool developed by the lead researchers, Drs. Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham. By using tablets, enumerators were able to collect data quicker, and built-in verification and prevention systems reduced the risk of entering erroneous values and ensured that no questions were skipped, thus resulting in higher quality data.

DATA COLLECTION

Data collection took place over a nine week-period from January 24, 2019, to March 31, 2019. Three teams, each consisting of a team leader and subteams of male and female enumerators, implemented the study under the guidance of the lead researchers and study supervisors. The enumerators were either University of Mosul students, University of Duhok students, or professionals with research experience. The teams were divided according to their governorate of residence: Nineveh, Erbil, or Duhok. Prior to data collection, the enumerators were required to participate in a five-day training workshop led by Dr. Vinck that explained the objectives and content of the study, survey and interview techniques, use of tablets for digital data collection, troubleshooting and methods for solving potential technical problems. The training included mock interviews and concluded by pilot-testing with randomly selected individuals at non-sample sites.

At each study location, the enumerators were required to conduct four interviews per day. The interviews were conducted one-on-one, anonymously, and in confidential settings. The enumerators had no prior contact with the participants before the interview. At the end of each day of data collection, the data were synchronized to a central encrypted server, enabling the lead researchers and study supervisors to monitor data for completion and consistency and to identify outliers. If any issues arose during the quality check, the

lead researchers and study supervisors would discuss these issues with the enumerator teams before the next day of data collection. Once data collection was completed, the database was imported into Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) for data analysis. The results presented here are adjusted for the complex sample design and weighted to correct known disproportionate stratification of the sample and unequal probability of selection, down to the household-level.

LIMITATIONS

As with any other social science research, we must also acknowledge some of the study's limitations.

First, the study sample was designed and developed rigorously to be representative of the adult populations directly affected by the conflict with IS in northern Iraq, resulting in a sample size of 5,213 respondents. Some selected individuals could not or refused to be interviewed because of lack of time, fatigue from participating in previous humanitarian surveys and other reasons. Additionally, the enumerators encountered difficulties finishing the interviews with IDPs in camps in south Mosul, where the IS family members are currently displaced. Given the perceived affiliation with IS, the enumerators expressed discomfort and had concerns about personal safety, which could have impacted the impartiality and accuracy of the results. While it is unknown how the responses from these individuals would have differed from the sampled individuals, the sampling approach was designed to reduce any potential for selection bias. Results are representative of the adult population at the time of the survey. Opinions may change over time.

Second, the study relied on a self-reported method of data collection. Consequently, there are several factors that may have affected the quality and validity of the data, including inaccurate recall of past events, misunderstanding of questions and / or concepts, reactivity to the enumerator due to the sensitive nature of some questions, or intentional misreporting (e.g., avoiding socially unacceptable answers). Given that some IDPs are in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and some of the respondents are Kurds, their answers regarding questions about the Kurdish government or Peshmerga might be affected by this social desirability bias. We minimized such risks through a careful, iterative development of the questionnaire to ensure questions were clearly understood and to reduce potential biases.

PARTICIPANTS' PROFILES

By design, the survey included an equal proportion of men and women among respondents for all study groups. About three out of four respondents were married among IDPs in camps (74%) and not in camps (77%) as well as among residents outside of Mosul city (74%). The percentage of married residents was lower among Mosul city residents (69%). The average age of respondents ranged from 36 to 39 depending on the study groups, with IDPs in camps younger on average than respondents in the other groups. IDPs were, on average, less likely to be literate compared to Mosul residents. One in three IDPs in camps (32%) indicated having no formal education, compared to 21% among IDPs not in camps, 8% among Mosul city residents and 7% among residents outside of Mosul city.. Unsurprisingly, IDPs were also more likely to be unemployed, especially when residing in camps (29%) rather than not in camps (15%) and, in comparison with Mosul city residents (8%) and residents outside of Mosul city (7%).

There were important differences in the religious composition of the sample by study site. Among Mosul city residents, Sunni Muslims accounted for most of the sample (60%), with another 37% describing themselves as Muslim, without distinguishing different sects. Residents outside of Mosul city were more diverse. Of these residents, 34% identified as Yazidi, while 24% identified as Christian, 20% as Shi'a Muslim and 6% as Sunni Muslim. In addition, another 16% of residents outside of Mosul city described themselves as Muslim without identifying their sect.

In contrast, among the IDP populations residing in camps, Yazidis accounted for half the sample (50%) and Sunni Muslims (38%) and Muslims (only) (10%) largely composed the remainder. As for the IDPs residing outside of designated camps, largely in urban areas, Yazidis and Sunni Muslims accounted for two-thirds of the sample (33% and 32%, respectively). Christians and Muslims (only) accounted for 19% and 15%, respectively, of the IDP population not in camps. Shi'a Muslims represented 1% of IDPs in camps as well as 1% not in camps.

Figure 4: Participants profile

Mosul city residents

Gender:	50% Women
Age (mean):	38.2 years old
Civil status:	67% married
Education:	8% none
	13% illiterate
Employment:	8% none
Religion:	60% Sunni Muslim
	37% Muslim
	3% Shia Muslim

Residents outside of Mosul city

Gender:	50% Women
Age (mean):	39.2 years old
Civil status:	74% married
Education:	7% none
	6% illiterate
Employment:	7% none
Religion:	34% Yazidi
	24% Christian
	20% Shia Muslim
	16% Muslim
	6% Sunni Muslim

IDPs in camps

Gender:	50% Women
Age (mean):	35.6 years old
Civil status:	74% married
Education:	32% none
	37% illiterate
Employment:	29% none
Religion:	50% Yazidi
	38% Sunni Muslim
	10% Muslim
	1% Shia Muslim

IDPs not in camps

Gender:	50% Women
Age (mean):	38.1 years old
Civil status:	77% married
Education:	21% none
	25% illiterate
Employment:	15% none
Religion:	33% Yazidi
	32% Sunni Muslim
	19% Christian
	15% muslim
	1% Shia Muslim

RESULTS

PRIORITIES: RESPONDENTS PRIORITIZED SECURITY, LIVELIHOODS AND THE SATISFACTION OF BASIC NEEDS BUT ALSO EXPRESSED STRONG DESIRE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRUTH.

PRIORITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

When asked about their current priorities, the two most cited concerns among all surveyed groups were the need to improve security and the availability of jobs and employment opportunities, with only Mosul city residents citing the need for jobs and employment (56%) over improved security (45%). The satisfaction of basic services was the third most-cited concern among the surveyed groups, aside from respondents residing in IDP camps, who were more likely to express concern for the return of IDPs to their home areas (41%) over the need for basic services (34%). IDPs, in general, were more likely than Mosul residents to highlight the return of IDPs to their home areas as a priority concern. Concerns over the satisfaction of basic needs and services such as reconstruction, education and access to healthcare were also mentioned frequently by respondents as a priority. Few respondents, however, mentioned peacebuilding, fighting corruption, rule of law, justice, or fighting sectarianism as a major concern. This hierarchy of needs is common in conflict and post-conflict situations but does not mean that concerns for justice do not exist. In fact, there was a strong desire for accountability among all respondents. The vast majority of those surveyed believed that it was either extremely or very important to hold those responsible for violence accountable, including lower-ranking members of the Islamic State.

The focus on security was reflected when respondents were asked what, if anything, should be done for the Yazidis and other minorities. Most respondents mentioned security (76% of IDPs in camps, 80% of IDPs not in camps, 73% of Mosul city residents and 74% outside of Mosul city). The other two frequently mentioned needs were for services (30% of IDPs in camps, 33% of IDPs not in camps, 25% of Mosul city residents and 27% of residents outside of Mosul city) and reconstruction (36% of IDPs in camps, 37% of IDPs not in camps, 25% of Mosul city residents and 26% of residents outside of Mosul city.

TRUTH

Knowing the truth was also an important issue for the affected communities regardless of their demographic or ethno-religious affiliation. Almost all the IDPs and Mosul residents believed that knowing the truth of what Iraq experienced was either very or extremely important (94% of the IDPs in camps, 97% of IDPs not in camps, 91% of Mosul city residents and 94% outside of Mosul city). Most of the respondents, however, had not heard of truth commissions. After receiving a brief, neutral explanation on what truth commissions are, most of the respondents believed that a commission would be appropriate. However, there was a significant difference between the IDPs and Mosul residents: 87% of the IDPs in camps and 96% of the IDPs not in camps answered with 'yes', while only 70% of Mosul city residents and 66% outside of Mosul city answered 'yes.' Religious minorities were also slightly more interested in having a truth commission (89% of Yazidis, 86% of Christians, 80% Sunni Muslims, 73% of self-identified Muslims, 67% of Shi'a Muslims).

Figure 5: Priorities and importance of truth and accountability





Figure 6: Support for truth commission



MEASURES FOR SURVIVORS

Beyond general priorities, the survey explored what, if anything, should be done for victims as an open-ended question. A large majority of respondents emphasized compensation and reparations (both IDPs in and not in camps, 76%; Mosul city residents, 93%; outside of Mosul, 87%). In addition, security and basic services were also often cited by the respondents, reflecting the general priorities of the population. IDPs expressed a greater concern for security as a measure for victims, likely reflecting the need for security before they could return home. Security was identified by 47% of IDPs in camps and 51% of IDPs not in camps, but only 16% of Mosul city residents and 20% of residents outside of Mosul city. Holding perpetrators accountable was only mentioned by 16% of IDPs in camps, 22% of IDPs not in camps, 10% of Mosul city residents and 12% outside of Mosul city.

Figure 7:
Measures for victims



ACCOUNTABILITY: RESPONDENTS BELIEVED EVERYONE SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE AND ULTIMATELY PUNISHED, INCLUDING LOW-RANKING IS SUPPORTERS AND THOSE IN THE GOVERNMENT WHO ENABLED THE RISE OF IS, NOT JUST THOSE MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLENCE.

BROAD ACCOUNTABILITY

As noted, respondents strongly supported accountability. When asked specifically who should be held accountable, respondents further reinforced this strong desire to hold both lower- and higher-ranking IS members accountable, with 73% of IDPs in camps, 79% of IDPs not in camps, 54% of Mosul city residents, and 48% of residents outside of Mosul city indicating that "all IS members" should be held accountable. Respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they did not believe that it was sufficient to hold only senior Islamic State members accountable for their crimes.

While IDPs were more likely than Mosul residents to believe that all IS members should be held accountable, Mosul residents, in contrast, were more likely than IDPs to believe that national political officials should be held accountable for their role(s) in causing the conflict. One out of two Mosul residents (50% of Mosul city residents and 49% of residents outside of Mosul city) cited the need to hold national political officials accountable compared to only one in three for IDP populations (35% of IDPs in camps and 32% of IDPs not in camps). Comparably, IDPs were more likely than Mosul residents to want all IS supporters to be held accountable. A possible explanation for the difference is the religious make-up and proximity to IS among Mosul residents and those who were displaced. About 13% of Sunni respondents, who represented 60% of the Mosul residents, mentioned 'accountability for all IS supporters' compared to 22% of the Yazidis, who represented 50% of IDPs in camps.

In line with this broad demand for accountability, few respondents indicated some willingness to grant amnesties or pardons. Mosul residents appeared to be less flexible than IDPs in terms of supporting amnesties: 53% of Mosul city residents and 67% of residents outside of Mosul city compared to 41% of IDPs in camps and 44% of IDPs not in camps stated no one should receive amnesty. However, the IDPs were more inclined to grant amnesties/pardons under certain conditions than Mosul residents: (28% of IDPs in camps; 36% of IDPs not in camps vs. 12% of Mosul city residents and 7% of residents outside of Mosul city).

Generally, the respondents did not show willingness to grant amnesty or pardon to IS leaders, fighters, commanders or even members and supporters. In general, there was a common perception that amnesties and pardons should be reserved for those who were forced to work for IS, families of IS who were not members themselves, those who were not involved in the violence, and children (under 18). Across all these categories, IDPs were more likely than Mosul residents to believe these persons should receive amnesty or pardon. The difference could be partly attributed to the fact that Mosul residents were subjected to the Islamic State's occupation and experienced the conflict much differently than IDPs, who largely fled to the KRI where they would be safer and away from IS rules.

Figure 8:
Who should be held accountable?



Important to hold accountable low-ranking IS members (% very important - extremely important)



Enough to hold accountable only high ranking IS officials. (% yes)



Figure 9: Amnesty or pardon



PERPETRATORS OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Although the topic warrants further investigation given the high prevalence of rape, sexual slavery, forced marriages and other abuses that occurred during the conflict, a majority of the residents (78% of IDPs in camps, 78% of IDPs not in camps, 68% of Mosul city residents, 69% of residents outside of Mosul city) believe that those who committed sexual violence crimes should be prosecuted separately from other perpetrators.

Figure 10:
Should those who committed crimes be held accountable for sexual violence separately from other crimes? (% yes)



HOLDING THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE

As noted above, about one in three IDPs and about half the residents within and outside the city of Mosul said that national political officials responsible for the violence should be held accountable. This may reflect the perception that government policies and widespread corruption were at least partially responsible for the violence. When asked what contributed most to the emergence of the Islamic State, respondents across all surveyed groups were most likely to cite former government policies and corruption as determining factors. Comparatively, Mosul city residents were more likely than the other surveyed groups to refer to former government policies (63%) as a root cause to the Islamic State's formation and ascension. Residents within and outside Mosul city were also more likely than IDP groups to cite the effects of corruption (38% and 42%, respectively) as a root cause. While the narrative around the rise and power of the Islamic State often centered on the group's radical interpretation and brutal implementation of Islamic Shari'a, respondents generally did not attribute the presence of radical groups and ideologies to the group's rise. Instead, respondents were far more likely to highlight issues that are political in nature, such as former government policies, corruption, influence and presence of foreign governments, as well as political parties. At the same time, a majority of respondents across all of the surveyed groups believed that reparations / compensation for victims of IS should be the responsibility of the Iraqi government (IDPs in camps, 79%; IDPs not in camps, 81%; Mosul city residents, 90%; Residents outside of Mosul city, 88%).

Figure 11: Government accountability



FAMILIES OF ISLAMIC STATE MEMBERS

What to do, if anything, with the families of IS members is a complex and sensitive topic in Iraq. As of September 2019, reporting suggests that there are over 370,000 IS-affiliated family members being held in IDP camps isolated from other populations within Iraq.[52] They have been unable to return home, and often lack critical civil documents to travel and receive certain goods and services.[53] Without proper identification, Iraqis are unable to access many goods and services, such as education and welfare, and cannot travel freely throughout the country. However, to receive such documentation, individuals must contact the Iraqi government and undergo a security screening process; though, due to their affiliation with IS (actual or perceived), these family members often do not pass the security screening. In some cases, despite receiving proper approvals and documentation, families are still unable to return to their homes because of perceived affiliations (individual, tribal, familial) to IS.[54] The high level of distrust toward Arab Sunnis has made it quite difficult for some to return home, let alone be accepted by their community once they have returned.[55]

When asked what should happen to the families of the IS members, respondents most often cited the need to hold family members accountable or responsible: 44% of IDPs in camps, 62% of IDPs not in camps, 36% of Mosul city residents, and 44% of residents outside of Mosul city. Following their concerns for accountability, respondents across the surveyed groups, except for residents outside of Mosul city, were also likely to believe that IS family members should be reintegrated into society (Figure12). Conversely, Mosul residents, in particular, were more likely to believe that IS family members should be removed from their current area of residence; 17% of Mosul city residents and 20% of residents outside of Mosul city wanted IS families to be removed from their area of residence, whereas only 6% of IDPs (both in camp and out of camp) expressed the same belief.

While there is some acknowledgment that IS family members *should* be reintegrated into society (Figure 13) respondents also largely did not *want* IS family members to return to their homes. Residents outside of Mosul city were most averse to the idea of reintegrating IS family members to their areas of origin, with only 11% either strongly agreeing or agreeing and 72% either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with their return. IDPs in camps were more likely than other surveyed groups to believe that IS family members should be reintegrated, with 30% either strongly agreeing or agreeing and 47% either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with their return.

Broken down further, Christians, Yazidis, and Shi'a Muslims were less likely to support the return of IS members' families than were Sunni Muslims and self-identified Muslims (no distinction). About seven in ten people among Christians (71%), Yazidi (65%), and Shi'a Muslims (73%) either did not agree or strongly disagreed with the return of IS members' families, while the percentage of Sunni Muslims and self-identified Muslims who either did not agree or strongly disagreed was 52% and 45% respectively.

Combined, Christians, Yazidis and Shi'a Muslims compose about 73% of the residents outside of Mosul city. Since this group might have experienced more systematic and longer suffering, that may partially explain why a very high number of residents outside of Mosul city were strongly against the return of IS members' families.

Figure 12: What should happen to families of IS members?



Figure 13: Do you agree with the return of the IS members' families to their homes?



FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILTY

Most respondents indicated that holding accountable those responsible for the violence had to be achieved with the death penalty. Most believed that the death penalty should be applied to IS leaders: 79% of IDPs in camps, 86% of IDPs not in camps, 82% of Mosul city residents and 86% of residents outside of Mosul city. Other accountability mechanisms such as imprisonment or prosecution by an international or national tribunal were rarely expressed. Across the surveyed groups, respondents, especially IDPs, were also likely to believe that the death penalty should be applied to IS supporters. Conversely, residents within and outside Mosul city were more likely than IDPs to believe that IS supporters should be subject to prison time rather than the death penalty. Support for the death penalty was further assessed by asking respondents if they would forego the death penalty in favor of United Nations support for a judicial probe to assess crimes committed by the Islamic State. Over two-thirds of all respondents indicated that it was more important that the death penalty be applied to Islamic State crimes than to have more UN support: 72% of IDPs in camps, 79% of IDPs not in camps, 62% of Mosul city residents and 72% of residents outside of Mosul city favored the death penalty over UN support.

Figure 14:
What is more important: UN support or to be able to impose death penalty even if it means no UN support?



Figure 15: Accountability mechanisms for IS leaders, supporters and government officials responsible for the violence



JUSTICE: DESPITE A STRONG DEMAND FOR CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONDENTS HAD LITTLE FAITH IN THE ORDINARY JUSTICE SYSTEM, OR MORE BROADLY, IN THE INSTITUTIONS THAT SHOULD SERVE THEM. AS A RESULT, FEW BELIEVED JUSTICE WAS POSSIBLE.

THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE

Despite the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq, there has been little progress in establishing a comprehensive justice and accountability framework for survivors.

Meanwhile, domestic legal proceedings continue to prosecute supposed IS members and affiliates; although, as noted above, these proceedings rarely meet international standards. Moreover, in many respects, the transitional justice measures being implemented post-IS are unknown to survivors of the conflict: survivors themselves are often unaware of ongoing investigations and there are no measures to engage and promote victim participation in legal proceedings. This disengagement may help explain survivors' lack of faith that justice will be achieved and low levels of trust in Iraqi institutions to provide such justice.

As noted above, nearly all the respondents across all sampled areas believed it is important to hold both high- and low-ranking IS members accountable for their crimes. However, most members of each surveyed group did not believe that justice for civilian survivors of the conflict with the Islamic State was achievable. IDPs showed greater pessimism than Mosul residents, with only 29% of IDPs in camp and 28% of IDPs not in camps believing justice was possible compared to 42% of Mosul city residents and 44% of residents outside of Mosul city.

Figure 16: Belief that justice is possible for the violence against civilians during the conflict with IS (% yes)



TRUST

The belief that justice for civilian survivors was not possible could partly be explained by the respondents' lack of confidence and trust in the Iraqi justice system. Aside from IDPs not in camps, respondents across the surveyed groups were most likely to believe that nobody could conduct a fair and accurate inquiry into violence against civilians. Generally, IDP respondents trusted the international community and the Kurdistan Regional Government to conduct a fair and accurate inquiry more than Mosul residents.

Figure 17: Who or what institution, if anyone, do you believe could conduct a fair and accurate inquiry into the violence against civilians in Iraq during the conflict with IS?



LOCATION

Most of the respondents, especially Mosul residents, would like to see those responsible for crimes and violence tried in Iraq (45% of IDPs in camps, 37% of IDPs not in camps, 70% of Mosul city residents and 73% of residents outside of Mosul city).

Second to domestic trials in Iraq, respondents were then most likely to prefer an international court (21% of IDPs in camps, 23% of IDPs not in camps, 14% of Mosul city residents, and 9% of residents outside of Mosul city). IDP populations were also more likely than Mosul residents to support trials being held in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (18% of IDPs in camps and 23% of IDPs not in camps compared to 2% and 3% for Mosul city residents and residents outside of Mosul city, respectively). Holding trials in other countries had little support among all respondents.

Figure 18: If people responsible for violence against civilians are taken to court, where should they be tried?



PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE

Despite the strong desire to have the justice process implemented in Iraq, most respondents felt that the Iraqi legal system was corrupt, incapable of adequately addressing the crimes committed by IS, and inaccessible to ordinary people. Only 17% of IDPs in camps, 14% of IDPs not in camps, 24% of Mosul city residents and 27% of residents outside of Mosul city either agreed or strongly agreed that the Iraqi Government would conduct a fair and accurate investigation of Islamic State violence and crimes. Mosul residents had more confidence in the Iraqi Government compared to IDPs. Most respondents expressed doubt in the Iraqi legal system's ability to hold IS accountable. This sentiment was expressed among 62% of IDPs in camps and 69% of IDPs not in camps. Mosul residents—both in and out of the city—reported a similar lack of confidence, albeit to a lesser degree, in the capability of the Iraqi legal system: 45% of Mosul city residents and 47% of residents outside of Mosul city either agreed or strongly agreed the Iraqi legal system could deliver accountability.

Part of the reason for the lack of confidence in the Iraqi legal system was the perception of corruption and inaccessibility. Most respondents agreed to the statement that the legal system in Iraq is corrupt, with more IDPs showing agreement than the other groups: 62% of IDPs in camps, 69% of IDPs not in camps, 45% of Mosul city residents and 47% of residents outside of Mosul city either agreed or strongly agreed that the Iraqi legal system was corrupt. Many respondents did not believe that the legal system in Iraq was accessible to ordinary people (72% of IDPs in camps; 71% IDPs not in camps; 68% of Mosul city residents; 67% of residents outside of Mosul city).

Figure 19: Perception of the Iraqi ordinary justice system



GENERALIZED TRUST

Consistent with respondents' lack of confidence in the Iraqi judicial system, respondents also did not report high levels of trust in Iraqi institutions, including the official government. It should be noted that a 2003 study of the lead field researchers, Drs. Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, also found that Iraqis have historically low levels of trust in official institutions[56] and that the findings in this current study indicate that trust has not been built by the new government. Respondents most frequently indicated they had no trust in the Iraqi Government to have their best interest in mind. Only 11% of IDPs in camps, 8% of IDPs not in camps, 13% of Mosul city residents and 16% of residents outside of Mosul city expressed high levels of trust in the Iraqi Government. Meanwhile, IDPs appeared to trust the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) more than Mosul residents did, with the majority either expressing high levels of confidence ("quite a bit") or completely trusting ("extremely") the KRG.

Level of trust was more complex in regard to the Iraqi Army. Relatively, a higher percentage of Mosul residents (69% in city and 73% out-of-city) expressed high levels of trust toward the Iraqi Army compared to IDPs (30% in camps and 23% not in camps). The varying level of trust in the Iraqi Army is most likely explained by the strong role the Iraqi Army had in the Mosul offensive, liberating the city and surrounding area from IS control.

IDPs—both within camps (72%) and not in camps (79%)—were more likely than Mosul residents to show high levels of trust in the Peshmerga forces, with residents outside of Mosul (42%) showing more trust than Mosul city residents (30%).

Generally, IDPs expressed little trust in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) to behave in the best interest of the population, with only 11% of IDPs in camps and 6% of IDPs not in camps expressing a high level of trust. There was a bit more variance between Mosul populations. Mosul city residents showed low levels of trust with only 21% expressing confidence in the PMF to act in the interest of the population, while residents outside of Mosul city showed a moderate level of trust, with 55% believing the PMU have the best interest of the population at heart.

Across the four surveyed groups, respondents also showed relatively low levels of trust in religious leaders, again with Mosul residents showing more variance, with 26% of IDPs in camps, 23% of IDPs not in camps, 18% of Mosul city residents compared to 40% of residents outside of Mosul city showing high levels of trust in religious leaders.

Figure 20: Governance

Can you tell me how much you trust the following actors to act in the best interest of the population?



TRUST IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILTY EFFORTS

More than two-thirds of IDP respondents, both in camps and not in camps, trusted the United Nations as the organization capable of conducting a fair and accurate investigation in Iraq. In contrast, Mosul residents appeared much less confident—only 51% of Mosul city residents and 47% of residents outside of Mosul city trusted the United Nations to conduct an investigation.

Most of the surveyed groups had not heard of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and an even larger majority of respondents, across all surveyed groups, had not heard of the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) resolution No. 2379 of 2017 on establishing an investigative team tasked with collecting, storing and preserving evidence of IS crimes in Iraq. Among respondents, less than 5% had heard of the United Nations resolution to create an investigative team (4% of IDPs in camps, 3% of IDPs not in camps, 4% of Mosul city residents, and 5% of residents outside of Mosul city).

Figure 21: Awareness about international justice efforts

Figure 22: Reconciliation and justice



RECONCILIATION: RESPONDENTS STRONGLY IDENTIFIED A NEED FOR RECONCILIATION IN IRAQ. THEY NOTED THAT ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE EFFORTS WERE ESSENTIAL FOR TRUST AND RECONCILIATION.

Most respondents (93% of IDPs in camps, 96% of IDPs not in camps, 95% of Mosul city residents and of 98% of residents outside of Mosul city) believed there was a need for reconciliation within Iraq. They also believed that achieving justice for survivors of the Islamic State was essential for reconciliation (95% of IDPs in camps, 93% of IDPs not in camps, 91% of Mosul city residents and 94% of residents outside of Mosul city).

DEFINITION OF RECONCILIATION

The majority of the respondents (64% of IDPs in camps, 72% of IDPs not in camps, 53% of Mosul city residents and 59% of residents outside of Mosul city) defined reconciliation as "living in peace with others." Respondents also defined reconciliation by the mechanism with which it can be achieved: rule of law, peacebuilding, and finding the truth, with different margins in the demographic groups. Rule of law was mentioned by 21% of IDPs in camps, 22% of IDPs not in camps, 19% of Mosul city residents, and 15% of residents outside of Mosul city. Peacebuilding was mentioned by 24% of IDPs in camps, 26% of IDPs not in camps, 32% of Mosul city residents, and 29% of residents outside of Mosul city. Finding the truth was more frequently mentioned by the IDPs both in and not in camps (22%) than by Mosul city residents (11%) and residents outside of Mosul city (13%).

MEANS FOR RECONCILIATION

Regarding measures that would help to create unity and trust among the people of Iraq, respondents most commonly mentioned the need for political changes (33% of IDPs in camps, 33% of IDPs not in camps, and 37% of Mosul residents, both city and out-of-city residents) and a reduction of poverty (30% of IDPs in camps, 31% of IDPs not in camps, 25% of Mosul city residents, and 14% of residents outside of Mosul city). Two additional measures mentioned were to establish the truth (28% of IDPs in camps, 35% of IDPs not in camps, and 16% of Mosul residents, both city and out-of-city residents) and hold perpetrators accountable (24% of IDPs in camps, 26% of IDPs not in camps, 17% of Mosul city residents, and 20% of residents outside of Mosul city).

Figure 23: What does reconciliation mean to you?



Figure 24: What measures would help to create unity and trust among the people of Iraq?



CURRENT RELATIONS

Despite expressing a need for reconciliation, many respondents were positive about their relations with individuals from other religious groups. Respondents in affected communities reported that they felt quite safe living and interacting with someone from a different religious/ethic group.

Respondents also indicated a high level of trust in the people in their current location. More than one-half of IDPs (54% of IDPs in camps and 60% of IDPs not in camps) rated their level of trust as either "quite a bit" or "extremely" compared to 37% of Mosul city residents and 48% of Mosul out-of-city residents. The difference may be explained by the fact that the city of Mosul residents believed that there were still IS supporters/collaborators within the city.

Figure 25: How much do you trust the people in your current location?



Figure 26: How safe would you feel living near someone from a religious or ethnic group that is not your own?



PEACE: RESPONDENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE DISPLACED, WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECT FOR PEACE IN IRAQ.

Perhaps as a result of the lack of trust in institutions and unmet needs for justice and reconciliation, few respondents expressed optimism about the prospect for peace in Iraq. Perceptions of peace varied widely between IDP populations and Mosul residents. Mosul residents—both city and out-of-city residents—were more optimistic than IDPs about the potential for peace in Iraq. Among Mosul residents, 71% of city residents and 73% of out-of-city residents believed peace was possible, while among IDPS, only 36% of IDPs in camps and 31% of IDPs not in camps believed it to be possible. Similarly, Mosul residents were also more positive than IDPs about the potential for Iraqi communities to live together peacefully. Among Mosul residents, 68% of city residents and 73% of out-of-city residents believed Iraqi communities could live together peacefully, while among IDPs, only 40% of IDPs in camps and 39% of IDPs not in camps believed it to be possible. The varying levels of optimism between those who were Mosul residents and those displaced from their homes at the time of the survey can largely be explained by the fact that those who were displaced saw little prospect for them to return home.

Figure 27: Perception of peace



CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the survey findings offer a snapshot of the perceptions and attitudes of communities affected by the conflict with the Islamic State (IS) toward critical matters, such as immediate priorities and needs, justice and accountability for crimes and acts of violence, peacebuilding, and social cohesion in northern Iraq.

First, survey respondents voiced three pressing concerns: the need for improved security, the need for jobs and employment, and access to basic services. Not only do these findings support those of several other studies,[57] they also indicate nationwide concerns that have recently culminated in the form of civilian protests. These protests are currently gripping Iraq, with protestors across the country streaming into the streets demanding political reform to address government malfeasance, outright corruption, and rampant unemployment, among other issues. Furthermore, what these survey findings and recent civilian protests show is that there is severe lack of trust in official institutions, particularly in the Government of Iraq itself, stemming in large part from the belief that these institutions do not act in the best interest of the population. This presents a complex challenge for the Government of Iraq: the need to simultaneously address the inter-connected issues of social and economic development, terrorism, security, justice, and accountability. Gaining the trust and support of the Iraqi populace, as well as that of regional and international partners, will be critical to addressing and sustaining solutions to these mounting issues.

Second, regarding issues of accountability and the reintegration of IS members and affiliates, the study found that the majority of respondents believe that both high-ranking and low-ranking IS members should be held accountable, and that it would be unacceptable if only *some* IS members were prosecuted. There is, however, more variance when it comes to prosecuting IS supporters and those who were either coerced into joining or did not partake in any violence. In addition, a large portion of the survey respondents believed that IS family members *should* be held accountable. Yet there is a portion of respondents, albeit smaller, that want IS family members to be reintegrated back into the community. As with any reintegration and rehabilitation process of individuals who once committed or supported acts of violence and crimes, gaining trust and providing space for re-establishing such trust, support, and interaction is a complex and sensitive issue that needs to be carefully planned and systematically explored. At this time, the Government of Iraq still does not have a comprehensive solution for the return and reintegration of IS families, despite its efforts to explore solutions. Meanwhile, in most cases, local communities either outright refuse to allow these families to return to their homes or they refuse to host IS families as they see them as a security threat. For example, several IDP camps in Nineveh were recently closed and the government tried to return the displaced families to their areas of origin (many of which were in Salah al-Din), but, in this case, locals refused to accept them back for their perceived IS affiliation and fear for their own security.

Third, regarding who will be involved with justice and accountability efforts to address Islamic State crimes, our survey findings show that few respondents had confidence in the Government of Iraq's ability to investigate the crimes committed by IS fairly and accurately and provide justice to survivors of the conflict, with respondents often citing corruption and inaccessibility. Yet, while there appears to be a deep mistrust in Iraqi legal institutions and the government itself, respondents also strongly indicated that justice and accountability measures should be implemented locally in Iraq, not in another country or at an international court. Given the limited resources available to it, the Government of Iraq will continue to need the international community's assistance with local accountability efforts. The strong desire for and commitment to the death penalty among Iraqis, coupled with the complexities of trying foreign nationals of the Islamic State, are presenting challenges for the United Nations and the international community. Conversely, some European countries are also pushing the Government of Iraq to prosecute the European nationals of the Islamic State captured in Syria and Iraq; so as to avoid repatriating the individuals and trying them in Europe. Simultaneously, Iraqi legislators are considering an amendment to the Iraqi High Tribunal, which previously tried Saddam and other members of his regime using international laws, to include the crimes committed by the Islamic State.

Fourth, in addition to accountability measures, there is an overwhelming need and desire among Iraqis to know the truth of what happened during the Islamic State's occupation and the subsequent conflict to liberate Iraqi territory from IS control. Given this immense need, many respondents also believe that a truth commission would be valuable. In the post-Saddam regime era, Iraq has used many ad-hoc fact-finding committees to investigate specific events and crimes. In practice, however, these committees are rarely impartial or operate transparently; rather they were created to serve the interests of those who created them and were not designed to investigate, document, and disseminate the truth of what happened. For that reason, among others, Iraqis are eager to see a transparent, thorough, and substantive truth commission.

Lastly, despite expressing a need and desire for reconciliation, which the majority of respondents defined as "living in peace" or "rule of law", Iraqis are generally not willing to grant amnesties and pardons to those who committed crimes. Many respondents did, however, appear to distinguish between those who were involved in violence and those who were not, and as a result, were willing to grant pardons and amnesties to those who weren't involved in violence. Respondents were much more trustful of their fellow Iraqis, including those from different ethno-religious groups than their own, than they were of official Iraqi institutions, with a majority reporting that they feel safe living and interacting with others and that they trust others in the current location. In order to help further build inter-communal trust across Iraq, many respondents indicated the need for political reform, which is not an easy task and may require significant changes to Iraq's electoral process.

Since 2003, a muhasasa or quota system has served as the bedrock for Iraq's politics, whereby one's political identity and success become conflated with one's ethno-sectarian identity. During this same period, the ebb and flow of internal conflict and prevalence of terrorist organizations was often attributed to sectarian discontent and grievances. While it is true that some Iraqis define their identity and victimhood along ethno-sectarian lines,[58] the pervasive narratives defining Iraq's challenges as

simply rooted in ethno-sectarian fractionalization are misguided. Among conflict-affected communities in northern Iraq, inter-communal relations are viewed in relatively positive terms. Rather than the challenge being diversity itself, the challenge is the Government of Iraq's ability to promote and facilitate reconciliation and unity.

The United Nations has called for increased aid to Iraq to help stabilization efforts—to improve infrastructure; restore hospitals, schools, and livelihoods; and upgrade the country's water supply. With 50% of the population being aged 19 or younger, ensuring the delivery of basic goods and services becomes particularly critical as youth can be especially susceptible to extremist ideologies in the absence of employment opportunities and schooling.[59]

Moreover, with only limited funds available to rebuild the city of Mosul, there is a fear that continued deprivation from lack of basic services and infrastructure could reignite underlying resentments and frustrations toward Baghdad among the city's Arab Sunni population, pushing some locals back into the Islamic State's orbit and allowing violent-extremist ideologies to take root once again.[60] Furthermore, citing the destruction of houses and cultural sites, poor infrastructure, lack of livelihoods, absence of security, and fear of neighboring communities, some of Iraq's displaced communities expressed a strong sense of reluctance and outright refusal to return to their homes. Iraq's displaced ethno-religious minorities are particularly vulnerable,

That said, there continues to be a real concern that reform and reconstruction efforts are not addressing the root causes of the conflict, such as corruption and the deep distrust of the federal government and governmental institutions. Without an accountable government that is perceived to be legitimate and is trusted by all Iraqis, calls for justice and accountability may go unanswered, and the country risks slipping back into another conflict.[61]

In light of the findings from this study, we make the following recommendations to Iraqi policy makers, the Government of Iraq, and the international community.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Iraqi policy makers and the Government of Iraq

- Support local communities in strengthening security and developing economic opportunities and social safety nets that ensure basic needs are met. As part of this, ensuring the safe and secure return of the IDPs to their homes will be critical.
- Strategically examine and address factors and conditions that fostered the emergence of IS by reviewing current and former government policies and addressing known grievances, such as corruption and the interference of foreign governments.
- Make efforts to gain the trust of survivors of the conflict that policy makers will conduct fair and accurate investigations into the crimes committed against them.
- Set up a national plan to integrate IS families and rehabilitate the IS fighters under the age of 18 years old. This plan should be part of a holistic strategy to address the needs of survivors of violence as well as the issues related to collective punishment in order to begin to rebuild the social cohesion in the country.
- Take significant steps to reform and develop the capacity of the Iraqi judiciary and legal system to address the crimes committed by IS. International elements need to be incorporated into the justice process in order to address the massive crimes committed against the civilian population.
- Separate the prosecution of crimes related to sexual violence and enslavement from other crimes. The prosecution must ensure a victim-based approach.
- When issuing a pardon or amnesty, consider the perception of the affected communities about who and under what conditions individuals are eligible for amnesty.
- Adopt a national plan for reconciliation that centers on achieving justice for the survivors of the conflict with IS.
- Adopt a comprehensive strategy for transitional justice that includes establishing a truth commission as part of truth-seeking mechanisms and reparation programs that address the survivors' needs based on knowledge of their sufferings.

To the international community and the United Nations

- Provide essential technical support to the Iraqi policy makers and judiciary in order to reform the Iraqi legal system and build the capacity of legal personnel to conduct trials based on international standards of fair trials, for the crimes committed against civilians.
- Provide the technical support for Iraqi policy makers to build a comprehensive transitional justice plan that includes measures of accountability, institutional reforms, reparations, and truth-seeking mechanisms. This plan should ensure survivor-centered justice.
- Deploy the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by the Islamic State to develop an outreach plan for the Iraqi public, particularly in communities affected by

violence, to explain and get support for their work.

- Encourage and assist the Government of Iraq to prosecute the cases involving conflict-related sexual violence and to establish a reparations program for the survivors of the sexual violence in the conflict that addresses the special needs of these survivors.

NOTES

1 Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Siddharth Mohandas, and Benjamin Runkle, *Occupying Iraq: A history of the coalition provisional authority,* RAND Corporation (2009).
2 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, *entered into force* 23 May 2003, CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf.
3 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, *entered into force* 16 May 2003, CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf.
4 Mark Thompson, "How Disbanding the Iraqi Army Fueled ISIS," *Time*, May 29, 2015.
5 According to the CIA World Fact Book, Iraq's religious population composition is 64-69% Shi'a, 29-34% Sunni, 1% Christian and 1-4% other. Iraq's ethnic population composition is 75-80% Arab, 15-20% Kurdish, and 5% other (which includes, among others, Turkmen, Yazidi, Shabak and Assyrian).
6 Fanar Haddad, *Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2016).
7 "Al-Zarqawi group claims allegiance to bin Laden," *CNN*, October 17, 2004.
8 Robert Worth, "Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury," *The New York Times*, February 22, 2006.
9 "Iraq conflict: Civilians suffering 'staggering' violence – UN," *BBC News*, January 19, 2016.
10 "Iraq army capitulates to Isis militants in four cities," *The Guardian,* June 11, 2014.
11 "ISIS Fast Facts," *CNN,* May 1, 2019.
12 Abbas Kadhim, "One Year Post-ISIS: Iraq is on the Right Path, but Must Take Further Steps," Atlantic Council (blog), December 10, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/one-year-post-isis-iraq-is-on-the-right-path-but-must-take-further-steps.
13 Minority Rights Group International, *Between the Millstones: Iraq's Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul* (February 2015).
14 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, *"They Came to Destroy": ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis*, June 15, 2016, A/HRC/32/CRP.2, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.
15 Ibid.
16 Office of Rescue of the Kidnapped Yazidis, personal communication, July 20, 2019.
17 Barack Obama, "Statement by the President on ISIL," The White House, September 10, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1.
18 More information on Global Coalition, its member states, and its mission can be found on its website, https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/mission/.
19 "How the battle for Mosul unfolded," *BBC News,* July 10, 2017.
20 Margert Coker and Falih Hassan, "Iraq Prime Minister Declares Victory Over ISIS," *The New York Times*, December 9, 2017.
21 IOM-Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, http://iraqdtm.iom.int/.
22 Ministry of Planning, personal communication, July 2019.
23 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "The bureaucracy of evil: how Islamic State ran a city," *The Guardian*, January 29, 2018.
24 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retaking of Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017* (November 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/report-protection-civilians-context-ninewa-operations-and-retaking-mosul-city-17-october.
25 "ISIS 'executes' female journalist in Mosul," *Al Arabiya*, July 27, 2015.

26 "First media victims of ISIS offensive," Reporters Without Borders (news), June 16, 2014.
27 Lafta, R., Valeria Cetorelli, and Gilbert Burnham, "Living in Mosul during the time of ISIS and the military liberation: results from a 40-cluster household survey," *Conflict and Health* 12, no. 1 (2018), https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-018-0167-8.
28 "Iraq: UNESCO outraged over terrorist attack against Mosul Museum," *UN News*, February 26, 2015.
29 "Islamic State was defeated. Now who will pay to rebuild Iraq?" *NBC News*, December 28, 2017.
30 Susannah George, "Mosul is a graveyard: Final IS battle kills 9,000 civilians," *AP News,* December 21, 2017.
31 Human Appeal, *Challenges Upon Return in West Mosul* (January 2018).
32 International Organization for Migration, *Iraq Displacement Crisis: 2014 -2017* (October 2018).
33 IOM-Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, http://iraqdtm.iom.int/.
34 Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior Joint Crisis Coordination Centre, *Humanitarian Situation Report: Registered IDPs and refugees in the Kurdistan Region in December 2019* (January 2020), http://jcc.gov.krd/en/article/read/314.
35 Ibid.
36 Edward Wong, "Hussein Charged With Genocide in 50,000 Deaths," *The New York Times,* April 05, 2006.
37 International Center for Transitional Justice, *Dujail Trial and Error?* (November 2006).
38 Stover, Eric, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti, "Bremer's" Gordian knot": Transitional justice and the US occupation of Iraq," *Human Rights Quarterly* (2005): 830-857.
39 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Eric, "Goals and processes: the Arab world and the transitional justice impact literature," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 20, no. 3 (2016): 426-443.
40 Amnesty International, *Unjust and unfair: The death penalty in Iraq* (April 2007).
41 United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 237 (2017)*, 21 September 2017, S/RES/2379 (2017), https://undocs.org/S/RES/2379(2017).
42 Zachary D. Kaufman, "New UN Team Investigating ISIS Atrocities Raises Questions About Justice in Iraq and Beyond," *Just Security,* September 28, 2017.
43 United Nations, press release, "Investigative Team Making 'Significant Progress' Gathering Evidence to Prosecute ISIL/Da'esh for Atrocity Crimes in Iraq, Special Adviser Tells Security Council," July 15, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13882.doc.htm.
44 Physicians for Human Rights, *Building Forensic Capacity to Document, Collect, Identify, Analyze, and Preserve Evidence of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Northern Iraq* (July 2017).
45 Ibid.; Phone interview with Judge Ayman Mustafa, the head of the CIGE, January 19, 2020.
46 "Iraq: Missed Opportunity for Comprehensive Justice," Human Rights Watch (news), September 21, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/21/iraq-missed-opportunity-comprehensive-justice.
47 Van Schaack, Beth, "The Iraq investigative team and prospects for justice for the Yazidi genocide," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 16, no. 1 (2018): 113-139.
48 Mara Revkin, *The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism,* Centre for Policy Research at United Nations University (May 2018); Mara Revkin, "Iraq's Harsh Approach to Punishing Islamic State 'Collaborators' Stands to Have Counterproductive Consequences. Lawfare (blog), June 11, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/iraqs-harsh-approach-punishing-islamic-state-collaborators-stands-have-counterproductive.
49 Stephanie Nebehay, "Iraqi victims of Islamic State leadership deserve justice: U.N," *Reuters*, April 4, 2019; Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan, "A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects," *New York Times*, April 17, 2018.
50 "Iraq: Key Courts Improve ISIS Trial Procedures," Human Rights Watch (news), March 13, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/13/iraq-key-courts-improve-isis-trial-procedures.
51 Michelle Bachelet, "Opening statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights," Human Rights Council, June 24, 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24724&LangID=E.
52 ""You are not welcome," That is what IS Member Families Face When They Return To Their Homes," *Al Jazeera*, September 14, 2019.

53 "Iraq: Families of Alleged ISIS Members Denied IDs," Human Rights Watch (news), February 25, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/25/iraq-families-alleged-isis-members-denied-ids .
54 "Iraq: Displaced Families Blocked from Returning," Human Rights Watch (news), June 24, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/24/iraq-displaced-families-blocked-returning.
55 Alice Su, "After ISIS, Iraq Is Still Broken," *The Atlantic*. August 2, 2018.
56 University of California, Berkeley, Human Rights Center, and International Center for Transitional Justice, *Iraqi Voices: Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice and Social Reconstruction* (2004).
57 National Democratic Institute, *Iraqis Call on the New Government for Jobs, Services, and Reconstruction* (October 2018).
58 Siddiqui, Nadia, Roger Guiu, and Aaso Ameen Shwan, "Among brothers and strangers: Identities in displacement in Iraq," *International Migration* 57, no. 2 (2019): 80-95.
59 Michael R. Gordon, "Areas Newly Seized From ISIS Seen at Risk of Backsliding," *Wall Street Journal,* December 12, 2017.
60 Raya Jalabi and Michael Georgy "This man is trying to rebuild Mosul. He needs help – lots of it," *Reuters*, March 21, 2018.
61 Renad Mansour, *Iraq after the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State*, Chatham House (2017).

ISBN 9780996068024